
Military Police Leader's Handbook

August 2015

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Military Police Leader's Handbook

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Preface

TC 3-39.30 is a quick reference guide for military police leaders who support Army forces across the range of military operations. It is based on the foundations that are established in FM 3-39 and supports the emphasis on simultaneous offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities. The manual is also based on an extensive survey of military police leaders that was conducted by the United States (U.S.) Army Military Police School. The survey was supplemented by follow-on focus groups and external staffs to finalize the most relevant subjects for inclusion in this manual. TC 3-39.30 focuses on military police operations that are conducted at company level and below. The manual describes the capabilities and organization of the military police, demonstrates the flexibility and diversity of military police in adapting to any mission, and characterizes the military police as a combat force multiplier.

The principal audience for TC 3-39.30 is military police leaders and Soldiers who are tasked with planning, directing, and executing military police operations at company level and below. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases, host nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

TC 3-39.30 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.

TC 3-39.30 applies to Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of TC 3-39.30 is the U.S. Army Military Police School. The preparing agency is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate; Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division; Doctrine Branch. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929; e-mail the DA Form 2028 to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdiddcoddmpdoc@mail.mil>; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Introduction

Initiative, decisive action (offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities), Army core competencies (combined arms maneuver and wide area security), and mission command are the foundations for the Army operational concept of unified land operations. Military police support unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. This framework requires military police to be knowledgeable, multiskilled, and adaptive to achieve the commander's intent.

The primary focus of TC 3-39.30 is military police operations at the company level and below. The manual provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions.

This manual is a synopsis of doctrine from several Army publications, including ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-90, STP 19-31B1-SM, STP 19-31B24-SM-TG, and STP 21-24-SMCT. The information included in the manual also reflects the most recently modified military police doctrinal publications, such as ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.20, ATP 3-39.34, FM 3-39, and FM 3-63.

Additionally, TC 3-39.30 is aligned with JP 3-0, JP 3-07.2, JP 3-09.3, and JP 3-10. The inclusion of joint doctrine describes how military police support unified land operations within the structure of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments.

TC 3-39.30 is a significant revision from its predecessor, FM 3-19.4 (now obsolete). The transformation of the Army operations concept and current operating environment and the restructuring of the military police modified table of organization and equipment and lessons learned guided the modifications. The manual is organized into 7 chapters with 13 appendixes that provide additional details on selected operational topics. Chapters 1–3 describe military police aspects of the operational environment, the Military Police Corps Regiment, and the foundations of military police operations (combat operations and sustainment operations). Chapters 4–7 focus on military police disciplines, police operations, detention operations, security and mobility support, and the integrated function of police intelligence as they pertain to military police leaders at the company level and below.

Each of the appendixes addresses specific subjects that provide the military police leader with quick reference information that is pertinent to its specific title. While significant information is presented within each chapter or appendix, there are also references to other publications to benefit the military police leader who needs additional, detailed information that is beyond the scope of this manual.

TC 3-39.30 covers the following information:

- Chapter 1 addresses military police support to unified land operations and the application of military police capabilities.
- Chapter 2 provides an overview of military police company or platoon organizations, missions, capabilities, and dependencies and key military police personnel duties and responsibilities.
- Chapter 3 describes the military police role in supporting logistics, including maintenance and supply.
- Chapter 4 describes police operations that support law enforcement (LE) and includes additional information about HN police training and support and military police support to customs operations.
- Chapter 5 focuses on detention operations and describes principles and policies that govern detainee treatment, detainee processing, and HN corrections reform training and support information.
- Chapter 6 discusses security and mobility support operations, including gap-crossing and breaching operations, the passage of lines, route regulation enforcement, route reconnaissance, area security, and populace and resource control.
- Chapter 7 discusses police intelligence, including military police support to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); analyses to identify trends, patterns, and associations; and biometrics.
- Appendix A is a reference for military police leaders concerning the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and related troop leading procedures.
- Appendix B describes how to make the best use of translators.

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- Appendix C addresses media relations and interview guidelines and includes a discussion about operations security.
 - Appendix D describes the route classification and sign system that is used by military police.
 - Appendix E addresses assault and clearing techniques when conducting urban operations.
 - Appendix F focuses on preventing and responding to civil disturbances.
 - Appendix G provides an overview of site exploitation, including a description of military police support roles.
 - Appendix H describes the military working dogs (MWDs) that support military police operations and discusses their unique training and support to unified land operations.
 - Appendix I contains key order samples, selected operation order (OPORD) attachments, and reports that military police leaders must typically complete.
 - Appendix J focuses on the basic concepts, supporting techniques, and control measures that are associated with tactics.
 - Appendix K addresses the awareness, identification, and detection of the explosive hazards response.
 - Appendix L describes selected detention operations forms.
 - Appendix M identifies the procedure for requesting close air support (CAS), calls for fire (CFFs), and close combat attacks.

The information in this manual is not a substitute for the ingenuity and enterprise of military police leaders; instead, it is a basis for decisionmaking. Regardless of the detail, depth, or scope of a manual, it is the military police leader on the ground who must comprehend and successfully execute key military police tasks.

Chapter 1

Military Police Operations

Military police operations enable maneuver commanders to achieve objectives by providing a unique set of technical capabilities that support Army warfighting through security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. The performance of these disciplines enables military police forces to contribute versatile, lethal, and nonlethal combat power across the range of military operations. Military police perform the same disciplines, regardless of the command level.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-1. Military police commanders and leaders must continuously evaluate and adapt tactics to ensure that those tactics are appropriate for the operational environment. The capabilities inherent in military police organizations provide a significant force enabler to other Army organization and unified-action partners across the range of military operations. Military police operations are viewed through a policing and corrections lens that focuses efforts on civil order maintenance, threat mitigation, and personnel and asset protection, regardless of the operational environment. Military police demonstrate their competencies through the performance of unique technical capabilities and tactical tasks. These technical capabilities and tactical tasks combine to form the military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support) that enable the elements of combat power, supporting the generating force and operational Army across the range of military operations.

1-2. Military police support encompasses the following military police disciplines:

- **Security and mobility support.** Military police conduct security and mobility support to protect the force and noncombatants and to preserve the commander's freedom of action. Military police units expedite the secure movement of theater resources to ensure that commanders receive the forces, supplies, and equipment needed to support the operation plan and changing tactical situations. Throughout the security and mobility support discipline, military police units conduct proactive measures to detect, deter, and defeat threat forces that operate within the area of operations (AO). The security and mobility support discipline also includes major areas, such as area security, antiterrorism, dislocated civilian operations, and protective services.
- **Police operations.** Military police work to reduce the opportunity for criminal activity in an AO by assessing local conditions, conducting police engagement at all levels (to include coordinating and maintaining liaisons with other Department of Defense (DOD), HN, joint, and multinational agencies), and developing coherent policing strategies. Military police units at all levels coordinate actions to identify and influence crime-conducive conditions that might promote random and organized criminal activity or that have the potential to threaten a tactical line of effort or a Soldier. Military police support and develop strategies to maintain order and enforce the rule of law across the range of military operations. The police operations discipline also includes major areas, such as LE, criminal investigations, HN police training and support, and U.S. customs operations support.
- **Detention operations.** Military police conduct detention operations to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees or U.S. military prisoners) as a result of military or civil conflict or to facilitate criminal prosecution. These operations inherently control the movement and activities of a specific population for the imperative reasons of security, safety, or intelligence gathering.

1-3. In the current environment, the Army operates as part of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team. As discussed in ADP 3-0, recent experiences and studies of other conflicts have revealed the following insights that are guiding the Army effort to prepare for future operations:

- Major operations combine offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks so that they are executed simultaneously at multiple echelons.
- The operational environment evolves over time and changes as a result of military operations.
- Operations that are conducted during one phase of a major operation will directly affect subsequent phases. Commanders should conduct current operations in a manner that sets the conditions that are necessary for future operations.
- Major operations are conducted not only to defeat the enemy, but also to restore peace. The military plays a large role in this effort, even after major combat operations have ended. Restoring peace after a violent conflict has occurred may take longer and be more difficult than defeating enemy forces.
- In any major operation, changing conditions require Army forces to adapt tactics, techniques, and procedures to the operational environment. To be successful, leaders must develop learning organizations that know and understand current doctrine, collect and share best practices, and implement lessons learned that support current and future organizations.

1-4. The military police view of the operational environment is nested within the holistic Army view of the operational environment. The basic view is the same, but it is complemented by the policing lens that marks the military police approach to operations. Military police share a heightened degree of focus on maintaining order and enforcing laws that enhances their ability to identify and effectively react to a wide range of potential challenges and opportunities across the range of military operations. The military police approach to operations includes an emphasis on—

- Rapid and accurate assessments of the operational environment, focusing on the criminal dimension.
- Effective interpersonal communications that facilitate information engagement.
- Critical thinking and problem-solving techniques to establish control and de-escalate incidents.
- A disciplined and precise method of documenting incidents and actions that support investigative and due process requirements.
- The rapid identification of threats and the application of appropriate force options (from verbal persuasion to lethal force) that is necessary to control the environment.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-5. Unified land operations is the Army operational concept. *Unified land operations* is how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). FM 3-39 contains a detailed discussion of unified land operations as they apply to military police support.

1-6. The nature of unified land operations demands versatile, well-trained units and tough, adaptive leaders. Military police units meet this demand by applying tailored and focused forces and capabilities that are organized through military police functions. By performing these functions, military police forces contribute significant combat power—lethal and nonlethal—across the range of military operations. Each of these functions is discussed in detail in later chapters.

1-7. Providing the requisite military police support is challenging and often requires a delicate balance. The inherently unpredictable nature of unified land operations requires military police forces to continuously evaluate and adapt capabilities to each mission. Tactics that are effective for one mission may not have the same effect during another. Each operation requires an original design and flexible execution. Leaders and Soldiers must remain technically and tactically competent and possess the levels of mental agility, flexibility, and resiliency that are required to support unified land operations.

1-8. Measuring the impact of a mission extends well beyond the unit level. Leaders must identify and establish specific metrics to assess the impact or specific phase of an operation. Assessing the results begins while the operation is ongoing and continues at regular intervals by using measures of effectiveness and performance to evaluate the progress toward success and mission accomplishment.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

1-9. Warfighting functions provide military police commanders with a common framework to link required military police disciplines and their respective capabilities to the synchronized application of combined arms. Alignment within warfighting functions provides the framework for the military police tasks that are outlined in FM 7-15. While these functional relationships reflect primary task alignments, military police disciplines actually have a much broader range of influence and support. The subordination of a task beneath a specific warfighting function does not negate its relevance within another warfighting function. Military police disciplines collectively support warfighting functions, and each military police discipline is applied within one or more of the warfighting functions. (See figure 1-1 for information on the primary relationships of military police disciplines to warfighting functions.)




Figure 1-1. Primary relationships of military police disciplines to warfighting functions

1-10. An analysis of tasks within FM 7-15 reflects the following primary and secondary relationships:

- Police and detention operations are primarily linked to the protection warfighting function.
- Security and mobility support is divided between the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions.

MILITARY POLICE CAPABILITY APPLICATIONS

1-11. The commander's concept of the operation is the single, unifying idea that provides direction for the entire operation. Military police support planning is complex and requires an in-depth understanding of the operational environment, commander's intent, concept of operation, and capabilities and limitations of military police forces in support of the operation. Military police leaders and planners must continually assess and predict shifts in mission requirements and required military police capabilities as operations transition between phases or as conditions in the operational environment change. FM 3-39 contains a detailed discussion of military police capabilities across the range of military operations. Not every echelon or unit conducts simultaneous decisive action (offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities) combinations. Divisions and higher echelons conduct decisive actions based on mission variables. Brigade combat teams may focus exclusively on offensive or defensive tasks during large-scale combat operations, but that focus typically shifts to the simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks during irregular warfare or peace operations. Battalions often conduct offensive or defensive tasks during large-scale combat operations and then shift to stability tasks as the mission dictates. Smaller units, such as company level and below, typically execute decisive action tasks sequentially based on capabilities and the current situation. However, simultaneous execution can occur in irregular warfare and peace operations.

OFFENSE

1-12. Military police operations that support the offense include the simultaneous application of military police capabilities through synchronizing warfighting functions throughout the depth of the AO. Although all functions are applied simultaneously to some degree, the primary focus is on the close support of maneuver forces. (See figure 1-2 for military police tasks that support offensive operations.)




Figure 1-2. Notional military police operations in the offense

DEFENSE

1-13. During the defense, military police units support the mission commander by contributing to the movement and sustainment of the main effort. The primary focus for military police forces during defensive operations is to conduct security mobility support, ensure maneuverability of counterattacking forces, and assist in the evacuation of captured or detained persons. (See figure 1-3 for a notional application of military police capabilities during defensive tasks.)




Figure 1-3. Notional military police operations in the defense

STABILITY

1-14. Military police support during the conduct of stability tasks includes the simultaneous application of capabilities just as it does during the conduct of offense and defense. Military police can support stability tasks through all disciplines; however, the primary concentration of effort is on police and detention operations. Conducting policing activities in support of civil security and civil control lines of effort is critical in establishing the rule of law. Police intelligence operations (PIO) is integrated and executed continuously throughout military police operations. (See figure 1-4, page 1-6, for a notional application of military police capabilities that support stability operations.)




Figure 1-4. Notional military police operations that support stability operations

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1-15. Military police support to defense support of civil authorities may include the simultaneous application of all military police disciplines. Specialized military police capabilities also have the potential to be employed. Military police support may be required for Army forces that provide mission command, sustainment, and protection to government agencies at all levels until they can function normally. In a martial law situation, extensive military police support may be required. (See figure 1-5 for a notional application of military police capabilities during defense support of civil authorities.)

1-16. Military police Soldiers have essential training and technical capabilities for relief operations, with a focus on restoring civil order. The restoration of civil order requires—

- Operational unity.
- Effective coordination.
- Public acceptance.
- Threat awareness.
- Minimal use of force.




Figure 1-5. Notional military police operations during defense support of civil authorities

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Chapter 2

Military Police Organizations

Military police organizations approach missions through a policing lens, focusing efforts on the maintenance of order, mitigation of threats, and protection of personnel and assets. Military police possess the robust skills of shoot, move, and communicate; but they are also trained in exercising judgment and resolving issues by using the lowest level of force required. Military police technical skills and lethal capabilities enable them to be force multipliers in any mission. To fully exploit military police capabilities, the regiment has organized its forces to achieve the comprehensive employment of assets across the range of military operations. This chapter focuses on the fundamental organizational structure of baseline and specialized military police companies.

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY ORGANIZATIONS

2-1. In the military police force pool, there are three standard company organizations—military police, military police detention, and guard. Each unit is structured to perform a specific collection of military police tasks, although overlapping capabilities exist among the three. Baseline companies are the military police force principal elements and are the primary components of military police and military police detention battalions. These organizations consist primarily of tactically to operationally focused military police and military police detention companies that may be task-organized to brigade combat teams or be tasked to perform other supporting operations. (See FM 3-39 for additional information regarding the organization of military police forces.)

2-2. Current military police organization specifications are located in the *Table of Organization and Equipment Unit Reference Book*.

2-3. Specialized military police units provide distinct technical skills that are unique to a particular element. While providing specific augmentation at the tactical level, specialized military police units concentrate on executing key capabilities at operational and strategic levels. These smaller, more specialized units are structured to support larger, military police-related operations.

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON ORGANIZATIONS

2-4. There are many configurations of military police platoons. The basic military police team consists of a team leader, a driver, and a gunner. The team leader directs the actions of the team, and the position may be filled by a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, squad leader, assistant squad leader, or team leader. The driver is responsible for driving the vehicle (sometimes referred to as a weapons platform), and the position is filled by a private first class or specialist in Military Occupational Specialty 31B with a standard duty title of military police or driver. The gunner is responsible for manning the crew-served weapon, and the position is usually filled by a junior enlisted Soldier in military occupational Specialty 31B.

2-5. A platoon organization is often customized based on the structure and mission of the unit to which the platoon is task-organized or assigned. A standard military police platoon in a military police company is organized by the following structure:

- Three military police Soldiers form the basic team.
- Two military police teams create a section.

- Two sections build a squad.
 - Three squads form a platoon.
- 2-6. A platoon within a military police detention company is organized by the following structure:
- Five military police Soldiers form the basic team.
 - Two teams create a squad.
 - Four squads build a platoon.
- 2-7. A platoon within a guard company is organized by the following structure:
- Five military police Soldiers form the basic team.
 - Two teams create a squad.
 - Four squads build a platoon.
- 2-8. A platoon is primarily designed in a manner that optimizes support to the mission-essential task list of the higher element. Specific military police platoons (such as those in a military police company or a military police detention) are organized and equipped based on allocations that are dictated in the respective table of organization and equipment. Other military police forces are tailored to fit operational needs and do not follow a set table of organization and equipment. Instead, the force is customized to fulfill anticipated mission requirements for specific operations.

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES

- 2-9. Military police companies are focused on support to combat maneuver organizations at the tactical level. Military police companies provide the following capabilities to the supported commander:
- Maneuver and mobility of operations forces by preserving the freedom of movement on main supply routes (MSRs).
 - Protection of high-risk personnel and facilities during security and mobility support.
 - Temporary detention operations for detained individuals.
 - PIO integration throughout military police operations.
- 2-10. Military police companies are ideally suited for conducting police operations on military bases and base camps. They contribute advanced LE skills to assist with policing, corrections, and judicial support for HN government and stability tasks in the AO. Selected military police companies may also perform a detention role to supplement detention requirements.
- 2-11. A military police company is employed to execute military police disciplines throughout the entire length and depth of the battlefield in support of contingency operations. (See figure 2-1 for an illustration of the military police company mission and capabilities.)

MILITARY POLICE DETENTION COMPANY MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES

- 2-12. The military police detention company is typically assigned to a military police detention battalion, but it may also be assigned to a military police battalion or brigade. When performing a peacetime, fixed-base confinement mission, the military police detention company is assigned to the organization that operates (or is responsible for) the detention facility. Military police detention companies provide the following capabilities to the supported commander:
- Temporary or long-term detention operations support.
 - Staff augmentation to a battalion in support of prisoner administration and sustainment functions within a detention facility.
 - Training and subject matter expertise in support of HN corrections reform.




Figure 2-1. Military police company

2-13. A military police detention company may also be employed in a direct support role at echelons above corps to confine U.S. military prisoners; detain high-risk detainees, detainees, or civilian internees; or support dislocated civilian resettlement operations. This unit normally operates from the division support area through the corps area to echelons above corps. Military police detention companies are employed in different configurations based on specific mission requirements to secure detainees or U.S. military prisoners. (See figure 2-2, page 2-4, for an illustration of the military police detention company mission and capabilities. For detailed information concerning detention operations, see FM 3-63.)




Figure 2-2. Military police detention company

GUARD COMPANY MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND DEPENDENCIES

2-14. The guard company is assigned to a military police detention battalion. (See figure 2-3 for an illustration of the guard company mission, capabilities, and dependencies.)

2-15. Guard companies provide the following capabilities to the supported commander:

- Guard support of an installation.
- Security for a resettlement camp.
- Individual detainee escorts and guards for detainees at medical treatment facilities that are separate from detention facilities.
- Security for the confinement of U.S. military prisoners.
- Security for detainees when task-organized to a military police detention battalion.
- Support for HN corrections reform.




Figure 2-3. Guard company

GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR SECURITY COMPANY MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES

2-16. The ground-based interceptor security company is a specialized military police unit. The sole mission of this company is to secure the ground-based interceptor missile site. This mission focus allows the company to dedicate tactical assets to the security and defense of the critical site with minimal diversion of combat power to collateral or other economy-of-force efforts. The ground-based interceptor security company contributes to—

- Fixed-site security for a ground-based interceptor site.
- The detection, identification, and elimination of hostile threats to a critical facility.
- The security of critical assets within the expanded perimeter of the ground-based interceptor missile.

2-17. Figure 2-4, page 2-6, illustrates the ground-based interceptor security company mission and capabilities. This company provides a fully functioning, properly resourced guard force that is capable of conducting sustained and continuous operations which are focused on securing and defending the ground-based interceptor missile site from Level I and Level II threats.




Figure 2-4. Ground-based interceptor security company

MILITARY POLICE LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENT MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES

2-18. Military police LE detachments consist of modular teams with specific capabilities, such as criminal investigations, physical security, traffic management and enforcement, and police station operations. These specialized teams may deploy individually or as part of an entire military police LE detachment, depending on capability requirements. Employing a military police LE detachment can greatly extend and optimize limited military police assets at home stations and on U.S. military bases and base camps within mature theaters of operation.

2-19. Deployed military police LE detachments are normally assigned to a military police brigade that is trained and equipped to provide technical supervision, planning, employment, and coordination of support for police operations. The deployed military police LE detachment forms the core of policing capabilities, providing the administrative and technical expertise required to operate a forward military police LE operations center. At home stations, the teams that comprise the military police LE detachment are assigned LE duties within the provost marshal's office, making up the core of dedicated technical policing expertise that supports U.S. Army installations and joint bases. (See figure 2-5 for an illustration of the military police LE detachment mission, capabilities, and dependencies.)




Figure 2-5. LE detachment

KEY MILITARY POLICE PERSONNEL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-20. The Army cannot accomplish its mission unless all American leaders, Soldiers, and Army civilians accomplish theirs. The duties and responsibilities of key military police personnel overlap and complement each other, and a clear understanding of these duties and responsibilities is essential to effective mission execution.

COMPANY COMMANDER

2-21. The military police company commander is responsible for mission planning, collective training, property accountability, and overall unit readiness. The commander must maintain a high level of discipline, morale, and physical fitness within the unit. The commander mentors and provides professional development to junior officers within the company. The commander must be able to clearly communicate the intent and define the company mission-essential task list. The commander must be tactically proficient; know the mission, capabilities, and dependencies of the unit; and have the ability to articulate information to maneuver commanders and staffs. The commander must collect the facts; seek input; and make informed, key decisions. In support of decisive action, the commander is responsible for accomplishing the assigned mission of the company. The commander is ultimately accountable for everything that does or does not happen in the unit.

FIRST SERGEANT

2-22. The first sergeant is the senior noncommissioned officer and is typically the most experienced Soldier in the unit. The first sergeant is responsible for providing individual training, enforcing discipline, and resolving Soldier issues across the company. The first sergeant also provides professional noncommissioned officer development and coaches, counsels, and mentors unit Soldiers. He oversees the coordination of training and supervises the execution of the commander's orders. The first sergeant serves as the commander's primary tactical advisor and expert on individual and noncommissioned officer skills. In support of unified land operations, the first sergeant resources platoons, supervises the execution of the company mission, and enforces company standard operating procedures (SOPs).

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

2-23. The primary role of the executive officer is to assist the company commander in mission planning and accomplishment. The executive officer provides oversight on logistic and administrative matters that are related to the daily operations of the company and typically assumes command in the absence of the commander. The executive officer manages the unit budget, property book, and status report and oversees maintenance, support and sustainment, physical security, and the Command Supply Discipline Program. He also supervises unit support sections and the headquarters element. In support of unified land operations, the executive officer works in conjunction with the operations sergeant to monitor company operations, update and publish unit tactical reports, and coordinate unit support and sustainment.

OPERATIONS SERGEANT

2-24. The operations sergeant plans, organizes, and serves as a senior advisor to the first sergeant and company commander on matters that concern operational missions and company taskings. Operations sergeants prepare, revise, maintain, and publish unit plans, OPORDs, graphics, policies, and SOPs for the company. Along with the executive officer, the operations sergeant provides operational oversight of unit support sections and headquarters, monitors or manages company operations, updates and publishes unit tactical reports, and coordinates unit support and sustainment in support of unified land operations.

PLATOON LEADER

2-25. The military police platoon leader is responsible to the company commander for platoon training, discipline, equipment, and personnel readiness. The platoon leader develops platoon training plans based on the company mission-essential task list, maintains accountability and serviceability of assigned equipment, enforces discipline, and promotes morale. The platoon leader must be tactically proficient; know the mission, capabilities, and dependencies of the platoon; and have the ability to articulate information to maneuver element leaders and Soldiers. In support of unified land operations, the platoon leader is responsible for accomplishing the assigned mission of the platoon.

PLATOON SERGEANT

2-26. The military police platoon sergeant is responsible for the daily operations of the platoon. The platoon sergeant ensures the execution of the platoon physical fitness program, individual readiness program, and platoon equipment maintenance. He provides noncommissioned officer professional development and coaches, counsels, and mentors platoon Soldiers. The platoon sergeant coordinates resources for training and mission requirements, supervises individual and team training, enforces standards and discipline, and oversees the execution of platoon leader guidance. In the absence of the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant takes command of the platoon. In support of decisive action, he resources squads, supervises the execution of the platoon mission, and enforces SOPs.

SQUAD LEADER

2-27. The squad leader is responsible for the health, welfare, and safety of Soldiers who are assigned to the squad. He ensures that Soldiers meet the standards that are related to individual and team training, physical fitness, equipment maintenance, property accountability, and personal appearance. He enforces discipline and the execution of platoon leader guidance. The squad leader coaches, counsels, and mentors team leaders and verifies that team leaders are doing the same for subordinates. In support of decisive action, the squad leader is responsible for the control and tactical employment of the squad. He ensures that the squad executes the commander's mission objectives and confirms that the Soldiers in the squad understand their roles.

UNIT TRAINING MANAGEMENT

2-28. Unit training management is delivered in several ways. The primary portal to unit training management is through the [Army Training Network](#). This password-protected Web site enables users to view unit training management modules, tutorials, and examples. Unit training management reflects the Army method to plan and operate rather than the artificialities of a distinct and separate training management process.

2-29. The Army operations process provides a common framework for guiding commanders as they lead and manage unit training and leader development. Effective unit training results from a sound analysis of the unit mission and the unit ability to accomplish that mission. The higher unit mission, unit mission-essential task list, and higher commander's guidance drive the commander's selection of collective tasks on which the unit trains to accomplish mission success.

2-30. Commanders and other leaders plan to develop their subordinate leaders—through training, education, and experience—in the three training domains (institutional, operational, and self-development). Leaders use the operations process to integrate leader development into a unit training plan. (See ADRP 7-0 for additional information.)

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Chapter 3

Sustainment

The strength of a military police unit is a reflection of its sustainment capabilities. The *sustainment warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0). Although sustainment may not be the decisive operation, its support across the range of military operations is vital. Successful military police operations depend on the effective integration of sustainment support. Leaders must place equal emphasis on sustainment and operational aspects. Maintaining sustainment operations requires engaged leaders at all levels within the company—from the team leader to the commander. The keys to integrating sustainment into military police operations are proper planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. This chapter provides information regarding the maintenance and supply aspects of sustainment at the company level.

LOGISTICS

3-1. *Logistics* is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and evacuation and disposition of materiel, acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities, and acquisition or furnishing of services. (ADP 4-0.) For successful unit logistics support planning, leaders at all levels must—

- Determine the causes of equipment readiness deficiencies, take corrective actions within their areas of responsibility, and provide feedback on systemic readiness problems to the next higher headquarters.
- Enforce supply and maintenance controls to prevent the abuse of priorities and enforce supply and maintenance discipline.
- Ensure accuracy and timeliness for equipment readiness reporting.

3-2. Planning logistics support for military police operations is a continuous, complex process. Forecasting company logistics requirements is based on several factors, such as the unit mission-essential task list, projected future missions, threat evaluation, weather/terrain analysis, and unit status report. Logistics support planning is a function of leadership at each level.

3-3. The characteristics of logistics describe the planning and execution considerations that are required for successful support operations. Identifying them during the planning process provides the leader with a guide for analytical thinking and prudent planning. The characteristics are as follows:

- **Anticipation**—the ability to foresee future operations and identify, accumulate, and maintain the assets and capabilities to support those operations.
- **Simplicity**—the avoidance of complexity in planning and executing logistics functions. (Mission orders, drills, and SOPs contribute to simplicity.)
- **Responsiveness**—getting the right supplies and other support functions in the right place at the right time.
- **Economy**—providing appropriate support without excess. (Commanders must judge economy in prioritizing and allocating resources.)
- **Flexibility**—the ability to adapt organizational structure and logistics procedures to changing situations, missions, and operations.

- **Integration**—the coordination of logistics operations with other missions and components of the organization.
- **Attainability**—the minimum quantity of supplies and available services that are required to begin an operation.
- **Sustainability**—the ability to maintain continuous support to all phases of operations.
- **Survivability**—the capacity to shield logistics functions from destruction.
- **Improvisation**—the ability to make, fabricate, arrange, or invent what is needed from available supplies. This should not, however, be considered as an acceptable alternative to proper planning.

MAINTENANCE

3-4. Maintenance operations are complex and require effective and aggressive management for achieving maximum efficiency in utilizing resources, maintaining productivity, and sustaining required equipment effectiveness. Successful units have active maintenance management programs that promote comprehensive maintenance practices and high degrees of operational readiness.

3-5. Maintenance operations are vital to the execution of military police company missions. Proper maintenance is critical in keeping vehicles, equipment, and other materiel in serviceable condition. Effective maintenance systems demand total unit involvement. Knowing how to maintain a piece of equipment to standard is just as important as knowing how to employ it.

3-6. Maintenance operations are an integral aspect of mission planning and sustainment. Thorough maintenance plans, published SOPs, and engaged leaders ensure maximum operational readiness of unit and individual equipment.

3-7. The commander's main role in these programs is to issue written guidance for maintenance activities in the command. An important element of this guidance is the establishment of standards that allow the commander to measure performance, develop problem indicators, and influence corrective action.

ARMY MAINTENANCE STANDARDS

3-8. Unit maintenance SOPs must include procedures that are designed to achieve and sustain the following Army maintenance standards for assigned equipment:

- Ensure that unit equipment is fully mission-capable.
- Identify faults by following prescribed intervals in applicable technical manuals and preventive maintenance checks and services tables.
- Complete repairs, services, and other related work that will correct unit level equipment and materiel faults according to DA Pam 738-751 or DA Pam 750-8.
- Order the parts and supplies that are required to complete corrective actions on a valid, funded requisition according to AR 710-2.
- Verify that the corrective actions that are not authorized at unit level by the maintenance allocation chart are on a valid support maintenance request, such as DA Form 5990-E (*Maintenance Request*).
- Apply routine, urgent, and emergency modification work orders to equipment according to AR 750-10.
- Confirm that authorized basic issue items and end item components are present and serviceable or on a valid supply request.

MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES

3-9. Within a military police company, the commander, first sergeant, platoon leaders, and noncommissioned officers occupy the most critical positions in the Army maintenance process. If the commander and other leaders appropriately prioritize maintenance operations in the overall unit mission requirements, the chances for unit success and mission accomplishment will be increased.

- 3-10. Some key maintenance questions that commanders, leaders, and supervisors must ask include—
- Am I technically competent enough to supervise Soldiers and inspect equipment?
 - Have I been in the motor pool or equipment storage area on a frequent basis?
 - Have I established maintenance as a priority in the unit or organization?
 - Have I allotted prime training time strictly for the care, preservation, and maintenance of equipment and maintenance training?
 - Have I provided sufficient manpower to accomplish the mission?
 - Do I foster an ownership relationship with regard to equipment?
 - Are subordinate leaders present and active participants during scheduled maintenance periods?
- 3-11. Key maintenance responsibilities for the military police platoon leader include the following:
- Ensure that platoon weapons, equipment, and vehicles are combat-ready or are reported as non-mission-capable to the commander.
 - Know the present status of equipment, including document numbers and job order numbers.
 - Develop and supervise a maintenance training program.
 - Ensure that equipment and Soldiers have appropriate technical manuals and leader supervision during maintenance operations.
 - Ensure that Soldiers perform unit level preventive maintenance checks and services on assigned equipment according to appropriate technical manuals.
- 3-12. Key maintenance responsibilities for the military police platoon sergeant include the following:
- Direct and supervise the unit maintenance of platoon equipment.
 - Help the platoon leader comply with responsibilities, and assume those responsibilities in the platoon leader's absence.
 - Coordinate with the designated maintenance element for operator level repair, and request organization level and direct-support level maintenance.
 - Supervise and account for platoon personnel during maintenance periods.
 - Ensure that the platoon uses repair parts after receipt.
 - Collect and consolidate the platoon maintenance status in the field, and provide the appropriate reports to maintenance personnel.
 - Keep the platoon leader informed of the maintenance and logistics status.
- 3-13. Key maintenance responsibilities for the military police squad leader include the following:
- Update the platoon sergeant on the maintenance and logistics status of squad equipment.
 - Perform regular inspections on squad equipment to ensure that Soldiers follow proper maintenance procedures.
 - Review DA Form 5988-E (*Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet*) for accuracy and completeness.
 - Supervise and account for squad personnel during maintenance performance.
- 3-14. Key maintenance responsibilities for the military police team leader include the following:
- Update the squad leader on the maintenance and logistics status of team equipment.
 - Ensure that Soldiers complete and update DA Form 5988-E according to unit SOPs.
 - Ensure that the priority of maintenance effort is placed on mission-essential equipment.
 - Ensure that Soldiers receive proper training on preventive maintenance checks and services procedures and that they perform them on equipment according to the applicable technical manual.

MAINTENANCE FORMS

3-15. Accurate maintenance records require thorough documentation. Table 3-1 provides a list of common maintenance forms.

Table 3-1. Common maintenance forms

Number	Title
DA Form 348	<i>Equipment Operator's Qualification Record (Except Aircraft)</i>
DA Form 461-5	<i>Vehicle Classification Inspection</i>
DA Form 2402	<i>Maintenance Tag</i>
DA Form 2406	<i>Materiel Condition Status Report</i>
DA Form 2408-14	<i>Uncorrected Fault Record</i>
DA Form 2408-20	<i>Oil Analysis Log</i>
DA Form 2415	<i>Ammunition Condition Report</i>
DA Form 3590	<i>Request for Disposition or Waiver</i>
DA Form 5519-R	<i>Tool Sign Out Log/Register</i>
DA Form 5982-E	<i>Dispatch Control Log</i>
DA Form 5984-E	<i>Operator's Permit Record</i>
DA Form 5987-E	<i>Motor Equipment Dispatch</i>
DA Form 5988-E	<i>Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet</i>
DA Form 5990-E	<i>Maintenance Request</i>
DD Form 314	<i>Preventive Maintenance Schedule and Record</i>
DD Form 1970	<i>Motor Equipment Utilization Record</i>
Legend:	
DA	Department of the Army
DD	Department of Defense form

SUPPLY

3-16. Units must account for property (including historical artifacts, art, flags, organizational property, and associated items) that is acquired by the Army from any source (such as bought or donated) from the time of acquisition until consumption or disposal of the property. AR 735-5 addresses policies and procedures for property accountability. For accounting purposes, the following are the classifications of Army property (excluding real property):

- **Expendable property.** Expendable property is consumed or loses its identity in use. It also includes items with a unit cost of less than \$300 that are not consumed in use. Supply sergeants manage expendable property, but commanders maintain supervision over funds for expendable items. Examples of expendable property include oil, repair parts, training aids, and office paper.
- **Durable property.** Durable property is not consumed during use and does not require formal property book accountability. Its unique characteristics require control when issued to the user. Examples of durable property include handtools, cellular phones, and computer software.
- **Nonexpendable property.** Nonexpendable property retains its original identity and is not consumed during the period of use. It requires formal accountability by using unit level property book procedures throughout the life of the item. Examples of nonexpendable property include nonconsumable major end items that are authorized by Department of the Army (DA)-recognized authorization documents.

COMMAND SUPPLY DISCIPLINE PROGRAM

3-17. The Command Supply Discipline Program is a commander program that is typically managed by the unit executive officer. Leaders support the Command Supply Discipline Program by enforcing effective measures to ensure that resources are being used without fraud, waste, or abuse. Supply discipline starts at the lowest level by maintaining equipment accountability and managing classes of supplies. Irresponsible practices and behavior diminish unit combat power and reduce the ability to sustain requirements on the battlefield. (See AR 710-2 for additional information concerning the responsibilities and guidance for the Command Supply Discipline Program.)

3-18. Company commander, executive officer, noncommissioned officer, and supervisor responsibilities include the following:

- Become familiar with applicable regulatory requirements.
- Perform duties routinely by using the Command Supply Discipline Program listing as a guide or checklist.
- Report to senior leaders any applicable requirements within the Command Supply Discipline Program that cannot be completed.
- Ensure the strictest compliance with the Command Supply Discipline Program. This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
 - Account for and safeguard property that belongs to, arrives in, or departs from the unit.
 - Conduct required inventories within the prescribed time frames by using the most current supply catalog, training manual, or other applicable publication.
 - Update hand receipts.
 - Inventory property before a hand receipt holder change.
 - Obtain proper receipts for turned-in equipment.
 - Notify senior leaders following the discovery of loss of, damage to, or destruction of government property.
 - Complete a subhand receipt for property that is not directly under immediate control.
 - Ensure that nonunit subhand-receipted property is according to regulatory guidance throughout the unit supply section.
 - Anticipate and plan for materials that are needed in a timely manner.
 - Teach subordinates supply discipline at all times.

PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY

3-19. Property accountability is the obligation of a person to keep an accurate, formal record of property issued. The record should show item identification data, quantities, balances, and transactions. This obligation may not be delegated. The accountable officer must ensure that the property issued is correctly noted on the property records, know what is on hand as determined by the property records, and take action to resolve shortages or overages.

3-20. Property accountability is one of the greatest challenges that a company commander will face while in command. The commander can do many things during a command tour but still fail as a commander if he does not maintain proper accountability of equipment. The commander is ultimately responsible for keeping the unit property in serviceable condition. The commander must stress to leaders and Soldiers within the unit that each person is responsible for property in his charge and not just for property that is listed on unit property books. (See AR 710-2 for specific guidelines that address property accountability and inventory responsibilities and procedures.)

PROPERTY RESPONSIBILITY

3-21. Property responsibility is the obligation of a person to ensure that the government property that is entrusted to his possession, command, or supervision is properly used and cared for and that proper custody and safekeeping are provided. AR 710-2 requires that someone be assigned direct responsibility for each

nonexpendable and durable item on hand in the unit. There are three types of responsibility based on the position within the organization and a fourth type based on signatures:

- **Direct responsibility.** Direct responsibility is the obligation of a person to ensure all Government property for which they have receipted, is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safekeeping are provided. Direct responsibility results from assignment as an accountable officer, receipt of formal written delegation, or acceptance of the property on hand receipt from an accountable officer. Commanders and/or supervisors will determine and assign, in writing, the individuals who will have direct responsibility for property. (See AR 735-5 for additional information.)
- **Command responsibility.** *Command responsibility* is the obligation of a commander to ensure all Government property within their command is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safekeeping of Government property are provided. Command responsibility is inherent in command and cannot be delegated. It is evidenced by assignment to a command position at any level and includes—
 - Ensuring the security of all property of the command, whether in used or in storage.
 - Observing subordinates to ensure their activities contribute to the proper custody, care, use, and safekeeping of all property within the command.
 - Enforcing all security, safety, and accounting requirements.
 - When necessary, taking administrative or disciplinary measures. (AR 735-5)

The commander assumes responsibility for unit property whether he has signed for it or not. He must personally ensure the security of unit property whether it is in storage or in use. For example, he must provide a secure place for mechanics to store the tool kits that are issued to them. If he has not done so, and an item is lost, the commander could be held liable for the loss. The commander must also ensure proper supervision to ensure that the tool kit is being used properly.

- **Supervisory responsibility.** *Supervisory responsibility* is the obligation of a supervisor to ensure all Government property issued to, or used by, their subordinates is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safekeeping of the property are provided. It is inherent in all supervisory positions and is not contingent upon signed receipts or responsibility statements. It arises because of assignment to a specific position and includes—
 - Providing proper guidance and direction.
 - Enforcing all security, safety, and accounting requirements.
 - Maintaining a supervisory climate that will facilitate and ensure the proper care and use of Government property. (AR 735-5)

Supervisory responsibility is inherent in all supervisory positions and is not contingent on signed receipts or responsibility statements. Supervisors can be held liable for losses that are incurred by subordinates.

- **Personal responsibility.** Personal responsibility is the obligation of a person to exercise reasonable and prudent actions to properly use, care for, safeguard, and dispose of all Government property issued for, acquired for, or converted to a person's exclusive use, with or without receipt. (See AR 735-5 for additional information.) Unit personnel are responsible for arms, hand-tools, organizational clothing, and individual equipment issued for their use. They are responsible whether they signed for the property or not. For example, when the tool kit is issued, the mechanic assumes personal responsibility for all of the items that are in it. The mechanic must take proper care of the kit and secure it in the assigned storage area when it is not being used. If the mechanic forgets to secure the kit and it is lost, he is responsible for the loss.

CLASSES OF SUPPLY

3-22. Table 3-2 describes the ten key classes of supplies.

Table 3-2. Supply classes

Class	Description
Class I	Subsistence (including health and welfare items)
Class II	Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool sets and tool kits, handtools, administrative actions, housekeeping supplies, and equipment (including items of equipment, other than major items, prescribed in authorization/allowance tables and items of supply [not including repair parts])
Class III	Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (including bulk and packaged fuels, lubricating oils and lubricants, petroleum specialty products, solid fuels, coal, and related products)
Class IV	Construction materials (including installed equipment and fortification/barrier materials)
Class V	Ammunition (including chemical, radiological, and special weapons), bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items
Class VI	Personal demand items (nonmilitary sales items)
Class VII	Major items—a final combination of end products that is ready for its intended use (launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, vehicles)
Class VIII	Medical material (including medical-peculiar repair parts)
Class IX	Repair parts and components (including kits, assemblies, and subassemblies [reparable and nonreparable] that are required for the maintenance support of equipment)
Class X	Material to support nonmilitary programs (such as agricultural and economic development) that is not included in Class I through Class IX supplies

HAND RECEIPTS

3-23. When issuing nonexpendable or durable items to an individual, section, or unit, DA Form 2062 (*Hand Receipt/Annex Number*) must be used. A hand receipt is a signed document acknowledging acceptance of and responsibility for the items of property listed thereon that are issued for use and are to be returned. (See AR 735-5.) An individual's signature on a hand receipt establishes direct responsibility. Prepare separate hand receipts for installation and organization property. (See DA Pam 710-2-1 for instructions on preparing DA Form 2062.)

3-24. The use of subhand receipts is required to assign property down to the user level. Unit leaders must ensure that company equipment is signed for down to the lowest level possible. Individual hand receipts foster a sense of ownership by the hand receipt holder, which promotes increased care and maintenance for the receipted items. (See DA Pam 710-2-1 for information concerning the specific procedures regarding hand receipts and subhand receipts.)

3-25. Hand receipts and subhand receipts should be kept current. Property information on the property book and hand receipts must agree at all times. Hand receipts are kept current by posting changes directly to the hand receipt as changes occur or by using change documents, such as DA Form 3161 (*Request for Issue or Turn-In*).

KEY STEPS FOR PERFORMING A FINANCIAL LIABILITY INVESTIGATION OF PROPERTY LOSS

3-26. A financial liability investigation of property loss documents the circumstances that concern the loss, damage, or destruction of government property. DD Form 200 (*Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss*) serves as a supporting document for removing property from accountable records. It also documents a financial liability charge that is assessed against an individual or entity or provides relief from financial liability. The hand receipt holder, accountable officer, or the person with the most knowledge will initiate a financial liability investigation when negligence or willful misconduct is suspected, an individual or entity does not admit liability, or the item lost is a controlled item.

3-27. The task of a financial liability officer (in conducting a financial liability investigation of property loss) is to determine if negligence or willful misconduct is the proximate cause of loss. To determine such responsibility, the facts that contribute to the loss are developed through investigation. The financial liability officer will perform the investigation as thoroughly as needed to ensure that the facts are fully developed, government interests are fully served, and individual rights are fully protected. (See AR 735-5 for an outline of the requirements for the financial liability investigation of property loss procedures.)

3-28. The following are key actions for conducting a financial liability investigation of property loss without an appointing officer:

- **Initiation.** The time limit for the initiation process is 15 days for Regular Army, 45 days for Army National Guard, and 75 days for U.S. Army Reserve. Initiation starts with the discovery of the loss and continues with the following:
 - Identify missing, damaged, or destroyed items.
 - Conduct a preliminary search for missing items.
 - Gather dates and circumstances.
 - Initiate DD Form 200.
- **Investigation and recommendation.** The time limit for the investigation and recommendation process is 40 days for Regular Army, 75 days for Army National Guard, and 85 days for U.S. Army Reserve. Investigation and recommendation starts after the accountable officer assigns the inquiry/investigation number and continues with the following:
 - Appoint an investigation officer if deemed necessary.
 - Review property records.
 - Obtain statements.
 - Ascertain facts.
 - Determine the proximate cause.
 - Calculate the amount of loss.
 - Make a recommendation.
 - Notify the individual if financial liability is recommended.
 - Consider the respondent's rebuttal statement.
 - Provide investigation to the approving authority.
- **Adjudication.** The time limit for the adjudication process is 20 days for Regular Army, 30 days for Army National Guard, and 80 days for U.S. Army Reserve. Adjudication starts upon receipt of the investigation of the property loss from the initiator or the investigating officer and continues with the following:
 - Review by approving authority.
 - Review by the judge advocate general (when assessment of financial liability is sought).
 - Decision by the approving authority.

- **Notification.** The financial liability officer is required to notify the individual who is being charged with the financial liability investigation of property loss outcome. The time limit for the notification process is 30 days for Regular Army, 30 days for U.S. Army Reserve, and 60 days for Army National Guard.
- **Reporting.** Provide results to the finance and accounting office and/or the U.S. Fiscal and Property Officer for collection.

SUPPLY FORMS

3-29. Accurate supply records require thorough documentation. Table 3-3 provides a list of common supply-related forms.

Table 3-3. Common supply-related forms

Form Number	Form Title
DA Form 2062	<i>Hand Receipt/Annex Number</i>
DA Form 2823	<i>Sworn Statement</i>
DA Form 3161	<i>Request for Issue or Turn-In</i>
DA Form 3645	<i>Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment Record</i>
DA Form 3749	<i>Equipment Receipt</i>
DA Form 4949	<i>Administrative Adjustment Report (AAR)</i>
DA Form 7531	<i>Checklist and Tracking Document for Financial Liability Investigations of Property Loss</i>
DD Form 200	<i>Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss</i>
DD Form 362	<i>Statement of Charges/Cash Collection Voucher</i>
DD Form 1131	<i>Cash Collection Voucher</i>
DD Form 1348-1A	<i>Issue Release/Receipt Document</i>
Legend: AAR administrative adjustment report DA Department of the Army DD Department of Defense form	

MILITARY POLICE LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES

3-30. Military police leaders and commanders are essential to the sustainment of military police organizations. Sustainment for military police units and military police assets that are organic, assigned, or attached directly to a supported unit is the responsibility of the leaders and staff of the unit that they support. (See FM 3-39 for information regarding sustainment planning for military police operations.)

3-31. At the military police company, the basic sustainment responsibilities are to monitor, report, and request requirements. The executive officer, operations sergeant, and supply sergeant are normally responsible for these functions within military police companies; and they receive guidance and oversight from the commander and first sergeant. They are also responsible for supporting augmentation that is assigned to the unit. The accurate and timely submission of personnel and logistics reports, requests, and other necessary information is essential.

3-32. The company commander ensures that sustainment operations maintain the mission capabilities of the unit and its ability to provide combat power. The commander provides critical insight during the planning process and—

- Coordinates for sustainment support requirements that are external to the military police unit.
- Anticipates problems, works to avoid delays in planning and battle transition, and conducts sustainment battle tracking.
- Communicates with subordinate leaders to identify the need for push packages, ensures push-package arrivals, and tracks push-package expenditures.

- Determines the location of unit resupply points and monitors the operation.
- Ensures that the unit executes sustainment operations according to the supported unit SOP and OPORD.
- Monitors equipment locations and the maintenance status.
- Tracks military police equipment use, maintenance deadlines, and fuel consumption.
- Receives, consolidates, and forwards logistics, administrative, personnel, and casualty reports to the parent or supported unit.
- Directs and supervises medical support in the unit and coordinates for additional support.
- Supervises and monitors the evacuation of casualties, detainees, and damaged equipment.
- Orients personnel replacements and assigns personnel to subordinate units.
- Conducts sustainment rehearsals at the unit level.
- Maintains and provides supplies for unit field sanitation activities.
- Integrates explosive ordnance disposal support as necessary.
- Manages, supports, and employs MWDs.

Chapter 4

Police Operations

Police operations is the primary discipline for military police. It provides the basic foundation for military police technical and tactical operations. Police operations encompass associated LE activities to control and protect populations and resources to facilitate the existence of a lawful and orderly environment. Military police conduct police operations under three basic conditions: to maintain good order and discipline on bases or base camps, to establish and maintain civil security and civil control in support of the rule of law in an operational environment, and to assist local LE agencies in times of crisis during defense support of civil authorities. This chapter outlines fundamental LE tasks, summarizes the primary tasks for organizing HN police training and support, and provides an overview of how military police assist customs and border support operations.

POLICE OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO DECISIVE ACTIONS

4-1. Police operations consist of the measures that are necessary to enforce laws, directives, and punitive regulations; conduct criminal investigations; and control populations and resources that ensure the existence of a lawful and orderly environment. Military police enforce laws and appropriate commander directives. They also maintain liaison and coordinate joint police operations with other DOD police organizations; HN military and civilian authorities; multinational police organizations; and U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies. A coordinated LE effort removes the conditions and opportunities that promote crime, preventing the diversion of military resources and maintaining military discipline. Military police units execute support to decisive action by providing military police with the technical capabilities that enable the establishment and maintenance of order while protecting personnel and assets. Specific police operations tasks that support offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities are outlined in chapter 1.

POLICING

4-2. Policing is the application of control measures within an AO to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters that affect the general welfare of the population. The Army continuously conducts policing to maintain order within its communities and formations. When directed, the Army also applies policing activities to HN populations to restore order when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent.

4-3. Policing, in general, is not dependent on a legal structure or the enforcement of specific laws or punitive regulations. Rather, policing is characterized by the restrictive rules of engagement that are designed to limit the application of force on a population or group. This restraint differentiates policing from conventionally focused military operations. Policing is a critical step in establishing civil security, which is a precursor to establishing civil control and the transition to the rule of law.

4-4. Military police disciplines are policing in nature and are conducted with the primary purpose of maintaining an environment with the requisite order and stability for commanders to focus efforts on other critical missions and tasks. Military police concurrently conduct many tasks that are aligned within other military police disciplines (detention operations and security and mobility support) and the military PIO to complement the police operations discipline.

POLICING PRINCIPLES

4-5. When conducting policing operations, military police are guided by six principles—prevention, public support, restraint, legitimacy, transparency, and assessment. These principles are not a rigid checklist, but

they represent dominant characteristics of the policing activities that are usually found in societies which are influenced by Western culture. Military police use these principles to guide the employment of policing activities as they shape the operational environment. (See ATP 3-39.10 for additional information about the six principles of policing.)

POLICE ENGAGEMENTS

4-6. Police engagement is a cornerstone to successful, long-term police operations. Successful police organizations interact with, and gain support from, most of the population that they serve. Military police conduct police engagement activities in environments that support bases and base camps in support of contingency operations.

4-7. Police engagement is a type of engagement that occurs between military police and organizations or populations to maintain social order. Military police engage local, HN, and multinational police partners; police agencies; civil leaders; and local populations to pass and obtain critical information that is relevant to police operations to influence internal and external audiences. The goal of police engagement is to develop a routine and reliable interpersonal network through which police information can flow to military police and subsequently into the operations process.

4-8. Based on the tactical situation, police engagement is formal or informal. Military police conduct formal police engagement as part of a deliberate strategy to gain support or information or to convey a message. This type of police engagement requires preparation, coordination, and postengagement reporting. Informal police engagement is less directive and occurs when military police interact with other police entities or populations.

4-9. Planning, information collection, analyses, and decisionmaking are key elements of police engagement. The protection of sensitive LE information and the dissemination of actionable information are central tenets that are maintained throughout police engagement operations. (See appendix A for additional information on operations, techniques, and planning considerations.) Effective police engagement relies on the balance between making information available and protecting information that may be sensitive or proprietary or whose disclosure might compromise ongoing LE, intelligence, military operations, or methods. Military police employ the following considerations when planning for and conducting police engagements:

- **Background.** As part of an initial mission analysis, military police consider previous experiences, mission authority, and mission intent. Although these preparation operations normally involve predetermined objectives (such as crime prevention, traffic control, or security reinforcement), military police are flexible in their contacts with the populace, transitioning immediately from one mission set to another as situations develop.
- **People.** During meetings and discussions, military police identify and/or reference designated sources by a variety of means (name, position, organization, biometrics). The results of previous engagements and the agendas of individuals or groups in similar positions are beneficial to future operations.
- **Meeting preparation.** Primary sources of information that are acquired before a formal police engagement include police information and intelligence, intelligence summaries, updates, and reviews of current command information themes and messages. Before an engagement, military police review the current collection plan for existing information and intelligence requirements.
- **Adjacent unit coordination.** Military police frequently have boundaries that encompass two or more unit AOs. When elements cross these boundaries, the owning unit acknowledges the presence and mission of the element. This coordination is important when addressing safety and security concerns, and military police must ensure that the police engagement is nested with the maneuver commander's engagement plan and operations.
- **Interpreter support.** Keys to successful operations are experience and rehearsal with assigned interpreters. Operations outside the United States often require interpreter support. Most Soldiers work with contracted HN or third-country nationals as interpreters. (See appendix B for additional information regarding translator employment considerations.)

- **Uniform and equipment requirements.** Based on the current threat level, leaders have the option to modify uniform requirements before police engagement occurs. A risk assessment may indicate that lowering individual uniform requirements (such as body armor or advanced combat helmets) during meetings with HN police or civic and religious leaders will maintain adequate protection while allowing a better flow of information and connection between the parties who are present. Consider using recording devices, overtly or covertly, to ensure that conversations are adequately captured. However, leaders must verify that these operations comply with U.S. and HN laws.
- **Postengagement follow-up operations.** Timely summaries to stakeholders ensure that the information collected is appropriately disseminated, proper analysis is conducted, information gaps are identified, and collection plans are updated for future engagements. When conducting police operations that involve U.S. persons, military and other intelligence organizations must operate under significant constraints. Military police must be familiar with legal and regulatory constraints on LE information.

4-10. Commanders resource and set priorities and goals for police engagement activities. However, it is the individual military police Soldier or team that interacts with the population that conducts the critical component of the police engagement process. During formal and informal police engagements, military police maintain a deliberate focus on, and commitment to, identifying criminal actors, crime-conducive conditions, and other criminal or policing factors that affect operations. At the conclusion of a mission, the information and interaction that results from police engagement must be reported to the chain of command.

LAW ENFORCEMENT PATROL OPERATIONS

4-11. LE includes the activities that are performed by personnel who are authorized by legal authority to compel compliance with, and investigate violations of, laws, directives, and punitive regulations. LE occurs in support of governance and the rule of law; however, to conduct LE, a legal system must exist.

4-12. A principal objective of LE is the simultaneous execution of policing tasks that complement the LE mission—tasks such as crime prevention, physical security, and traffic control measures. LE requires specific training, certification, and demonstrated capabilities to prevent untrained personnel from conducting the LE mission. Military police LE training certification standards are outlined in ST 19-31B. The specific training that is required of Army LE is designed to provide—

- An understanding of the rules for the use of force and force escalation.
- Competence in personal protection techniques to avoid physical injury.
- Training in less lethal techniques for subduing individuals in situations of unrest without serious injury.
- An understanding of the laws that are relevant to LE, including—
 - Due process requirements.
 - Authority and jurisdiction laws.
 - Search and seizure requirements and constraints.
- The knowledge of proper evidence collection techniques.
- The ability to write coherent police reports.
- An understanding of emergency and special response requirements.

PROVOST MARSHAL’S OFFICE

4-13. Police operations are organized within the framework of the provost marshal’s office, which is manned by a military police LE detachment and augmented by military police companies and/or civilian DA police to provide LE patrol capabilities. The provost marshal’s office and associated police personnel and resources are configured within a directorate of emergency services structure that is managed by the installation management command.

4-14. Organizing for police operations requires an assessment of the required capabilities that are specific to LE and policing tasks associated with the police operations discipline. Requisite capabilities for conducting dedicated police operations are associated with the military police LE detachment and other modular teams.

4-15. LE duties are assigned to the teams that comprise the military police LE detachment within the provost marshal's office, making up the core of dedicated technical policing expertise. A military police LE detachment consists of—

- A headquarters team to provide personnel, logistics, and administrative support.
- An operations team to provide planning, employment, and coordination of LE support and technical supervision of LE teams. (Military police assigned to the operations section must be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the Army operations process and be able to multitask and manage complex operations.)
- A desk team to establish and maintain police desk operations, including receiving calls and complaints; prioritizing and tasking patrols and investigative personnel as required; and ensuring the completion of initial reports. (The desk team serves as the primary control point for the LE-related incidents, communications, and operations that are initiated by assigned patrols or received directly from the field.)
- A force protection team to assist in risk and threat identification and mitigation, crisis planning, and the safeguarding of personnel and equipment at a fixed site. (The force protection team provides the expertise and technical capabilities that are related to antiterrorism and provides physical security that is required to assist units in the protection of personnel and equipment according to Army regulations, command policies, and field operating procedures.)
- A traffic management and enforcement team to investigate traffic accidents and provide expertise regarding trafficability, traffic flow, and enforcement regulation. (The team provides military police reports, accident information, and testimonies to magistrate courts, commanders, insurance agencies, and other LE agencies. Their knowledge of traffic control and flow, protection measures associated with vehicle movement, and traffic study capabilities can be a valuable asset to the provost marshal's office.)
- A military police investigation team to investigate criminal incidents, conduct surveillance operations, and collect and maintain evidence and operational information, to include personal identification (biometric) and police information. (Military police investigators maintain liaison with United States Army Criminal Investigation Command [USACIDC] groups, battalions, and elements regarding criminal investigations and information.)

4-16. Military police establish and organize policing activities primarily from the police operations center, which is commonly referred to (on bases and base camps) as the military police station. The police operations center is the hub of activity for LE. A police operations center can be established anywhere that police operations are required. Regardless of the location, the police operations center operates continuously to provide police assistance and emergency response, suppress criminal behavior, act as a repository for police information and police intelligence, and disseminate public safety information.

4-17. A stand-alone police operations center is typically employed for police operations support to U.S. military bases and base camps. Optimally, a police operations center will be manned by elements of a military police LE detachment. In some environments, police operations will be conducted by an organic military police brigade or battalion staff. In the earliest stages of transition from an extremely unstable security environment to stability tasks where civil security and civil control efforts have not yet been achieved, military police brigades and battalions conduct required police operations with organic staff elements to provide the required mission command of military police elements. As the environment stabilizes, military police LE detachments will typically be deployed to augment military police staff or establish a stand-alone police operations center to support the base commander.

POLICE EMERGENCY RESPONSE

4-18. Police operations include responses to many incidents that are outside the boundaries of normal LE activities. Based on the sensitivity of the incident, some responses require specific actions or considerations. Ensuring that personnel respond quickly and appropriately when incidents occur is an essential part of the police operations mission. Special-response situations include domestic disturbances, active shooters, hostage situations, and natural or man-made disasters. A training support package for active-shooter response is accessible through the Central Army Registry at <https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/#/dashboard>. Regardless

of the type of incident, LE responses require some actions to protect the public, safeguard evidence, and gather information.

4-19. An LE patrol will typically be dispatched to the scene of an incident. Upon arrival at the scene, LE patrol responsibilities include—

- Maintaining radio communications with the military police desk.
- Assessing immediate or potential dangers and taking actions, as appropriate, to mitigate risk to the public and emergency response personnel, including—
 - Hazmat, fire, or explosive hazards.
 - Active shooters, violent persons, or other threats.
 - Environmental conditions (traffic, weather, obscurant).
- Requesting additional emergency response capabilities, including—
 - Medical.
 - Fire.
 - Hazmat response.
 - Civil engineer.
 - Towing service.
- Establishing control of the incident scene, including—
 - Controlling traffic.
 - Securing identified crime scenes.
 - Evacuating personnel and establishing a perimeter (if required).
- Identifying victims and injured personnel and rendering first aid, as appropriate.
- Identifying evidence and establishing measures to protect or preserve the evidence.
- Identifying witnesses, victims, or potential subjects.
- Detaining personnel at the scene (in a safe location) to conduct interviews.

CRIME SCENES

4-20. Most criminal investigations begin at the scene of a crime (the actual site or location where the incident took place). It is essential that the first military police on the scene properly secure the crime scene. Preserving the scene with minimal contamination and disturbance of physical evidence is one of the most important aspects of securing the crime scene.

4-21. Controlling the movement and limiting the number of persons who enter the crime scene are essential to maintaining scene integrity, safeguarding evidence, and minimizing contamination. Actions of military police who respond to a crime scene include—

- Restricting individual movements and activities to maintain safety at the scene and prevent individuals from altering or destroying physical evidence.
- Identifying individuals at the scene.
- Securing and separating subjects from one another.
- Securing and separating witnesses from one another to prevent collaboration.
- Determining if bystanders are witnesses. (If they are witnesses, treat them according to the SOP; if they are not, remove them from the scene.)
- Controlling victims, family members, and friends, while showing compassion.
- Assisting medical and other emergency response personnel as necessary.

4-22. Military police who respond to a scene conduct an initial assessment to establish and control the crime scene and its boundaries. Military police must remove or exclude unauthorized and nonessential personnel from the scene, including military police who are not working the case, politicians, and members of the media. (See appendix C for additional guidance regarding interaction with the media.)

4-23. Guidelines for controlling a crime scene include—

- Establishing scene boundaries. Start at the location where the crime occurred and extend outward, creating a three-tiered perimeter that consists of the—
 - **Core.** The core is the actual crime scene.
 - **Inner perimeter.** The inner perimeter allows for a command post and comfort area just outside of the scene.
 - **Outer perimeter.** The outer perimeter is established as a border that is larger than the actual scene to ensure that onlookers and nonessential personnel are safe and away from the scene.
- Protecting trace and impression evidence if the victim or evidence was moved.
- Erecting physical barriers (ropes, cones, barrier tape, patrol vehicles, personnel, other equipment).
- Establishing an entry control point that allows one way in and one way out.
- Documenting individuals who enter and exit the scene on an entry control log once the perimeter is established.
- Controlling the flow of individuals and animals that enter and exit the scene to maintain scene integrity.
- Implementing measures to preserve and protect evidence from compromising elements (rain, snow, wind, footsteps, tire tracks, sprinklers).
- Ensuring that no one moves or repositions items (including weapons) unless individual safety is at risk.

EVIDENCE

4-24. The capability to properly secure and collect physical evidence in support of LE activities and other mission requirements is critical to successful criminal prosecution and mission success. In any criminal investigation, the validity of information that is obtained from physical evidence and subsequent analyses may be challenged if the evidence is not protected from contamination or if an uncompromised chain of custody is not maintained. (See AR 195-5 and ATP 3-39.12 for guidance on collecting and processing evidence.)

4-25. During LE activities, the collection of evidence by military police LE patrols who respond to a crime scene is typically limited to items that are obtained from a search incident during apprehension or to items (such as weapons, drugs, or other items found on a subject or within immediate control of a subject) that pose a danger to LE patrols and others in the area. At crime scenes or complex incident sites, a deliberate systematic search of the site to collect and document identified evidence is conducted under the supervision of military police investigators or USACIDC special agents, with additional military police supporting the effort.

CAUTION

Before collecting identified evidence at a crime scene, military police who conduct LE duties should verify (with the patrol supervisor) if evidence collection is required. Failure to comply may result in personal injury or equipment damage.

4-26. Evidence is contaminated through contact with people (fingerprints, hair, saliva, other contaminants) or from cross contamination between items of evidence. Therefore, responding LE patrols must identify potential evidence as early as possible. Table 4-1 outlines collection guidelines for common evidence that is gathered by LE patrols. Avoid contamination by—

- Collecting and handling items gently with gloved hands.
- Handling evidence where fingerprints are least likely to be found, such as corners, edges, and rough surfaces.
- Practicing extreme care when using instruments (such as tweezers) to collect evidence to prevent possible destruction or alteration of the physical characteristics of the evidence.
- Avoiding writing directly on the evidence.
- Packaging items separately to maintain the integrity of evidence from the site to the laboratory.
- Protecting items from physical breakage, contamination, and bacterial growth by—
 - Using appropriate containers, such as clean bags, boxes, envelopes, and cans.
 - Using clean, folded paper bags versus plastic bags for biological materials.
 - Ensuring that improvised packaging is clean to avoid contaminating the evidence.
 - Using folded, clean paper for small/trace items of evidence.

Table 4-1. Evidence collection guidelines

<i>Item</i>	<i>Collection</i>	<i>Recommended Packaging</i>
Firearms	• Photograph and document in a military police report. • Render weapons safe by removing ammunition, and save the ammunition as evidence. (It may contain latent prints and be useful for a comparison analysis.) • Handle firearms only on rough surfaces to prevent damage to other latent evidence. • Record manufacturer, model, serial number, and other markings.	• Wrap in paper, place in a wooden box, and secure with zip ties. For field expediency, wrap in paper and protect with cardboard. • Package ammunition similarly, but wrap separately from the weapon.
Sharp glass, metal objects, and metal fragments	• Use caution when collecting glass, metal fragments, and other sharp materials. • Collect glass found on clothing, the tops of shoes, or on the hair of a subject or victim.	• Wrap in paper or other porous material to protect sharp edges. Place in paper bags and then in a rigid container.
Documents and drawings	• Photograph and document in a military police report. (Documents and drawings may provide information on activity planning, personal contacts, handwriting samples, and other exploitable information.) • Consider that documents and drawings may contain fingerprints. Pick them up along the edges to avoid disturbing latent evidence. • Seize paper pads that may contain indented writings.	• Place in a paper envelope or plastic bag and then in a cardboard box. For field expediency, use a dry, clean bag or box.

Table 4-1. Evidence collection guidelines (continued)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Collection</i>	<i>Recommended Packaging</i>
Computers, laptops, digital cameras, and other electronic devices	• Photograph and document in a military police report. • Remove power cords from the computers, not from the wall outlets. • Remove battery packs and power cords from laptops. • Leave personal digital assistant devices and cellular phones turned on, and keep them charged. • Collect software and other peripheral items. (Criminals or threat elements may have the capability to track digital electronic items. These items should be transported to personnel trained in digital analysis as quickly as possible to expedite exploitation and mitigate tracking threats.)	• Wrap in butcher paper. Tape only to the butcher paper; do not tape directly to the tower or laptop. Place in a cardboard box.
CDs and DVDs	• Photograph and document in a military police report. • Pick CDs and DVDs up along the edges to avoid disturbing latent evidence.	• Wrap in butcher paper, and then place in a cardboard box. Do not allow tape to touch CDs or DVDs. Prop up so that only the edges are touching the sides of the box.
Chemicals	• Do not collect chemicals unless they must absolutely be seized. Obtain safety guidance from trained CBRN or hazmat personnel. • Photograph in place when possible. • Document site exploitative sketches.	• Do not mix chemicals. • Keep in original containers if possible. • Allow trained personnel to retrieve and package chemical evidence.
Tobacco products and matches	• Consider that tobacco products and matches may contain DNA, saliva, latent prints, lip gloss, lipstick, or other evidence that is recoverable in a laboratory.	• Place in a clean envelope or a druggist fold, and then seal. Place in a clean glass jar or metal container.

Table 4-1. Evidence collection guidelines (continued)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Collection</i>	<i>Recommended Packaging</i>
Biological material (saliva, semen, water, urine)	• Photograph in place when possible. • Document site exploitative sketches.	• Absorb moist/liquid material onto a cotton swab. • Dry the swab, and then place it in a paper bag or clean paper. Wrap in another layer of clean paper.
Soils and minerals	• Dig soil and mineral samples from any outside area. Collect at least ½ cup per sample. • Retrieve soil samples from carpet (or other flooring), shovels or other tools, or various locations within a vehicle, including the accelerator, clutch, trunk, and carpet.	• Place in a small vial, jar, or clean metal can. For field expediency, use a clean glass jar or metal container.
Tools	• Photograph in place when possible. • Document site exploitative sketches.	• Wrap individually in clean paper, and then place in a wooden box. For field expediency, use a clean cardboard box.
Toolmarks	• Photograph when possible. • Document site exploitative sketches. • Collect the item with the toolmark, or remove the toolmark from the larger item. (This may require cutting or otherwise removing a portion of a structure, such as a door or window frame, fence, or other marked object.)	• Cushion with paper towels or cotton, and then place in a cardboard box. For field expediency, use a clean cardboard box.
Building materials (including insulation, wood, roofing materials, ceiling particles, other materials)	• Collect samples of other material containing residue or damage. Gather as much of the damaged area or residue as possible.	• Package small trace evidence by putting it in a padded, hard container or a druggist fold. For field expediency, clean toilet paper or paper towels may be used as packaging materials. • Wrap larger samples in clean paper, and then place in a clean cardboard box.

Table 4-1. Evidence collection guidelines (continued)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Collection</i>	<i>Recommended Packaging</i>
Paint	- Allow wet paint to dry before collection, and then scrape or cut the paint from the surface. - Collect paint chips (about the size of a nickel) from the top layer of the original surface of the painted object. (The sample may have to be cut from the top to the surface.)	- Paint chips: Place in a druggist fold, and then in a larger envelope. - Dried paint: Scrape into a druggist fold, or seize the entire identified section of material.
Drugs and narcotics	- Photograph and document evidence. - Do not process clandestine drug labs. (They may contain extremely dangerous chemicals and booby traps.) - Be cognizant of the fact that a site which contains large amounts of drugs or narcotics is likely to have additional items (currency, weapons, business logs and other written records, computers containing associated digital records) that are related to that activity.	- Count pills and place in plastic or glass jars or pill boxes. Keep pill types separated. - Do not place plant materials (biological substances) in plastic bags. (Moisture within the material can cause mold if not packaged in breathable material.)
Wires, ropes, and cords	- Photograph in place when possible. - Document site exploitative sketches. - Consider latent prints if the material is smooth (plastic). - Remember that woven materials (rough surfaces) may hold trace evidence, such as skin cells. Do not touch with bare hands. - Consider biological material on the rope, cord, or wire. - Do not untie knots. Cut the knot out for collection. Cut away as far as possible from the knot.	- Small pieces: Place in a druggist fold, and then double-wrap in a larger envelope. - Large sections: Roll into wrapped paper, and then place in an appropriate size wooden box. For field expediency, use a clean paper bag or a clean cardboard box.
Tape	- Photograph in place when possible. - Document site exploitation sketches. - Place a ball of tape on a glass or hard, plastic surface. - Place unraveled tape sticky side down on a glass or hard, plastic surface to prevent smudging or smearing.	Place in a clean cardboard box to preserve the nonstick side.

Table 4-1. Evidence collection guidelines (continued)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Collection</i>	<i>Recommended Packaging</i>
Burnt paper	- Remember that burnt paper is difficult to collect without destroying it. - Consider that burnt paper turns black instead of disintegrating. - Be aware that the evidence may need to be hand-carried to a laboratory or storage site.	- Place a piece of paper under the burnt paper. - Put in a box that is padded with toilet paper or a paper towel.
Postblast sites, CBRN hazards, and UXO	Immediately contact explosive ordnance disposal personnel, CBRN personnel, or other specialized units that service these sites.	N/A
Legend: CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear DNA deoxyribonucleic acid NA not applicable UXO unexploded ordnance		

4-27. Before transferring evidence to military police investigations, USACIDC, or another agency, the duty officer or patrol supervisor ensures that evidence obtained by LE patrols is thoroughly documented and that required evidence collection forms are accurately completed. Some administrative requirements include the completion of—

- DA Form 2823.
- DA Form 3975 (*Military Police Report*).
- DA Form 4137 (*Evidence/Property Custody Document*).

DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES

4-28. Due to the unique nature of domestic disturbances, LE personnel should treat them as high-risk situations. A domestic disturbance manifests itself in several forms, including domestic dispute and domestic violence:

- A domestic dispute is an argument that could indicate a pattern of behavior that results in emotional or psychological abuse; economic control; and/or interference with personal liberty against a current or former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a child, or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common residence. During a domestic dispute, LE personnel typically have four courses of action (COAs) available: mediation, referral, temporary separation, or apprehension.
- Domestic violence is a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and local and state laws. It is the use of force or violence or a violation of a lawful order of protection against a current or former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a child, or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common residence. Public awareness, the nature of domestic violence, and recent legal policy mandates dictate many of the actions that LE personnel are required to take when they respond to cases of domestic violence. This often limits LE discretion, but it also serves to protect all parties involved.

4-29. A force of at least two LE personnel is required for response to a scene of a domestic disturbance in progress or of one that just occurred. The LE patrol must approach the scene of a domestic disturbance call with great caution, taking into consideration such things as—

- Contacting the military police desk while en route to ascertain if there are registered weapons at the scene.
- Parking away from the residence.

- Waiting for backup. (When a patrol consists of only one person, it is essential to wait for backup to ensure that a force of at least two LE personnel are present.)
- Increasing situational awareness by stopping and listening from a safe vantage point before attempting contact.
- Checking outside the residence for the assailant(s).

4-30. Upon arrival and after determining the best method for approaching the incident, LE patrol personnel identify themselves, explain their presence, and request entry to the residence. LE personnel request to speak to the person who placed the call. If the caller is someone other than the victim, LE personnel should not reveal the name or location of the caller. They should be persistent in accessing and speaking to the victim privately, but within eye contact of the other officer. If LE personnel are refused entry and forced entry appears imminent to investigate the call, the desk sergeant or other appropriate LE representative will coordinate with the staff judge advocate for legal advice. Delays in obtaining staff judge advocate legal opinions will not delay actions to preserve life as determined by on-scene patrols.

4-31. If there is an obvious imminent threat to persons at the location and the on-scene patrol determines that immediate forced access is required for the protection of persons at the site, LE personnel may proceed without waiting for staff judge advocate or other approval. LE personnel must thoroughly document observations in a patrol report, specifically the details that warranted the immediate entry. Additionally, LE personnel are responsible for—

- Remaining at the scene and speaking to the victim when there is evidence present which indicates that a crime has occurred. Such evidence may be the condition of the scene or the state of the person who is speaking to LE personnel.
- Remaining at the scene if they believe that serious injury has occurred or will occur.
- Entering quarters with consent of the parties involved or without consent, if necessary, to prevent serious bodily injury or render emergency aid to injured persons.
- Driving by the location after departing the scene to observe for further disturbances.
- Parking away from the scene location if remaining in the area to continue observation of the premises.

4-32. After LE personnel have accessed the scene, they establish control by—

- Identifying potential weapons in surrounding areas.
- Separating the alleged victim and the alleged suspect.
- Restraining, detaining, or apprehending the alleged suspect.
- Assessing injuries, administering first aid, and notifying emergency medical services.
- Inquiring about the alleged incident.
- Identifying occupants and witnesses on the premises.
- Separating occupants and witnesses from the alleged victims and suspects and keeping all persons out of hearing range of one another.
- Conducting a protective sweep to locate hiding or injured persons.

FIELD INTERVIEWS

4-33. Interviews that are conducted during LE activities and investigations are less structured than LE interrogations. LE personnel conduct interviews to gather information and determine facts about a crime or incident. During LE patrols, military police frequently conduct field interviews upon observation of suspicious activity or to attempt to gather information about a crime or incident.

4-34. An interview is a nonstructured discussion where open-ended questions are asked to determine facts about an incident or crime. LE patrols conduct interviews to determine as many facts as possible about the crime or incident to support preliminary and follow-up investigations. LE personnel must know the elements of proof for crimes that may have been committed to ensure that appropriate questions are asked and relevant information is obtained.

4-35. At a minimum, interviews that are conducted by LE patrols and investigators should address the following:

- **Who.** Determine the individuals who are involved in the incident, including victims, witnesses, and potential subjects.
- **What.** Determine what happened during the incident, including the major events or actions that are relevant to the incident.
- **When.** Identify when the incident occurred, including a chronology of events leading up to and following the incident.
- **Where.** Determine the exact location of where the incident occurred.
- **Why.** Identify the cause or motivation that caused the incident to occur.
- **How.** Determine how the incident occurred. Identify and obtain details of the specific actions leading up to and during the incident.

4-36. Document the information collected during the field interview, and forward it through operational channels to the operations section for processing. Locally produced field interview cards assist LE patrols in obtaining relevant information. Military police contact the persons who are identified during field interviews for further interview if crimes are later reported in that area. If the same person is habitually stopped in an area where criminal activity is identified, this may indicate a pattern of activity.

TRAFFIC STOPS

4-37. The enforcement of traffic laws and regulations is an important public safety activity. The purpose of traffic enforcement is to ensure that roads are safe for traffic and to compel compliance with traffic laws by motorists. Military police who conduct LE patrols are required to support traffic enforcement. An inherent task of traffic enforcement is identifying traffic law violators and performing traffic stops. When executing a traffic stop, military police conduct a number of actions, such as—

- Observing a moving violation.

Note. The observation of a moving violation serves as probable cause for initiating a traffic stop.

- Assessing the situation and determining where to initiate a traffic stop. This is done by—
 - Selecting a safe area for the stop.
 - Selecting a familiar area that is well lit.
 - Selecting an area away from heavy traffic to avoid hindering the flow of traffic.
 - Selecting an area where a traffic hazard will not be created; for example, not on a curve, at an intersection, or at the crest of a hill.
- Continuing to observe for suspicious behavior, such as unusual movement within the vehicle or objects being thrown from the vehicle.
- Radioing the military police station and providing the following information while continuing to observe the vehicle:
 - The location of the stop.
 - The license plate number and a description of the vehicle being stopped.
 - The number of occupants and a brief description of the occupants if known.
 - The reason for the stop.
- Initiating the traffic stop by—
 - Using emergency equipment to signal the vehicle to pull over immediately.
 - Offsetting the patrol vehicle by turning the front wheels to the left, leaving a distance of 10 to 12 feet (3.05 to 3.66 meters) between the subject vehicle and the patrol vehicle. (Illuminate the violator's vehicle during limited visibility.)

- Waiting until the National Criminal Information Center vehicle check comes back from the military police station via the radio before approaching the vehicle.

Note. If the National Criminal Information Center check indicates that the registered owner may be wanted for a more serious offense or that the vehicle is listed as stolen, reassess the situation and call for backup. At this point, the situation is now a high-risk traffic stop.

- Approaching the vehicle in the following manner:
 - Clear traffic to the front and rear, ensuring that it is safe to exit your vehicle.
 - Maintain visual contact with the violator's vehicle.
 - Press down on the trunk with the palm of your hand to ensure that it is closed.
 - Observe the interior of the vehicle for suspicious or threatening behavior during approach.
 - Stop at the driver's window, slightly behind the driver.
- Making contact with the driver by—
 - Identifying yourself, your official position, and the reason for the stop.
 - Requesting that the driver hand over his driver's license, vehicle registration (military dispatch if the vehicle is a military vehicle), proof of insurance and, if applicable, military identification card.
 - Instructing the driver and occupants to remain in the vehicle.
 - Returning to the patrol vehicle, ensuring that you do not turn your back to the violator's vehicle.
- Conducting a National Criminal Information Center check on the driver in the following manner:
 - Give the military police desk the driver's information according to the local SOP.
 - Take appropriate actions if the driver's license is suspended or revoked or if the driver is wanted on a warrant.
 - Continue with the original violation if the check comes back clear.
- Determining the COA before conducting one of the following procedures:
 - Write the appropriate citation, such as DD Form 1408 (*Armed Forces Traffic Ticket*) or a violation notice from the Central Violations Bureau, based on the circumstances and according to the local SOP.
 - Record the details of the stop in the patrol report according to the local SOP if a citation is not being issued.
- Issuing the citation to the violator in the following manner:
 - Return to the violator, remaining cautious and alert.
 - Explain to the violator that a citation is being issued or that a verbal warning is being given.
 - Give the violator the verbal warning or the appropriate copy of the citation form.
- Dismissing the violator in the following manner:
 - Return the violator's identification card, driver's license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration one at a time. Identify each item as it is returned.
 - Assist the driver in merging into the flow of traffic.
 - Notify the radio operator at the military police station of the action taken (verbal warning or citation), and then return to service.

FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS

4-38. After the initiation of a traffic stop, the military police patrol assesses if there is reason to suspect that the violator is impaired. The patrol investigates a suspected impaired driver by conducting preexit testing and

standardized field sobriety tests to determine if probable cause exists to charge the driver with driving while impaired. Investigating a suspected impaired driver requires a number of actions, such as—

- Determining if the driver is impaired by making initial contact with the driver via face-to-face observation and by using your senses.
- Looking for—
 - Bloodshot eyes.
 - Soiled clothing.
 - Fumbling fingers.
 - Alcohol containers.
 - Drugs or drug paraphernalia.
 - Bruises, bumps, or scratches.
 - Unusual actions.
- Listening for—
 - Slurred speech.
 - An admission of drinking.
 - Inconsistent responses.
 - Abusive language.
 - Unusual statements.
- Smelling for—
 - Alcoholic beverage odors.
 - Marijuana odors.
 - Cover-up odors (breath spray or peanut butter).
 - Unusual odors.
- Conducting preexit testing. Interview the driver by using multiple strategies, including the—
 - **Question-and-answer technique.** Ask questions that are simple, but divide the driver's attention; for example, ask the driver to provide the time without looking, or ask for two items simultaneously, such as asking the driver to produce a driver's license and a military identification card.
 - **Alphabet recital technique.** Ask the driver if he knows the alphabet. If the answer is yes or if it is apparent that a reasonable person would think that the driver would know the alphabet, instruct the driver to recite part of the alphabet, beginning with the letter E and stopping with the letter R or any other combination of letters that will cause the driver to start or stop at an unaccustomed place.
 - **Countdown test technique.** Ask the subject to count out loud 15 or more numbers in reverse sequence. Do not give this test using starting and stopping points that end in zero or five, because these numbers are too easy to recall.
 - **Finger-count test technique.** Ask the subject to touch the tip of the right thumb in turn to the tip of each finger on the right hand while simultaneously counting up one, two, three, and four. Ask the subject to reverse the direction on the fingers while simultaneously counting down four, three, two, and one. Demonstrate while providing instructions.
- Instructing the driver to exit the vehicle if you believe that probable cause exists that he is impaired.

Note. Individual patrols should request additional military police support when they conduct traffic stops that involve suspected impaired drivers. If an additional patrol is not available, military police must take the appropriate precautionary measures.

- Observing how the driver exits and walks. Look for—
 - Angry or unusual reactions.
 - The failure to follow instructions.

- Trouble opening the door.
- The use of hands on the vehicle to maintain balance.
- Escorting the driver to a position that is off the roadway where the lighting is appropriate. (The patrol may need to reposition the patrol car camera to record evidence if doing so does not increase the risk for military police.)
- Asking the driver if he has an injury that may affect him during the tests before conducting one of the following procedures:
 - Determine what the injury is, and seek further guidance from the military police desk sergeant on how to proceed if the driver states yes.
 - Continue with the standardized field sobriety tests if the driver states no.

4-39. Use DD Form 1920 (*Alcohol Incident Report*) to record the observations and behavior of persons who are suspected of driving while impaired. The suspect may refuse to perform these tests or may refuse to finish a test once started. If so, the LE patrol annotates the refusal on DD Form 1920.

4-40. The standardized field sobriety test battery is a series of three tests that are administered and evaluated in a standardized manner to obtain validated indicators of impairment and establish probable cause for apprehension. Military police conduct the following standardized field sobriety tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand.

DANGER

When conducting standardized field sobriety tests, be aware of the positions of weapons (pistols and military police clubs) in relation to the driver. Keep weapons facing away from the individual being tested, and maintain a safe distance. Failure to comply may result in personal injury or death.

Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Tests

4-41. The horizontal gaze nystagmus test is an involuntary jerking of the eye that occurs naturally as the eyes gaze to the side and is undetectable to the naked eye without the contributing effects of alcohol. Under normal circumstances, nystagmus occurs when the eyes are rotated at high peripheral angles. However, when a person is impaired by alcohol, nystagmus is exaggerated and may occur at lesser angles. In the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the officer observes the eyes of a suspect as the suspect follows a slowly moving object, such as a pen or small flashlight, horizontally with his eyes. An alcohol-impaired person often has difficulty smoothly tracking a moving object. The examiner tests for the following indicators of impairment in each eye:

- If the eye cannot follow a moving object smoothly (lack of smooth pursuit).
- If jerking is distinct when the eye is at maximum deviation (the onset of nystagmus before 45°).
- If the angle of the onset of jerking is within 45° of the center (maximum deviation before 45°).
- If, between the two eyes, four or more clues appear.

Note. Only those Soldiers who are certified according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration are permitted to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.

Walk-and-Turn Tests

4-42. The walk-and-turn test is a divided attention test that is easily performed by most unimpaired persons. It requires a suspect to listen to and follow instructions while performing simple physical movements.

Impaired persons have difficulty with tasks that require their attention to be divided between simple mental and physical exercises. Administer the walk-and-turn test by conducting the following actions:

- Point out the line on which the driver will walk and turn. If no lines are available, instruct the driver to walk in a generally straight line.
 - Point out that there are no obstructions, and ensure that the individual understands where to perform the test.
 - Instruct the driver to assume the start position. Tell him to place his right foot in front of his left foot and to keep his arms at his sides without grabbing his pants while he listens to the instructions.
 - Demonstrate to the driver how to properly stand for the test.
 - Instruct the driver to stay in the start position and to remain in that position until instructed to begin the test.
 - Instruct the driver not to walk until told to do so.
 - Ensure that the driver understands the instructions.
- Explain as you demonstrate the walk-and-turn test by conducting the following actions:
 - Tell the driver that, when told to start, he must take nine heel-to-toe steps down the line, turn around, and take nine heel-to-toe steps back up the line. Demonstrate two or three heel-to-toe steps.
 - Instruct the driver that when turning he must keep the front foot on the line and turn by pivoting on the front foot, taking a series of small steps with the other foot. Demonstrate and say, “While you are walking, keep your arms at your sides, watch your feet at all times, and count your steps out loud.”
 - Inform the driver that once he starts walking, he is not to stop until the test is completed.
 - Ask the driver if he understands the instructions.
 - Instruct the driver to begin. Count his first step from the heel-to-toe position as “One.”
- Observe the driver’s performance, and record observations. The following actions are indications of poor performance on the test:
 - Cannot keep balance while listening to instructions.
 - Starts before instructions are finished.
 - Stops to steady self while walking.
 - Does not touch heel to toe.
 - Steps off the line.
 - Uses arms to maintain balance.
 - Turns improperly.
 - Takes an incorrect number of steps.
 - Stops to ask how to conduct the turn, whether or not to turn, or how many steps to take.

4-43. Sometimes suspects cannot complete the test. The inability to complete the test occurs when the suspect—

- Steps off the line three or more times.
- Is in danger of falling.
- Cannot do the test.

One-Leg Stand Tests

4-44. The one-leg stand test is also a divided attention test that requires a suspect to listen to and follow instructions while he performs simple physical movements. By forcing a driver to concentrate on two tasks at once, the test is designed to evaluate mental and physical impairment. Administer the one-leg stand test by conducting the following actions:

- Instruct the driver to stand with his feet together and to keep his arms at his sides.
- Explain as you demonstrate the one-leg stand in the following manner:

- Tell the driver that, when told to start, he must stand on one leg while holding the other foot out in front of him.
- Demonstrate the one-leg stand.
- Inform the driver that he may stand on either leg.
- Inform the driver to keep his raised foot straight, about 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) off the ground, with his toes pointed forward so that the foot is approximately parallel to the ground.
- Demonstrate the correct position.
- Inform the driver that while looking at his raised foot, he must count aloud in the following manner, “One thousand and one, one thousand and two,” and so on until he reaches, “one thousand and thirty.” (Use any similar sequence of numbers for the counting task.)
- Ensure that the driver understands the instructions.
- Instruct the driver to begin the test.
- Check and record the time that the subject holds up his foot.
- Stop the driver when 30 seconds have passed.
- Look for the following actions during the test:
 - Sways while balancing.
 - Uses arms for balance.
 - Hops.
 - Puts his foot down.
- Sometimes suspects cannot complete the test. The inability to complete the test occurs when the suspect—
 - Puts his foot down three or more times during the 30-second count.
 - Is in danger of falling.
 - Cannot do the test.

INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED

4-45. Military police determine if probable cause exists to apprehend the driver for driving while impaired based on the evidence collected during preexit testing and standardized field sobriety tests. LE patrols process an individual suspected of driving while impaired by conducting the following actions:

- Apprehend the subject.
- Initiate a chain of custody on the evidence that is relevant to the case.
- Transport the subject to the military police station.
- Issue an implied consent warning for breath and bodily fluid testing according to the local SOP.
- Warn the subject that refusal to voluntarily submit to or complete a requested chemical test results in the revocation of driving privileges. The subject does not have the right to have an attorney present before stating if he will submit to a test or during the actual test.
- Escort the subject to the chemical testing area for breath tests or to a medical treatment facility for bodily fluid tests if the subject consents voluntarily, and obtain a chemical test according to the local SOP. (Chemical breath tests are conducted by qualified personnel as outlined in AR 190-5.)
- Do not administer a test if the subject who is suspected of impaired driving refuses to submit to a chemical test. (Exceptions to this rule are outlined in AR 190-5.)
- Issue applicable citations according to the local SOP.
- Release the subject to the military police desk sergeant.
- Complete a hard copy DA Form 3975, or complete it via the Centralized Operations Police Suite.
- Complete and submit applicable forms according to the local SOP.

PERSONNEL SEARCHES

4-46. A search is an examination, authorized by law, of a specific person, property, or area for specified evidence or property for the purpose of seizing such property, evidence, or person. Military police perform many types of personnel searches, such as frisk searches, stand-up searches, and prone searches. The degree of detail with which military police conduct a personnel search depends on many different factors. The LE patrol must determine which type of search to perform based on the situation and the authorization to search.

4-47. When conducting a search, it is essential to adhere to basic search principles. Following these guidelines ensures an effective search and promotes the safety of military police and the subject. These search principles apply to all search methods and include—

- Conducting searches by using a two-Soldier team when possible—one to conduct the search and the other to provide security and overwatch. (Enlist another military police Soldier to assist if possible, but be prepared to search without one if necessary.)
- Searching in a clear, secure area.
- Conducting same-gender searches. (If mixed-gender searches are necessary for speed or security, conduct them in a respectful manner. To prevent allegations of misconduct, avoid actions that could be interpreted as sexual in nature.)
- Putting the subject at a disadvantage by placing him in a position that compromises his balance or by securing his hands with handcuffs or disposable restraints.
- Staying behind and to the side of the subject when conducting the search. (This provides a tactical advantage to military police and prevents being struck by the subject's elbows or knees if the subject begins to resist.)
- Mentally dividing the body into two parts vertically. Repeat the search on both sides by using the same sequence while overlapping center areas.
- Being ready to counter resistance or an assault by the subject. Employ the appropriate level of force immediately in response to the actions of the subject.
- Considering the subject to be armed until the search proves otherwise.

Frisk Searches

4-48. The frisk search is the most common method of individual searches employed by military police who conduct police operations. The frisk search is an effective method of identifying weapons or contraband on an individual during a consent search, Terry stop, or search incident to apprehension. A frisk is a search of a person's outer clothing to detect concealed weapons or contraband. Perform a frisk search by conducting the following actions:

- Direct the subject to—
 - Raise his arms above his head, lock his elbows, and spread his fingers with his palms facing you.
 - Turn so that his back is toward you.
 - Spread his feet apart (more than shoulder-width) with his toes pointed out.
 - Interlock his fingers and place his hands on the top of his head.
- Ensure that the assisting military police Soldier, if available, is in the correct position. The assisting military police Soldier stands in front of the subject and to one side, at a 45° angle and out of the subject's reach.
- Conduct the frisk by running your hands along the outside of the subject's garments only.
- Do not search the subject's pockets or waistband unless the patdown suggests the presence of a weapon.
- Ask for permission to search items that the subject is carrying, such as a purse or backpack. If given permission, search the items in a manner that is consistent with looking for weapons. If the subject refuses to give permission or if you are unsure if you are authorized to search these items, contact the military police desk sergeant for further guidance.
- Stop the search if a weapon is found, and take the necessary safety measures before continuing the search.

Stand-Up Searches

4-49. Similar to the frisk search, the stand-up search is used to detect concealed contraband or weapons. The stand-up search is methodical and thorough. Military police may conduct the stand-up search while the subject is or is not wearing handcuffs or disposable restraints. The decision to use handcuffs or disposable restraints is based on the current situation and local LE SOPs. If local policy permits, it is safer to restrain the subject before searching because it is impossible to predict what a subject will do when he is apprehended. Perform the following actions when conducting a stand-up search while a subject is wearing handcuffs or disposable restraints:

- Direct the subject to—
 - Turn and face away from you.
 - Spread his feet until you say, “Stop.”
 - Point his toes outward.
 - Bring his hands behind his back with his palms out and thumbs pointed upward.
 - Stand still.
- Ensure that the assisting military police Soldier, if available, is in the correct position. The supporting military police Soldier stands in front of the subject and to one side, at a 45° angle and out of the subject’s reach.
- Approach the subject cautiously, apply handcuffs, and maintain positive control of the subject throughout the search.
- Position yourself behind the subject. Maintain balance by placing your front foot forward and your rear foot to the outside of the subject’s feet.
- Search the subject by using the pat-and-crush method. Examine—
 - The subject’s headgear. Before crushing, bend the seams of the headgear to determine if razor blades or similar items are hidden inside. Complete the search of the headgear, and place it on the ground.
 - The head and hair.
 - The selected side from the arm to the shoulder.
 - The neck and collar. Bring neckwear worn by the subject to the back, and inspect it carefully for weapons or contraband.
 - The selected side of the back from the shoulder to the waist.
 - The selected side of the chest from the shoulder to the waist.

Note. When searching females, check the bra by pulling out the center far enough to allow concealed weapons or contraband to fall out.

- The selected side waistband. Begin in the front, and work around to the middle of the back. Before crushing, bend the waistband material to detect contraband or weapons. Check between the belt and the pants, the pants and the undergarment, and the undergarment and the skin.
- The selected side of the buttocks.

Note. Squat, rather than bend, to maintain your balance when searching the lower half of the subject’s body.

- The selected side hip, abdomen, and crotch.
- The selected side leg from the crotch to the top of the shoe.
- The selected side shoe. Check the top edge of the boot or shoe by carefully inserting a finger along the top edge to feel for weapons.
- Reverse the position of your feet, and search the opposite side.

Prone Searches

4-50. Military police use the prone search when the situation requires a detailed search of the subject for the safety of military police personnel and the subject. Military police also use the prone search when handling a noncompliant subject. The prone search is a systematic and comprehensive search method for concealed contraband or weapons. Before conducting a prone search, military police restrain the subject with handcuffs or disposable restraints. The military police Soldier assesses the situation and determines if physical force, such as an arm bar takedown, should be employed to promote subject compliance. Military police perform the following actions when conducting a prone search:

- Position the subject.
 - Tell the subject to face you, raise his arms above his head, lock his elbows, and spread his fingers with his palms facing you.
 - Visually check the subject's hands for evidence of weapons.
 - Order the subject to turn around and drop to his knees.
 - Search the back of the subject's hands for evidence of weapons.
 - Direct the subject to lie on his stomach and extend his arms straight out to the sides with his palms up and to place his forehead on the ground.
 - Tell the subject to spread his legs as far as possible, turn his feet outward, and keep his heels in contact with the ground.
- Ensure that the assistant, if available, is in front of and to one side of the subject, opposite the side being searched first.
- Apply handcuffs or disposable restraints in the following manner:
 - Approach the front of the subject at a 45° angle.
 - Squat, and place your knee that is nearest the subject between his shoulder blades.
 - Direct the subject to put his arm that is nearest you behind him with his palm facing up.
 - Grasp the subject's hand in a handshake hold, and apply the first handcuff or disposable restraint.
 - Hold the chain between the handcuffs or the area between the disposable restraints while simultaneously holding the belt or waistband of the subject's trousers, and direct the subject to put his other hand behind him, with his palm facing out. Apply the other handcuff or disposable restraint.
- Search the subject by using a rub-down or squeezing method in the following sequence:
 - Hold the chain that is found between the handcuffs or in the area between the disposable restraints, and lift the subject's arms slightly. Search the area in the small of the back and areas where the subject can reach. Release the restraint, and stand.
 - Move to the subject's waist, and face the subject's head. Squat, but do not rest your knee on the ground or on the subject. If necessary, pivot to conduct the rest of the search.
 - Remove the subject's headgear. Before crushing, bend the seams of the headgear to determine if razor blades or similar items are hidden inside. Complete the search of the headgear, and place it on the ground.
- Search the subject's head and hair.
- Search the subject from fingers to shoulders.
- Search the collar and neck area. Bring neckwear worn by the subject to the back, and remove anything that could be used as a weapon.
- Search the subject's back from shoulder to waist on the side nearest you.
- Grasp the inside of the subject's closest elbow, and pull the subject toward his side, just enough to search the front without the subject being completely placed on his side. Then search the front from shoulder to waist.

Note. When searching females, check the bra by pulling out the center far enough to allow concealed weapons or contraband to fall out.

- Switch hands while controlling the subject's elbow without changing position.
- Search the subject from waist to knee, including the crotch.
- Return the subject to the facedown position, and release his elbow. Remind the subject to keep his feet spread and his heels on the floor.
- Tell the subject to raise his foot by bending at the knee.
- Grasp the subject's foot, and search from the knee to the foot. Check the top of the footwear by inserting a finger along the top edge and feeling for evidence of weapons. Also check the sides and soles of footwear.
- Tell the subject to put his foot back down.
- Stand, and move to the subject's unsearched side. Move around the subject's head, but do not walk between the subject and the assistant military police Soldier.
- Ensure that the assistant moves to the side opposite of the side being searched.
- Squat beside the subject with your body facing the same direction as the subject's head.
- Search the subject's other side by using the same method.
- Help the subject stand when the search is complete. Turn him onto his side so that he is facing away from you, and tell him to bring his knees up to his chest. Grasp his arms, and assist him to his knees and then to his feet.

Note. If interrupted during the search, restart from the beginning to ensure that an area is not overlooked.

VEHICLE SEARCHES

4-51. Apprehending military police have the authority to make a warrantless search of the interior of a vehicle at the time and place of the apprehension if there is probable cause to apprehend one of the occupants. When a person is lawfully apprehended, that person and the surrounding area can be searched. The search for weapons or destructible evidence is conducted. The surrounding area of the person consists of the area within immediate control and the area in which the person being apprehended could reasonably reach with a sudden movement to obtain a weapon or evidence. This area can be anywhere, including inside a vehicle. To search a vehicle incident to apprehension, the apprehended individual must be within reaching distance of the passenger compartment or it must be reasonable to believe that the passenger compartment of the vehicle contains evidence that is related to the offense of the apprehension. This search does not include the trunk or engine compartment.

4-52. The scope of the search can extend to the entire automobile if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. The warrantless search does not need to take place where the apprehension of the occupant took place if there is a valid reason for conducting the search at another location, such as at the military police station. However, key to this exception is that the exigent circumstances that make obtaining a search authorization impractical must be present. The vehicle must be one that a reasonable person would believe to be operable. Clear indications of an inoperable car would be if there was no motor or the car was on blocks. This search exception is different from the search incident to apprehension in that Army LE personnel must have probable cause of a crime that is above and beyond that of the probable cause to apprehend.

4-53. When an LE patrol stops an automobile, the military police who conduct the stop must make a protective search of the passenger compartment if there is reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains weapons that are potentially dangerous to the patrol. The investigative search extends to the areas of the passenger compartment in which a weapon may be placed or hidden. Just because there is a stop of an automobile does not mean that the patrol conducts an investigative search.

4-54. If military police see items (such as drugs or drug paraphernalia or evidence of a crime) in plain view while they are conducting a traffic stop, there is probable cause to believe that other evidence is located inside the vehicle. Therefore, military police can search the vehicle there or they can have the vehicle taken to the military police station to be searched. If the car was not in motion before the owner was taken into custody,

and if there was no likelihood that the vehicle would be removed by a third party, military police obtain a search warrant to search the vehicle.

4-55. Military police are also trained to perform vehicle inspections at access control points, such as entries to or exits from installations. An inspection never requires probable cause and, at times, is more intrusive than a search. A commander of a U.S. military installation authorizes appropriate personnel to inspect persons or the property of those persons as a prerequisite for entry to, or exit from, that installation. Deny entry to any individual who refuses the inspection. This inspection or search can include the entire vehicle (including the trunk and engine compartment) and containers in the subject's possession. The inspection or search is not conducted for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence of crimes to be used in courts-martial or other disciplinary proceedings. However, if military police discover evidence during the course of the inspection or search, they must handle and process the items according to AR 195-5 and ATP 3-39.12.

4-56. Military police conduct vehicle searches in teams of no less than two LE personnel—a searcher and security. Perform vehicle searches according to the local SOP or as outlined in STP 19-31B1-SM. Conduct a vehicle search by—

- Informing the occupants of the reason for the search.
- Identifying the occupants by looking at their driver's licenses or identification cards.
- Directing the occupants to get out of the vehicle.
- Directing the occupants (with the exception of the driver) to move to a place about 5 meters (5.47 yards) from the vehicle, out of the flow of traffic where they can be observed.
- Directing the driver to open doors and compartments, to include the ashtray, glove box, armrest, trunk, and hood. After this task is complete, tell the driver to join the other occupants of the car.
- Searching the outside of the vehicle. Simultaneously look for electrical wires that seem out of place and for unidentifiable foreign objects. Search—
 - The undercarriage and other areas that are difficult to see. (Use a mirror and/or flashlight if necessary.)
 - Under the left front fender well and behind the wheel.
 - Under the front bumper and behind and under the grill.
 - Under the hood and areas behind the radiator and around the engine.
 - Under the right front fender well and behind the wheel.
 - Under the right side of the body, back to and including the right rear fender well and behind the wheel.
 - Inside cargo areas and the trunk.
 - Under and behind the rear bumper.
 - Under the left rear fender well and behind the wheel.
 - Under the left side of the body, back to the left front fender well.
 - The top of the vehicle.
 - Around the fuel tank(s).
- Searching the inside of the vehicle, to include—
 - Behind and under the seat.
 - Under the dashboard.
 - Inside the glove and tool compartments.
 - Above the sun visor.

AUTHORITY TO APPREHEND

4-57. Authority refers to the right of LE personnel to exercise power and exact obedience. Article 7 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives Army LE personnel (including security police, military police, and persons designated by proper authorities to perform military criminal investigative, guard, or police duties)—whether subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice or not—the authority to apprehend military personnel for any violation of the code. This authority applies worldwide and is subject to the restrictions in Manual for Courts-Martial United States, Rule 302.

4-58. The Uniform Code of Military Justice does not typically grant Army LE personnel arrest authority over civilians during routine police operations within the United States. However, the base and base camp commander's inherent authority to protect the base and base camp permits Army LE personnel, as agents of the base and base camp commander, to apprehend civilians for offenses that occur on the installation. This arrest authority is limited in that Army LE personnel can detain civilians for a reasonable period of time to investigate the incident before turning them over to an appropriate civilian LE authority.

MILITARY POLICE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT

4-59. Traffic management and enforcement are integral parts of police operations. The maintenance and orderly movement of personnel, equipment, supplies, and other resources are critical to military operations and to a functioning civilian infrastructure. Military police traffic management and enforcement are important components of the overall effort to establish and maintain traffic control to protect personnel and resources.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT RESPONSE

4-60. When dispatched to a traffic accident, military police quickly assess the situation and determine priorities based on specific factors, such as the severity of the accident, roadway blockages, injuries, and environmental conditions. The on-scene investigation is primarily concerned with data gathering and recording. At an accident scene, military police conduct a number of actions, such as—

- **Establishing traffic control.** Traffic control mitigates the risk of additional accidents that are caused by the traffic flow degradation created by the initial accident. Upon arrival, military police determine if traffic control is needed before conducting one of the following procedures:
 - For minor accidents where damage is minimal and no injuries are reported, direct the accident vehicles out of the roadway to eliminate traffic control requirements.
 - For major accidents, the vehicles are best left in place until an investigation of the accident site can be completed. (The intent is to prevent other collisions from occurring and to protect the scene while gaining as much information as possible to accurately report the incident.)
 - For traffic control, additional patrols provide assistance until the scene is cleared. (For major accidents that involve life-threatening injuries or fatalities, scene processing may take several hours.)
- **Assessing incidents for the presence of hazmat.** Military police who respond to an accident site survey the immediate area for the presence of hazmat. This is especially true in accidents that involve commercial vehicles. While not as likely, passenger vehicles may also have hazmat onboard. Military police responder actions include the following:
 - Approach a scene, and remain observant for signs of spills or odors which might indicate that hazmat is present. Placards on vehicles are indicators of possible hazmat onboard.
 - Identify safety precautions to protect LE personnel and the public if hazmat is discovered. Request assistance from the fire department or other hazmat response elements if necessary.
- **Identifying injured personnel.** Military police determine the extent of injuries to people at the accident scene and administer first aid and emergency treatment, as needed, while waiting for medical first responders to arrive. The fire department is alerted to extract personnel who are trapped within the wreckage. Military police recommend that persons with injuries (even those with minor injuries) seek evaluation by medical personnel to ensure that more serious medical problems are not present.
- **Taking action to protect property.** The scene should be secured to protect property and preserve evidence. The personal property of collision victims must be gathered and returned to the victims or inventoried and secured until the property is returned.
- **Requesting additional support.** Military police must assess the requirements for additional emergency response capabilities. Additional support includes—
 - Medical.
 - Fire.

- Hazmat response.
- Civil engineer.
- Towing.
- Portable lighting.
- Temporary traffic control.
- **Obtaining vehicle and operator information.** Military police check items such as driver's licenses, military identifications, vehicle registrations, and proof of insurances on accident victims.
- **Identifying damage.** Military police assess the damage to vehicles and surrounding facilities and infrastructure and then document identified information.
- **Locating and interviewing witnesses.** Military police identify and separate potential witnesses. When possible, witnesses should be separated until interviews are complete to prevent discussion that may influence their perception of the events that surround the accident. Document the witness interviews that are not annotated on witness statements in the military police accident report.
- **Gathering required information.** Responding military police obtain the facts that surround the accident for inclusion in the accident report. Verify information by statements or physical evidence, including measurements for diagrams of the accident scene when applicable.
- **Completing the accident report.** Military police use gathered data and observations to complete DA Form 3946 (*Military Police Traffic Accident Report*) and supporting documentation.

TRAFFIC CONSIDERATIONS

4-61. Traffic management and enforcement are conducted in support of police operations and are LE or policing tasks that directly support the maintenance of good order and discipline as part of a broader police operations mission set that is performed by military police. The LE tasks that are related to traffic management and enforcement include those associated with traffic enforcement and accidents. Military police conduct additional traffic control tasks to enable the freedom of movement and maximize traffic flow through the—

- Employment of police engagement and public awareness activities.
- Use of traffic control posts when required during peak traffic times, special events, accidents, disasters, or other incidents.
- Analysis and assessment of traffic conditions to develop recommendations and solutions to traffic problems.

4-62. Traffic accident investigators receive specialized training to conduct traffic management and enforcement. They possess specific capabilities in traffic accident investigations and the enforcement of traffic-related laws, including suppression of driving-under-the-influence violations. Traffic accident investigators provide expertise and assist the provost marshal and military police staff in developing traffic control and enforcement plans. These plans combine the elements of traffic management and enforcement (enforcement, investigation, and control) into a holistic traffic plan.

HOST NATION POLICE TRAINING AND SUPPORT

4-63. Military police play a central role in U.S. military efforts to establish civil control by identifying gaps and capabilities in existing HN police capacities, including infrastructure and organizational requirements. The applications of police operations and the requirements for military police to conduct HN police training and support operations have grown tremendously as nation-building and protracted stability actions have demonstrated the need for civil security and control.

4-64. Initially, military police provide the required technical capabilities and skill sets to conduct police operations in support of HN populations to establish civil security and set the conditions that are necessary to regenerate HN police capability and capacity. Military police then recruit, train, partner with, and mentor HN police organizations until the forces are capable of independent LE and police operations.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR RECRUITING HOST NATION POLICE

4-65. Successful police recruitment is critical when reconstituting HN police forces. Consider the following when developing an HN police recruiting program:

- Set up recruitment centers in secure areas that are protected from attacks by threat elements that oppose U.S. and HN efforts.
- Establish and enforce a clear set of appropriate mental, physical, and moral standards.
- Develop police recruitment programs with substantial input from local HN authorities, take local culture into account, and use themes that resonate with the local population.
- Ensure that major demographic groups are properly represented. The United States and multinational partners encourage and support HN efforts to recruit from minority populations.

4-66. The careful vetting of candidates and the cooperation of community leaders are necessary if the local police are to become an effective and legitimate force. The failure to properly vet potential police candidates results in significant, long-term problems. Criminals, persons with psychological issues, insurgent elements, and many other categories of undesirable personnel may attempt to gain employment within the police force. The military police brigade and battalion intelligence officers and staffs must be heavily involved in the vetting process.

4-67. Police leader candidate standards must be high. Candidates must possess good health and have the ability to pass an academic test that is set to a higher standard than those for enlisted police recruits. Potential leadership level candidates should be carefully vetted to ensure that there are no close ties to criminal or radical organizations. Lower-level police supervisors are selected from the best police force members to ensure that objective standards are established and enforced and that promotion is by merit and not through unlawful influence, nepotism, or other factors.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOST NATION POLICE TRAINING

4-68. Military police units are skilled at providing police development and transition teams to train HN police personnel in basic and advanced LE skills, investigations, police station operations, and senior police leader skills. Military police are also capable of providing specialty training in functional course areas, such as counterdrug operations, forensics, or advanced investigative techniques based on local needs. Police development and transition teams may serve in an advisory role to assist in the transition of responsibility for domestic security to the HN police to provide a safe and secure environment.

4-69. HN police training must be simultaneously conducted from the most senior administrative levels to ground level police patrols. The conduct of an effective HN police training program requires consistency and synchronization in the application of training, policy directives, and logistics support. Successful HN police training requires military police to—

- Assess police roles, responsibilities, structures, management procedures, and practices.
- Determine existing and required police capabilities and capacities, including logistics and administrative support for police operations.
- Understand the traditional role of police within the HN and develop training strategies to change the institutional culture of the police force, if required, to one that emphasizes public service, humane treatment, and established principles of policing.
- Build intra- and interagency linkages to ensure that police activities complement the other key functions within the civil authority triad (judicial system and corrections).
- Ensure that effective and consistent police training capabilities are present within the HN police infrastructure.
- Train and develop investigative processes, including the gathering, handling, and preserving of evidence (to include maintaining a viable chain of custody) to support ongoing prosecutions.
- Enhance the ability of police services to plan and develop police intelligence analysis skills.
- Develop and strengthen policies and mechanisms for police accountability.

4-70. The objective of a police training program is to develop a legitimate, trustworthy, and professional HN police force. As proficiencies increase, HN police assume leading roles while military police observe,

monitor, and advise personnel during multinational operations. Over time, military police continue to assume more of a teaching, coaching, and mentoring role.

4-71. Military police or corrections personnel may also provide training for detention operations. Appropriate U.S. personnel can train HN personnel to handle and interview detainees and prisoners according to internationally recognized human rights standards. Prisoner and detainee management procedures provide for the security and the fair and efficient processing of detained personnel.

HOST NATION POLICE CAPABILITIES

4-72. An accurate assessment of the HN police is critical to successful training plan development. Military police who perform HN police training and development conduct initial and ongoing assessments of LE and detention elements to evaluate progress and determine if the training plan needs modification. Thorough and accurate assessments of the HN police capability enable military police to develop training, advisement plans, and goals based on identified capability gaps.

4-73. Table 4-2 provides considerations for assessing HN LE capabilities. Not all questions need to be asked directly because the assessment element may be able to intuitively determine answers. Additional required questions are based on the organization, operational environment, and other factors. Each area should be assessed by LE personnel who possess the background and experience to make informed assessments.

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations

<i>Area of Focus</i>	<i>Information Requirements</i>
Operating Environment Considerations	
General Organizational Data	• Who are the main security providers (state and nonstate)? • What is the division of responsibility between security providers? • What role does the military play in civil security matters? • What are the major problems of community safety? • What types of injustices do people experience regularly? • What is the LE approach? • Are some communities underserved by police? • What are the sources of LE funding (formal and informal)? • What role did the police play under the previous government? ▪ Limited to minor crime and traffic patrols? ▪ Full capability organization consistent with Western police standards? ▪ Showpiece organization? ▪ State security? • Do the police have a history of following the rule of law and due process steps, or are they known for heavy-handed or abusive policing tactics? • What is the demographic breakdown of the police? ▪ Does it match the breakdown of the country? ▪ Do regional and local police forces match their local demographics? • Which priorities directed the location of police stations? ▪ Are stations located for political or crime-deterrence reasons? ▪ Are police assets equitably dispersed based on population and criminal analysis? • Can the public easily access the police stations? Are they willing to make complaints at the station? • Does the public view the police as a professional organization? If not, how are they viewed (cronyism, thugs, an enforcement arm of a tyrannical state, inept, incompetent, corrupt)?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

<i>Area of Focus</i>	<i>Information Requirements</i>
Police Training Functions	
Training	• Is there required formal training before initial employment? • Is there required transition training? • Is there required refresher or sustainment training? • Is patrol or crime prevention training provided? • Is traffic management and accident investigation training provided? • Is there required, daily institutionalized roll call training? • Does a field training officer program exist? • Are distance learning programs provided?
Training Curriculum	• Does the training program fully prepare officers to maintain the rule of law and abide by judicial and prosecutorial directives? • Is training on human rights incorporated throughout the curriculum? • Are the police trained to handle known threats? • Is regular human rights refresher training conducted during normal duties? • Does the training curriculum use a skills-based environment and on-the-job training? • Does the training curriculum promote human, individual, and constitutional rights? • Does training prepare police for handling crimes against women and instruct them on how to interact with female victims?
Academy or Training Management and Infrastructure	• Do formal police academies exist? At what command levels? • Are there national training requirements? Are those requirements enforced at all police levels? • Does the academy have instructor and curriculum development guidelines? • Does the academy or academies have sufficient resources? • Are training records maintained for all personnel attending police training (including those who failed to complete entry level training)?
Police Station Operations	
Police Desk Operations	• Does each police station maintain a functional police desk to— ▪ Receive incoming calls for police assistance? ▪ Prioritize the employment of resources and assign tasks? ▪ Initiate notifications regarding reported incidents of police activity? ▪ Review the initial case work of LE patrols? ▪ Maintain a police journal to document police activities and contacts? • Do police desk personnel have access to LE databases and reporting systems? • Are procedures in place for maintaining police station security?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

Area of Focus	Information Requirements
Police Station Operations (continued)	
Case Management Practices	• What happens when an allegation or complaint about a crime is made? ▪ Is it recorded immediately? By whom? ▪ Is there a standard format for recording initial crime reports? ▪ Is it made on paper or on an automated system? ▪ How is the immediate action identified and managed? ▪ How does the person who initially records the crime report manage the issue? ▪ Who must be notified about the crime? • Are procedures in place that accurately record information about arrested suspects and their property? Are these records updated and forwarded as the suspect moves through the system, and are file copies maintained at the originating station?
Information Sharing	• Does a formal information-sharing mechanism exist within the criminal justice system? If so, how is it used? • Is there active and routine coordination among the LE community, the prosecutor's office, corrections, and the border police? Does this include the means for— ▪ Court orders to be communicated to police? ▪ Corrections to notify police of legitimate inmate release and illegitimate escapes? • Is there active coordination or formal information sharing between the LE community and agencies that deliver public services, such as social services, public health, and behavioral health? • Is there a reliable liaison between the LE community and nonstate providers of security who operate under an official assignment? • Is there a formal mechanism for oversight, coordination, and regulation with nonstate security providers? • Is there an operational liaison with international organizations that contribute to the policing efforts of the country?
Police Records and Statistics	• Do the following functions exist? ▪ A booking station system. ▪ A property- and evidence-tracking system. ▪ Effective criminal records management of active cases. ▪ Centralized historical criminal archives. • Are police incidents reported in a uniform manner? • Do the following systems exist? ▪ Case tracking. ▪ Police services tracking. ▪ Traffic and vehicle databases. • Are statistics maintained on police service requests, crime reports, and arrest and conviction rates?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

Area of Focus	Information Requirements
Police Station Operations (continued)	
Police Information and Intelligence	• Are statistics regarding the incidence of criminal offenses against a variety of criteria compiled? Are they compiled in relation to local, regional, and national geographical areas? Are these statistics available to the public? Are they available to local, regional, and national police commanders? • Do laws that govern the collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal intelligence and personal information exist? Do the police adhere to these laws and policies? • Do the police have a means (such as photograph records or fingerprints) of confirming a person's identity? • Do police develop identity records (such as photographs, fingerprints, and narrative descriptions) of suspects as allowed by law? At what command level are these records maintained? Can stations cross-reference the data? If so, to what level? • Can police at every level collect, evaluate, collate, analyze, and disseminate police information and criminal intelligence up, down, and laterally across the organization? • Is all information and intelligence recorded in some manner (hardcopy or electronically) at the originating station and forwarded to higher headquarters? • Do the police have personnel who are dedicated to evaluating and analyzing intelligence? Are they specially trained? • Do the police make operational decisions based on gathered intelligence? • Are police leaders held accountable for their effectiveness at responding to criminal patterns that are identified through intelligence?
Detention Operations	• Are there policies in place that govern the treatment of detainees in police custody? Are police personnel acting in compliance with those policies? • Are detainees housed separately from prisoners (pretrial versus posttrial)? • Do the police have processes in place to move detainees to a police level where they will appear before a judge, or does a judge travel to the police stations? • Are detainees normally seen by a judge within the period prescribed by law? • Are juvenile and women detainees housed separately from men? • Do the police have policies for injured detainees and special-needs detainees (those who are mentally ill, are a threat to self or others, or are subject to threats from other detainees)? • Do the police maintain accurate records of all detainees, including— ▪ Identification? ▪ Reason for arrest? ▪ Injuries or illnesses? ▪ Personal property? ▪ Disposition of the detainee?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

Area of Focus	Information Requirements
Police Station Operations (continued)	
Detention Operations (continued)	Are these records maintained after the detainee is released or transferred? Note. Considerations pertaining to detention operations are found in ATP 3-39.20 and FM 3-63.
Public Relations and Interaction With the Public	- Does LE program participants engage in community outreach activities, public relations activities, or other routine public interaction activities? - Do LE program participants organize public awareness meetings? - Do the police leaders regularly meet with local government officials, such as mayors or council members, to discuss police operations or issues?
Specialized Police Units	- Do police services possess the capability to manage civil disturbances without resorting to military support? - Do specialized unit capabilities exist, including— - Special-reaction or special-weapons teams? - Explosive ordnance disposal teams? - Protection for dignitaries, high-profile individuals, or other important persons? - Narcotics and explosives detection police dogs? - Are proper training and equipment provided? Are they employed properly?
Criminal Database and Collection of Crime Statistics	- Does a centralized criminal evidence database exist? - Who manages and maintains it? - Who has access to it? - Who enters the evidence and information into the system? - Can evidence be cross-referenced in the database to develop leads or connections? - Are crime statistics collected in a reliable and generally accessible (digital or otherwise automated) criminal database? - Is the criminal database or collection of crime statistics used for strategic analyses?
Patrol Operations	
Patrol Activities	- Do the police actively patrol communities or assigned jurisdictions, or do they remain in the stations and only respond to calls? - Do police patrols respond to calls for service and crime threats in a timely fashion? - Can police stations take complaints on location and telephonically? Can the stations dispatch patrols via radio?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

<i>Area of Focus</i>	<i>Information Requirements</i>
Patrol Operations (continued)	
Patrol Activities (continued)	• Are police patrol officers equipped with the transportation and tools that are necessary to perform their responsibilities? • Are they trained for, and capable of, resolving calls for service on the scene? • Are all LE officers (not just investigators) trained in crime scene preservation? Are they trained in what to look for and how to protect evidence? Are they aware of potential cross contamination issues? Are they supplied with latex or similar gloves? Do they know how to bag, label, and record evidence and exhibits? In major cases, is an officer designated to ensure continuity and preserve the integrity of evidence?
Community-Integrated Policing and Patrols and Community Action Plans	• Is there substantial use of community-integrated policing? • Are foot patrols and fixed posts used in community-integrated policing? • Does a centralized complaint call-in system (like 911) exist? • Is there a viable strategic plan to conduct community policing?
LE Investigations	• Do the police or the courts serve as the principal investigative arm for the government? If it is the courts, what investigative capacity do the police have by law? • How are investigators selected? Are they experienced police, or are they hired directly as investigators? What required training do investigators attend? Does it include— ▪ Laws and guidelines related to investigatory powers? ▪ Crime scene preservation? ▪ Forensic techniques? ▪ Searching? ▪ Interviewing? ▪ Case file preparation? ▪ Vulnerable people (victims, witnesses, suspects)? ▪ Diversity?
Crime Scene Search and Collection Capabilities	• Do the police have the ability, training, and resourcing to secure and process a crime scene? • Do the police employ chain-of-custody and evidence protection techniques? • Do modern or contemporary fingerprint analysis, identification, and photography capabilities exist? • Are forensics used in cases and analyses used in criminal investigations and prosecutions?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

Area of Focus	Information Requirements
Police Operations (continued)	
Forensic Laboratory Support	• Does a forensic laboratory capability exist? • Does the laboratory have the capability to process and analyze— ▪ Firearms and toolmarks? ▪ Questioned documents? ▪ Drug analyses? ▪ Toxicology reports? ▪ Trace evidence findings? ▪ Serology/DNA analyses? ▪ Pathology and forensic medicines?
Supervision and Management	
Leadership Selection and Training	• How are leaders selected in the police organization? • Are senior leaders experienced police officers, or are they political appointees? • Are first-line supervisors capable of providing reliable LE guidance and direction to junior police? • Are operational police leaders replaced when new political leaders are appointed or elected? • Are management and supervisory structures considered to be robust and reliable? • Is the span of control of police leadership adequate to promote and sustain effective mission command? • Do first-line supervisors and managers receive leadership training? • Do executive, command, and senior management personnel receive development training?
Strategy and Mission	• Is there a wide-ranging written strategy and mission that addresses known crimes, threats, and incursions? ▪ Does the strategy establish appropriate time frames for addressing the known threats? ▪ Does the strategy define specific outcome-oriented goals with achievable, forward-leaning performance targets? • Does management have strong strategic and operation planning capabilities?
Policy and Procedures	• Are directives, SOPs, and policies or written guidance that govern principal police systems developed at the appropriate command level, and are they disseminated throughout the force? ▪ Do these procedures contain operational standards for coordination at central, regional, and local levels, as appropriate, for the known security risk? ▪ Do these procedures delegate sufficient authority to the police at all levels to perform their duties without excessive reliance on clearing routine actions through the chain of command?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

<i>Area of Focus</i>	<i>Information Requirements</i>
Supervision and Management (continued)	
Funding	• Does the police organization have sufficient funding to sustain and nurture a proficient agency? • What level of government funds the police? • Are police funds dedicated to the police organization? Is it protected from use for anything other than police-related requirements? • Is an audit system in place to provide oversight of expenditures? • Is the police budget publicly disclosed?
Laboratory and Office Management	• Do the police have access to criminal forensic laboratories? • At which police command level do they operate? • Are they adequately resourced with equipment and trained personnel to effectively conduct forensics investigations?
Personnel Administration	
Recruitment and Advertisements	• Does the program use a diverse recruitment policy, such as targeted advertising or regional testing? • Do all ethnicities or other groups, including women, have statistically equal representation at all levels? • Does the program use a proactive nondiscrimination policy in LE recruitment? • Does the program use a standardized application process?
Minimum Qualifications, Standards, and Testing	• Does the police organization use standardized and documented practices and criteria for employment? • Do applicants undergo general knowledge, physical fitness, health, and psychological testing? • Is there required police background screening for new recruits? • Is the required police screening for new recruits in compliance with a nationally established vetting standard?
Personnel Practices	• Are requirements for advancement to each rank clearly laid out and enforced? • Is there an appropriate manpower allocation for mission expectations? • Are police paid a living wage that is competitive with the private sector? • Is career progression nondiscriminatory? • Is career progression competitive based on merit? • What is the morale of the police? • Do the police have an established discipline policy that clearly states administrative offenses, punishments, and adjudication authority? • Are police who commit crimes prosecuted through the civil courts? • Does a police counseling and police record certification database exist?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

<i>Area of Focus</i>	<i>Information Requirements</i>
Logistics	
Infrastructure and Equipment	• Are the infrastructure and equipment readily available for use when needed? • Is the operational infrastructure policy based on strategic priorities, wear-out projections, and known demands for consumable supplies and equipment? • How is equipment serviced or maintained? Are service and maintenance capabilities adequate? • Can local jurisdictions establish service or supply contracts with local vendors? • Does the headquarters track on-hand equipment supply and resupply needs of subordinate stations? • Does a system exist to track firearms and equipment issues? • Are there controls for infrastructure, inventory, and warehouses? • Do police support equipment and services (such as transportation or fleet management, armory, and communications) exist? • Do technology equipment and services (such as computers, electronic information systems, or forensic equipment) exist? • Are there practices or offices for budget, finance, and procurement functions?
Independent Oversight and Internal Affairs	
Inspector General, Appraisal, Corruption Unit, and Abuse Tracking	• Do the police have a professional code of conduct? Is it followed? • Do the police have functional internal affairs and inspector general systems? • Are policies that govern the activities of the inspector general or internal affairs sections (how and when they conduct investigations and to whom they report) written? • Are human rights abuses identified, investigated, and tracked? • Is there documented evidence of internal reviews that were conducted by the inspector general, internal affairs, or command reviews?
Civilian Oversight	• Does a civilian review board exist? • Is there a citizen complaint and information center that is used and generally effective? • Does civilian oversight of police activities exist?

Table 4-2. HN police organizational assessment considerations (continued)

<i>Area of Focus</i>	<i>Information Requirements</i>
Independent Oversight and Internal Affairs (continued)	
Public Perception	• What is the degree of public support (opinion) of the LE program? • Is there evidence that the public generally feels secure? • Does the public believe that police are accountable for their actions? • Does the public believe that LE departments are generally free from systematic corruption? • Is there a system for police consultation with local communities?
Legend: ATP Army techniques publication DNA deoxyribonucleic acid FM field manual HN host nation LE law enforcement SOP standard operating procedure	

CUSTOMS AND BORDER SUPPORT

4-74. Military police units support the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, other federal agencies, joint staffs, and commanders who enforce the laws and regulations of the United States concerning customs, agriculture, and immigration border clearances. Military police customs personnel are trained to inspect and enforce these requirements. They inspect and examine the DOD cargo, equipment, aircraft, vehicles, and personal baggage that depart from locations outside the United States en route to U.S. points of entry. The inspectors ensure that returning military equipment conforms to U.S. Department of Agriculture standards and that the gear returning with personnel who serve abroad complies with U.S. customs laws for reentry into the United States. As with other functions, MWD teams may be employed in support of customs operations for the detection of explosives or narcotics. (See ATP 3-39.34 for additional information regarding MWDs.)

4-75. Military police customs personnel can transfer their experience from supporting U.S. customs operations to supporting HN customs operations at entry points and other checkpoints. MWD teams provide the capability to detect smuggled contraband. Military police units can provide LE expertise and work closely with HN border personnel, providing training and assistance until the HN is capable of assuming full authority.

CUSTOMS TEAMS

4-76. Customs inspectors are the first line of defense against the introduction of foreign plant and animal pests and diseases into the United States and help prevent contraband from entering the country. Their mission involves preventing restricted and prohibited items (agricultural pests, environmental hazards, controlled substances, contraband) from entering the United States.

4-77. Military police support to customs operations is normally performed by specially trained military police customs teams. A military police customs element is composed of a five-person team of military police that is organized to train and supervise members of other organizations (multinational forces, contractors, other federal agencies) to perform customs inspections at a seaport of debarkation or aerial port of debarkation. A military police customs team typically consists of—

- A senior military customs inspections supervisor who provides technical supervision for customs team operations and coordinates logistics support, operational integration, and staff planning.
- A senior military customs inspections team to augment U.S. customs personnel in conducting customs training and performing customs operations in support of units and personnel who are redeploying to the United States or its territories. Customs teams may also provide technical expertise and support for border operations to enforce restrictions on contraband or other regulated items.

REDEPLOYMENTS

4-78. DOD personnel are often required to redeploy from anywhere in the world. Associated with this movement is an elevated risk for the inadvertent introduction of exotic plant and animal pests into the United States. The Armed Forces Pest Management Board Technical Guide No. 31 provides specific guidance on processing and shipping DOD-sponsored retrograde cargo that is destined for the continental United States. For a unit to redeploy successfully, it must—

- Coordinate for site requirements and standards, including the—
 - Staging area.
 - Download area.
 - Vehicle or equipment wash area.
 - Inspection area.
 - Sterile holding area.
- Determine existing U.S. Department of Agriculture preclearance requirements.
- Complete administrative requirements.

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Chapter 5

Detention Operations

Detention involves the detainment of a population or group that poses some level of threat to military operations. (See FM 3-39 for additional information.) Detention operations are conducted by military police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees or U.S. military prisoners) as a result of military or civil conflict or to facilitate criminal prosecution. (See FM 3-39 for additional information.) The Army is the DOD executive agent for detainee operations and long-term confinement of U.S. military prisoners. Detention is addressed under the protection warfighting function. (See ADRP 3-37 and FM 3-63 for additional information.) This chapter focuses on military police support to detainee operations—from the point of capture to detention or release.

DETENTION OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO DECISIVE ACTIONS

5-1. Military police units conduct detention operations in support of decisive actions by conducting detainee operations and, as required, confinement of U.S. military prisoners. During stability operations, military police also provide support to HN corrections reform.

PRINCIPLES

5-2. Military police units are specifically organized and trained to perform a variety of missions and have the ability to perform detainee operations; however, those identified as military police detention organizations are specifically focused and trained to perform the missions that are associated with detainee operations. Military police are uniquely suited to perform detainee operations because of the skills that are developed through training, education, and experiential learning during LE missions and the execution of corrections duties at U.S. military corrections facilities. The fundamental principles of these military police missions are directly applicable to the detainee operations mission. These principles include—

- **Humane treatment.** Military police are well trained in the law of land warfare, applicable U.S. laws and regulations, and DOD and Army policies. Detainees must be protected from unlawful acts of violence and the deprivation of basic human necessities and must be detained in a safe and secure environment. Humane treatment is consistent with Army and Soldier values and ensures an operational climate that is conducive to population control. Although military police must be fair and firm, humane treatment is essential to establish goodwill among detainee populations and to prevent adversarial relationships between guard forces and detainee populations. Standards for humane treatment outlined in this publication are derived from the substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions that provide for the protection of noncombatants, who deserve to be respected and protected at all times.
- **Close contact.** The nature of detainee operations places Soldiers in close contact with detainee populations. Detainee operations may place Soldiers in continuous contact with or near insurgents, terrorists, or criminals who will exploit every opportunity to escape and kill or injure U.S. personnel or multinational partners.
- **Care, custody, and control.** Detainee operations require detailed, advanced planning and execution to provide responsive and thorough care, custody, and control of large detainee populations. Military police and other U.S. armed forces must plan, procure, and provide the

necessary resources to care for detainee populations, to include subsistence, clothing, hygiene, shelter, and transport to appropriate locations. Military police provide direct supervision and control of detained persons to ensure their control, health, welfare, and safety. They use their experience and exercise the appropriate authority and measured force (using necessary lawful restrictive measures) to mitigate the unlawful or inappropriate actions of others, prevent self-harm, and protect persons under their control.

- **Accountability.** U.S. armed forces are accountable for detainee populations, property, evidence, and related documents from the moment of capture until their disposition is determined. During detainee operations, DD Form 2745 (*Enemy Prisoner of War [EPW] Capture Tag*) or the subsequent issuance of an internment serial number provides the only authorized serial number to be used to track detainees and their property, evidence, and related documents. Accountability must be maintained throughout required custody activities; property and evidence control; records management; database management; investigations through legal disposition; and reporting to theater, national, and international organizations according to international and U.S. laws, regulations, and policies.
- **Segregation.** Detainee populations include numerous types or groups of individuals that must be segregated for a variety of reasons. Detainee populations are segregated based on legal status (according to DOD and Army policies) and gender. Juveniles within the detainee population are typically segregated from the general population. Detainees may also be segregated by ethnic and family groups and may be further segregated to protect vulnerable individuals. Additionally, detainees may be categorized by behavior (cooperative, neutral, or combative) to accurately resource guards and facilities. Individuals within the detainee population may also be segregated to prevent self-harm. Although segregation may not be requested or conducted to facilitate interrogation, interrogators may interrogate detainees who have been properly segregated. (See DODD 3115.09 for additional information.)
- **Minimum force.** Military police, guards, and security personnel must use the minimum level of force necessary to protect themselves and others, prevent escapes, and prevent persons from self-harm. Military police, guards, and security personnel must apply a measured response when they confront violent or noncompliant detainee populations. Minimum force also applies when using restraints. Individuals who pose an imminent escape risk or are identified as a potential threat to themselves or others may need to be restrained to prevent escape or acts of violence. The level of restraint required varies with each situation. In the most severe circumstances, restraining individuals may involve applying restraints to fully immobilize them. In less severe circumstances, restraining individuals may involve using verbal commands, such as “Halt!” Restraints should only be applied to mitigate actual risks. Restraining for any other purpose may be counterproductive to effective detainee operations and may not be in compliance with international laws.

WARNING

Never use restraints as punishment. Failure to comply may result in immediate personal injury or equipment damage.

5-3. Military police who perform detention operations must be familiar with the laws, regulations, and current policies that govern the treatment of detainees and current doctrinal publications on detainee operations, including AR 190-8, DODD 2310.01E, DODD 2311.01E, FM 3-53, FM 3-63, FM 27-10, Geneva Conventions, the law of war, and the U.S. military code of conduct.

PERSONNEL

5-4. Detention operations focus on all types of detainees and U.S. military prisoners. Although a part of detention operations, the term *confinement* (rather than detention) is generally used when referring to U.S. military prisoners.

DETAINEES

5-5. A *detainee* is any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel (JP 3-63). Detainees may include civilian internees, retained personnel, and lawful enemy combatants, such as EPWs and unlawful enemy combatants. Detainees do not include personnel who are being held for LE purposes, except where the United States is the occupying power.

Civilian Internees

5-6. A *civilian internee* is a civilian who is interned during armed conflict, occupation, or other military operation for security reasons, for protection, or because he or she committed an offense against the detaining power (JP 1-02). Civilian internees usually qualify for protected status according to the Geneva Conventions. Civilian internees must be kept separate from EPWs and persons deprived of liberty.

Note. U.S. forces may detain or imprison protected persons as spies or saboteurs if they are suspected of engaging in activities that are hostile to the security of the state or occupying power. However, they retain their status, rights, and privileges as protected persons.

Retained Personnel

5-7. *Retained personnel* are detainees who fall into one of the following categories: a. Designated enemy medical personnel and medical staff administrators who are exclusively engaged in either the search for, collection, transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick, or the prevention of disease; b. Staff of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and that of other volunteer aid societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist medical service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations; c. Chaplains attached to enemy armed forces. (JP 3-63).

5-8. Retained personnel fall into a special category for medical personnel and chaplains because of their skills and training. These individuals may be retained by the detaining power to aid other detainees, preferably those of the armed forces to which they belong. The Geneva Conventions require that retained personnel receive, at a minimum, the benefits and protection that are given to those with EPW status and that they be granted the facilities that are necessary to provide medical care and religious ministry services to the detainee population.

5-9. Privileges and considerations that are extended to retained personnel because of their profession include—

- Additional correspondence privileges for chaplains and senior retained medical personnel.
- The necessary facilities to provide detainees with medical care, spiritual assistance, and welfare services.
- The authority and means of transportation for periodic visits to other detention facilities and to hospitals outside the retained personnel detention facility to execute medical, spiritual, and welfare duties.
- The restriction of work assignments to medical or religious duties that they are qualified to perform.
- The assignment to quarters that are separate from those of other detainees when possible.

Enemy Combatants

5-10. An *enemy combatant* is, in general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict (JP 3-63). Enemy combatants can be lawful or unlawful.

Lawful

5-11. Lawful enemy combatants who are entitled to protections under the GPW include—

- Members of the regular armed forces of a state party to the conflict.
- Militia, volunteer corps, and members of organized resistance movements who belong to a state that is party to the conflict. These individuals are under responsible command; wear a fixed, distinctive sign that is recognizable at a distance; carry their arms openly; and abide by the laws of war.
- Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority that is not recognized by the detaining power.
- Inhabitants of an unoccupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units. These individuals must carry their arms openly and respect war laws and customs.

5-12. Upon capture, lawful enemy combatants are entitled to EPW status. Other personnel who are entitled to EPW status upon capture include—

- Persons who accompany the armed forces who profess allegiance without actually being members of those forces. Those persons must have received authorization from the armed forces that they accompany.
- Crew members of the merchant marine and civil aircraft of the parties to the conflict who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under other international law provisions.

Unlawful

5-13. EPWs may be prosecuted for violations of the law of war. If prosecuted, they still retain their EPW status.

5-14. Unlawful enemy combatants are persons who—

- Are not entitled to combatant immunity.
- Engage in or support acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict.

5-15. Unlawful enemy combatants include, but are not limited to, individuals who are or were part of, or who support or supported Taliban or al-Qaida forces, associated forces, or other insurgent forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its multinational partners.

Note. EPW status is the default status for detainees. Detainees will be treated according to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War until their status is determined by a military tribunal or other competent authority. The United States uses the term *EPW* to identify an individual under the custody or control of the DOD according to Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. (See JP 3-63 for additional information.) The United States reserves the term *prisoner of war* to identify its own or multinational armed forces that have been taken captive.

UNITED STATES MILITARY PRISONERS

5-16. A U.S. military prisoner is a person who is sentenced to confinement or death during a court-martial and is ordered into confinement by a competent authority, regardless of whether or not the convening authority has approved the sentence. A U.S. military prisoner who is pending trial by court-martial and is placed into confinement by a competent authority is a pretrial prisoner.

CAPTURE, INITIAL DETENTION, AND SCREENING

5-17. Military police are responsible for receiving, securing, processing, and interning detainees and for operating temporary and permanent detention facilities. Personnel who conduct detainee operations must ensure that these operations are performed in a manner that provides for the humane treatment and care of detainees, thereby reducing the probability of incidents of abuse that involve U.S. armed forces and detainees. Detainees should be treated with respect and protected from harm. Report injuries, and correct and report violations of U.S. military policies that occur during the safeguarding of detainees. Acts and omissions that constitute inhumane treatment are violations of the law of war and, as such, must be corrected immediately. Simply reporting violations is insufficient. If a violation is ongoing, a Soldier has an obligation to stop the violation and report it to the chain of command or according to the SOP.

POINT OF CAPTURE

5-18. The point of capture represents the most vulnerable point at which Soldiers process detainees. It often requires Soldiers to disarm, search, and guard detainees in an unsecured environment and among other potential combatants, sympathizers, or counterinsurgents. It is likely that only a limited number of military police will be initially available at the point of capture. Despite the limited manpower and other limited processing resources, military police must begin processing detainees (regardless of the number) while waiting for the arrival of additional resources and transportation. It is here that military police leaders and Soldiers may have to assess the risks between providing security against potential attacks from other combatants or sympathizers in the area and providing enough security to control the detainees.

5-19. At the point of capture and beyond, Soldiers must monitor and control their emotions and those of their fellow Soldiers. Perhaps only moments earlier, these very detainees may have tried to kill or have killed or wounded fellow Soldiers. Soldiers must rely on Army values and strictly adhere to U.S. military policy and the published rules of engagement. Under no circumstances can Soldiers allow themselves or others to retaliate or otherwise harm detainees under U.S. armed forces control.

Note. Most detainee abuse allegations occur at the point of capture, where emotions following enemy contact may run high and where there is a need to collect immediate intelligence information that may prevent additional casualties. Military police must monitor stress to prevent violations of U.S. military policy.

5-20. Upon capture, Soldiers must process detainees by using the search, silence, segregate, speed, safeguard, and tag (5 Ss and T) technique. This technique provides a structure to guide Soldiers in conducting detainee operations until they transfer custody of detainees to another authority or location. Soldiers complete the 5 Ss and T technique as shown in table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Point-of-capture processing standards (5 Ss and T technique)

Requirements	Actions
Search	Neutralize a detainee; and confiscate weapons, personal items, and items of potential intelligence or evidentiary value.
Silence	Prevent detainees from communicating with each other or making audible clamor, such as chanting, singing, or praying. Silence uncooperative detainees by muffling them with a soft, clean cloth tied around their mouths and fastened at the backs of their heads. Do not use duct tape or other adhesives, place a cloth or other objects inside the mouth, or apply physical force to silence detainees.
Segregate	Segregate detainees according to policy and SOPs. (Segregation requirements differ from operation to operation.) The ability to segregate detainees may be limited by the availability of manpower and resources at the POC. At a minimum, try to segregate detainees by grade, gender, age (keep adults away from juveniles and small children with mothers), and security risk.

Table 5-1. Point-of-capture processing standards (5 Ss and T technique) (continued)

Requirements	Actions
Speed	Quickly move detainees from the continuing risks that are associated with other combatants and from sympathizers who may still be in the area of capture. If there are more detainees than can be controlled, call for additional support, search the detainees, and hold them in place until reinforcements arrive.
Safeguard	Protect detainees, and ensure the custody and integrity of confiscated items. Soldiers must safeguard detainees from combat risk, harm caused by other detainees, and improper treatment or care.
Tag	Ensure that each detainee is tagged by completing DD Form 2745. Confiscated equipment, personal items, and evidence will be linked to the detainee by using the serial number of the complete DD Form 2745. Enter the following information on DD Form 2745: Date and time of capture. Capturing unit. Point of capture. Circumstances of capture. Evacuate detainees from the POC through appropriate channels as humanely and quickly as possible after processing is complete.
Note: Locally produced forms may be used to supplement (but not replace) DD Form 2745.	
Legend:	
DD	Department of Defense form
POC	point of capture
SOP	standard operating procedure

DETAINEE PROCESSING

5-21. As indicated in the previous paragraph, detainee processing begins when U.S. armed forces capture an individual. It is accomplished at the point of capture for security, control, intelligence, and detainee welfare while in evacuation channels. Detainee processing must be accomplished with care to effectively collect critical intelligence, preserve evidence, maintain accountability, and protect detainees from danger or harm. Proper processing ensures that U.S. armed forces can take the appropriate action to release, detain, transfer custody of, prosecute, or adjudicate detainees.

5-22. For detainees who are not released at the point of capture, processing continues at the next location—typically a detainee collection point (DCP) or holding area—and may be completed at a theater detention facility. Each subsequent location becomes more detailed until the detainee is fully processed and/or released. Some functions that are performed at the point of capture (such as the search function) must be repeated as the detainee is processed through subsequent levels. Table 5-2 shows basic processing at subsequent levels. (See FM 3-63 for additional information.)

Table 5-2. Additional detainee processing standards

Requirements	Actions
Search ¹	- Search and inspect detainees and their possessions, to include clothing, shoes, and headgear. - Document detainee property by using DA Form 4137. Property returned to the detainee must be signed for by using DA Form 4137. - Coordinate with interrogation/intelligence teams to determine which confiscated items have intelligence value. Personal items (diaries, letters from home, family pictures) may be taken by interrogation/intelligence teams for review.

Table 5-2. Additional detainee processing standards (continued)

Requirements	Actions
Tag ²	- Ensure that DA Form 2823, DA Form 4137, DD Form 2708 (<i>Receipt for Pre-Trial/Post Trial Prisoner or Detained</i>), and DD Form 2745 are completed. - Issue the ISN at the theater detention facility.
Report	- Report the number of detainees by category and gender through appropriate command channels. This aids in determining transportation and security requirements. - Report/investigate detainee abuse incidents.
Evaluate ³	- Administer immediate first aid, as needed. - Ensure that medical personnel conduct medical screening and evaluation to identify, document, and treat wounds, injuries, and illnesses. - Evaluate for evacuation or release.
Segregate	Ensure that detainees are segregated.
Safeguard	Protect detainees, and ensure the custody and integrity of confiscated items.
¹ Conduct same-gender searches when possible. If mixed-gender searches are necessary for speed or security, conduct them in a respectful manner and avoid actions that could be interpreted as sexual misconduct. To prevent allegations of sexual misconduct, the on-site commander or leader must provide appropriate supervision while more mature and experienced personnel conduct mixed-gender searches.	
² Units that are designated to receive detainees will prepare a DD Form 2708 (accompanied by a list that contains each detainee name) and provide a copy of the paperwork to the escort.	
³ The decision to release an individual at the POC may be made by the senior-ranking person on the ground, based on command directives and guidance. After a detainee is processed into a DCP or DHA, the senior echelon commander (typically the battalion commander or brigade commander, respectively) holds release authority.	
Legend: DA Department of the Army DCP detainee collection point DD Department of Defense form DHA detainee holding area ISN internment serial number POC point of capture	

5-23. The normal processing flow may be modified to meet intelligence collection and medical treatment requirements. Military police and military intelligence personnel have associations with detainees, but they have different roles and responsibilities. (See table 5-3, page 5-8, for additional information.) Military intelligence personnel perform interrogation operations by using approved interrogation techniques. The execution of interrogation operations is coordinated with the detention facility commander to ensure visibility on detainee movement and accountability.

Table 5-3. Military police versus human intelligence responsibilities

Tasks	Military Police Responsibilities	Human Intelligence Responsibilities
Detainee Point of Capture Through Evacuation Tasks	• Process and restrain/control the detainee. • Conduct liaison with military and civilian agencies. • Transfer custody; and maintain accountability of the detainee, evidence, and property. • Collect biometric information. • Move the detainee while he is restrained. • Report/investigate detainee abuse.	• Screen and question detainees at traffic control points and checkpoints. • Question contacts, local civilians, and detainees. • Conduct liaison with military and civilian agencies. • Report information obtained. • Ensure that detainee abuse is reported. • Support document and media exploitation.
Detention Facility Tasks	• Detain and guard detainee and resettlement populations. • Conduct reception and processing operations. • Coordinate for Class I, II, and VIII supplies. • Coordinate nongovernmental organization, private organization, and interagency visits. • Ensure that detainee abuse is reported. • Transport detainees within the detention facility to the interrogation area. • Maintain security during interrogation operations.	• Debrief guards. • Screen detainees for priority information and intelligence requirements. • Observe detainees under military police control. • Ensure that detainee abuse is reported. • Conduct interrogations. • Report information obtained. • Cross-cue other intelligence disciplines, as needed. • Support document exploitation.

5-24. Military police will not be directly or indirectly involved in interrogations or in setting conditions for interrogations beyond the responsibilities that are associated with monitoring, guarding, and protecting. Military police may support military intelligence personnel by providing detainee escorts and/or additional security (such as combative detainees) as requested. Standard military police security, PIO, and the detention discipline are the only involvement that military police have in the interrogation process. Military police will—

- Exercise overall responsibility for the safety of detainees and human intelligence collectors, even in cases where detainees are in temporary custody of military intelligence personnel or other agency personnel for interrogation.
- Never participate in the interrogation of detainees, set conditions for future interrogation operations, or provide or allow MWDs to be used to intimidate detainees in an effort to collect information.
- Maintain custody and control of detainees.
- Provide observations of detainee actions and interactions to the chain of command and human intelligence personnel as appropriate.

5-25. Preserving critical information of detainees and, ultimately, transferring that information to civil authorities require robust detainee information management systems. (See FM 3-63 for additional information on detainee information management systems.)

5-26. The detainee reporting system is the mandated detainee accountability database for DOD agencies. Additional information regarding the detainee reporting system is provided in FM 3-63. Key functions of the detainee reporting system include—

- Assigning internment serial numbers.
- Documenting detainee transfers, releases, and repatriations.
- Recording detainee deaths.
- Recording detainee escapes.

DETAINEE FACILITIES

5-27. The number of detainees that are captured by U.S. armed forces can range from one to hundreds, depending on the scope of the operation and the elements involved. A large number of detainees requires significantly more Soldiers and resources and poses increased security risks. Detainees must be safeguarded and provided with provisions for adequate space, food, and waste disposal at each detention facility.

5-28. The construction of detainee holding facilities must meet health, well-being, and security requirements. (See AR 40-5, ATP 4-25.12, and FM 3-63 for an outline of sanitation and preventive medicine specifications for detainee facilities.) The standards are as follows:

- Provide adequate space within housing units to prevent overcrowding.
- Provide sufficient showers and latrines for detainees, and ensure that showers and latrines are cleaned and sanitized daily.
- Teach detainees who work in the dining facility the rules of proper food sanitation, and ensure that those rules are observed and practiced.
- Dispose of human waste properly to protect the health of detainees and U.S. armed forces that are associated with the facility.
- Provide sufficient potable water for drinking and food service purposes. At a minimum, detainees should receive the same amount of water that is afforded to U.S. military personnel.
- Provide sufficient water for bathing and laundry.
- Provide materials for detainee personal hygiene.
- Train U.S. military personnel on the proper disposal of garbage (dining facility and personal) to reduce the breeding of insects and rodents that can contribute to health hazards.
- Establish measures against standing water within the facility.
- Conduct pest control activities as required.
- Conduct medical, occupational, and environmental health surveillance.

DETAINEE COLLECTION POINTS

5-29. DCPs are generally nothing more than a guarded, fenced-off (with razor or concertina wire) area or secured building. Figure 5-1, page 5-10, shows an example DCP layout. The actual layout depends on the nature of the operation, terrain, building materials, and HN support. The capture rate and the number of detainees determine the size of the DCP. The use of existing structures (vacant schools, apartments, warehouses) is encouraged to conserve resources and provide protection for detainees. Detainees are treated humanely and as EPWs until their status is determined according to DOD policy.




Figure 5-1. Sample DCP layout

5-30. A military police platoon or company will likely be directed to set up and operate a DCP. The brigade combat team provost marshal develops and provides technical guidance over the platoon or company that operates the DCP. Medical, human intelligence, and counterintelligence assets that operate within the DCP are typically under the tactical control of the military police platoon or company that operates the DCP.

5-31. The number of military police teams or units that are needed to operate a DCP is based on the number of detainees that are expected and on other mission variables. DCPs are mobile and can be set up quickly, expanded, and relocated as the tactical situation dictates. Detainees are held at the DCP until military intelligence exploitation is complete and transportation becomes available for their release or transfer to a detainee holding area or, in some cases, directly to the theater detention facility.

5-32. The location of a DCP is in the operation plan or order. The DCP is typically located in a way that prevents detainees from observing activities within the proximate area. A DCP that is located close to the MSR makes detainee delivery and evacuation easier. A DCP can be established where actual combat operations (such as cordon-and-search operations) are occurring.

5-33. During long-term stability operations, multiple DCPs may need to be established across the brigade combat team AO. To prevent problems caused by the presence of detainees in the area, a DCP is seldom established near the indigenous population. Shelter and cover capabilities are key considerations when selecting a DCP location. Detainees can be used to dig or build cover to protect themselves from direct and indirect fire.

DETAINEE HOLDING AREAS

5-34. A detainee holding area is a temporary location that is used to field-process and house detainees and to provide resources for intelligence exploitation. Basic infrastructure elements include shelter, cover, latrines, basic hygiene facilities, and medical care.

THEATER DETENTION FACILITIES

FACILITY INFORMATION CYCLES

The diagram illustrates the Detention Operations Intelligence Fusion cycle, which is a continuous process for gathering and analyzing intelligence. At the center is a box labeled "Detention Operations Intelligence Fusion". Surrounding this central box are five phases, each represented by a box: Phase I (Sergeant of the Guard Briefing), Phase II (Guard Mount Briefing), Phase III (Post Changeover Briefing), Phase IV (Dismount Debriefing), and Phase V (Battle Update Briefing). These phases are connected by a circular flow of arrows, indicating a continuous cycle. Additionally, there are two external inputs: "Outgoing Sergeant of the Guard" and "Incoming Sergeant of the Guard", both represented by boxes with a silhouette of a soldier. Arrows point from these external inputs to the central cycle. A large double-headed arrow at the bottom of the diagram is labeled "COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS", indicating the overall context of the cycle.

5-38. The facility information cycle is continuous (operational 24 hours per day) and phased. The five successive phases coincide with briefings and debriefings that help ensure the timely dissemination of information. These phases and briefings include—

- 5-11**

- Verification of the current facility count.
- Synchronization of the intelligence/security section and the operations section facility information cycle.
- **Phase II: Guard mount briefing.** During phase II, information and specific instructions are given to the guard force, including—
 - Relevant Phase I information.
 - Priority information requirements and operational security consideration updates.
 - Cultural consideration restatements.
 - SOP modifications, special order changes, and emergency action plan revisions.
 - Equipment accountability.
 - Initial reaction force, force cell move, and combat lifesaver team identification.
 - Discussion of the rules for the use of force.
 - Specific military occupational specialty training.
- **Phase III: Post changeover briefing.** Phase III focuses on duty-specific briefings and describes pertinent information that may affect the post, including the—
 - Accountability of detainees.
 - Identification of possible hazards or concerns.
 - Accountability of sensitive items.
 - Review of significant activities, the pass-on book, and blotter entries.
 - Summary of passive collection requirements.
 - Completion of observation reports.
- **Phase IV: Dismount debriefing.** During Phase IV, the sergeant of the guard collects relevant information concerning significant activities from the guard force and disseminates the information accordingly. Exchanges of data include the following:
 - The guard force briefs the sergeant of the guard about events that occurred on shift.
 - The sergeant of the guard briefs the guard force on significant activities and lessons learned.
 - The sergeant of the guard briefs the compound officer in charge/noncommissioned officer in charge.
 - The sergeant of the guard completes the end-of-tour report.
 - The sergeant of the guard forwards reports to respective sections.
- **Phase V: Battle update briefing.** During the battle update briefing, the battalion staff updates the detention facility commander on intelligence, operations, personnel, logistics, and communication matters. This formal information exchange synchronizes activities within the facility. Information shared during the battle update briefing is then passed down to the sergeant of the guard, who briefs the incoming sergeant of the guard. The battle update briefing includes—
 - A summary of significant activities.
 - A briefing to the commander from individual staff sections.
 - A theater detention facility counterinsurgency operations update.
 - A solicitation of issues or concerns.
 - An assessment of future operations (24 to 48 hours).
 - A review of the commander's guidance.

5-39. The detention operations intelligence fusion cell is at the center of the facility information cycle. The staff members who are assigned to the cell simultaneously receive information and coordinate with the appropriate supporting elements. Information that is gathered during the facility information cycle is analyzed by the detention operations intelligence fusion cell to determine credibility and authenticity. To ensure timeliness and accurate information dissemination, the detention operations intelligence fusion cell is integrated into all five phases of the facility information cycle.

UNITED STATES MILITARY PRISONER CONFINEMENT

5-40. In a mature theater, military police may be required to operate a field detention and/or field confinement facility to hold or confine U.S. military prisoners and, on occasion, pretrial prisoners for short periods of time. (When possible, Soldiers awaiting trial remain with their units. When this is not possible and if specific legal requirements are met, U.S. military personnel may be placed in pretrial confinement under military police direct control.) Posttrial confinement may include temporary custody until the prisoner is evacuated from the theater to a permanent confinement facility or until the prisoner's short-term sentence is served as determined by the combatant commander.

5-41. Military police leaders who are tasked with conducting U.S. military prisoner operations must be familiar with the policies that are outlined in AR 190-47, the doctrine described in FM 3-63, and the tasks described in STP 19-31E1-SM and STP 19-31E24-SM-TG. When the combatant commander makes the decision to retain U.S. military prisoners in the theater, field detention facilities are possible as low as the brigade combat team level, while a field confinement facility is typically established at theater level and is used for longer-term confinement before the evacuation of U.S. military prisoners from theater. Provost marshals are responsible for the location, setup, and operation of these facilities.

Note. The rights of U.S. military prisoners are outlined in AR 190-47 and DODD 1325.04.

5-42. When operating a field detention facility, military police sign for each prisoner by using DD Form 2707 (*Confinement Order*) and for each prisoner's property by using DA Form 4137. Policies and procedures concerning the care and treatment of prisoners and the safeguarding of a prisoner's personal effects apply to both detention and confinement facilities. If preexisting structures are available, use them as field detention facilities. If tents are used, they should not be smaller than a general-purpose, medium tent. Probable equipment and supplies that are required for the establishment of a field detention facility include, but are not limited to—

- Barbed wire (roll and concertina).
- Fence posts.
- Gates and doors.
- Floodlights and spotlights.
- Generators.
- Food service and cleaning equipment.
- Water cans.
- Lister bags.
- First aid equipment and supplies.
- Clothing and bedding.

Note. No member of the U.S. armed forces may be placed in confinement in immediate association with a detainee who is not a member of the U.S. armed forces.

5-43. Use DD Form 2708 to transfer U.S. prisoners from a field detention facility to a field confinement facility, which is a semipermanent or permanent facility that may be better equipped and resourced than a detention facility. DA Form 4137 and DD Form 2707 also accompany the prisoner.

HOST NATION CORRECTIONS REFORM SUPPORT

5-44. Military police may be required to provide training and advice to HN personnel for HN detention and corrections operations. HN personnel should be trained on detention tasks to handle detainees according to internationally recognized standards for the care and treatment of prisoners or other detainees. Management procedures should provide for the security and fair and efficient processing of those detained. Effective HN detention operations is a necessary goal of HN training to replace the need for U.S. support.

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Chapter 6

Security and Mobility Support

Security and mobility support is a military police discipline that is conducted to protect the force, protect noncombatants, and preserve the commander's freedom of action. (See ATP 3-39.30 for additional information.) Military police units expedite the secure movement of theater resources to ensure that commanders receive the forces, supplies, and equipment needed to support the operation plan and changing tactical situations. Throughout security and mobility support, military police units conduct proactive measures to detect, deter, and defeat threat forces that operate in the AO.

SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT TO DECISIVE ACTIONS

6-1. Military police units conduct security and mobility support to decisive actions by expediting military traffic flow and by aiding forces in their efforts to maneuver and mass. During offensive tasks, military police operations that are in close support of maneuver forces are a primary focus. Military police conduct security and mobility support to assist the commander in speeding the shift of forces to support the main effort and in enhancing overall trafficability. During defensive operations, a primary focus is to ensure the movement of repositioning or counterattacking forces. Military police must anticipate transitions from the defense to the offense and assist the forward movement of reserves or reaction forces.

6-2. During support to stability, when the focused demand of military police capabilities is on police operations, security and mobility support priority tasks may include controlling the movement of dislocated civilians and the mobilization of materiel resources. Typically, during defense support of civil authorities tasks, security and mobility support tasks are not a priority.

MOVEMENT SUPPORT TO MOBILITY OPERATIONS

6-3. Military police provide movement support to mobility operations, ensuring the orderly and safe movement of U.S. forces and enabling the freedom of movement for the maneuver commander. Military police support movement control to facilitate the movement of follow-on forces in support of the operation plan.

GAP-CROSSING OPERATIONS

6-4. Military police provide support to gap-crossing operations (wet or dry) within the immediate gap-crossing site and on routes that lead to and from the site. Military police traffic control posts can be essential in expediting unit movement in and across the gap according to the movement plan. In addition, effective traffic control contributes to the flexibility of the crossing plan by enabling commanders to change the sequence, timing, and site of the crossing units. Military police units that operate inside the crossing areas are typically under the operational control of the crossing area commander for the duration of the operation.

6-5. The number and placement of military police units that support a gap-crossing operation will vary with the size of the crossing force, the direction of the crossing (forward or retrograde), and the degree of enemy resistance that is expected or encountered. The military police leader who supports the crossing site is responsible for developing a traffic control plan to support the commander's intent, including—

- Traffic control posts and temporary route signs to control traffic from adjacent unit areas that could interfere with movements at major crossroads on MSRs and near crossing sites and lateral boundaries.
- Staging areas.
- Holding areas on the crossing entrance and exit banks.

- Mobile patrols to control traffic, identify problems, guide and escort vehicles, and reroute traffic when necessary.
- Temporary collection points to evacuate detainees and dislocated civilians through crossing areas as quickly as possible so that they do not impede the movement of friendly forces.

6-6. Locations for traffic control posts at gap crossings are based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). In most gap-crossing operations, traffic control posts are located on both sides of the gap (river, ravine, mountain pass, or other terrain feature which presents an obstacle that requires bridging) to improve communication and coordination among units.

6-7. When a brigade combat team is crossing, the organic military police platoon may also cross to provide uninterrupted support to the brigade combat team. In these instances, there is typically a reliance on an engineer headquarters or a maneuver enhancement brigade in the area of responsibility to support the crossing. The same is true for breaching and passage of lines operations. (See appendix D for additional information.)

6-8. To ease the control of large, fast-moving forces, the gap-crossing plan usually allots one crossing area for each maneuver brigade. The commander uses control measures to delineate areas of responsibility for subordinates and to ease traffic control. (See figure 6-1 for a graphical representation of gap-crossing control measures.)




Figure 6-1. Gap-crossing control measures

Release Lines

6-9. In gap-crossing operations, release lines delineate the crossing area. Release lines are located on the far side and near side and indicate a change in the headquarters that controls the movement. Release lines are normally located within 3 to 4 kilometers (1.86 to 2.49 miles) of the gap and on easily identifiable terrain features.

Crossing Areas

6-10. Crossing areas are controlled access areas that decrease congestion at the gap. This permits the swift movement of forces. Each lead brigade has a crossing area on both sides of the gap that is defined by brigade boundaries and the release line. Crossing areas normally extend 3 to 4 kilometers (1.86 to 2.49 miles) on each side of the gap, depending on the terrain and the anticipated enemy engagement.

Waiting Areas

6-11. Waiting areas are located adjacent to the routes or axes of advance. Commanders use waiting areas to conceal vehicles, troops, and equipment while waiting to resume movement or make final crossing preparations:

Staging areas.

6-12. Staging areas are battalion-size waiting areas outside the crossing area where forces wait to enter the crossing area. The brigade traffic control cell handles unit movement into the staging areas. The crossing area commander controls movement from the staging areas into the crossing areas. Military police operate traffic control posts at the staging areas according to the crossing and traffic circulation plans. They emplace temporary signs along the route from the staging area through the crossing area to guide the convoys. Units make crossing preparations and receive briefings on vehicle speed and spacing in the staging areas. Staging areas—

- Are located to support the crossing concept.
- Are far enough back to permit the rerouting of the battalion along other roads or to alternate crossing sites.
- Are easily accessible from major routes.
- Have enough area for dispersing a battalion-size unit.
- Provide concealment.

Call-forward areas.

6-13. Call-forward areas are company-size waiting areas within the crossing area. Engineers use them to organize units into raft loads, or crews use them to make final vehicle crossing preparations, depending on whether the crossing is over a wet or dry gap. The crossing area commander controls movement from the staging area to the call-forward area. The crossing site commander directs movement from the call-forward area to the crossing site and on to the far side attack position. As a minimum, each crossing site commander operates his own call-forward area.

Holding areas.

6-14. Holding areas are used during traffic interruptions. Units move into these areas when directed by traffic control post personnel and disperse rather than stay on the roads. Holding areas outside the crossing area accommodate battalion-size elements. Within the crossing area, they are large enough for a company. Far side holding areas are used to organize return traffic. Military police operate holding areas according to crossing and traffic circulation plans. Holding areas are—

- Used as call-forward areas for return traffic from the far side.
- Located to support the crossing plan.
- Accessed easily from routes.
- Designed large enough to allow for dispersion.

- Designed to offer cover and concealment.
- Designed to be defendable.
- Used to maximize traffic flow with minimum control.

Attack positions.

6-15. Attack positions are the last positions that are occupied or passed through by the assault echelon or the attacking force before crossing the line of departure. Within the bridgehead, the attack position is the last position before leaving the crossing area or bridgehead line.

Assembly areas.

6-16. An *assembly area* is an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation (FM 3-90-1). Ideally, an assembly area provides—

- Concealment from air and ground observation.
- Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.
- Space for dispersion. (Each assembly area is separated by enough distance from other assembly areas to preclude mutual interference.)
- Cover from direct fire.
- Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain unit vehicles and individual Soldier movements.
- Terrain making of electromagnetic signatures.
- Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the assembly area.
- Sanctuary from enemy medium-range artillery fires because it is located outside the enemy's range.

Engineer Equipment Parks

6-17. Engineer equipment parks are located a convenient distance from bridging and rafting sites for assembling, preparing, and storing bridge equipment and materiel. They are at least 1 kilometer (0.62 miles) from the gap and hold spare equipment and empty bridge trucks that are not required at crossing sites. Engineer equipment parks should be located where they do not interfere with traffic to the crossing sites and where equipment can be concealed and dispersed. Ideally, routes that lead from engineer equipment parks to crossing sites are not the same routes that are used by units that are crossing the gap.

Traffic Control Posts

6-18. In deliberate gap crossings, traffic control post personnel assist the crossing area headquarters in traffic control by reporting and regulating the movement of units and convoys. Traffic control post personnel relay messages between the crossing area headquarters and the moving units. The brigade provost marshal identifies locations that require traffic control posts. Military police operate traffic control posts on both sides of the gap to control traffic moving toward or away from it. Traffic control posts are operated at major or critical crossroads and road junctions, staging areas, holding areas, and engineer regulating points.

Engineer Regulating Points

6-19. Engineer regulating points are used to ensure that vehicles do not exceed the capacity of the crossing means. They also help maintain traffic flow. Vehicles that are not allowed to cross are removed to prevent a traffic backup at the actual crossing site. Engineers man engineer regulating points and report to the crossing site commander. Traffic control posts are colocated with engineer regulating points to ensure that all vehicles clear the call-forward areas. An additional duty of engineer regulating point personnel is to give the drivers final instructions on site-specific procedures and other information, such as speed and vehicle intervals. As a minimum, each crossing site requires an engineer regulating point at its own call-forward area. If enough engineer assets are available, an engineer regulating point may be established at far side holding areas to regulate rearward traffic.

BREACHING OPERATIONS

6-20. Breaching operations are a combined arms mission that is conducted to allow forces to maneuver through obstacles. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics, techniques, and procedures to advance an attacking force to the far side of an obstacle that may be covered by fire. It is possibly the most difficult combat task that a force can encounter. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle and end when the battle handover has occurred between the follow-on forces and the unit that conducts the breaching operation.

6-21. Military police support to breaching operations is similar to the support that is provided to gap-crossing operations and permits an efficient and orderly flow of forces into and through the breached area. Military police support is based on mission variables, available resources, and the commander's priorities. Support includes—

- Establishing and operating traffic control posts along routes that lead to, or depart from, the breaching site.
- Establishing and operating holding areas.
- Establishing and operating traffic control posts at the breaching site.
- Assisting engineers with the posting of temporary route signs.
- Establishing straggler control operations.
- Conducting supportive area security operations.

6-22. Military police units must closely coordinate with the crossing force commander and the task force commander who is responsible for the breaching operation. This allows military police units to effectively control the traffic flow to appropriate, cleared lanes; assist in directing the formation through various lanes; and modify traffic flow when lanes are closed due to the tactical environment, maintenance requirements, or expansion construction. Figure 6-2 shows the flexibility that a combination of multiple lanes and guides or traffic control posts provides the commander.




Figure 6-2. Sample support to breaching operations

PASSAGE OF LINES

6-23. During a passage-of-lines operation, forces move forward, rearward, or laterally through the combat positions of another force with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. This high-risk operation requires close coordination among the passing unit, stationary unit, and supporting forces. It ensures the maintenance of enemy contact while allowing the relief of previously committed forces. The stationary force must control and secure the AO far enough to its front that the passing unit can move through the stationary force and re-form into a combat formation before contact with an enemy force. Generally, the stationary unit supports the passing unit until the passing unit masks the direct fire of the stationary unit. The stationary unit continues to support the passing force with its fire support systems until the passing unit moves beyond the supporting range of the stationary force. The stationary unit is also responsible for the security of the line of departure of the forward passing unit until it is able to assume that responsibility. The boundaries of the forward passing force after it completes its passage do not have to coincide with the boundaries of the stationary force. (See FM 3-90-2 for additional information about conducting a passage of lines.)

6-24. Military police units assist passage-of-lines operations by reducing the confusion and congestion of units that move into and out of the passage area. Military police units provide traffic regulation and enforcement in areas that surround passage points and passage lanes to ensure that passing units have priority for using routes to and through the areas. The headquarters that directs the operation sets the priority of use for the route.

6-25. Military police support for a passage of lines is generally conducted at the platoon level, with the platoon leader selecting the method that best supports the passing unit movement through the stationary unit. The company monitors the platoon and coordinates with higher headquarters. The scope of the operation and METT-TC may dictate the need for additional support.

6-26. Before actual operation, the military police units that are assigned to support passage operations conduct route reconnaissance and become familiar with the routes to and around the area of passage. This enables military police units to extend the commander's mission command by providing directions at passage points and by guiding the units through the passage lanes. Traffic control measures may include traffic control posts, temporary route signs, checkpoints, roadblocks, defiles, and escort and guide vehicles. Military police must also be prepared to initiate vehicle holding areas at designated locations along movement routes. If the road network sustains damage, vehicles will be routed into a holding area until traffic can be restored or rerouted.

6-27. Maintaining unit integrity and reducing the incidence of stragglers are vital to enabling the passing unit momentum in a forward passage of lines. Military police units perform aggressive straggler and dislocated civilian control operations to prevent possible infiltration of the enemy into friendly forces. (See figure 6-3 for additional information on the passage of lines.)

6-28. The company operations section is required to conduct detailed coordination with passing and stationary units, to include—

- Communication requirements.
- Recognition signals.
- Route start points.
- Times of passage.
- Passing lanes.
- Control measures, including traffic control posts, escort and guide vehicles, and temporary route signs. (Temporary route signs will decrease the number of traffic control posts needed; but if routes are not well defined or if they cross congested areas, expect to provide traffic control posts or escort vehicles.)
- Detainee and dislocated civilian evacuations.




Figure 6-3. Forward passage of lines

6-29. The platoon leader continuously coordinates with the company operations section to confirm—

- The size of the passing unit.
- Locations of assembly areas.
- Recognition signals.
- The time that the passage of lines will commence.

6-30. Military police support for a passage of lines begins at the route start point, which also serves as a contact point. Recognition signals are displayed at the start point. Military police monitor the passing unit command net during the entire passage. Radio silence is maintained during this time.

MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE REGULATION ENFORCEMENT

6-31. Military police units provide MSR regulation enforcement to keep routes within controlled spaces free for priority tactical and sustainment operations. Military police units support the command MSR regulation measures as stated in the traffic regulation plan, which contains specific measures to ensure the smooth and

efficient use of the road network. It assigns military route numbers and names, the direction of travel, highway regulation points, and preplanned military police traffic control posts. Most important to military police, it provides the route control classification. Military police units ensure that classified routes are used only by authorized traffic within their timetable schedule.

6-32. To expedite traffic on MSRs, military police units operate special circulation control measures, such as—

- Temporary route signs.
- Static posts (traffic control posts, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas) and defiles at critical points.
- Mobile patrolling between static posts.
- Traffic and road condition monitoring.
- Convoy security.

6-33. Military police units also gather military and police information on friendly and enemy activities and help stranded vehicles and crews. They place temporary route signs to warn of hazards or to guide drivers who are unfamiliar with the routes. Using these measures, military police units exercise jurisdiction over the road network in the AO and coordinate with the HN (when possible) to expedite movement on MSRs.

6-34. Military police units that are employed with engineer, logistics, explosive ordnance disposal, aviation, and other forces may establish movement corridors to provide secure movement of military traffic through vulnerable areas. A *movement corridor* is a designated area established to protect and enable ground movement along a route (FM 3-81). Based on published movement tables, the combined movement corridor forces will open and maintain a safe passage route through uncontrolled terrain. The opening of the route requires a synchronized effort, with each branch providing unique movement and mobility skills to the route. The sequence may include engineer route clearance and maintenance activities that are integrated with operational area security implementation along the corridor.

6-35. Engineer and military police forces conduct route reconnaissance missions to determine problems along the route. Sustainment forces may then establish temporary holding, maintenance, or rest areas along the corridor as the tactical situation dictates. With the establishment of military police traffic control posts and convoy escorts of critical commodities of supplies and with aviation convoy security in place, the convoys move along the protected route to their final destination. The movement corridor opens and closes for specified periods of time to meet movement table requirements.

Marking Routes

6-36. Route signs support the traffic regulation plan by ensuring that specific routes are accurately identified. Accurate and well-placed signs along the roadside help drivers arrive at their destinations. Military police patrols monitor signs on a routine basis, checking and creating specific signs before critical moves. When military police patrols discover that signs are damaged, destroyed, or moved due to weather, saboteurs, or battle activities, it is necessary to construct temporary signs to replace them. This also applies when patrols encounter immediate and temporary MSR obstructions, such as blown bridges or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) contamination. Military police Soldiers quickly construct and erect signs to—

- Identify routes.
- Guide traffic around problem areas.
- Provide directions, distances, and general information.

6-37. See appendix D for additional details concerning route signs.

Establishing and Operating a Traffic Control Post

6-38. Military police conduct security and mobility support to expedite military traffic flow by operating traffic control posts at critical locations. A *traffic control post* is a manned post that is used to preclude the interruption of traffic flow or movement along a designated route (FM 3-39).

6-39. The squad leader has responsibility for the traffic control post. The number of military police and the types of weapons that are needed to establish and operate a traffic control post are based on METT-TC. However, the traffic control post is usually manned by one military police squad. (See figure 6-4 for additional information on traffic control posts.)




Figure 6-4. Sample traffic control post

- 6-40. When establishing and operating a traffic control post, the military police leader—
- Provides additional overwatch for the traffic control post.
 - Sustains communications with the chain of command.
 - Selects positions for squad members and the assigned crew-served weapons by—
 - Positioning one team to direct the flow of traffic and control movement on the MSR.
 - Positioning another team to provide overwatch security for the military police who conduct movement control.
 - Rotating primary overwatch security duty between teams in the squad.
 - Rotating duties with the military police who conduct movement control on the MSR.
 - Directs and prepares concealed defensive positions (cover and concealment, good fields of fire, communications) based on METT-TC.
 - Maintains situational awareness.
 - Reconnoiters the surrounding area for enemy activity.
 - Records key information about incidents and subsequently notifies the chain of command according to the unit SOP.

Note. Soldiers who operate a traffic control post must clearly understand the escalation of force and the rules of engagement.

6-41. Military police operate a traffic control post to enforce the circulation control of traffic movement and MSR regulations—not to apprehend violators. Tasks may include directing military personnel to their units or to a straggler collection point if the location of their unit is unknown; managing dislocated civilians; watching for activity by insurgents, conventional enemy forces, and enemy aircraft; and screening suspicious people according to the SOP, area rules of engagement, and the commander's guidance.

6-42. Military police who operate a traffic control post also watch for and monitor local inhabitants. Civilian drivers who use the MSR may stop at the traffic control post to report suspected or actual enemy activity. If Soldiers receive such information, they should use the standard size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) format or spot reports to provide this information to the chain of command.

Establishing and Operating a Holding Area

6-43. Forces use holding areas during traffic interruptions or deployment from an aerial port or seaport of embarkation. Holding areas can be used as independent measures or with other measures (such as defiles or checkpoints) to support operations, such as gap crossings or the passage of lines. For example, a holding area may be established at each end of a defile to minimize congestion or it may be established with a roadblock

or checkpoint for searching vehicles. Holding areas should offer concealment and a dispersion capability for the vehicles that are located within them.

6-44. METT-TC and the size of the holding area determine the number of teams that are needed to operate it. When a military police squad operates a holding area, the squad leader designates one team to control the entrance to the holding area, one team to control the exit from the holding area, and one team to provide security. The fourth team provides additional overwatch, assists with traffic direction and parking, and executes the supplementary tasks that are assigned by the squad leader. The team leader also assigns each squad member a fighting position. When operating a large holding area, the military police leader may need additional personnel inside the area to direct traffic and parking and ensure that units comply with the flow plan.

Establishing and Operating a Defile

6-45. Military police operate defiles when natural or man-made obstacles restrict traffic flow on an MSR. A defile is a special movement circulation control measure that is conducted to keep traffic moving smoothly through a narrow passageway.

6-46. Defile operations prevent traffic jams by allowing traffic to move in only one direction at a time. When establishing or operating a defile, be vigilant to possible enemy attack due to the restrictive and vulnerable nature that a defile imposes. Tasks that are associated with establishing and operating a defile include—

- Preparing support by fire positions and, if needed, fighting positions.
- Controlling the traffic that enters and leaves the defile at both ends.
- Keeping security throughout the defile.
- Notifying road users of traffic and tactical situations.

6-47. Before emplacing a defile, conduct a reconnaissance of the area and of the proposed location. Use the simplest method of control. Plan for two methods in case a backup is needed. Control measures can include the following:

- **Flag.** The flag is given to the last driver, or it is attached to the last vehicle that enters the defile. Another military police Soldier removes the flag when the vehicle reaches the end of the defile. This serves as a signal for traffic to start in the opposite direction.
- **Rider.** The rider method is the same as the flag method except that the control person rides in the last vehicle in each group. This method is used to ensure that all vehicles have cleared the area.
- **Lead vehicle.** The lead vehicle leads the convoy through the defile. This method is used when movement through the defile is long or confusing.
- **Trail vehicle.** The trail vehicle method is the same as the flag and rider methods except that a trail vehicle is inserted behind the last vehicle that goes through the defile.
- **Visual.** Control personnel are placed where they can readily see and signal each other at both ends of the defile. Agreed-upon, hand-and-arm signals or a signaling device (such as a flashlight) are used to communicate. Signaling techniques are normally used in small defile operations. Holding areas are not normally needed.
- **Communication.** Radios are used as a last resort.

6-48. Additional tasks include—

- Setting up a temporary or static defense based on the amount of time that the defile will be used.
- Using temporary signs to mark alternate or bypass routes. (These should be placed well in advance to allow vehicles to avoid the defile where possible. Signs are used to reduce the need for additional personnel.)
- Controlling access to the defile to keep large numbers of vehicles and personnel from entering the defile at the same time.
- Setting up procedures for clearing the road if and when breakdowns occur. (Wrecker support may need to be coordinated. If it is unavailable, field methods should be used.)

6-49. Large defile operations must have a holding area at each end of the defile. Holding areas should offer cover and concealment for vehicles and troops and must be large enough to accommodate the number of

vehicles that are expected or scheduled to use the route. Where a nuclear airburst is possible, holding areas should be 2 to 3 kilometers (1.24 to 1.86 miles) from the defile. (See figure 6-5 for a depiction of a defile operation.)




Figure 6-5. Sample large defile operation

STRAGGLER CONTROL

6-50. Straggler control refers to operations that are conducted to regulate friendly forces which have become separated from their commands by events in the AO. (See FM 3-39 for additional information.) Military police conduct straggler control by using mobile patrols, traffic control posts, and checkpoint teams to return stragglers to parent units. Military police units direct Soldiers to the parent or replacement unit according to command policies. These units also provide basic first aid and initiate medical evacuation of wounded stragglers.

6-51. Military police units can set up special posts for straggler control following CBRN attacks or major enemy actions that result in large numbers of lost, dazed, or confused military personnel. Mobile military police patrols operate between traffic control posts and direct stragglers to straggler control points or collect stragglers as required. Straggler collection points may be needed if many stragglers are present in the AO. If multinational forces are present in the theater, each nation establishes a collection point for its own personnel. Military police units must be aware of allied straggler collection locations and assist allied Soldiers in returning to their respective commands. Military police units use available theater transportation assets to transfer stragglers from traffic control posts and checkpoints to straggler collection points. Stragglers are screened and sorted at collection points for evacuation to a medical treatment facility, for return to the unit, or for transport to another destination as directed by the controlling headquarters.

AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

6-52. Commanders conduct area damage control when the damage and scope of the attack are limited and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. Optimally, commanders aim to recover immediately. This involves resuming operations; maintaining or restoring order; administering first aid; searching and rescuing entrapped, sick, and injured personnel; evacuating casualties; isolating danger or hazard areas; and mitigating personnel and materiel losses. Some attacks may rise to the level of national significance and require additional resources for mitigation, recovery, and investigation.

6-53. Military police provide support to area damage control when the damage and scope of the attack are limited and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. Optimally, commanders aim to recover immediately. This involves resuming operations; maintaining or restoring order; administering first aid; searching and rescuing entrapped, sick, and injured personnel; evacuating casualties; isolating danger or hazard areas; and mitigating personnel and materiel losses.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

6-54. *Route reconnaissance* is a directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADRP 3-90). Reconnaissance focuses on a specific line of communication, such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor. It is conducted to determine if the route is clear of obstacles and threat forces and to establish how well or poorly it will support the planned movement. Route reconnaissance may be conducted as part of a multifunctional team with engineer, CBRN, and other specialties. It is a priority task for military police during offensive and defensive operations and a secondary task during stability and defense support of civil authorities tasks.

6-55. Military police patrols that conduct a route reconnaissance collect data to the level of detail that is required by the commander. Route reconnaissance tasks may include the following:

- Find and report enemy forces that can influence movement. (When enemy activity is recognized, military police patrols report it, maintain surveillance, and develop the situation according to the commander's plan and intent.)
- Determine route trafficability.
- Reconnoiter terrain that the enemy can use to dominate movement (choke points; ambush sites; pickup, landing, and drop zones).
- Reconnoiter built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes.
- Locate obstructions and restrictions (bridges, tunnels, defiles, overpasses and underpasses, culverts, steep grades, sharp curves, flooding, rock falls).
- Locate mines, obstacles, and barriers along the route.
- Locate fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing obstacles.
- Locate areas that are suitable for short halts and holding areas.
- Identify natural defense and counterambush locations.
- Identify areas where terrain restricts communications.
- Report the above route information (to include providing a sketch map or route overlay) to the headquarters that initiates the route reconnaissance mission.

6-56. When time is critical, military police may conduct a hasty route reconnaissance to obtain specific information only. The size of the patrol for a route reconnaissance is based on METT-TC. In most environments, route reconnaissance operations are not conducted with less than a squad. The squad leader organizes the squad into security teams and a reconnaissance team. The reconnaissance team completes DA Form 1248 (*Road Reconnaissance Report*) and prepares a reconnaissance overlay.

6-57. Figure 6-6 shows a sample completed DA Form 1248. As indicated in FM 3-34.170, the following should be considered when completing the form:

- Block 1a should indicate the country and map name, not just the country.
- Block 1c should indicate the sheet number and edition.
- Block 3 requires at least a 6-digit grid coordinate.
- Section II should contain the specific details of the most limiting road characteristics.
- Section III (d) should read, "Curves with a radius of 25 meters (82 feet) and less. (Also record curves with a radius of 25.1 to 45 meters [82.3 to 147.6 feet].)"
- Section IV should have a completed scale block as follows:
 - Scale: _____ units = _____ kilometers.
 - Include the road classification formula for each section of road.
 - Indicate on the sketch the location of obstructions.
- As many copies of the form as needed should be used to cover portions of the road.

ROAD RECONNAISSANCE REPORT				DATE	
For use of this form, see FM 3-34.170, proponent agency is TRADOC.				2 Apr 15	
TO: (Headquarters ordering reconnaissance) Commander, ATTN: S-2, 21st Engr Bn			FROM: (Name, grade and unit of officer or NCO making reconnaissance) DOE, John, 1LT, Co A, 522d Engr		
1. MAPS	a. COUNTRY USA, Fort Leonard Wood Special	b. SCALE 1:50,000	c. SHEET NUMBER OF MAPS AMS V733 Sheet 5561 IV	2. DATE/TIME GROUP (Of signature) 021430ZAPR15	
SECTION I - GENERAL ROAD INFORMATION					
3. ROAD GRID REFERENCE		4. ROAD MARKING (Civilian or Military number of road)		5. LENGTH OF ROAD (Miles or kilometers, specify)	
FROM UT 122864		TO UT 097999		Missouri Route J 16 km	
6. WIDTH OF ROADWAY (Feet or meters, specify) 6.7 m to 9.3 m		8. WEATHER DURING RECONNAISSANCE (Include last rainfall, if known) Fair, temperature 79°F Last rainfall, 15 Mar 15			
7. RECONNAISSANCE					
DATE 2 Apr 15		TIME 0615			
SECTION II - DETAILED ROAD INFORMATION					
When circumstances permit more detailed information will be shown in an overlay or on the mileage chart on the reverse side of this form. Use standard symbols.					
9. ALIGNMENT (Check one ONLY)			10. DRAINAGE (Check one ONLY)		
☐ (1) FLAT GRADIENTS AND EASY CURVES			☐ (1) ADEQUATE DITCHES, CROWN/CAMBER WITH ADEQUATE CULVERTS IN GOOD CONDITION		
☐ (2) STEEP GRADIENTS (Excess of 7 in 100)			☐ (2) INADEQUATE DITCHES, CROWN/CAMBER OR CULVERTS, ITS CULVERTS OR DITCHES ARE BLOCKED OR OTHER-WISE IN POOR CONDITION		
☐ (3) SHARP CURVES (Radius less than 100 ft (30m))					
☒ (4) STEEP GRADIENTS AND SHARP CURVES					
11. FOUNDATION (Check one ONLY)					
☒ (1) STABILIZED COMPACT MATERIAL OF GOOD QUALITY			☐ (2) UNSTABLE, LOOSE OR EASILY DISPLACED MATERIAL		
12. SURFACE DESCRIPTION (Complete items 12a and b)					
a. THE SURFACE IS (Check one ONLY)					
☒ (1) FREE OF POTHoles, BUMPS, OR RUTS LIKELY TO REDUCE CONVOY SPEED			☐ (2) BUMPY, RUTTED OR POTHOLED TO AN EXTENT LIKELY TO REDUCE CONVOY SPEED		
b. TYPE OF SURFACE (Check one ONLY)					
☐ (1) CONCRETE			☐ (6) WATERBOUND MACADAM		
☒ (2) BITUMINOUS (Specify type where known): Asphalt			☐ (7) GRAVEL		
☐ (3) BRICK (Pave)			☐ (8) LIGHTLY METALLED		
☐ (4) STONE (Pave)			☐ (9) NATURAL OR STABILIZED SOIL, SAND CLAY, SHELL, CINDERS, DISINTEGRATED GRANITE, OR OTHER SELECTED MATERIAL		
☐ (5) CRUSHED ROCK OR CORAL			☐ (10) OTHER (Describe):		
SECTION III - OBSTRUCTIONS					
List in the columns below particulars of the following obstructions which affect the traffic capacity of a road. If information of any factor cannot be ascertained, insert "NOT KNOWN"					
(a) Overhead obstructions, less than 14 feet or 4.25 meters, such as tunnels, bridges, overhead wires and overhanging buildings.					
(b) Reductions in road widths which limit the traffic capacity, such as craters, narrow bridges, archways, and buildings.					
(c) Excessive gradients (Above 7 in 100)					
(d) Curves less than 100 feet (30 meters) in radius					
(e) Fords					
SERIAL NUMBER	PARTICULARS	GRID REFERENCE	REMARKS		
1	Steep grade, 8 percent	UT 119872	200 m long		
2	Sharp curve	UT 112877	21 m radius		
3	Constriction	UT 112878	6.7 m wide, 300 m long		
4	Constriction	UT 105896	7 m wide, 100 m long		
5	Built-up area	UT 094856	7.3 m wide, 2,000 m long		

DA FORM 1248, MAY 2007

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE

Page 1 of 2
APD LC v1.00

Figure 6-6. Sample DA Form 1248




Figure 6-6. Sample DA Form 1248 (continued)

Legend:	
1LT	first lieutenant
APD	Army Publishing Directorate
attn:	attention
bn	battalion
co	company
DA	Department of the Army
engr	engineer
F	Fahrenheit
FM	field manual
ft	feet
kb	bituminous (asphaltic) concrete
km	kilometer(s)
m	meter(s)
ob	obstruction
S-2	intelligence staff officer
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine
USA	United States of America

SAMPLE

Figure 6-6. Sample DA Form 1248 (continued)

POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL

6-58. Regardless of the operational environment, military operations can be disrupted by—

- The uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians.
- The uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians who conduct legitimate activities.
- Illegal or illegitimate activities, such as insurgent operations or black market activities.

6-59. Populace and resource control operations are ideally conducted by the HN. However, during extreme conditions where HN capabilities have broken down or are nonexistent, U.S. forces must fill the void and perform them instead.

6-60. Populace control operations provide security for the HN population, deny personnel and materials to the enemy, mobilize the population, preserve materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of the threat. Dislocated civilian operations and noncombatant evacuation operations are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations. Populace controls can include—

- Maintaining curfews.
- Restricting movement in specified areas.
- Requiring travel permits.
- Resettling specific portions of a population.
- Implementing martial law during a complete breakdown of law and order.

6-61. Resource control regulates the movement and consumption of materiel resources. Resource control measures may include—

- Requiring licenses.
- Implementing and enforcing regulations or guidelines.
- Conducting checkpoints and inspection stations.
- Implementing amnesty programs.
- Implementing ration controls.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

6-62. Military operations often require the temporary resettlement of civilian populations. Military police provide support to resettlement operations, to include establishing and operating facilities and supporting civil affairs efforts to ensure that supply routes remain open and clear to the maneuver commander. The level of control is drastically different from the control that is exercised during detainee operations. During detainee operations, the level of control and supervision is high based on the security risk. During resettlement operations, dislocated civilians are allowed freedom of movement as long as it does not impede military operations. However, a facility that houses large numbers of persons for significant periods of time will be prone to unrest and the formation of disruptive and criminal networks.

6-63. Some of the same information-gathering techniques that are employed to identify and mitigate disruptive and dangerous activities within a detainee facility may be required for a resettlement operation. Additional tasks that support and complement resettlement operations include enforcing curfews, restricting movements, checking travel permits and registration cards, operating checkpoints, instituting amnesty programs, and conducting inspections.

6-64. Resettlement operations minimize civilian interference with military operations and protect civilians from combat operations. Resettlement operations should be conducted by HN elements when possible, minimizing the requirement for military resources. Civil affairs elements coordinate with HN agencies to facilitate resettlement operations. Nonmilitary international aid organizations and other nongovernmental organizations are the primary resources that are used to assist civil affairs forces. However, civil affairs forces may depend on other military units (such as detention units) to assist with a particular category of dislocated civilians.

6-65. Controlling dislocated civilians is essential during military operations because uncontrolled masses of people can seriously impair the military mission. Commanders plan measures to protect dislocated civilians in the AO and to prevent their interference with the mission. The military police commander and staff must have a clear understanding of the operational environment, rules of engagement, and legal considerations before setting up a resettlement facility in support of resettlement operations. Detention units are specifically trained to provide care and shelter for dislocated civilians.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL

6-66. Military police units that provide traffic regulation and enforcement on MSRs may encounter dislocated civilians who could hinder military traffic flow. These units ensure priority to military traffic by diverting dislocated civilians from MSRs and other areas to alternate routes or detention facilities. Military police deny the movement of civilians whose locations, directions of movement, or actions may be a threat to themselves or to military operations. If functioning, the HN government is responsible for identifying routes for the safe movement of dislocated civilians out of an AO. If needed, military police units assist the civil affairs unit and HN assets in redirecting dislocated civilians to alternate routes.

6-67. U.S. and military police forces do not assume control of dislocated civilians unless they are requested to do so by the HN or are operating in an environment with a hostile government. When the joint force commander or geographic combatant commander assumes responsibility, military police elements coordinate with civil affairs elements to set up traffic control posts at critical points along the route to direct dislocated civilians to secondary roadways and areas that are not used by military forces. When directed, dislocated civilians may be housed within the resettlement facilities that are operated by U.S. forces and supported by military police as part of the security and mobility support discipline.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

6-68. *Noncombatant evacuation operations* are operations directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by the Department of State (JP 3-68). Although the United States usually considers noncombatant evacuation operations in connection with combat operations, it may also conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in anticipation of, or response to, a natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country. Civil unrest in a country may warrant evacuation to the United States or another safe haven.

6-69. Military police units can provide support to noncombatant evacuations and are capable of providing security at departure locations and extraction sites and for convoys carrying evacuees. Military police are skilled in interpersonal communications and the graduated use of force from LE experiences. This skill set transfers well to working in direct contact with the evacuees.

6-70. DOD defines the following two categories of noncombatant evacuees:

- U.S. citizens that competent authority can order to evacuate, including—
 - Civilian employees of all agencies of the U.S. government and their dependents.
 - Military personnel of the U.S. armed forces who are specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.
 - Dependents of members of the U.S. armed forces.
- U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens that competent authority may authorize or assist (but not necessarily order) to evacuate, including—
 - Civilian employees of U.S. government agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country but are willing to evacuate.
 - Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
 - Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.
 - Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the U.S. government and military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the Department of State.

Note. JP 3-68 provides additional information on noncombatant evacuation operations.

EVACUATION PLANNING

6-71. When the decision is made to evacuate a community, planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units, supplies, and first responders. Mass evacuation planning includes—

- **Transportation.** Planners should consider the maximum use of civilian transportation.
- **Security.** Military and HN security forces provide security for civilians after evacuation. These organizations also provide for the security of civilian property that has been left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.
- **Documentation.** In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents to ensure that dislocated civilians are properly manifested and orderly movement is accomplished.
- **Briefing.** Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. This can be accomplished by using leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other available means. This briefing explains the details of the move, the restrictions on personal belongings, the organization for movement, and schedules.
- **Rations.** For movements that last no more than 2 days, planners should ensure that dislocated civilians are supplied with rations at the time of departure or at designated points en route.
- **Health care.** The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of evacuees. Military medical personnel, equipment, and supplies may be used to supplement HN and civilian organization assets if necessary and authorized. Special consideration should be given by medical personnel to take proper steps before the movement to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
- **Return.** During planning, consideration should be given to providing for the eventual return of evacuees and to the criteria that is used for determining the duration of their absence.

Rules of Interaction

6-72. Rules of interaction provide Soldiers with a guide for interacting with the civilian population. Rules of interaction include—

- Treating dislocated civilians humanely and with respect.
- Avoiding discussions of politics and policies with dislocated civilians.

- Avoiding promises. (If confronted, reply with “I will see what I can do.”)
- Refraining from making obscene gestures. (Dislocated civilians may understand the meaning.)
- Avoiding derogatory remarks. (Dislocated civilians may understand English, and the local linguists surely do.)
- Treating dislocated civilians equally. (Dislocated civilians may become offended if they do not receive the same treatment or resources that other dislocated civilians receive.)
- Respecting religious articles and materials.
- Treating medical problems seriously.
- Greeting dislocated civilians in their native language.

Rules for the Use of Force

6-73. The rules for the use of force that are used in population and resources control operations vary from operation to operation. The company commander, in conjunction with the staff judge advocate and upon joint staff approval, establishes rules for the use of force and approves special rules for the use of force that are developed for use in resettlement facilities. The rules for the use of force evolve to fit the changing environment, ensuring continued protection and safety for the dislocated civilian population and U.S. military personnel. Ensure that rules for the use of force remain simple and understandable so that Soldiers are not confused and do not have to memorize extensive checklists. The standing rules for the use of force apply to Title 10, United States Code (10 USC) military police who conduct operations in the United States and its territories, absent explicit additional guidance from the Secretary of Defense. Commanders may also submit supplemental rules for use of force requests for Secretary of Defense approval.

6-74. Nonlethal measures can and may be authorized by the rules for the use of force anytime during an operation to protect Soldiers and dislocated civilians from injury. Nonlethal weapons may include riot batons, pepper spray, stun guns, and shotguns that are loaded with nonlethal munitions. The rules for the use of force may include less than lethal force to protect mission-essential equipment from damage or destruction. Mission-essential equipment includes tactical and nontactical vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, computers, and office and personal equipment.

Rule of Law

6-75. Planning for the follow on to major combat operations should begin in the early planning stages for war. Efforts to transition to the rule of law must start as soon as stability tasks begin, often simultaneously with major combat operations. First, security and political conditions must be established and initiated to support policing, judicial, and corrections systems for the fair and equitable treatment of citizens by the HN government. This is often easier said than done. Many nations do not have the underpinnings of the rule of law to understand and implement the system and will require coaching, mentoring, training, and support along a continuum toward peaceful existence. Additionally, if efforts in combat operations do not include shaping the area for stability, criminals, insurgents, and organized crime will control the population and developing government, making the rule of law plan efforts exponentially more difficult. Citizens must have the right to ownership, fair treatment by policing and judicial systems, and corrections systems that enforce compliance with the law in a manner that is equitable and uniformly fair to everyone. Military police forces are well suited for providing HN assistance and training for the policing and corrections aspects of law.

6-76. Military police units must cultivate relationships with existing HN police and local officials in the operational area early in the operation to maximize efficiencies later during the transition period. This process will provide valuable police intelligence that will aid the unit in planning and recommending COAs to assist in establishing the rule of law.

6-77. Whether in a transitional military authority role or while supporting a legitimate HN government, military police support the population and resources control plan for mitigating criminal activity through resource control measures. These actions may include—

- Securing stocks of critical commodities from theft or pillage.
- Supporting border security and customs enforcement.

- Identifying and mitigating black market activities that deal in critical commodities.
- Securing stockpiles of natural resources.

6-78. Military police support to transition to the rule of law can include helping to establish and train local police officers in basic to advanced LE skills and in police station operations. Military police units can assist with developing requests for the LE equipment and sustainment items that are necessary for local LE. They also provide joint patrol and operation of the police station, mentoring HN personnel until the HN is capable of independent operations. Military police detention units can assist with establishing corrections operations in a reopened or temporary facility and train guard forces and prison operations staffs to properly operate a facility.

6-79. These activities build confidence in the local population that law-abiding citizens will be treated fairly and equitably and that laws will be applied equally and uniformly to every citizen. Citizens must know that they will not be unlawfully detained or imprisoned. They must also be confident that the unlawful activity of others will be policed and punished.

6-80. The rule of law cannot expand or be sustained in crime-ridden environments where citizens fear for their safety due to criminal activity. Resource control measures are specifically targeted to deter criminal activity and contribute toward building the trust and confidence of the local populace while strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government or provisional authority.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

6-81. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and enemy force and civilian population dispositions so that the commander can maneuver forces freely and rapidly. It is a focused collection effort that is performed before, during, and after operations to provide the information that is used in the IPB process. It is used by the military police leader to formulate, confirm, or modify the COA.

6-82. There are seven fundamentals that are common to successful reconnaissance operations. Leaders must ensure that the planning, preparation, and execution of reconnaissance missions adhere to the following fundamentals:

- Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
- Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
- Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
- Report information rapidly and accurately.
- Retain the freedom of maneuver.
- Gain and maintain threat contact.
- Develop the situation rapidly.

6-83. Regardless of the type of reconnaissance (route, area, or zone), the unit consists of three elements: mission command, reconnaissance, and security. Upon receipt of a reconnaissance mission, the mission leader develops an estimate of the situation and task-organizes the size of the reconnaissance force based on the elements of METT-TC. The mission leader develops the plan based on—

- Accurate intelligence.
- Rehearsals.
- Inspections.
- Deception measures.
- The use of the smallest possible unit to accomplish the mission.
- Minimal audio and electronic communications.
- The use of surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation devices.
- An undetected presence.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

6-84. Military police conduct route reconnaissance and surveillance operations to gain detailed information on specific routes, MSRs, movement corridors, and enemy activities. (See FM 3-34.170 for additional information on the planning considerations for reconnaissance missions.)

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

6-85. *Area reconnaissance* is a form of reconnaissance that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADRP 3-90). Area reconnaissance is vital to maintaining area security and contributes to the commander's intelligence collection plan. Military police area reconnaissance is a composite of actions; it is initiated from the observations and reports that are gathered over time by military police patrols and from the information that is gained through coordination with HN police and other friendly forces. Military police area reconnaissance plans include areas near facilities that are designated as critical by the commander, such as—

- Named areas of interest.
- Air bases.
- Bases and base clusters.
- Communication centers.
- Logistics support clusters.
- Key terminals, depots, and bridges.
- Critical terrain features.
- High-value assets.

6-86. When conducting an area reconnaissance mission, military police leaders follow these principles:

- The unit moves to the appointed area in the shortest possible time. This typically involves traveling along existing roads by using the appropriate movement techniques. During this movement to an area, the unit reports and bypasses enemy opposition.
- The unit halts and sets up an objective rally point when it reaches the designated area. Once the unit establishes the objective rally point, it reconnoiters the objective in one of the following ways:
 - When terrain permits, the security element moves to an overwatch position to observe the reconnaissance element. The mission leader may instruct small reconnaissance teams to move to each surveillance or vantage point around the objective instead of having the entire reconnaissance element move as a unit from point to point.
 - When the terrain does not allow the unit to secure the objective area, the unit leaves a security element at the objective rally point and uses reconnaissance and security teams to reconnoiter the objective. These teams move to different surveillance or vantage points from which they reconnoiter the objective.
- All elements return to the objective rally point after the unit reconnoiters the objective for the details that are outlined in the order. Teams share information, consolidate it, and report it; then they return to the patrol headquarters or continue to the next mission.

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

6-87. *Zone reconnaissance* is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADRP 3-90). The commander assigns a zone reconnaissance mission when he needs additional information on a zone before committing other forces to it. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, when existing knowledge of the terrain is limited, or when combat operations have altered the terrain. Zone reconnaissance techniques include the use of moving elements, stationary teams, or a series of area reconnaissance actions. The three methods that military police use to conduct a zone reconnaissance are fan, converging routes, and successive sector.

Fan Method

6-88. When using the fan method, the military police leader first selects a series of objective rally points throughout the zone from which to operate. The element establishes security at the first objective rally point. The mission leader confirms the unit location and selects reconnaissance routes to and from the objective rally point. These routes form a fan-shaped pattern around the objective rally point. The routes must overlap to ensure that the element reconnoiters the entire area. As soon as the mission leader confirms the routes, he sends out reconnaissance elements along adjacent routes to prevent the patrol from potentially making contact in two different directions. The leader does not commit all of the elements at once; he keeps a small reserve in the objective rally point. For example, if the unit has three reconnaissance elements, the leader sends out two and keeps the third as a reserve. After the element reconnoiters the entire area, the mission leader collects and disseminates the information that is acquired during the reconnaissance before moving on to the next objective rally point. The unit repeats this action at each successive objective rally point. (See figure 6-7 for an illustration of the fan method.)




Figure 6-7. Fan method

Converging-Routes Method

6-89. When using the converging-routes method, the unit establishes security at the designated objective rally point. The leader confirms his location and divides the unit into smaller elements. He selects routes from the objective rally point through the zone to a rendezvous point at the far side of the zone from the objective rally point. The mission leader gives each element a reconnaissance route, the location for the rendezvous point, and a linkup time. All elements depart for their designated routes, with each element reconnoitering its assigned route. After reconnoitering the zone, all elements link up at the rendezvous point at the designated time. The unit establishes security in the same manner that it established security for the objective rally point. (See figure 6-8, page 6-22, for an illustration of the converging-routes method.)




Figure 6-8. Converging-routes method

Successive-Sector Method

6-90. The successive-sector method is a continuation of the converging-routes method. The leader divides the zone into a series of sectors. The unit uses the converging routes within each sector to reconnoiter to an intermediate linkup point, where the mission leader collects and disseminates the information that has been gathered to that point. The unit then reconnoiters to the next sector. Using this method, the leader selects an objective rally point, a series of reconnaissance routes, and linkup points. The actions from each objective rally point to each linkup point are the same as in the converging-routes method. Each linkup point becomes the objective rally point for the next phase. This action continues until the unit reconnoiters the entire zone. (See figure 6-9 for an illustration on the successive-sector method.)




Figure 6-9. Successive-sector method

Reconnaissance Patrol

6-91. A reconnaissance patrol collects information to confirm or disprove the accuracy of the information that was previously gained. The intent for this type of patrol is to move stealthily, avoid enemy contact, and accomplish the tactical task without engaging in close combat. Reconnaissance patrols try to accomplish the mission without being detected or observed. Because detection cannot always be avoided, a reconnaissance patrol carries the arms and equipment to protect itself and break contact with the enemy.

6-92. A reconnaissance patrol normally travels light, with as few personnel, arms, ammunition, and equipment as possible. This increases stealth and cross-country mobility in close terrain. Regardless of how the patrol is armed and equipped, the leader plans for the worst-case scenario: direct fire contact with a hostile force. Military police leaders must anticipate where they may be observed and control the hazard by emplacing measures to lessen the risk of that happening. If reconnaissance patrols are detected or if unanticipated opportunities arise, the patrols must be able to rapidly transition to combat.

Presence Patrol

6-93. A presence patrol is a form of reconnaissance that is used in stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. Its primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit AO. To do so, the patrol gathers specific and general critical information as determined by the commander. The patrol seeks out this information and then observes and reports it. Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander's intent. In addition to reconnaissance tasks, presence patrols demonstrate to the local populace the presence and intent of U.S. forces. Presence patrols are intended to clearly demonstrate the determination, competency, confidence, concern, and overwhelming power of the force.

6-94. Before sending out presence patrols, the commander should carefully consider which message he wants to convey and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader. A presence patrol takes deliberate steps to visibly reinforce the impression that the commander wants to convey to the populace. Where the patrol goes, what it does, how it handles weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how it interacts with the populace are parts of that impression. When the presence patrol returns to the main body, the commander thoroughly debriefs it, not only for hard information, but also for the patrol leader's impressions of the effects of the patrol on the populace. This allows the commander to determine whether to modify the actions of subsequent patrols.

6-95. Commanders must address additional considerations when planning or conducting patrols in and around urban areas. (See appendix E for additional information on urban operations.) Some of these considerations include—

- Planning for and rehearsing actions in and around large crowds of civilians or noncombatants. (See appendix F for additional information regarding civil disturbances.)
- Briefing the element that conducts the patrol on information/intelligence collection priorities.
- Assigning responsibility to specific Soldiers for maintaining all-around and high-low security on each floor and the roofs of buildings.
- Periodically occupying rooftops during the patrol to increase observation and security.
- Using urban city maps, because navigation by grid in an urban area can be difficult. (Maps that show street names and neighborhoods are much more useful.)
- Knowing the numbers and locations of translators and interpreters in the patrol.
- Knowing the ethnicity of translators and how that might affect the population in the patrol area or route.
- Checking recent activities or trends in the local population or urban areas.
- Keeping the speed of the patrol slow and promoting a relaxed and confident attitude toward the local population, except where the current improvised explosive device (IED) threat calls for high-speed movement. This enables patrol members to concentrate on the urban environment and the population and increases their ability to gather information.

SURVEILLANCE

6-96. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the commitment of reconnaissance assets against specific locations or specially targeted enemy units. Military police surveillance focuses on providing early warning of enemy reconnaissance elements rather than on gaining and maintaining contact with the main body of the enemy or destroying it.

6-97. Military police maintain continuous surveillance of assigned named areas of interest and enemy reconnaissance avenues of approach in assigned AOs. Units accomplish this by setting up a series of listening posts (LPs)/observation posts (OPs). Military police conduct active, mounted patrols to extend their observation limits or to cover dead space and the area between OPs.

6-98. The unit ability to report is critical during surveillance. Effective early warning requires detailed planning for uninterrupted communications. The mission leader considers communication distances and significant terrain features to identify potential wireless communication problems. If problems exist, he requests support from higher headquarters.

LISTENING AND OBSERVATION POSTS

6-99. LPs/OPs are positions from which military police observe the enemy and direct and adjust indirect fires against him. They are the primary means of maintaining surveillance of an assigned avenue of approach or named area of interest. The LP/OP is generally used—

- On key terrain to observe a specific area.
- As an early warning security measure in a defensive perimeter.
- For the monitoring of likely enemy avenues of approach.

Types of Listening and Observation Posts

6-100. LPs/OPs may be mounted or dismounted:

- **Mounted LPs/OPs.** Mounted LPs/OPs offer the advantages of vehicular optics, weapon systems, and the speed of displacement. However, an enemy can detect mounted LPs/OPs more readily than dismounted posts. The LP/OP remains mounted if rapid movement or displacement is anticipated.
- **Dismounted LPs/OPs.** Dismounted LPs/OPs provide maximum stealth and have the greatest likelihood of remaining undetected by the enemy, but they lack the agility of mounted LPs/OPs. The disadvantage of the dismounted LP/OP is the time it takes to remount and move if necessary.

Selection of a Listening or Observation Post Site

6-101. Based on an analysis of METT-TC factors and guidance from the commander, the platoon leader determines the number of LPs/OPs to establish how to position them to allow long-range observation along the avenues of approach that are assigned by the commander to provide depth through the sector. Squad and team leaders select the exact positions for each LP/OP on the ground. LPs/OPs must have the following characteristics:

- **Covered and concealed routes to and from the LP/OP.** Military police must be able to enter and leave the LP/OP without being seen by the enemy.
- **Unobstructed observation of the assigned area.** Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent LPs/OPs overlap to ensure full coverage.
- **Effective cover and concealment.** Leaders should select positions with cover and concealment to reduce vulnerability on the battlefield. Military police may need to pass up a position with favorable observation capability, but with no cover and concealment, in favor of a position that affords better survivability.

- **A location that will not attract attention.** LPs/OPs should not be in locations that attract attention, such as water towers, isolated groves of trees, or lone buildings or trees. These positions draw enemy attention and may be used as enemy artillery target reference points. LPs/OPs should also be located away from natural lines of drift, along which a moving enemy force can be expected to travel. Such locations might include a route on the floor of a valley or a site near a major highway.
- **A location that does not skyline observers.** Avoid topographical crests, and position LPs/OPs further down the slope of the hill or on the side, provided there are covered and concealed routes into and out of the position. (See figure 6-10 for information on the correct position of an LP/OP.)




Figure 6-10. LP/OP position

Operation of a Listening or Observation Post

6-102. Ideally, a military police team should man an LP/OP to maintain team integrity. Duties on LPs/OPs are rotated—one team member observes, one team member records and reports observed information, and one team member rests or provides backup security. The team rotates duties every 20 to 30 minutes because the visual efficiency of an observer decreases rapidly after that length of time. The team leader sends enemy observations up the chain of command by using a size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment report. When the LP/OP team is part of a defensive perimeter, it—

- Ensures that it has rearward cover.
- Builds fighting positions for protection and concealment.
- Uses trip flares, noisemaking devices, and night vision devices to detect the enemy.
- Emplaces claymore mines for added protection.
- Coordinates with the perimeter on reentry procedures to the perimeter from the withdrawal route.

6-103. The squad leader prepares a sector sketch, such as the one shown in figure 6-11, page 6-26. The sketch may include—

- A rough sketch of key and significant terrain, including named areas of interest and avenues of approach.
- A north-pointing arrow.
- The location of the LP/OP.
- The location of the hide position.
- Locations of vehicle fighting and observation positions.
- Alternate positions (hide, fighting, observation).
- Routes to and from the OP and fighting positions.
- Sectors of observation.

- Preplanned artillery targets.
- Target reference points for direct fire.
- Prepared spot reports and CFFs based on trigger points and projected locations where the enemy will first be seen.




Figure 6-11. Sample LP/OP sketch

Urban Considerations

6-104. Constructing and manning LPs/OPs are high-frequency tasks for companies and subordinate elements when they must establish area security during stability operations. Each LP/OP is established for a specified time and purpose. During most stability operations, LPs/OPs are overt (conspicuously visible, unlike their tactical counterparts) and deliberately constructed. They are similar in construction to bunkers and are supported by fighting positions, barriers, and patrols. If necessary, military police can also employ hasty LPs/OPs. Based on the mission variables of METT-TC, deliberate LPs/OPs may include specialized facilities, such as—

- An observation tower.
- An ammunition and fuel storage area.
- Power sources.
- A supporting helipad.
- Kitchen, sleep, shower, and toilet areas.

6-105. Each LP/OP must be integrated into supporting direct and indirect fire plans and the overall observation plan. If LP/OPs are established in buildings, they should be fortified and hardened according to the SOP.

AREA SECURITY

6-106. *Area security* is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90). Military police conduct area security in support of unified land operations to protect the force, impose order, and ensure the freedom of movement for units to conduct assigned missions. Military police units that provide area security play a key role in supporting forces throughout the AO. The military police unit firepower, movement, and communications capabilities make it

possible for the unit to detect the threat while aggressively patrolling the AO, MSRs, key terrain, and critical assets. This chapter highlights military police tasks that support area security, such as reconnaissance and surveillance operations, operational area security, physical security, and antiterrorism measures.

6-107. Area security tasks focus on named areas of interest in an effort to answer the commander's critical information requirements, aid in tactical decisionmaking, and confirm or deny threat intentions. Military police organize forces that are engaged in operational area security missions in a manner that emphasizes mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities.

AREA AND BASE SECURITY OPERATIONS

6-108. Military police conduct area and base security operations to protect friendly forces, bases and base camps, and support area actions. As part of area security operations, military police units provide protection operations for bases (to include air bases) in the AO. In this role, military police units are capable of detecting, providing early warning of, and engaging enemy forces. Typically, military police units provide in-depth security by operating outside the perimeter of the base, beyond the range of threat weapons. This facilitates early detection of the threat and engagement of threat forces at a sufficient standoff distance to destroy or disrupt the threat before it can engage friendly bases.

6-109. Air base protection and defense are key components of military police area security operations. When the threat exceeds the air base capabilities, the engaged commander requests military police assistance. Air base defense requires special military police coordination with the U.S. Air Force security forces and other security forces that are responsible for base defense. Air Force security force units are responsible for internal air base security and defense. Military police units are typically responsible for the external defense of the air base. Air Force and Army forces must coordinate defensive efforts, including boundaries, fire control measures, and contact points. Combining Air Force security forces with military police units provides an in-depth defense for weapon systems, aircraft, command centers, personnel, and other priority resources that are established by the air base commander.

Base and Base Camp Defense

6-110. *Base defense* is the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces (JP 3-10).

6-111. Base commanders are responsible for establishing base defense procedures for their area of responsibility.

6-112. When developing a base defense strategy, a simple, flexible defense plan is key. The plan should maximize the use of SOPs and battle drills at the user level. The base defense plan should also integrate the following fundamentals:

- **Understand the enemy.** Defenders must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of enemy forces, weapons, equipment, and tactics.
- **Use situational awareness.** Intelligence operations are essential to assembling an accurate picture of the operational environment.
- **Use defender advantages.** Defender advantages may permit a numerically inferior force to defeat a much larger one. These advantages include—
 - The ability to fight from cover.
 - A more detailed knowledge of the local terrain and environment.
 - The ability to prepare positions, routes, obstacles, and fields of fire in advance.
 - The ability to plan communications, control measures, indirect fires, and logistics support for contingency operations.
 - The ability to deceive enemy forces about friendly defensive capabilities, dispositions, and operation executions.

- **Concentrate at critical times and places.** Conduct the defense of a base along interior lines, permitting the timely and secure movement of forces to engage the most critical threats. The commander must mass combat power at points of decision by economizing in some areas, retaining a reserve, and maneuvering to gain local superiority at critical points.
- **Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks.** Fixed bases usually have well-established perimeters with limited depth. Counterreconnaissance and counterattack add depth to the operations that are outside the perimeter, allowing the base to continue its primary mission with minimal interference.
- **Extend counterreconnaissance patrols 3 to 5 kilometers (1.86 to 3.11 miles) outside the perimeter, based on terrain.** This reduces the risk of fratricide, especially at night.
- **Coordinate critical defense assets.** The synchronization of indirect fires, air defense resources, tactical aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops, armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and helicopters can produce a combined-arms effect.
- **Balance base security with political and legal constraints.** This fundamental is especially critical in a low-intensity conflict environment.
- **Know the law of war and rules of engagement.** Base commanders and their subordinates must comply with the rules of engagement. In joint service operations, reconcile inconsistencies with the rules of engagement.

6-113. Base defense forces are troops assigned or attached to a base for the primary purpose of base defense. The mission of the base defense force is to conduct reaction operations to deter, resist, or destroy an enemy Level I force that is attacking the base.

6-114. The base defense force consists of combined security assets that are provided by units contained on the base. The base commander considers available Army, joint, and multinational resources and forces in determining the exact organization of the base defense force. If the base comes under attack, the base commander responds within the capability of the base defense force.

6-115. The emphasis on specific base defense and security measures depends on the anticipated threat level. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously. (See table 6-1.)

Table 6-1. Threat levels

<i>Threat Level</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Response</i>
I	A Level I threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by maneuver units that operate in the sustainment area or by the perimeter defenses. A Level I threat for a typical base consists of a squad-size unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks; disrupting friendly mission command, logistics, and facilities; and interdicting friendly LOCs.	The typical response force for a Level I threat is a maneuver unit or perimeter defenses that are established by friendly bases and base clusters.
II	A Level II threat is represented by enemy activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster that is augmented by a response force. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited small combat units. Typical objectives for a Level II threat include disrupting and destroying friendly mission command, logistics, and commercial facilities and interdicting friendly LOCs.	The typical response force for a Level II threat is a military police platoon; however, it can also be a combat arms maneuver element.

Table 6-1. Threat levels (continued)

Threat Level	Description	Response
III	A Level III threat is a threat that is beyond the defensive capability of the base, base cluster, and local reserve or response force. Level III threats normally consist of a mobile enemy force. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Additional objectives could also include destroying friendly facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation assembly areas, arming and refueling points and interdicting LOCs and major supply routes.	The typical response force to a Level III threat is a tactical combat force.
Note. See JP 3-10 for additional information.		
Legend: JP joint publication LOC line of communication		

6-116. A base defense force should have a significant amount of direct fire lethality that is provided by a mixture of small arms, automatic weapons, and antitank systems. It should also have access to supporting indirect fires, a high degree of tactical mobility, and a reasonable span of control. It should be capable of—

- Conducting reconnaissance patrols for detecting and reporting the location, strength, and capabilities of enemy forces that are located near the base.
- Developing positions within and outside the base from which enemy advances can be stopped or destroyed.
- Using reserve elements to attack relatively small enemy units that threaten to penetrate the base perimeter.

6-117. Providing internal security for the critical capabilities that are located on the base.

6-118. To streamline mission command of the base defense force in the event of an attack, the base commander designates a base defense force commander. The base defense force commander needs a base defense operations center to ensure the integration of defense plans and the maximum effectiveness of the total base defense effort. A *base defense operations center* is a command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense (JP 3-10). It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts. The nature of the base defense operations center depends on the combination of the forces that are involved. The forces may be joint, interagency, or multinational.

6-119. Military police leaders must anticipate the integration of their capabilities into the base defense plan and, therefore, must know their mission, capabilities, and dependencies and have the ability to articulate the information to nonmilitary police leaders or battle staff. Military police can provide essential early warnings of enemy activity by exercising PIO to predict and prevent a threat from affecting base operations. Additional base defensive tasks may include patrols, access control, critical base facility security, LPs/OPs, and the initial response force.

Response Force Operations

6-120. A response force is a mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually by the area commander, to deal with Level II threats in the operation area. The base camp or critical facility commander usually assigns response force operations to military police units.

6-121. The military police company commander determines the size and composition of the response force. The nature and scope of the threatening enemy force influence the number of military police elements that are dedicated to response force operations. So, too, do current intelligence and the base or critical facility commander's risk assessment. When developing his plan, the military police commander considers—

- Current base defense plans.
- Ongoing operations priorities.
- The criticality of the base that is under attack.
- The amount of time that is needed for given elements to consolidate.
- The ability to communicate between security elements.
- The identification of contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.
- The availability of additional forces to supplement the response force element, if required.
- The integration of engineer, CBRN, fire, and CAS.

6-122. Military police consolidate into squads or platoons to delay, defeat, or defend against Level I and Level II threats. Military police response forces also shape and delay Level III threats until a designated combined arms tactical combat force arrives for decisive operations. Military police forces that perform as a response force are capable of conducting the following offensive operations:

- Movement to contact.
- Hasty ambush.
- Hasty attack.
- Delay.
- CFF.
- Repel attack against critical sites.
- Defense of critical sites.

FIGHTING AND SURVIVABILITY POSITIONS

6-123. Whether a unit is attacking, defending, or conducting retrograde operations, its success or failure depends on the ability of the individual Soldier to place accurate fire on the enemy. Consequently, the Soldier must immediately seek and use firing positions properly. The type of fighting position (hasty or deliberate) that is constructed depends on the available time and equipment and the required level of protection.

6-124. Consider the following when selecting a fighting position:

- Choose a position that takes advantage of available cover and concealment.
- Choose a position that allows observation and fire around the side of an object while concealing most of the head and body.
- Choose a position that allows the ability to stay low when observing and firing.
- Choose a position with a background that does not silhouette against the surrounding environment.

6-125. From the time that a Soldier begins occupying a fighting position, he should continue to make improvements. When time permits, he should reinforce positions to provide maximum cover and concealment. Cover provides protection from bullets, exploding rounds, flames, nuclear effects, and biological and chemical agents. Cover also offers concealment, which obscures the fighting position from enemy observation; however, it does not provide protection from enemy fire. (See TC 3-21.75 for additional guidance regarding cover and concealment techniques.)

Hasty Fighting Positions

6-126. Use hasty fighting positions to exploit available cover techniques and when there is little time for preparation, which is typically during attack or the early stages of defense. This position should give frontal cover from enemy direct fire while allowing fire to the front and the oblique. When there is little or no natural

cover, hasty positions provide immediate protection. Examples of hasty fighting positions are natural ditches or holes, shell craters, and skirmisher trenches. Some hasty fighting positions in an urban area are—

- Building corners.
- Walls (behind them).
- Windows.
- Unprepared loopholes (small, preexisting holes in a wall that allow a Soldier to observe and engage targets in his sector).
- Roof peaks.

6-127. Some considerations for selecting and occupying individual fighting positions in urban terrain are—

- Avoid firing over cover; when possible, fire around it.
- Avoid silhouetting against light-colored buildings, the skyline, and other objects.
- Carefully select a new fighting position before leaving an old one.
- Avoid setting a pattern; fire from barricaded and nonbarricaded windows.
- Keep exposure time to a minimum.
- Use construction material that is readily available in an urban area.

6-128. See TC 90-1 for additional guidance and graphics regarding hasty fighting positions in urban terrain.

Deliberate Fighting Positions

6-129. Deliberate fighting positions allow Soldiers to engage a particular area, avenue of approach, or enemy position while reducing exposure to return fire. They can be developed from hasty positions by making improvements during periods of relaxed enemy pressure. Examples of improvements include adding overhead cover, digging grenade sumps, adding trenches to adjacent positions, and maintaining camouflage. (See TC 3-21.75 for additional guidance and graphics regarding the types and specifications of deliberate fighting positions.)

6-130. Examples of deliberate positions include—

- Barricaded windows.
- Fortified loopholes (small, reinforced holes in a wall that allow a Soldier to observe and engage targets in his sector).
- Sniper positions.
- Antiarmor positions.
- Machine gun positions.

Sectors and Fields of Fire

6-131. Although a fighting position should provide maximum protection for Soldiers and their equipment, the primary consideration is given to sectors of fire and effective weapons employment. Sight weapon systems where natural or existing positions are available or where terrain will provide the most protection while maintaining the ability to engage the enemy. Leaders consider how to best use available terrain and how to modify it to provide the most advantageous sectors of fire while maximizing the capabilities of weapon systems.

RANGE CARDS

6-132. A range card (a rough plan of the terrain around a weapon position) is a sketch of the assigned sector that a direct fire weapon system is intended to cover. DA Form 5517-R (*Standard Range Card*) provides a record of firing data and aids defensive fire planning.

6-133. Prepare range cards immediately upon arrival to a position, regardless of the length of stay, and update them as necessary. Prepare two copies of the range card—one copy stays at the fighting position, and the other copy goes to the squad leader.

Range Card Components

- 6-134. Figure 6-12 depicts a completed standard range card, which consists of—
- **Sectors of fire.** A sector of fire is an area that is covered by fire from an individual, a weapon, or a unit. Leaders assign a primary and secondary sector of fire to each position.
 - **Principal direction of fire.** The principal direction of fire is the direction of fire that is assigned priority to cover an area that has good fields of fire or has a likely dismounted avenue of approach. The weapon is positioned to fire directly down this approach rather than across the front of the element. It also provides mutual support to an adjacent unit. Machine guns are sighted by using the principal direction of fire if a final protective line has not been assigned. If a principal direction of fire is assigned and other targets are not engaged, machine guns remain on the principal direction of fire.
 - **Final protective line.** The final protective line is a predetermined line along which grazing fire is placed to stop an enemy assault. Leaders assign final protective lines where terrain and distance allow. The final protective line will then dictate the location of the primary sector. The final protective line will become the primary sector limit (right or left) that is closest to friendly troops. When not firing at other targets, fire is set on the final protective line or principal direction of fire.
 - **Dead space.** Dead space is an area that direct fire weapons cannot hit, such as an area behind a house or a hill.

Automatic-Weapon Range Cards

- 6-135. The following procedures outline how to prepare a range card for an automatic weapon:
- Orient the card so that the primary and secondary sectors of fire (if assigned) can fit.
 - Draw a rough sketch of the terrain that is located to the front of your position. Include prominent natural and man-made features that could be likely targets.
 - Draw your position at the bottom of the sketch.
 - Fill in the marginal data, including the gun number (or squad), unit (only the platoon and company), and date.
 - Use a lensatic compass to determine magnetic north, and sketch in the magnetic north arrow on the card. Ensure that the arrow base starts at the top of the marginal data section.
 - Sketch prominent terrain features (hilltops, road junctions, buildings).
 - Sketch identified targets, and numerically label them for reference in the data section.
 - Determine the direction between each target, and enter the information under the appropriate column in the data section.
 - Determine the elevation of each numbered target, and enter the information under the appropriate column in the data section.
 - Determine the range or distance to each target, and enter the information under the appropriate column in the data section.
 - Enter the ammunition type under the appropriate column in the data section.
 - Describe each target under the appropriate column in the data section.
 - Write the distance (in meters) and the azimuth (in degrees) from the targets.
 - Use the remarks section to annotate the width and depth of linear targets.

STANDARD RANGE CARD For use of this form see ATTP 3-21.71; the proponent agency is TRADOC.					
SQUAD <u>3d</u>	May be used for all types of direct fire weapons.				F MAGNETIC NORTH
PLT <u>2d</u>					
CO <u>B</u>					
DATA SECTION					
POSITION IDENTIFICATION GLO8451038				DATE 12 Oct 14	
WEAPON M60 #2			EACH CIRCLE EQUALS METERS <u>100</u>		
NO.	DIRECTION/ DEFLECTION	ELEVATION	RANGE	AMMO	DESCRIPTION
1	L035	0/24	400		PDF (wooded road junction)
2	R375	-50/15	625		Barn
3	R175	-50/40	725		Hedgerow
REMARKS: (1) TW 17 A30 (2) TW 3/L3 (3) TW 7/A3					
DA FORM 5517-R, FEB 1986 APD LC v1.01					

Figure 6-12. Sample standard range card

Legend:	
ammo	ammunition
APD	Army Publishing Directorate
ATTP	Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
co	company
DA	Department of the Army
F	magnetic north
Feb	February
m	meter(s)
No.	number
PDF	portable document format
plt	platoon
sqd	squad
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine
TW	target width

SAMPLE

Figure 6-12. Sample standard range card (continued)

Final Protective Lines

- 6-136. Conduct the following actions, including a final protective line on a range card:
- Sketch in the assigned limits of the primary sector of fire.
 - Sketch in the assigned final protective line on the sector limit.
 - Determine the dead space on the final protective line.
 - Sketch the dead space by showing a break in the symbol for a final protective line, and write the range to the beginning and end of the dead space.
 - Label targets in the primary sector in the order of priority—the final protective line is Number 1.

Principal Direction of Fire

- 6-137. Conduct the following actions to prepare a range card when assigned a principal direction of fire instead of a final protective line:
- Sketch in the assigned limits of the primary sector of fire. (The sector should not exceed 875 mils (22.22 millimeters), the maximum traverse of the tripod-mounted machine gun.)
 - Sketch in the symbol for an automatic weapon that is oriented on the most dangerous target within the sector. (The principal direction of fire will be target Number 1; all other targets will be numbered in priority.)
 - Sketch in the secondary sector of fire (as assigned). Label targets within the secondary sector, with the range in meters from the gun to each target. (The secondary sector is drawn by using a broken line.) Sketch in aiming stakes, if used.

PROTECTIVE SERVICES

- 6-138. The security of high-risk personnel is the responsibility of USACIDC. However, due to a limited number of USACIDC special agents in theaters of operation, military police often provide close-in security of protected persons.

6-139. The goal of a protective services detail mission is to protect high-risk personnel from hazards that are caused by personal design, accidents, or negligence. Although absolute protection is never possible, following specific, well-established protective services detail basic principles will increase the probability of a successful mission. The fundamentals that are necessary for these missions include—

- **Planning and coordinating.** Planning is critical to a successful mission. Meticulously plan every element of protection, and scrutinize every act or movement of the principal and protective services detail to ensure maximum security. Mission leaders must thoroughly brief and rehearse emergency procedures to ensure that personnel instinctively react instantly and correctly.
- **Ensuring the availability of resources.** There are many factors that determine the number of personnel who are assigned to, and the equipment that is used for, a protection detail; however, the availability of resources is the most important. Pay special consideration to the principal's position, the threat level at the location at which he is visiting, and the complexity of the mission. Consider these factors when requesting and providing resources for a mission.
- **Assigning responsibilities.** Assigning individual responsibilities ensures the successful completion of all facets of the mission.
- **Controlling information.** Closely control the release of personal information that pertains to the principal and other members of the party, the details of the itinerary, and the security procedures to be employed. Ensure that protective-services detail personnel understand that they are prohibited from discussing or releasing this information with anyone other than authorized personnel. The release of information to anyone other than authorized personnel adversely affects the integrity of the security mission.
- **Being flexible.** Unexpected changes to the itinerary require flexibility to be the primary factor in planning protective services detail missions. Prepare alternate and contingency plans to cover inclement weather, possible threats, or other actions that may affect the security of high-risk personnel. Good preventive measures and thorough backup plans are critical.

6-140. The military police commander who is tasked with a protective services detail mission designates a leader as the noncommissioned officer in charge of the security detail. The leader is given full responsibility for all phases of the security mission, including coordination. This allows for a single point of contact for the conduct of the mission. The leader coordinates with USACIDC special agents to develop a comprehensive plan and organize resources.

6-141. Ideally, the leader uses organic weapons, vehicles, and equipment to execute the mission. If the mission requires special equipment, the leader conducts the necessary coordination. Depending on the threat level, selected members of the security team may be armed with an M4. The mission leader considers the use of shotguns if there is a threat of attack in a congested area where the employment of long-range weapons poses a danger of injuring innocent persons. Members of the team who are selected to physically escort high-risk personnel are armed with a sidearm (typically an M9) only, which allows them to have both hands free to react to close-in threats.

6-142. The military police leader thoroughly briefs the security plan to personnel who are selected for the mission. After the mission leader finalizes the security plan, he assembles the security team and conducts detailed rehearsals. The security plan includes—

- Restrictions on individuals who approach the protected person.
- Evacuation procedures if the protected person is attacked and the threat cannot be immediately reduced.
- Control measures, such as designated checkpoints.
- Crowd control measures.
- Alternate routes.
- Emergency medical evacuation procedures.
- Emergency actions to be taken in the event of an ambush or indirect fire.

6-143. Military police who conduct protective services detail missions must remain alert at all times and provide constant security to the protected person. Protection is accomplished by establishing a series of protective cordons around high-risk personnel. Use protective measures that allow the principal the freedom of movement, but do not interfere with the conduct of duties. Military police provide security by—

- Restricting the circulation of unauthorized personnel around the protected person.
- Remaining a short distance away from the protected person.
- Taking positions that allow for the observation of everything and everyone near the protected person.
- Securing the facility of the protected person.
- Maintaining constant communications with higher headquarters.

CONVOY SECURITY

6-144. A *convoy security* is a specialized area security task conducted to protect convoys (ATP 3-91). Units conduct convoy security operations when there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes in an AO and when there is a significant danger of enemy ground action that is directed against the convoy. Local or theater policy dictates when and which convoys receive security and protection. (See ATP 4-01.45 for additional guidance on convoy tactics, techniques, and procedures.)

6-145. Military police units are capable of providing convoy security for high-priority, designated units that transport joint force or geographic combatant commander-designated critical supplies to combat forces. Military police teams that move with a convoy are typically the least effective method for securing convoys. It is often most efficient to employ military police units on aggressive patrolling and route, area, and zone reconnaissance measures that create a safe and secure environment for unit movement.

6-146. During the execution of convoy security missions, military police implement the following principles of mounted movement for tactical convoys:

- **360° security.** Combine maximum, all-around visibility for situational awareness with interlocking sectors of fire and mutual support. Convoy personnel should also be aware of what is above and below their position. Situational awareness should focus on approaching vehicles, potential IEDs/mines, suspicious wires/antennas, canalizing terrain, bridges and overpasses, and suspicious individuals or groups.
- **Deterrence.** Present a menacing, aggressive, and professional posture that demonstrates readiness and a willingness to engage. An aggressive posture deters the enemy from approaching or engaging the convoy.
- **Agility.** Adapt to the conditions that are set by the environment or enemy.
- **Unpredictability.** Minimize the enemy ability to predict the time, route, composition, or purpose of the convoy.

6-147. Military police leaders who are assigned a convoy security mission develop the security plan; provide guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for units to provide for their own security during convoys; and establish protection and security requirements for convoys that carry critical assets. The mission leader plans for security of the convoy by developing a strategy that includes the required considerations for the specific mission (including coordination with appropriate units for required support), obtaining necessary equipment and supplies, and preparing mission briefings for security personnel. When planning convoy security operations, the mission leader—

- Coordinates with HN security personnel when necessary.
- Consults with sources (intelligence personnel, engineers, highway traffic division personnel) to obtain as much information as possible.
- Reconnoiters the convoy route to—
 - Identify likely trouble spots and ambush sites.
 - Determine possible locations for traffic control posts and checkpoints.
 - Identify route conditions.
 - Determine locations of friendly units in the area.

- Coordinates with the convoy commander.
- Determines the appropriate actions to take if there is an attack—
 - By an IED.
 - By a sniper.
 - With the road blocked.
 - With the road not blocked.
 - From the air.
 - With artillery.

Note. The reaction to an enemy attack while providing convoy security varies based on the mission or the type of cargo. When carrying special weapons or ammunition, ensure that procedures are addressed in the OPORD on how to react to enemy contact.

- Determines protective measures for mines and other explosive hazards.
- Determines the convoy organization, to include the location of critical cargo vehicles, armored vehicles, maintenance/recovery vehicles, and crew-served weapons.
- Determines the location at which military police vehicles and personnel will be positioned in the convoy.
- Determines primary and backup radio frequencies and emergency communications procedures.
- Determines the timetable for movements.
- Determines start and release points.
- Determines security measures to be used at halts and rest stops.
- Determines the time and place that military police support begins and ends.
- Determines road conditions.
- Determines supporting fires, to include artillery support, engineer support for minesweeping the route, gunship support, and HN police support, if applicable.
- Determines the method of escort for the convoy.
- Briefs personnel on the mission, enemy situation, and specific individual duties to be performed.
- Coordinates with friendly units in the area where the convoy will pass and identifies the support that friendly units can provide.
- Coordinates with aviation assets, if available.
- Ensures that leaders conduct thorough precombat checks, inspections, and rehearsals.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

6-148. Physical security is that part of the Army security system, based on threat analysis that is concerned with procedures and physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, property, and operations; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materials, and information; and to protect against espionage, terrorism, sabotage, damage, misuse, and theft. (See ATP 3-39.32 for additional information.) The security of property, equipment, facilities, and personnel is the responsibility of military police leaders. Military police commanders are charged with protecting personnel, information, and critical resources in locations and situations against a wide range of threats through the development and implementation of effective physical security programs, policies, and procedures.

6-149. Physical security measures are instrumental in preventing unauthorized access to restricted, controlled, or vulnerable areas. Prioritize physical security measures based on vulnerability and threat assessments to protect critical sites, personnel, and equipment. Use physical security in conjunction with other security measures (mobile patrols, operations, information security measures) as part of a comprehensive security program.

6-150. Military police support the commander's physical security programs by—

- Controlling or monitoring installation, base, or base cluster access or entrance points.
- Monitoring intrusion detection systems and providing a response force.

- Conducting physical security inspections. (Inspectors must have successfully completed the U.S. Army Military Police School Conventional Physical Security Course.)
- Conducting perimeter security or site surveillance.
- Recommending the placement of walls, berms, gates, or barriers around designated mission-essential vulnerable areas, critical facilities, or perimeters.
- Supporting the commander's risk analysis effort.
- Conducting roving patrols, checkpoints, or roadblocks.
- Conducting vulnerability and criticality assessments.
- Supporting antiterrorism measures.
- Performing other physical security measures as required by the commander.

CHECKPOINTS

6-151. It is often necessary for commanders to control the freedom of movement in an AO for a specific period of time or as an enduring operation. Military police accomplish this by placing permanent or temporary checkpoints along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain that is identified through METT-TC. Checkpoint personnel monitor and control the movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information.

6-152. Establishing checkpoints is a critical measure in a commander's overall protection efforts. Checkpoints also enable effective civil control operations. Military police provide expertise to commanders on the construction and procedures that are involved in checkpoint operations. Military police also operate critical checkpoints to control traffic flow, enforce laws, and control movement at critical locations, such as border crossing sites or critical facility accesses. Military police establish and operate two types of checkpoints: deliberate and hasty.

DELIBERATE CHECKPOINT

6-153. A deliberate checkpoint is a fixed position that is constructed and employed to protect an operating base, a well-established MSR, or a main road in a rural or built-up area. (See figure 6-13 for an illustration of a deliberate checkpoint.)




Figure 6-13. Sample deliberate checkpoint

6-154. Military police use deliberate checkpoints to—

- Control vehicles and pedestrian traffic so that crowds cannot assemble.
- Arrest known offenders or suspected enemy personnel.
- Enforce curfews.
- Deter illegal movements.
- Prevent the movement of supplies to the enemy.
- Deny the enemy contact with local inhabitants.
- Dominate the area of responsibility around the checkpoint.
- Collect information.

6-155. Checkpoints are categorized by how much traffic is expected to pass through them. A heavy-traffic checkpoint normally requires a platoon to operate it. Although not optimal, a military police squad can operate a light-traffic checkpoint for a short duration (12 hours or less).

HASTY CHECKPOINT

6-156. Military police activate a hasty checkpoint as part of a larger tactical plan or in reaction to hostile activities (bombs, mine incidents, sniper attacks) and can lift the checkpoint on the command of the controlling headquarters. A hasty checkpoint has a specific task and purpose. (See figure 6-14 for an illustration of a hasty checkpoint.)




Figure 6-14. Sample hasty checkpoint

6-157. Military police set up hasty checkpoints to achieve surprise. Leaders avoid setting patterns by moving the checkpoint location and changing the method of operation at random. Military police establish hasty checkpoints where they cannot be seen by approaching traffic until it is too late for approaching traffic

to unobtrusively withdraw. Good locations to set up hasty checkpoints include bridges, defiles, highway intersections, the reverse slopes of hills, and just beyond sharp curves. Hasty checkpoints are used for—

- Employing vehicles (reinforced with concertina wire) as the obstacle. Military police may use tire deflation devices or road spike strips. These devices are more effective than concertina wire and may be less intrusive in stability operations.
- Positioning the vehicles at each end of the checkpoint to partially block the route.
- Conducting the search in the area between the vehicles.
- Establishing overwatch positions.
- Concealing a reaction force (at least one team) nearby to react in case the site is attacked.

ORGANIZATION OF CHECKPOINT FORCES

6-158. The basic organization of a checkpoint includes a headquarters element, a security element, a search element, and an assault element. To operate a checkpoint, task-organize the unit as follows:

- The headquarters element is responsible for—
 - Exercising mission command.
 - Maintaining a log of activities.
 - Maintaining communication with higher headquarters.
 - Coordinating local patrols.
 - Coordinating the role of civil authorities as required.
 - Coordinating linkups as required.
 - Coordinating relief in place as required.
 - Integrating reserve/quick-reaction forces.
- The security element consists of a military police squad and is responsible for—
 - Monitoring traffic flow up to and through the checkpoint.
 - Watching for and reporting suspicious activity.
 - Providing early warning to search and assault elements.
 - Preventing enemy ambush.
- The search element consists of a military police squad and is responsible for—
 - Halting vehicles at the checkpoint.
 - Guiding vehicles to the designated search point.
 - Conducting personnel and vehicle searches.
 - Directing cleared vehicles through the checkpoint.
 - Detaining personnel as directed.
- The assault element is responsible for—
 - Preparing and occupying fortified fighting positions.
 - Eliminating (according to the rules of engagement) hostile elements that force their way past the search team.

Note. Checkpoints are part of a police action. As such, Soldiers who participate in the operation must clearly understand the rules of engagement and the use of deadly force.

ORGANIZATION OF A CHECKPOINT

6-159. Checkpoint layout, construction, and operation reflect METT-TC factors. The following procedures and considerations normally apply to the organization of a checkpoint:

- Position the checkpoint where traffic cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass the checkpoint without being observed.
- Position vehicles and crew-served weapons off the road, but within sight of the checkpoint to help deter resistance toward Soldiers at the checkpoint. Place vehicles in a hull-down position, which allows Soldiers to engage vehicles that try to break through or bypass the checkpoint.

- Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area. (Traffic enters the checkpoint single file.)
- Place signs that are written in the HN language to explain the checkpoint, and include instructions for passing through it.
- Establish communications according to the unit SOP.
- Designate the search area for vehicles and personnel. If possible, surround the search area with barriers that protect against threats, such as booby-trapped vehicles or suicide bombers. Women are typically only checked with a metal detector or searched by female personnel. However, this depends on the rules of engagement and METT-TC. (See chapter 4 for additional information regarding vehicle and personnel searches.)

Note. If applicable, checkpoint personnel should include linguists.

ACCESS CONTROL POINT

6-160. The *access control point* is a corridor at the installation perimeter through which all vehicles and pedestrians must pass when entering or exiting the installation (ATP 3-39.32). A critical aspect of the security posture of a post, camp, station, or base of operation is access control. The objective of access control is to prevent unauthorized access and to intercept contraband, such as weapons, explosives, illegal drugs, and classified material. Access control involves the establishment of a system of complementary, overlapping security measures to control access to critical resources and information. These measures include—

- Physical barriers.
- Clear zones.
- Lighting techniques.
- Access and key controls.
- Security badges.
- Intrusion detection devices.
- Defensive positions.
- Nonlethal capabilities.

6-161. An access control point should be subdivided into four zones, each encompassing specific functions and operations. Beginning at the perimeter boundary, the access zones include the—

- **Approach zone.** The approach zone runs from the access control point entrance to the beginning of the access control zone. It is the area through which vehicles must pass before they reach the actual checkpoint. Specific functions in the approach zone include—
 - Reducing the speed of incoming vehicles.
 - Sorting and queuing vehicles for identification authentication.
 - Providing adequate queuing distance for vehicles that are waiting for entry to ensure minimal impact on off-site traffic flow.
 - Providing sufficient standoff distance for responding to threat vehicles with the appropriate level of force.
- **Access control zone.** The access control zone is the primary controlling element of the access control point and lies between the response and approach zones. The purpose of the access control zone is to determine the authorization of a vehicle to enter. The identity of each occupant in a vehicle is verified via picture identification. Soldiers or guards conduct access verification, which results in a vehicle being authorized access or being directed to another area of the access control point. Design the access control zone to—
 - Manage authorized vehicles and personnel.
 - Reject unauthorized vehicles.
 - Minimize adverse impacts on traffic flow.
 - Provide cover to protect against inclement weather.

- Facilitate identification and inspection procedures.
- Provide a platform for lighting, detection, and surveillance equipment.
- **Response zone.** The response zone is the area that extends from the end of the access control zone to the final active vehicle barrier. This zone defines the end of the access control point. The purpose of the response zone is to allow the security force to respond to a threat, operate active vehicle barriers, and close the access control point, if necessary. Design the response zone with—
 - Sufficient length to provide adequate reaction time for the security force to respond to a threat.
 - Full containment and control of vehicles through the use of active and passive vehicle barriers.
 - Final denial barriers at the end of the response zone to stop threat vehicles from gaining forced entry.
- **Safety zone.** The safety zone extends from the active and passive vehicle barriers that define the boundary of the access control point. Establishing an appropriate safety zone reduces the effects of a potential explosion near the access control point. Determine the acceptable standoff distance or safety zone by the expected weight of the explosive charge and the facility or asset to be protected.

6-162. Military police leaders who are tasked to supervise an access control point ensure that operations are conducted according to AR 190-13, AR 525-13, TC 19-210, and the local SOP. Leaders—

- Verify that special guard orders include instructions for—
 - Performing sign-in procedures.
 - Maintaining access rosters, if applicable.
 - Contacting off-site emergency vehicles.
 - Maintaining on-site emergency vehicles.
 - Processing authorized identification card holders.
 - Using the contact roster for key personnel.
 - Using a map of the installation.
 - Maintaining phone numbers for key organizations of the installation.
 - Implementing random antiterrorism measures for force protection conditions.
 - Using the proper levels of force.
 - Maintaining a list of personnel who are barred from the installation.
- Conduct a guard mount.
- Make communication checks (telephonic and radio) with higher headquarters or the military police desk.
- Conduct an equipment inventory and report discrepancies before taking responsibility for the inventory.
- Employ traffic control devices according to the special orders at each gate. Check the—
 - Operational gate (electronic).
 - Barriers.
 - Directional signs.
 - Regulatory signs.
 - Warning signs.
 - Portable lights.
 - Traffic cones.
- Inspect the condition of the facilities and surrounding areas.
- Immediately report the deficiencies that affect access control operations.
- Perform immediate gate closure procedures according to the appropriate force protection condition level and the local SOP.
- Inventory gate equipment and inspect the facility before the end of the shift.

ANTITERRORISM

6-163. Antiterrorism is the Army defensive program that is used to protect against terrorism. Army antiterrorism focuses on risk management, planning (including the antiterrorism plan), training, exercise, resource generation, comprehensive program review, and the conduct of random antiterrorism measures. During planning, coordinate specific antiterrorism security requirements with the efforts of other security enhancement programs, such as intelligence support to antiterrorism, LE, physical security, and others. Effective antiterrorism programs synchronize intelligence, composite risk management, and existing security programs to provide a holistic approach to defend against terrorist threats.

6-164. Military police are trained extensively in antiterrorism measures and methods for assessing the threat, implementing preventive measures, and responding to terrorist incidents in an LE capacity and in general terms. Military police identify potential terrorist threats and other threat activities to enhance the freedom of action. The identification of threats is necessary to establish measures to protect from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. The identification of threats also enables U.S. forces to take actions and implement procedures to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts or attacks. These actions include education to enhance the understanding of the nature of terrorism, the maintenance of heightened situational awareness regarding current threats, and the mitigation of vulnerabilities to terrorist acts by implementing appropriate protective measures.

6-165. Military police are trained and prepared to rapidly respond to terrorist attacks when prevention efforts fail. These emergency response actions incorporate measures to treat casualties, apprehend perpetrators, preserve evidence, minimize property damage, restore operations, and expedite the criminal investigation and collection of lessons learned from a terrorist incident. (See AR 525-13 and ATP 3-37.2 for additional information regarding antiterrorism.)

6-166. Military police commanders have the responsibility and authority to enforce appropriate security measures to ensure the protection of the elements and personnel who are subject to their control. Commanders ensure the antiterrorism awareness and readiness of personnel (including dependent family members) who are assigned or attached to the unit. Commanders implement eight standard antiterrorism tasks to support antiterrorism objectives (deter incidents, employ countermeasures, mitigate effects, and conduct incident recovery procedures). Antiterrorism tasks include—

- **Establish an antiterrorism program.** Commanders communicate the spirit and intent of antiterrorism policies throughout the chain of command or noncommissioned officer support channels by establishing antiterrorism programs. The programs provide standards, policies, and procedures to reduce vulnerabilities from terrorist attacks.
- **Collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information.** Commanders develop a system to collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist threat information and apply the appropriate force protection conditions.
- **Assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities.** Commanders continuously assess antiterrorism efforts. These assessments review the overall program functions, individual physical and procedural security measures, and unit predeployment preparations.
- **Increase antiterrorism awareness in every Soldier, civilian, and family member.** Commanders inform personnel of the terrorist threat and adequately train them to apply protective measures. Unit collective training includes antiterrorism training, regardless of the unit location.
- **Maintain installation defenses according to force protection conditions.** Commanders use antiterrorism-specific security procedural and physical measures to protect personnel, information, and materiel from terrorist threats.
- **Establish civil/military partnerships in preparation for a terrorist incident crisis.** Commanders coordinate with local civilian communities to establish working relationships and formulate partnerships to combat and defend against terrorism.

- **Establish terrorist threat and incident response planning.** Commanders must develop reactive plans. These plans prescribe appropriate actions for reporting terrorist threat information, responding to terrorist threats and attacks, and reporting terrorist incidents.
- **Conduct exercises and evaluate and assess antiterrorism plans.** Commanders institute an exercise program that develops, refines, and tests antiterrorism response procedures to terrorist threats and incidents. This exercise program ensures that antiterrorism is an integral part of exercise planning.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

6-167. Military police units perform counteractions to protect the force and prevent or defeat threat forces from operating within the AO throughout the area security function. Military police countermeasures include implementing vulnerability assessments. A *vulnerability assessment* is a Department of Defense, command, or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to determine the vulnerability of an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or other site to a terrorist attack (JP 3-07.2). It identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism. It also identifies the physical characteristics or procedures that render critical assets, areas, infrastructures, or special events vulnerable to known or potential threats and hazards. The assessment provides a basis for developing controls to eliminate or mitigate vulnerabilities. Vulnerability is the component of risk over which the commander has the most control and greatest influence. The normal sequence of a vulnerability assessment is as follows:

- List assets and capabilities and the threats against them.
- Determine common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.
- Train the assessment team on assessment intent and methodology.
- Evaluate assets and capabilities for vulnerability.
- Review assessment results.

CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT

6-168. Military police conduct criticality assessments of bases to assist commanders with counterreconnaissance efforts. They also advise commanders on the security measures that are designed to prevent the threat from gaining access to friendly forces and facilities. A criticality assessment identifies the key assets that are required to accomplish a mission. It addresses the impact of the temporary or permanent loss of key assets on the unit ability to conduct a mission. Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities and operations, information, facilities, materials, and the interdependent networks that connect them. Military police who conduct the assessment need to work with tenant organizations to identify critical assets and functions since many of these functions will be outside the knowledge set of military police who conduct the assessment. The following are the general actions for a criticality assessment:

- List key assets and capabilities.
- Determine if critical functions or combat power can be substantially duplicated with other elements of the command or an external resource.
- Determine the time required to substantially duplicate key assets and capabilities in the event of temporary or permanent loss.
- Set priorities for responses to threats that are targeted toward personnel, physical assets, and information.

6-169. When determining asset criticality, use the following to assist in standardizing the process:

- **Importance.** Determine the value of the area and the assets that are located in the area in regard to function, inherent nature, and monetary value.
- **Effect.** Measure the ramification of a terrorist incident in the area in regard to psychological, economic, sociological, and military impacts.

- **Recoverability.** Measure the time required for the function that is occurring at that area to be restored in regard to resource availability, parts, expertise and manpower, and redundancy. (If a DOD asset is injured, damaged, or destroyed, it may still have future value in the accomplishment of other DOD missions or be of great symbolic value to the DOD, the U.S. government, and the American people. However, leaders must give consideration to the resources that are required to recover or repair an asset.)
- **Mission functionality.** Measure key positions, special facilities, and specialized equipment to fulfill assigned missions.
- **Substitutability.** Determine if substitutes are available for personnel, facilities, or materiel. Ascertain the ability of substitutes to perform assigned missions. Decide if the mission can still be accomplished successfully if substitutes are less capable.
- **Repairability.** Conclude if an injured or damaged DOD asset can be repaired and rendered operable. Clarify costs and the time that is required to make repairs. Determine if repairs would degrade asset performance and, if so, establish if the mission can be accomplished in the degraded condition.

6-170. The DOD has created several decision support tools to perform criticality assessments in support of the vulnerability assessment process, including the mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity (MSHARPP) assessment and the criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) assessment. (See ATP 3-37.2 and DODI 2000.12 for additional information concerning these two assessments.)

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Chapter 7

Police Intelligence Operations

Police intelligence operations is a military police function that is integrated throughout all military police operations and supports the operations process through analysis, production, and dissemination of information collected as a result of police activities to enhance situational understanding, protection, civil control, and LE. (See FM 3-39 for additional information.) This information—whether police, criminal, or tactical—is gathered during the conduct of military police operations and, after analysis, may contribute to the commander’s critical information requirements; intelligence-led, time-sensitive operations; or the policing strategies that are required to forecast, anticipate, and preempt crime or related disruptive activities to maintain order. This chapter highlights the application of police intelligence capabilities in collecting, analyzing, and reporting information and police intelligence.

POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

7-1. Military police units that conduct PIO support decisive actions by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating police information and police intelligence on infrastructure, systems, populations, and individuals. *Police information* is the available information concerning known and potential enemy and criminal threats and vulnerabilities collected during police activities, operations, and investigations (FM 3-39). The analysis of police information produces police intelligence. *Police intelligence* is the application of systems, technologies, and processes that analyze applicable data and information necessary for situational understanding and focusing policing activities to achieve social order (FM 3-39). Police information and police intelligence enable increased situational understanding and informed decisionmaking by Army commanders and shape the execution of policing and LE activities.

7-2. Priority PIO tasks are the same across offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities; but the concentration of effort differs. For example, the tempo of offensive tasks may not allow the time that is required to fully establish the police intelligence network to integrate PIO across the entire AO. Even so, the support that is provided during offensive tasks—such as enforcing the rules of evidence, facilitating forensic examination of key items, obtaining biometric identity, and collecting information for criminal prosecution—can play a key role in establishing civil security and civil control in the AO. In general, more stability in unit locations and operations in the AO during defensive tasks allows for the rapid and extensive development of police intelligence networks. These networks—with HN police, the local population, community leaders, other governmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations—enable the establishment of a more robust police intelligence capability.

7-3. PIO is a significant enabler in the early phases of a stability operation as military police and USACIDC elements gather, analyze, and disseminate critical information and police intelligence regarding police and prison systems, HN capabilities, policing and prison activities capabilities, and criminal environment assessments in the AO. This is especially relevant to the civil security and civil control lines of operations. During defense support of civil authorities, military police LE personnel may conduct PIO in support of civilian authorities through the development of U.S.-based networks that are integrated with local, county, state, tribal, and federal LE agencies.

MILITARY POLICE AND POLICE INTELLIGENCE

7-4. The PIO function represents the military police capability to facilitate the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of police information and intelligence in support of the intelligence requirements that are generated by commanders, provost marshals, and investigators who perform policing activities. PIO products feed into the Army operations process which, in turn, facilitates the development of a holistic common operational picture, enhances situational understanding, and enables combined arms operations.

7-5. PIO provides a continuous source of police information and intelligence to ongoing police operations and the Army operations process. Military police develop PIO skills while they support police operations at the home camp and station, enabling them to integrate skills across all military police disciplines. PIO skills are increasingly relevant in the modern operational environment, where irregular threats operate from positions that are intermingled in the population. The threat operates in small groups, in cells and, occasionally, as individuals. Many of the threat methods that are employed are criminal activities that mirror organized criminal methods. It is not uncommon for members of armed groups, insurgents, or other belligerents to use or mimic established criminal networks, activities, and practices to move contraband, raise funds, or otherwise further their goals and objectives. Assessing the impact of criminal activity on military operations and then deconflicting that activity from other threat or environmental factors can be essential to mission success.

COLLECTION OF POLICE INFORMATION

7-6. Military police Soldiers throughout the AO collect information while interacting with the population, including observations of the local population, discussions with community leaders and residents, and analyses of population registration data (vehicle and driver's licensing, real estate transactions, school enrollment). Military police and USACIDC Soldiers actively look for variations in daily routines and actions that fall outside the expected social order. Sources of police information include—

- Military police patrols (LE, combat, reconnaissance).
- Military police surveillance (LE and tactical).
- Criminal investigations.
- Interviews and LE interrogations.
- Police investigations.
- Police informants and LE sources.
- Forensic evidence and biometric data.
- Detention operations (passive interaction and observation of detainees, prisoners, and visitors or LE interviews of detained, displaced, or incarcerated persons).
- Citizen complaints and emergencies.
- Other governmental agencies.
- Nongovernmental organizations.
- HN civilian, military, and police forces.
- Community leaders (neighborhood mayors, watch leaders, religious and tribal leaders).
- Battalion and brigade information sources (signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, human intelligence).
- Coalition military and police forces.
- Open-source information (media and public information forums).
- Military information support operations teams.
- Civil affairs teams.
- Other military units.
- Other LE agencies.

7-7. The USACIDC personnel specifically conduct and disseminate information from—

- Criminal investigations.
- Forensic laboratory analyses and results.
- Personal security vulnerability assessments.
- Crime activity threat analyses.
- Logistics security threat assessments.
- Crime prevention surveys.

7-8. Police information flows continuously from the conduct of tactical military police operations and through the interpersonal information network that is established through police engagement and investigations. This information is obtained through deliberate or passive collection efforts by military police during the execution of other military police missions and activities. Information is gathered to answer the commander's critical information requirements and staff intelligence requirements.

7-9. Occasionally, information may be collected that is not directly pertinent to a specific intelligence requirement, but it is recognized by the collector, staff, or other personnel as timely and critical to ongoing operations. This type of information is called exceptional information and results from discovering something unanticipated about an opponent or a situation. Exceptional information should be disseminated immediately through operational and command networks. Exceptional information is specific and immediately vital information that directly affects the success of a current operation. It would have been a commander's critical information requirement if it were foreseen; therefore, it is treated as one.

7-10. Police engagements are opportunities for establishing long-term information networks. These engagements become social and organizational networks that provide formal and informal opportunities for identifying and sharing information. PIO uses these opportunities to focus policing efforts. Military police can help control, limit, or restrict insurgent freedom of movement in specific areas while supporting HN police and security strategies. Information that is collected and analyzed identifies crime-conducive conditions that are exploited by insurgents, terrorists, and criminals and provides preemptive opportunities for coalition forces. A police engagement may be a proactive activity as part of a deliberate information gathering, targeting, or collecting effort or it may be a reactive response to an episodic event. (See chapter 4 for information on how to conduct a police engagement.)

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

7-11. Information and police intelligence are continuously pushed into the Army operations process to support the IPB, targeting, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization. PIO contributes to the commander's situational understanding, enhances the common operational picture, and adds critical police information to the intelligence process.

7-12. *Intelligence preparation of the battlefield* is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3). Commanders and staffs develop the IPB and apply its products in all phases of the operations process. They also ensure that there are tactics, techniques, and procedures in place for the continual assessment, development, and dissemination of IPB products. PIO is a reciprocating effort that is based on discovering information, analyzing and determining its actionable intelligence value, and then feeding it into the IPB process for follow-on operations. IPB products help commanders understand the environment, mitigate vulnerabilities, and exploit opportunities. In addition to the tactical information that may be obtained, PIO provides information on possible criminal threats and threats to the social order that may negate current operations and change a friendly threat posture.

7-13. Military police closely examine civil considerations that can affect military operations and social order. (See FM 3-39 for more information concerning civil considerations.) The following are sample situations that depict how the IPB process is supported by military police:

- Military police engage other police personnel or organizations that are in, or are adjacent to, the operational area to obtain relevant information. Military police may conduct joint patrols and coordinate with military (U.S. and other) forces that are in, or are adjacent to, the AO.
- Information that is obtained during a police engagement may validate or provide fidelity to assumptions that are made during the initial IPB about the criminal or civil environment. Biometric personal identity data that is collected at a joint police checkpoint during police operations might immediately identify a criminal or threat actor while confirming the trafficking patterns and trends of contraband. This information is rapidly disseminated through common user information systems to enhance the common operational picture and update existing IPB templates.
- A military police commander who conducts police mentorship or transition activities in support of a stability operation may direct a criminal demographic survey of criminals who are detained in the indigenous police station jails to verify humane treatment, initiate due process improvements, and gather criminal information. The results of these surveys may reveal criminal trends and patterns, which are committed by the HN police, that have a chilling effect on an entire neighborhood.

7-14. Further information is gathered through police and civil leader engagements, military intelligence channels, and interviews with other criminal detainees to develop focused operations that support integrated police strategies to target criminal perpetrators and reduce crime-conducive conditions.

ANALYSES TO IDENTIFY TRENDS, PATTERNS, AND ASSOCIATIONS

7-15. Thorough, timely analyses of the police information that is collected in response to intelligence requirements and investigative leads are used throughout the operations process. Analysis should allow the developed police intelligence to answer information requirements or provide actionable police intelligence that drives operations and LE investigations. These operations and LE investigations are then more likely to be successful and support the intent and requirements of the commander or investigator.

Trend Analysis

7-16. Trend analysis refers to the gathering, sorting, prioritizing, and plotting of historical information to indicate past crimes and trends, patterns, or associations. It provides a view of how events, elements, and conditions have affected police operations and criminal dimensions in the past. This historical perspective offers continuous insights for developing possible or probable COAs that the enemy or criminal threat may repeat or pursue. Trend analysis results are sometimes referred to as statistical intelligence. PIO statistical intelligence refers to the data that is collected from police reports, raw data files, and other historical data that is assembled into usable maps, charts, and graphs. This information must be routinely updated to be effective.

Pattern Analysis

7-17. Pattern analysis helps to identify indicators of threat activity. A pattern analysis is based on the premise that activities conducted by individuals, groups, or organizations tend to be replicated in identifiable ways. A thorough analysis of seemingly random events can result in the identification of certain patterns. During PIO, pattern analysis is the effort that is used to find links between crimes and other incidents to reveal similarities and differences that are used to help predict and prevent future criminal, disruptive, or threat activities. There are numerous tools and techniques that are used to display data and establish patterns for analyses. These tools and techniques include—

- Association and activities matrices.
- Incident maps and overlays.
- Pattern analyses plots.

Association Analysis

7-18. Association analysis (better known as link analysis) is a technique that is used to graphically depict relationships or associations between two or more entities of interest. These relationships or associations may be between persons, contacts, events, activities, locations, organizations, or networks. The analysis provides avenues for further investigation by highlighting associations with known or unknown suspects and generating inferences based on what is known about the current relationships of the individuals, organizations, or entities that are being targeted. (See ATP 3-39.20 for additional information regarding trend and association analysis.)

COLLECTED INFORMATION REPORTS

7-19. Military police collection efforts may be the deliberate result of the commander's critical information requirements or other intelligence requirements. At other times, military police inadvertently discover new information about people or sites as a result of performing an investigation or event. (See appendix G for information regarding site exploitation.) This information feeds into the operations and targeting process to enable the lethal and nonlethal targeting of people, groups, and networks.

7-20. Military police submit compiled reports at the conclusion of a collection activity for the staff, investigator, or commander who requires the information. The location of physical evidence is preserved and reported to maintain chain-of-custody requirements and to allow timely reexaminations of other evidence. Appropriate data is provided to police intelligence personnel who support LE and investigative operations. Collection efforts in support of military police operations during unified land operations are documented and provided to the designated military police or USACIDC staff and police intelligence personnel for further assessment and analysis.

BIOMETRICS

7-21. *Biometrics* is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). Biometrics refers to the use of a person's physical characteristics or personal traits to identify or verify the claimed identity of that individual. A person's unique identification biometric data includes—

- Fingerprints.
- Retinal scans (iris pigmentation).
- Genetic makeup (deoxyribonucleic acid).
- Voice inflections or patterns of speech (voice scans).
- Facial scans.
- Gaits (the way a person walks).
- Handwritten signatures.

7-22. Biometrics support military operations by enabling military police to—

- Identify an unknown individual during tactical operations.
- Verify the identity of HN police and security recruits.
- Locate or track a person of interest.
- Identify friendly force individuals.
- Manage local populations during military operations.
- Control physical access.
- Enable information assurance.
- Collect forensic evidence.
- Manage emergency situations during nonmilitary operations.
- Share identity information.

7-23. Electronic, automated biometric systems provide a way to leverage unique individual attributes by converting the biometric (such as a fingerprint) into digital form and then comparing it against a computerized database to quickly and relatively accurately identify or authenticate the claimed identity. The biometric automated tool set and the handheld interagency identification detection equipment are key enablers for military police. Military police must be technically proficient in using these biometric systems.

7-24. Military police use this equipment to collect individual biographical and biometric data by converting it into a digital format that is then temporarily stored in the equipment. This stored data must be uploaded to the main theater database, where it is processed, categorized, and made accessible for future identification and forensic purposes. After the biometric data is uploaded, processed, and made available, military police can readily verify and track individuals who are encountered across the operational area or in other operational areas. (See TC 2-22.82 for additional information regarding biometrics and intelligence collection.)

Note. The failure to upload collected information to the main theater database negates force protection and investigative benefits of the process.

7-25. The biometric automated tool set is an accurate, timely, and efficient automated personnel enrollment and tracking system that collects and saves biometric data in a database that is searched or queried. It incorporates an individual's iris scan, fingerprints, photograph, and biographical information and stores the collected data onto a central server that is located on a secure network. The biometric automated tool set is then able to match the information against existing records. The biometric automated toolset has the organic ability to create identification cards to aid in the timely identification or verification of personnel.

7-26. The handheld interagency identification detection equipment is a portable, battery-operated, handheld multimodal biometric device that can support biometric identification and enrollment tasks. It is used to digitally record an individual's iris, fingerprint, facial features, and biographic contextual information.

7-27. Biometric applications measure and record biological characteristics or personal behavioral traits and compile the data in databases for future comparison. These characteristics and traits are useful for making positive identifications, establishing security procedures, and tracking individuals. Biometric data is used for enhancing force protection, especially at checkpoints or access points. Police assets can verify the identity of a specific individual during an initial enrollment into a master database. Later searches of the database can verify the identity of an otherwise unknown individual. Collected biometric data can also be used to match a person with collected forensic evidence. It is a means to identify and target criminals or insurgents with lethal or nonlethal effects. (See the [Defense Forensics and Biometric Agency Web site](#) for additional information.)

Appendix A

Operations, Techniques, and Planning Considerations

During operations, leaders must make decisions, develop plans, and direct actions under varying degrees of complexity and uncertainty. Because predictability in operational environments is rare, it is imperative that military police leaders know and understand the significance of mission command, the importance of the operations process, and the fundamentals of effective planning. This appendix provides a summary of the concept of mission command, the specific elements that support the operations process, and the planning considerations that target the needs of small-unit leaders. It highlights critical thinking, the MDMP, the running estimate, troop leading procedures, and risk management.

MISSION COMMAND WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

A-1. Commanders use warfighting functions to help exercise command and assist in exercising control. The *mission command warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). This function emphasizes the—

- Changing roles and responsibilities of leaders in distributed and increasingly decentralized operations.
- Requirement for leaders at every echelon to cocreate the context for operations.
- Importance of teaming and collaborating with joint, international, interagency, and multinational partners.
- Need for leaders to anticipate and manage transitions during the course of a mission.

A-2. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander who uses mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. The commander is the central figure in mission command and is essential to integrating the capabilities of warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. Successful mission command requires the delegation of the greatest possible freedom of action to subordinates. This, in turn, enables subordinates to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively through disciplined initiative in dynamic conditions within the commander's intent. Mission command focuses on empowering subordinate leaders and sharing information to facilitate decentralized execution.

A-3. The role of the commander in mission command is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning throughout execution while continually assessing the situation. To ensure mission accomplishment, the commander—

- Drives the operations process. (See figure A-1, page A-2.)
- Understands, visualizes, describes, directs, leads, and assesses operations.
- Develops teams among modular formations and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.
- Leads synchronization information-related capabilities.




Figure A-1. Operations process

A-4. The operations process is the Army model for the exercise of mission command. Commanders apply the methodology of design to gain and maintain a greater understanding of the operational environment and support the operations process. They seek to visualize the end state and operational approach. They describe the visualization to promote a shared understanding. Commanders direct action based on situational understanding and lead Soldiers and partners during execution. They continuously assess the progress of operations and adapt (reframe) as required.

CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING

A-5. Leaders make tactical decisions in complex and demanding situations with limited and inadequate knowledge. Due to the rapidly changing events on the ground and the unique demands of asymmetrical threats, commanders rarely have all available information. Critical thinking is the purposeful and reflective judgment about what to believe or what to do in response to observations, experiences, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. Creative thinking involves creating something new or original and leads to new insights, novel approaches, fresh perspectives, and new ways of understanding and conceiving things. Critical and creative thinking are indispensable to the operations process. For commanders and staffs, these two skills begin with a rigorous analysis of friendly and enemy forces as they relate to one another in time and space. This analysis includes weapons systems ranges, mobility options afforded by terrain and weather, operational reach, communications systems ranges, sustainment, and other operational and mission variable considerations. A disciplined and focused analysis of operational and mission variables, coupled with critical and creative thinking about the challenges and opportunities that result from that analysis, is essential to developing a full appreciation of the range of available alternatives to accomplish missions.

MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

A-6. The *military decisionmaking process* is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a COA, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to—

- Understand the situation and mission.
- Develop and compare COAs.
- Decide on a COA that best accomplishes the mission.
- Produce an operation plan or order for execution.

A-7. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. This process helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning. The MDMP results in an improved understanding of the situation and a plan or order that guides the force through preparation and execution. The MDMP consists of seven steps, as shown in table A-1. Each step of the MDMP requires key inputs and produces expected outputs. The inputs build on previous steps, and the outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation while facilitating subsequent steps of the MDMP.

Table A-1. MDMP steps

Key Inputs	Steps	Key Outputs
Higher headquarters plan or order or a new mission anticipated by the commander	Step 1: Receipt of Mission	- Commander's initial guidance - Initial allocation of time - Initial warning order
- Higher headquarters plan or order - Higher headquarters knowledge and intelligence products - Knowledge products from other organizations - Design concept (if developed)	Step 2: Mission Analysis	- Problem statement - Mission statement - Initial commander's intent - Initial planning guidance - Initial commander's critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information - Updated IPB and running estimates - Assumptions - Warning orders
- Mission statement - Initial commander's intent, planning guidance, commander's critical information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information - Updated IPB and running estimates - Assumptions	Step 3: COA Development	- COA statements and sketches - Tentative task organization - Broad concept of operations - Revised planning guidance - Updated assumptions
- Updated running estimates - Revised planning guidance - COA statements and sketches - Updated assumptions	Step 4: COA Analysis (War Game)	- Refined COAs - Potential decision points - War-game results - Initial assessment measures - Updated assumptions

Table A-1. MDMP steps (continued)

<i>Key Inputs</i>	<i>Steps</i>	<i>Key Outputs</i>
- Updated running estimates - Refined COAs - Evaluation criteria - War-game results - Updated assumptions	Step 5: COA Comparison	- Evaluated COAs - Recommended COAs - Updated running estimates - Updated assumptions
- Updated running estimates - Evaluated COAs - Recommended COAs - Updated assumptions	Step 6: COA Approval	- Commander-selected COAs (including modifications) - Refined commander's intent, commander's critical information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information - Updated assumptions - Warning orders
- Commander-selected COAs (including modifications) - Refined commander's intent, commander's critical information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information - Updated assumptions	Step 7: Orders, Dissemination, and Transition	Approved operation plans or orders
Legend: COA course of action IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield		

A-8. The MDMP can be as comprehensive as time, resources, experience, and the situation permit. Conducting the steps and substeps of the MDMP is a detailed, deliberate, and time-consuming effort. Commanders may modify steps of the MDMP to fit time-constrained circumstances to produce a timely and satisfactory plan. Possible time-saving techniques include increasing commander involvement, limiting the number of COAs, maximizing parallel planning, increasing collaborative planning, and using liaison officers.

A-9. Units with a formally organized staff use the MDMP to organize planning, establish a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders. The MDMP provides a logical order of decisions and interactions between the commander and staff. Military police company level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use troop leading procedures to plan and prepare for operations.

RUNNING ESTIMATE

A-10. Effective plans and successful execution rely on accurate and current running estimates. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). The failure to maintain accurate running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions during execution. Military police commanders, provost marshals, and staff planners use the running estimate as a tool to facilitate accurate and current situational understanding and for predictive analysis. The running estimate is an extension of the MDMP. It is conducted concurrently with the planning process of the supported force commander and is continually refined. Table A-2 shows the parallel relationship between the MDMP and running estimate.

Table A-2. MDMP parallel steps and the military police running estimate

<i>MDMP</i>	<i>Military Police Running Estimate</i>
Receipt of Mission: - Alert staff and other key participants. - Gather the necessary tools. - Update running estimates. - Conduct an initial assessment. - Issue the commander's initial guidance. - Issue the initial warning order.	Receipt of Mission: - Alert the staff. - Compile critical facts and assumptions. - Update running estimates, specifically— - The status of friendly units. - The status of resources. - Key civil considerations.
Mission Analysis: - Analyze the higher headquarters order. - Conduct the IPB. - Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks. - Review available assets. - Determine constraints. - Identify critical facts and assumptions. - Conduct a risk assessment. - Determine the commander's critical information requirements. - Develop a surveillance and renaissance plan. - Plan the use of available time. - Write a restated mission. - Conduct a mission analysis briefing. - Approve the restated mission. - Develop the commander's intent. - Issue the commander's guidance. - Issue a warning order. - Review facts and assumptions.	Mission Analysis: - Analyze the higher headquarters orders, to include the— - Commander's intent. - Mission. - Concept of operation. - Timeline. - AO. - Conduct IPB, and develop the military police staff running estimate, to include— - The terrain and weather analysis. - Enemy mission and capabilities. - Friendly mission and capabilities. Note. Focus on POLICE factors to frame the IPB of the AO that is relevant to military police operations. - Analyze the military mission, including— - Specified military police tasks. - Implied military police tasks. - Available assets. - Limitations. - Risks as applied to military police capabilities. - Time. - Essential tasks for critical military police functions. - The restated mission. - Conduct a risk assessment, including— - Safety. - Law and order. - Police intelligence. - Detention and resettlement. - Movement support. - Protection. - Recommend changes to the commander's critical information requirements. - Integrate the military police reconnaissance effort.

**Table A-2. MDMP parallel steps and the military police running estimate
(continued)**

<i>MDMP</i>	<i>Military Police Running Estimate</i>
COA Development	• Develop a scheme of military police operations. • Analyze the relative combat power. • Refine essential tasks for military police functions. • Identify military police missions and the allocation of forces and assets. • Determine the military police priority of effort and support. • Refine the commander's guidance for military police operations.
	• Apply military police employment considerations. • Integrate military police operations into each COA.
COA Analysis	• War-game and refine the military police plan.
COA Comparison	• Recommend a COA.
COA Approval	• Finalize the military police plan.
Order Production	• Provide input to the basic OPORD, including— ▪ Scheme of military police operations. ▪ Essential tasks for military police support. ▪ Subunit instructions. ▪ Coordinating instructions. ▪ Military police information in the annexes and appendixes.
Legend: AO area of operations COA course of action IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield MDMP military decisionmaking process OPORD operation order POLICE police and prison structures, organized crime elements, legal systems, investigations and interviews, crime-conducive conditions, and enforcement gaps and mechanisms	

A-11. The development and continuous maintenance of the running estimate drives the coordination that is required of military police units, provost marshals, military police staff planners, and supported commanders in the development of plans, orders, and supporting annexes. Commanders maintain individual running estimates to consolidate the understanding and visualization of an operation. The commander's running estimate includes a summary of the problem and integrates the information and knowledge of staff and subordinate commander running estimates.

A-12. Effective plans and successful executions rely on current running estimates. During mission preparation and execution, commanders use recommendations from running estimates in decisionmaking. The failure to maintain running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions.

A-13. During the development or maintenance of the running estimate, military police leaders use the battlefield workload analysis worksheet as a tool to help determine the number of military police units that are required to perform multiple missions in the AO. A detailed workload analysis helps to eliminate overtasked and stressed military police personnel and ensures that adequate military police resources are applied to a mission. The battlefield workload analysis helps determine the required military police structure. There are individual tabs for military police baseline operations, MWD operations, detention operations, police operations, and USACIDC requirements. The battlefield workload analysis directly supports the military police staff running estimate and requires continuous maintenance throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of a mission to remain relevant as a staff planning tool. (See appendix H for additional information.) To request an automated copy or to propose comments or questions regarding the battlefield workload analysis, contact the [Military Police Doctrine Team](#).

TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

A-14. *Troop leading procedures* is a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). They enable small-unit leaders to use available time effectively and efficiently in the planning, preparing, executing, and assessing of combat missions. Collectively, troop leading procedures are a tool that is used to assist company commanders in making, issuing, and supervising the execution of OPORDs. (See appendix I for additional information on orders and reports.) These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing units for missions.

A-15. Troop leading procedures consist of eight steps. The sequence of the steps of troop leading procedures is not rigid. Leaders may modify the order to meet METT-TC conditions. Some steps are done concurrently, while others continue throughout the operation. (See figure A-2 for additional information on troop leading procedures and key planning tasks.)




Figure A-2. Planning at the company level and below

A-16. Troop leading procedures extend the MDMP to the company level. Troop leading procedures are integrally coupled with the MDMP; however, although they are parallel, they are not identical. Commanders who have a coordinating staff (customarily battalion level and above) use the MDMP as the primary planning process. Company level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use troop leading procedures to plan and prepare for operations. (See figure A-3 for a depiction of the parallel steps of the MDMP of a battalion with the troop leading procedures of a company.)




Figure A-3. Parallel steps of the MDMP and troop leading procedures

FRATRICIDE MITIGATION

A-17. Fratricide/friendly fire is a circumstance in which members of a U.S. or friendly military force are mistakenly or accidentally killed or injured in action by U.S. or friendly forces who are actively engaged with an enemy or who are directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force. Fratricide avoidance is a complex problem that defies simple solutions. Military police leaders must take action to reduce the risk and occurrence of fratricide.

PRIMARY CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE

A-18. Every fratricide incident is a function of many contributing factors or preconditions. Ultimately, combinations of these factors lead to an individual or unit error that produces friendly casualties. Military police leaders must identify potential risk factors and strive to eliminate or correct them. The causes of fratricide are—

- **A lack of positive target identification.** The primary cause of fratricide is the failure to positively identify a target. Military police must positively identify targets before engaging them.
- **Land navigation failure.** Difficult terrain or weather and visibility can hamper navigation, which may cause military police units to move out of sector, report wrong locations, become disoriented, or employ fire support weapons from wrong locations. As a result, friendly units may collide unexpectedly or be erroneously engaged.
- **Reporting and communication failure.** Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical situations change. This distorts the tactical picture that is available at each level and can lead to the erroneous clearance of supporting fire.

- **Direct fire control failure.** Defensive (and particularly offensive) fire control plans are not developed or they fail in execution. Some units do not designate target reference points, engagement areas, or priorities—or they fail to adhere to them. Units fail to tie control measures to recognizable features. Weapons positioning can be poor, and fire discipline can break down during contact.
- **Weapon error.** Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors, negligent discharges, explosive and hand grenade mistakes, and incorrect gun data use.
- **Operation hazard.** A variety of explosive devices and materials (unexploded ordnance [UXO], IEDs, unmarked or unrecorded minefields, booby traps) may create danger on the battlefield. Failure to mark, record, remove, or anticipate these threats can lead to casualties.

EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE

A-19. The effects of fratricide can be devastating and spread deeply within a unit. Fratricide results in unacceptable losses, increases the risk of mission failure, and affects the unit ability to survive and function. Additional effects of fratricide include—

- The loss of confidence in unit leadership.
- An increased self-doubt among leaders and Soldiers.
- A hesitancy to employ deadly force.
- The oversupervision of units.
- A loss of initiative.
- A loss of aggressiveness.
- Disrupted operations.
- A hesitation to conduct limited visibility operations.
- The degradation of cohesion and morale.

FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES

A-20. Commanders and leaders are responsible for preventing fratricide. They must lower the probability of fratricide without discouraging boldness and audacity. Good leadership that results in positive weapons control, troop movement control, and disciplined operational procedures contributes to achieving this goal. Situational understanding, friendly personnel, and combat identification methods also help. Eliminating fratricide increases Soldier willingness to act boldly with the confidence that misdirected friendly fires will not kill them.

A-21. The fratricide risk assessment matrix shows an approach to assess the relative risk of fratricide for combat maneuver. (See table A-3, page A-10, for additional information.) This matrix includes ratings for eight pairs of risk factors. The sum of the eight ratings provides an overall risk assessment. To determine each individual rating, select one of the alternatives in the leftmost column of the table and then read across that row to select among the alternatives for the paired risk factor. For example, to develop a rating for fire and maneuver control, first select the expected density of forces—heavy, normal, or sparse—and then select one of the alternatives for clarity of the situation (forces maintain separation, forces converge, or forces intermingle). In a scenario where a single military police platoon is expected to move through mostly deserted streets with no other friendly forces in the area and a low probability of encountering enemy troops, the rating for fire and maneuver control would be 1. In an alternative scenario, if numerous platoons from different companies are operating close together in a concentrated area of narrow streets and buildings, it is probable that the dense forces will intermingle in buildings, so the rating would be 9. (See CALL Handbook 92-3 for a detailed discussion of the matrix.)

Table A-3. Fratricide risk assessment format

Situational Awareness			
Fire and Maneuver Control			Rating: _____
Density of Forces	Clarity of the Situation		
	Forces Maintain Separation	Forces Converge	Forces Intermingle
Heavy	5	7	9
Normal	3	5	7
Sparse	1	3	5
Fire Distribution Plan			Rating: _____
Preparation Time Rehearsals Dissemination	Collective Proficiency		
	Strong SOPs/ Habitual Team Attachments	Moderately Trained/ Familiar Task Organization	Unseasoned/ Unfamiliar Task Organization
Brief-Back Rehearsals	3	4	5
Reduced-Force Rehearsals	2	3	4
Full-Force Rehearsals	1	2	3
Land Navigation			Rating: _____
Extent of Reconnaissance and IPB	Visibility and Navigation Difficulty		
	Ample Controls/ High Confidence	Confidence/ Much Effort	Very Difficult/ Low Confidence
Minimal	3	4	5
Limited	2	3	4
Extensive	1	2	3
Fire Control and Battle Tracking			Rating: _____
Clearance of Fires	Communication and Cross-talk		
	Reliable/ Redundant	Adequate Means	Unreliable/ No Backups
Passive Only	21	23	25
Positive	1	3	5
Explosive Hazards			Rating: _____
Use of Additional Dud-Producing Munitions	Knowledge of Existing Hazards		
	Extensive	Partial	Extremely Limited
Unknown	3	4	5
Major	2	3	4
Minor	1	2	3

Table A-3. Fratricide risk assessment format (continued)

Positive Identification			
Combat Identification			Rating: _____
Engagement Ranges and Fields of Fire	Friendly Recognition and Marking System		
	Practiced/ Very Effective	Expedient/ Somewhat Effective	Marginally Effective
Identification Unlikely	3	6	7
Marginal Identification	2	4	5
Optimal Identification	1	2	3
Discipline			
Fire Control Discipline			Rating: _____
Control or Supervision	Rules of Engagement		
	Complete/ Effective	Complete/ Somewhat Effective	Expedient/ Untested
Ad Hoc—Improvised	4	6	7
Attached	2	4	5
Organic	1	2	3
Troops			
Soldier and Leader Preparedness			Rating: _____
Mission-Related Experience and Competence	Soldier and Leader Fatigue		
	Rested/ Low Exertion	Moderate Rest/ Exertion	Limited Rest/ High Exertion
Unseasoned	5	7	9
Moderate Experience	3	5	7
Highly Experienced	1	3	5
Assessment of Overall Risk			
Score (Ratings Total)	Risk		Ratings Total (Overall Risk):
8 to 20	Low Fratricide Risk		
21 to 30	Caution		
>30	High Fratricide Risk		
Legend: IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield SOP standard operating procedure			

A-22. The reduction of fratricide risk begins during the planning phase of an operation and continues through preparation and execution. The use of measures that reduce fratricide risk is not required, nor are these measures intended to restrict initiative. Military police leaders should apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors. (See appendix J for additional information.) The following measures provide a guide to actions that can reduce fratricide risk:

- Identify and assess potential fratricide risks during the estimate of the situation. Express these risks in the OPORD or fragmentary order.
- Maintain awareness of the current situation while focusing on current intelligence, unit locations and dispositions, denial areas (minefields and scatterable munitions), contaminated areas (improved conventional munitions), CBRN reports, and METT-TC factors.
- Ensure positive target identification. Review vehicle and weapon identification cards. Know at what ranges and under what conditions the positive identification of friendly vehicles and weapons is possible. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and enemy vehicles, including silhouettes and thermal signatures.
- Establish a command climate that stresses fratricide prevention. Enforce fratricide prevention measures, and emphasize the use of doctrinally sound tactics, techniques, and procedures. Ensure that constant supervision is maintained during order executions and that task and mission performances are to standard.
- Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate it.
- Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training that covers fratricide awareness, target identification and recognition, and fire discipline.
- Develop a simple, decisive plan, and give complete and concise mission orders.
- Use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine to simplify mission orders. Periodically review and update SOPs, as needed. Strive for maximum planning time.
- Use common language and vocabulary and doctrinally correct standard terminology and control measures (fire support coordination line, zone of engagement, restrictive fire lines).
- Conduct rehearsals when time permits.
- Be in the right place at the right time. Use position location and navigation devices to establish your location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right, leading, and follow-on). Synchronize tactical movement.
- Include a discussion on fratricide incidents in after action reports.
- Ensure that fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

A-23. *Personnel recovery* is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (JP 3-50). As the definition suggests, personnel recovery is a complex operation. Table A-4 illustrates premobilization planning considerations that outline unit and individual responsibilities in the personnel recovery process. Additionally, the table shows what unit commanders and first sergeants can expect from battalion support elements. (See FM 3-50 for specific details regarding the personnel recovery process.)

Table A-4. Personnel recovery premobilization planning considerations

<i>Focal Lens</i>	<i>Report</i>	<i>Locate</i>	<i>Support</i>	<i>Recover</i>	<i>Guidance</i>
Commander	Review policies, doctrine, regulations, and the OPLAN to develop guidelines and the intent for training.		Integrate PR into the family support plan. Coordinate public affairs office intent.	Identify the commander's critical information requirements. Establish the commander's location during the recovery mission.	Provide guidance and intent.
Coordination	Receive PR-specific training, to include training for specialized duty positions (remote work station operators, terrain detachments). Integrate PR into the SOPs. The 1SG assesses activities to integrate experience, lessons learned, and the noncommissioned officer support channel. Plan for the integration of DAC and contractors into the PR system.				Update SOPs and lessons learned.
Units	Ensure the interoperability of equipment.	Receive equipment. Conduct new equipment training, to include processes and procedures that facilitate locating the IMDC.	Identify family support requirements. Incorporate PR support products into training. Schedule training: CFF, CAS, and EVCs.	Train with the IMDC and recovery assets (suppression of enemy air defense, escort, mission command assets, and other combat arms). Train on actions at the objective (IMDC site).	Develop and implement PR SOPs. Publish the isolated personnel report and evasion plan of action guidance.
Individuals	Receive PR-specific training. Review procedures for reporting locations to unit headquarters.	Receive training on equipment and procedures used to determine locations.	Complete training: CFF/CAS/ EVCs.	Learn IMDC procedures during recovery.	Complete an isolated personnel report. Prepare an evasion plan of action.
Coordinating Instructions	Incorporate PR-specific tasks into the mission-essential task list. Complete isolated personnel report data, and prepare evasion plan of action.				
Legend: 1SG first sergeant CAS close air support CFF call for fire DAC Department of the Army civilian EVC evasion chart IMDC isolated, missing, detained, or captured OPLAN operation plan PR personnel recovery SOP standard operating procedure					

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Appendix B

Translator Employment Considerations

Translators are essential to effective unified land operations because of the critical roles that they play in enabling communication with other coalition forces, HN populations, and security forces. HN translators can provide significant cultural and operational environment knowledge that is unique to each operational area, and they can be a tremendous resource for understanding people, customs, and behaviors. This appendix addresses two key topics: how military police leaders and Soldiers should conduct translator operations and how to manage these typically limited assets.

TRANSLATOR OPERATIONS

B-1. Translators (also known as linguists or interpreters) are skilled language professionals who translate words and literal or interpreted meanings from one language to another. Most translators translate by using the consecutive method (sometimes referred to as the alternate interpretation method). This method requires the translator to listen to the phrase, sentence, or paragraph that is being spoken and then translate it after the speaker pauses. The other method is simultaneous interpretation and requires a greater set of skills than those possessed by most translators who support coalition forces. This method requires the translator to listen to the speaker and quickly translate what is said a phrase or few words later. Military police should become comfortable with using a translator and with supporting the alternate interpretation method.

CONTRACTED SUPPORT CATEGORIES

B-2. Contracted translators fall into one of the following three categories:

- **Category I.** Category I translators are HN personnel who do not have security clearances. Because they are the most abundant resource and the most likely to be available to military police for routine operations, they are the focus of this appendix.
- **Category II.** Category II translators are U.S. citizens who have a secret clearance. They possess good oral and written communication skills and typically translate for battalion or higher level commanders and tactical human intelligence teams.
- **Category III.** Category III translators are U.S. citizens who have a top secret clearance. They have excellent oral and written communications skills and are typically retained at division and higher levels of command.

B-3. Before deployment, military police units should internally identify and track assigned personnel who possess linguistic capabilities. When requirements exceed organic capabilities, unit commanders may have the authority to hire HN personnel to support operations. This hiring effort is conducted at the unit level or through an organization at a higher level that coordinates the initial screening and preliminary hiring of large numbers of HN translators. Category I translators require vetting, which may be very basic or very detailed, depending on the operational environment and the availability of cleared personnel who can accurately investigate the character, history, and trustworthiness of the translators.

B-4. Category I translators conduct basic translation for the activities that are related to patrols, access points, checkpoints, open-source intelligence collections, and civil-military operations. The occupational background of a translator is often unknown, but each translator has unique skills and knowledge sets that may limit or enhance effectiveness. For example, a translator with a master's degree in Shakespearean literature is not the best choice for discussing medical procedures or military techniques but may be a superior choice for understanding the culture and area organizations or for written translation engagements.

B-5. HN translators are often students; former teachers; doctors; or former government, military, or intelligence personnel. The failure to know the employment history of military or intelligence personnel may result in enemy counterintelligence or information collection activities. Military police who use Category I translators must actively demonstrate force protection and security principles while carefully vetting and monitoring the translator during engagement.

GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF CATEGORY I TRANSLATORS

B-6. When using HN personnel as translators, units should follow the guidelines that are associated with the following areas:

- Selecting translators.
- Establishing rapport.
- Orienting translators.
- Conducting meetings and engagements.
- Using effective speaking techniques.
- Performing quality checks.

Selecting Translators

B-7. The need for hiring a translator must be balanced from a force protection and quality assurance perspective. Category I background screenings should include the collection of personal and biometric data and a search through available reporting databases to determine whether the person is an insurgent. Military police should try to vet translators through all available means before hiring them. Select translators who are best able to demonstrate that they can communicate intelligently and effectively. Those with technical knowledge should be matched to the subject or situation for which they will be translating. For example, use translators with an engineering background when discussing local building contracts.

B-8. Translators must—

- Be a native language speaker.
- Have a respectable social status and an ethnic or religious identity that is not disruptive to the translation activity.
- Demonstrate good English language fluency.
- Have an understanding of the audience and the relevant technical competence for the subjects to be addressed.
- Be sufficiently intelligent to grasp the complexities of the translation activity.
- Be reliable.
- Demonstrate loyalty.
- Be the appropriate gender, age, or race for the activity or engagement.
- Be compatible with the military police they support.

Native Language Speaker

B-9. Translators should be native speakers of the socially or geographically determined dialect. Their speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience. Native speakers can better distinguish dialects of different regions and provinces. This knowledge can help them identify the individuals who participate in a dialogue and are from a different country or from outside the local area. The translator should not be a source of distraction from the meeting or event. The target audience should pay no attention to the way the translator talks—only to what is communicated.

Social Status and Ethnic or Religious Identity

B-10. If their social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience, translators may be limited in their effectiveness. Examples include significant differences in military rank or membership in a shunned ethnic or religious group. Military police must communicate with the local population, be tolerant of local prejudices, and choose a translator who is least likely to cause suspicion or miscommunication. Interpreters

should also have a good reputation in the community and not be intimidated when dealing with important audiences.

English Fluency

B-11. An often overlooked consideration is how well the translator speaks English. Translators should speak English fluently, but this is not likely. At a minimum, they should be able to correctly understand what the speaker says and be able to translate it from one language to another without losing the intent or meaning. Translation skills should be prioritized based on the needs of the mission. Verbal translation is typically more important than written translation. However, this is not the case when required tasks include a translator who transcribes a letter, proclamation, or directive from the native language to English or vice versa.

B-12. If the translator understands the speaker and the speaker understands the translator, the translator's command of the English language may be satisfactory. Military police can check a translator's understanding by speaking something in English and then asking him to explain what was said or intended. Formal English and slang are not the same and may create misunderstandings. Many education systems—especially in the Middle East—typically teach formal or standard English. Military police should understand this difference and use exact words to assist the translation process.

Understanding the Audience and Technical Competence

B-13. Translating the meaning of words from one language to another is challenging in its own right. However, understanding or interpreting inferred processes, terms, or standards is typically more challenging and is aligned to the technical competence of the translator. Translators should be able to accurately convey the information that is expressed by an individual or target audience. This is especially important when commanders speak with HN civilian leaders and security or military personnel. Translators who interpret technical subjects (including military discussions) should understand the concepts behind the terms and doctrine.

Intellectual Capabilities

B-14. Education does not equate to intelligence, but it does expose students to diverse and complex topics. As a result, the better educated the translators, the better they may perform. Translators should be quick, alert, and able to respond to changing conditions and situations. They should also be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them clearly and logically.

Reliability

B-15. Military police should understand that the concept of time varies widely. In many countries, timeliness is relatively unimportant. Stress to translators the U.S. military perspective on the importance of punctuality, and hold them accountable.

Loyalty

B-16. If translators are local nationals, their first loyalty will likely be to the HN or an ethnic group, not to the U.S. military. The security implications are clear. Be cautious when explaining concepts. Limit the information that translators can overhear. Some translators, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda. If such motives are suspected or detected, immediately report them to the chain of command, and document the basis of the suspicions for follow-on action.

Gender, Age, and Race

B-17. Gender, age, and race can seriously affect the mission effectiveness of translators. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may cause difficulties with gender. A female translator may not be culturally acceptable and, therefore, may be ineffective in communicating with males, but she may be needed to communicate with females. HN leaders, village elders, or tribal sheiks often respond better to a translator who is male, is mature, and demonstrates an understanding of, or respect for, the culture. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, military police must thoroughly study the culture to determine the most favorable characteristics for translators in the operational area.

Compatibility

B-18. The target audience quickly recognizes personality conflicts between military police and their translators. Such friction can undermine the effectiveness of communication. Look for compatible traits when selecting translators, and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

Establishing Rapport

B-19. Translators are a vital link between military police and the target audience. A mission may be jeopardized without supportive and cooperative translators. Mutual respect and understanding are essential to effective teamwork. Establish rapport early, and maintain it throughout the operation. Problems establishing rapport stem mostly from a lack of personal communication skills and misunderstandings regarding culture.

B-20. Military police should study the AO and its inhabitants during predeployment training and again after deployment to the AO. They should have a solid understanding of how the mission is impacted by the area or local operational environment variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. This understanding will enable them to better grasp what is occurring within the AO and provide a means to focus information-gathering questions to and through the translator.

B-21. Military police should be genuinely interested in the goals, career, and education of the translator. Many cultures emphasize family roles differently from the United States, so an understanding of the home life of the interpreter may be helpful. Gain as much cultural information as possible before deploying, but remember that translators can be valuable sources for filling gaps. Some information from translators will likely be biased and represent the views of the religious, political, or social group to which they belong. Do not discount biased perspectives, but take note and report them because such biases may be endemic for direct or indirect conflict. Members of opposing groups typically see things differently and may view historical and cultural aspects differently. Remain neutral, and create a perception of understanding or respect for the translator's perspective.

B-22. Military police should gain an interpreter's trust and confidence before discussing sensitive issues. A sensitive issue is not the same as classified information. Sensitive issues include religion, likes, dislikes, prejudices, and taboos. Approach these topics carefully. Although deeply held personal beliefs may be revealing and useful in a professional relationship, attempt to expose them from the interpreter gently and tactfully.

B-23. Military police must meet the same basic needs and comforts for translators that military personnel enjoy. Translators should have food, water, and shelter. When possible, they should also have access to air conditioning when it is hot or heat when it is cold. Depending on the individual situation, it may be possible or necessary (from a force protection perspective if the translator is being pursued by insurgents) for the translator to live with the assigned unit. This will normally also create a more subtle bonding that may enhance translator efficiency and effectiveness while supporting the unit. If there are several translators, it may be more effective for the translators to live together on the unit compound.

Orienting Translators

B-24. Early in the relationship, military police must explain to translators their duties, expected standards of conduct, engagement or meeting techniques, and other requirements or expectations. Translators should mirror the tone and personality of the speaker. They must not add their own questions or emotions. Instruct translators to inform speakers discreetly if they notice inconsistencies or peculiarities of speech, dress, or behavior.

B-25. Carefully select and arrange sites for interviews, meetings, or classes. The physical arrangement can be especially significant for certain groups or cultures. Military police or designated speakers and translators should understand the unique cultural practices before interviewing, instructing, or talking with foreign nationals. For example, speakers and translators should know when to stand, sit, or cross their legs. Gestures are a learned behavior and vary from culture to culture. If properly selected, translators should be helpful in this regard.

B-26. Military police must carefully analyze the target audience. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the target audience as individuals, and a genuine concern for receiving accurate information help accomplish the mission. For example, a farmer from a small village has markedly different expectations and requirements than a city executive.

B-27. Military police must understand and be prepared for the amount of time that is required when communicating through a translator. Translating and interpreting may take two or three times longer than the amount of time that is normally required for an event. Time may be saved if the interpreter is given pertinent information beforehand. This information may include briefing slides, questions, a lesson plan, handouts, or a glossary of difficult terms. Advance preparation may also include rehearsal, if appropriate.

Conducting Meetings and Engagements

B-28. As part of the initial training for translators, military police should emphasize that translators follow the speaker's lead. Appeal to the interpreter's professional pride, and clarify how the quality and quantity of the information that is sent and received depends on the translator's linguistic skills. Although translators perform some editing as a function of the interpreting process, they must transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions.

B-29. Avoid simultaneous translations so that you can observe the translator's behavior. Talk directly to the individual or audience for only a short duration (one or two sentences) to ensure that the translator does not misunderstand or omit anything. The translator should watch the speaker carefully and then mimic his or her body language with verbal translation. Observe translators closely to detect inconsistent behavior. After speakers present one major thought in its entirety, translators then reconstruct it in their language.

B-30. Military police should be aware that some translators might attempt to save face or protect themselves by concealing a lack of understanding. They may translate what they believe the speaker or audience said or meant without asking for clarification. This situation can result in misinformation and confusion. It can also impact the speaker's credibility. Translators must know that, when in doubt, they should ask for clarification.

B-31. If questions arise during the meeting or engagement, the translator should immediately refer them to the speaker for an answer. Tell translators not to attempt to answer questions, even if they know the correct answers. Neither the speaker nor the translator should correct each other in front of an individual or audience. Settle differences in a private setting.

B-32. If several qualified translators are available, military police should select at least two. This is particularly important if the interpreter works during long conferences or courses of instruction. With two translators available, they should each work for 30-minute periods. Due to the mental strain that is associated with this task, 4 hours of active interpreting a day is usually the most that translators can work before effectiveness declines.

B-33. During short meetings and conversations with two or more available translators, one translator can provide quality control and assistance for the person who is translating. This technique is useful when conducting coordination or negotiation meetings, as one interpreter can actively interpret while the other pays attention to the body language and side conversations of the audience. Many times, important auxiliary information can be learned by listening to what others are saying among themselves. This information can help in later negotiations.

Using Effective Speaking Techniques

B-34. An important first step for military police who communicate in a foreign language is to reinforce and refine English language skills. These skills are important, even when no attempt has been made to learn the HN language. Use correct words without using idioms or slang terms. The more clearly you speak in English, the easier it is for interpreters to translate correctly. For instance, you may want to add words usually left out in colloquial English, such as the word "air" in airplane.

B-35. Speakers should not use profanity and should avoid using slang terms. Many times, translators cannot translate such expressions. Even those they can translate might lose the desired meaning. For example, terms of surprise or reaction, such as "Gee whiz!" and "Golly!" are difficult to translate.

B-36. Speakers should avoid using acronyms. While these are a part of the everyday military language, most translators and target audiences do not know them. The interpreter may have to interrupt the meeting for clarification. This can disrupt the rhythm of the meeting or lesson. If translators constantly interrupt the speaker for explanation, they could lose credibility in the eyes of the target audience. If speakers use technical terms or expressions, they should ensure that translators convey the proper meaning.

B-37. Before speaking impulsively, consider what should be said. Break thoughts into logical parts, and articulate them one at a time. Using short, simple words and sentences helps the interpreter to translate quickly and easily. Speakers should never say more in one sentence than they can easily repeat immediately after saying it. Each sentence should contain a complete thought without extra words.

B-38. Speakers should avoid American folk and culture-specific references. Target audiences may have no idea what is being said. Even when translators understand the reference, they may find it difficult to quickly identify an appropriate equivalent in the cultural frame of reference of the target audience. Transitional phrases and qualifiers may confuse nonnative speakers and waste valuable time. Examples include “For example,” “In most cases,” “Maybe,” and “Perhaps.” Speakers should avoid American humor. Humor is culturally specific and does not translate well. Cultural and language differences can lead to misinterpretations by foreigners.

Performing Quality Checks

B-39. Do not presume that everything said is being repeated. Occasionally ask the translator to repeat what he told the audience. This is especially true if the speaker is trying to convey a complex or detailed process. If the speaker talks for 30 seconds and the translator talks for a significantly shorter or longer time, it is likely that some information initially presented was changed, left out, or expanded on or that a sidebar conversation occurred between the translator and the audience. As a further quality check (and if this option is available), periodically ask a Category II or Category III translator to vet recorded sections of meetings or transcribed documents of the Category I translator. This gives two insights into the translator: it reveals how precise the interpreter is in translating the speaker’s words and meanings, and it helps to establish or maintain a baseline of trust that the speaker must have with his translator.

TRANSLATOR MANAGEMENT

B-40. Interpreter programs are typically managed by battalion level or higher operations staff personnel. Military police units complement existing interpreter management systems by identifying an individual or individuals to manage unit level interpretation support requirements. In many units, this will be a noncommissioned officer or someone in the operations section. The functions of the unit level interpreter program manager include—

- Consolidating and prioritizing interpreter requirements.
- Coordinating the hiring or obtaining of qualified, local-hire translators (if available).
- Identifying personnel in the unit who have language skills and can, therefore, be used as translators.
- Establishing the training for translators and for those who use translators.
- Coordinating and ensuring that administrative and logistics requirements for translators are met.
- Assessing the translator’s ability to translate verbal and written English.
- Establishing and maintaining administrative, operational, and evaluation files for translators.
- Assigning or recommending the assignment of translators to operational missions based on specific capabilities.

Note. See FM 2-22.3 for additional translator and interpreter guidance.

B-41. Commanders must protect translators by emplacing security measures to keep translators and their families safe. Insurgents know the value of good translators and will often try to intimidate or kill translators and their family members. Insurgents may also coerce translators to gather information on U.S. operations. Military police must actively protect against subversion and espionage by—

- Limiting translators to information that is unclassified and needed only for a specific meeting or engagement.
- Not discussing operations with translators until immediately before their participation is needed.
- Monitoring the translator's behavior around other translators or military personnel to ensure that he is not collecting information.
- Being cognizant of the translator's physical, mental, and emotional well-being.

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Appendix C

Media Engagements

Members of the public media are everywhere. Military police must expect to meet them and be mentally prepared to react in a manner that most positively represents the Army. Media engagements can positively or negatively impact public support for military missions. The purpose of this appendix is to prepare military police for when media representatives are present and provide guidance on interacting with them.

MEDIA RELATIONS

C-1. The media can be a valuable or lost asset, depending on the relationship that military police establish. It is important to demonstrate professional respect and courtesy to U.S. and non-U.S. media personnel. Media organizations and journalists report based on the mission, regardless of whether or not military police support their reporting efforts. Many media organizations have a specific perspective or agenda that may be skewed in support of or against military operations. Attempts to restrict reporting will ultimately result in negative reports about military operations and in a justification for nonpublic support of the military. Therefore, it is most beneficial to work with the media and maintain a level of openness to shape the reported message so that it is accurate. (See FM 3-61 for additional guidance regarding public affairs operations.)

C-2. Military police should be aware that media members will be present before, during, and after deployment. Media representatives will want to ask questions or take photographs. Not all media representatives will ask permission—even when a Soldier is trying to have a private moment with loved ones. Respond politely and, as necessary, request that the reporter or photographer delay the interview or photographs, or direct them to the unit predesignated public affairs officer.

C-3. The public media wants to understand and report the unit mission while capturing the Soldiers' personal opinions from a public and human-interest perspective. However, military police in uniform or civilian attire who act in an official capacity must have approval from their chain of command before participating in interviews.

INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

C-4. Military police commanders should develop and publish unit SOPs for interaction with the media. Ensure that personnel know what is acceptable to discuss with the media and which topics to refer to the unit public affairs officer. Deploying units will be briefed by the installation or unit public affairs officer to clarify what may or may not be discussed with the media. Classified information that is already known by the public or media (for example, as a result of leaks) is still to be treated as classified.

C-5. Soldiers who are engaged with the media must be familiar with the command message and with how to incorporate that message into their response. Command messages are designed to help communicate official positions on various topics in ways that are clearly understood by the target audience. (See FM 3-61 for additional information on command messages.)

C-6. Soldiers should be courteous, be candid, speak confidently, and support the mission when interacting with reporters or photographers. Demonstrate good judgment and professionalism, and inform the chain of command about interactions with the media.

C-7. Military police leaders and Soldiers should follow the guidance and directives of their chain of command. Soldiers have the right to express personal opinions; however, Army regulations mandate that Soldiers must have command approval to wear their uniforms during media interviews to avoid public confusion between a military police leader's or Soldier's personal opinion versus the Army's official position.

Soldiers do not have to receive prior approval to participate in a media interview if acting in an unofficial capacity and not in uniform.

C-8. The interview will be an opportunity to make a presentation that reflects professionalism, knowledge, and enthusiasm. However, for the unprepared, some media questions can be stressful and embarrassing. When participating in an interview, Soldiers should follow these principles:

- Check identification and press credentials—
 - If they are produced, continue with the interview.
 - If they are not produced, refer the individual to the chain of command or public affairs representative.
- Recognize the following rights:
 - Soldiers do not have to speak to the media.
 - Soldiers do not have to answer all of the questions.
 - Soldiers control the length of the interview.
- Maintain operational security. Do not discuss classified information.
- Follow these guidelines:
 - Think before answering.
 - Tell the truth. Do not lie or intentionally mislead members of the media.
 - Discuss only matters about which you have direct knowledge or responsibility.
 - Do not answer speculative (what if) or hypothetical questions.
 - Avoid jargon, acronyms, slang, and technical terms.
 - Answer the question with which you are most comfortable when asked multiple questions at a time.
 - Keep answers clear and concise.
 - Assume that everything said may be printed or broadcast.
 - Use “I” and not “we” when stating opinions.
 - Do not say “no comment.” If an answer to a question is unknown or cannot be discussed, just say so.

OPERATIONS SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

C-9. Operational security is a valid reason for not answering some questions. If it can be seen from the road, the field, or by other civilians, it is generally not operational security. If it can endanger the lives of Soldiers or future missions, it is operational security. Maintaining current operational security training requirements promotes a clear understanding of what information is considered operational security.

C-10. Plan ahead. Secure classified and sensitive materials before the media arrive in the area. If reporters accidentally see or hear sensitive information, remain calm, and explain the situation to reporters. Honesty is the best policy. Politely ask them not to use the information, and report the incident to higher headquarters. Do not detain or confiscate material or equipment from validated, registered media personnel.

C-11. Obey the following operational security rules when participating in an interview:

- Do the interview in a location that will not expose the unit position. Stand in front of something that blocks the view of the surroundings or that is generic to the entire country.
- Use general terms for times, such as “this morning” instead of “0900.”
- Use approximate numbers when discussing troops and equipment, such as “around 200” or “more than 1,000.”
- Use general terms when discussing types of equipment, such as “helicopters” instead of “Apaches.”

Appendix D

Route Classifications and Signing Systems

Military police use the military route classification system when performing the security and mobility support discipline. A *route classification* is a classification assigned to a route using factors of minimum width, worst route type, least bridge, raft, or culvert military load classification, and obstructions to traffic flow (JP 3-34). This appendix discusses the route classification system and the types of route signing. (See FM 3-34.170 for additional information about both subjects.)

ROUTE CLASSIFICATION

D-1. The route classification describes the traffic-bearing capabilities and conditions of a selected route and supports decisions on the improvements that are needed before a route can carry the proposed traffic. The way in which route reconnaissance is performed depends on the amount of detail required, the time available, the terrain problems that are encountered, and the tactical situation. A hasty route classification determines the immediate military trafficability of a specified route. It is limited to the critical terrain data that is necessary for route classification. The results are part of the mobility input to the common operational picture. Information concerning the route is updated with additional reports as required by the situation or the commander's guidance. A deliberate route classification (including road, bridge, tunnel, and other components) is conducted when sufficient time and qualified technical personnel are available. Deliberate route classification is usually conducted when operational requirements are anticipated to cause heavy, protracted use of the road and may follow the conduct of a hasty route reconnaissance.

D-2. Route classification results from collecting detailed technical information on the various components of a designated route, such as the road network, bridges along a selected route, and underpasses or overpasses. Route classification provides a graphical display of the load-carrying and rate-of-travel capacities of the selected route. In a route classification, the designated route components are reconnoitered and a classification formula is determined. The resulting formula and the graphical information from the classification components are displayed as a route classification overlay, which may be included directly on the common operational picture and is supplemented by the component reports that are generated to determine the classification.

D-3. In a general sense, route classification is based on the technical information that is collected on the various components of the selected route. In application, a route classification may include only the most critical details, such as the route includes bridges with limited crossing capacity, underpasses with low overhead clearance, or critical sections of poorly maintained road. These components would be the determining components (and possible sole components) of a route classification. A route classification may also include alternate roads on which movement can be made and what type of vehicle and traffic load the alternate or bypass can handle. During combat operations, only the necessary and essential facts about a route are gathered as quickly and safely as possible from a route reconnaissance.

D-4. The route classification formula uses numbers, letters, and symbols to represent, in order, the—

- Route width (narrowest part along the route), in meters.
- Route type, which is based on the ability to withstand weather and includes—
 - Type X—all weather.
 - Type Y—limited all weather.
 - Type Z—fair weather.
- Lowest military load classification, which is found in the vehicle technical manual or on the vehicle data plate. A route military load classification is a class number that represents the safe load-carrying capacity and indicates the maximum vehicle class that can be accepted under normal

conditions. Usually, the lowest bridge military load classification (regardless of the vehicle type or traffic flow condition) determines the route military load classification. If there is not bridge on the route, the worst section of road will determine the overall route classification. The basis for a route military load classification are the effects of the vehicle characteristics (such as vehicle speed and tire width) and their loads on route trafficability. The broad categories are—

- Class 50—average traffic route.
- Class 80—heavy traffic route.
- Class 120—very heavy traffic route.
- Lowest overhead clearance, in meters, between the road surface and the overhead obstacle (power lines and overpasses). Use the infinity symbol (∞) for unlimited clearance in the route classification formula.
- Obstructions to traffic flow, if applicable, represented in the classification formula by the letters OB. The exact nature of an obstruction is identified graphically in a route classification overlay.
- Special conditions, such as snow blockage (T) or flooding (W).

D-5. The following are examples of route classification formulas:

- **6.1/Z/40/ ∞ .** This formula depicts a fair-weather route (Z) with a minimum traveled way of 6.1 meters (6.67 yards) and a military load classification of 40. Overhead clearance is unlimited (∞), and there are no obstructions to traffic flow. This route accommodates wheeled and tracked, single-flow traffic without obstruction.
- **7/Y/50/4.6 (OB) (W).** This formula depicts a limited, all-weather route (Y) with a minimum traveled way of 7 meters (7.66 yards), a military load classification of 50, an overhead clearance of 4.6 meters (5.03 yards), and an obstruction. This route width is not suitable for double-flow traffic (wheeled or tracked). This route is subject to regular, recurrent flooding.

D-6. The route classification formula and the graphical information from the classification components are displayed as a route classification overlay, which graphically depicts a route network of roads, bridge sites, and other components. As indicated in figure D-1, a route classification overlay provides specific details on the obstructions that will slow down a convoy or maneuver force along a route. Figure D-2, page D-4, depicts the different route reconnaissance symbols that are used on these overlays.

TEMPORARY ROUTE SIGNING

D-7. Posting signs at bridges and other constrictions or key locations along a route promotes efficient traffic control and limits the impact of hazardous areas along the route. Signs are used when it is necessary to identify the special controls that are placed on a route section or technical component; to warn vehicle operators of hazardous areas or conditions; and to identify holding areas, turnouts for parking and unloading vehicles, and checkpoints. The United States and allied nations use standardized procedures for posting military routes; however, this system may be integrated into other road sign systems according to military requirements.

D-8. A military route sign system, like the U.S. highway sign system, can enable road users to reach their destinations by following the route signs and road markings that are displayed along the roadside. Military police patrols monitor the signs on a routine basis, checking specific signs before critical moves. Engineers erect permanent signs, but these signs can be damaged, destroyed, or moved by weather, saboteurs, and battle.

D-9. When military police on patrol encounter immediate and temporary MSR obstructions, such as blown bridges or CBRN contamination, they construct and erect signs quickly to guide vehicles around the obstruction. Military police prepare and post temporary signs to—

- Identify routes.
- Reroute traffic around problem areas.
- Help convoys and units move quickly and easily to their destinations, even on unfamiliar routes.
- Show drivers the locations of staging areas, tactical assembly areas, detours, key units, and facilities.
- Give directions, distances, and general information.
- Help lost military personnel find their way to the closest military police element.




Figure D-1. Route classification overlay example

D-10. Military police obtain signing materials (signs, paint, wire) through the Army supply system. (Typically, military police platoons have route signing kits that contain the necessary items to construct hasty signs.) In an emergency, use boards, shingles, or cardboard.

D-11. Conduct preplanned route signing for convoys and units that travel long stretches of MSRs and link routes well in advance. It is a time-consuming, manpower- and material-intensive operation. Preplanned route signs are built by engineers or military police. If tasked to construct preplanned route signs, store the constructed and coded signs in a secure place to avoid the risk of being compromised.




Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols





<i>SINGLE CURVE</i>  Curve radius	SHARP CURVE: A sharp curve with a radius of ≤ 25 meters is an obstruction. All curves with a radius of ≤ 45 meters are reportable.
<i>MULTIPLE CURVES</i>  Number of curves Sharpest curve radius	SERIES OF SHARP CURVES: The figure on the left indicates the number of curves; the figure on the right indicates the minimum radius of curvature.
<i>CRITICAL POINT</i>  Number critical points in order, and describe them on DA Form 1711	CRITICAL POINT: A critical point is a key geographic point or position that is important to the success of an operation (a point in time, a crisis or turning point, or any point along a route of march where interference with troop movement could occur).
<i>CONSTRICTION</i>  Traveled-way width Total constricted length	CONSTRICTION: Any reduction in the traveled way below the minimum required is an obstruction. The figure to the left indicates the width of the constriction; the figure to the right indicates the total constricted length.
<i>UNDERPASS</i>  Minimum traveled-way width Traveled-way width and sidewalks Arch type Minimum overhead clearance Maximum overhead clearance UNDERPASSES: Show the shape of the structure (obstruction) when the overhead clearance is < 4.3 meters.	
<i>ROUTE DESIGNATION</i> (495)	ROUTE DESIGNATION: The civil or military route designation is written in parentheses along the route.

Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)




Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)




Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)




Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)

D-12. Military police squads use the route-signing kit to place signs along a route within the squad AO. One team posts the signs while another team provides overwatch security. The squad leader checks and confirms the sign placement by traveling the entire route. He develops an overlay with the location of each sign in his squad AO. Consolidate squad overlays to contribute to a platoon traffic control plan.

D-13. Place signs where they will support traffic control and traffic circulation plans. Reflect changes in sign locations on the traffic control plan overlay. Ensure that all route signs are large enough to be read easily in poor light. Size is not specified, but—

- Signs for international use cannot be less than 40 centimeters (15.75 inches) by 33 centimeters (12.99 inches).
- Bridge classification signs must conform to Standardization Agreement 2010.

D-14. Use the following guidelines when placing signs:

- Place hazard signs about 150 meters (164.04 yards) before the hazard.
- Place regulatory signs (such as stop or yield signs) where a regulation takes effect.
- Place signs on the side of the road that faces the traffic flow, about 1 meter (1.09 yards) off the traveled roadway. Conceal them from air view. If no cover is available, slant the sign stake forward.
- Place signs 1 to 2 meters (1.09 to 2.19 yards) above the road level. Place the signs at the same height if possible. Sign height is governed by roadside foliage, by whether the route is in an urban or rural area, and by day or night use. Do not use foliage to block signs. In urban areas, place signs so that they are not hidden by vehicles or pedestrians and do not hinder pedestrians. Choose locations where street lighting and vehicle headlights increase sign visibility.
- Use the least number of signs needed to be effective. Ensure that every sign is necessary and specific.
- Use more signs in urban areas than in rural areas.
- Use more signs on night routes than on routes that are primarily used during the day.
- Use signs to inform drivers to follow the common route when one road is used for two signed routes. Use signs to inform drivers when such routes diverge.

D-15. Conceal signs so that they are visible only from the direction of travel. There is no exact rule that states the distance from which a sign should be visible. However, the distance should be no greater than security allows and no less than is reasonable for individuals who receive directions.

D-16. Carefully conceal illuminated signs. Ensure that the light source is just strong enough to light the sign but not strong enough to be seen from the air. This entails masking and covering the light sources. Consider placing chemical light sticks on top of the signs.

D-17. Place temporary route signs where they will provide warning and reaction time for drivers. Do not block existing civilian signs. Place warning signs at convenient distances from where a route regulation takes effect. This distance can be shown on the panel (for example, BLACKOUT 500 METERS). In areas where blackout drive is the rule and drivers are using night vision equipment, employ infrared emitters on signs along routes to help guide units to their destinations. Just like any other light source, ensure that the infrared emitters are not visible from the air.

D-18. Figure D-3 depicts sample direction indicators that identify the route or name. Place such signs at intersections where roads merge and routes separate.




Figure D-3. Military route and location signs

D-19. Figure D-4 depicts the guide and warning signs that are used together at important road junctions. They are rectangular, with the symbols in white on a black background. They include a directional arrow and the route number, name, and/or symbol. Place guide signs at road junctions to prevent confusion.




Figure D-4. Guide and warning signs

D-20. Figure D-5 depicts confidence and confirmation signs. Confidence signs reassure drivers that they are still on the correct route; use them where needed. Confirmation signs let drivers know that they are on the correct route after changing direction of travel. These should be used after turns but should also be visible to drivers while they are making turns. Place confirmation signs 150 meters (164.04 yards) beyond critical road junctions to let drivers know that they are on the correct route.




Figure D-5. Confidence and confirmation signs

D-21. Figure D-6 depicts countdown and regulatory signs. Countdown signs warn of anything that requires a major change to the movement. They are positioned in a series of three signs at 100-meter (109-yard) intervals before designated locations, such as start points, relay points, MSR junctions, and blackout areas.




Figure D-6. Countdown and regulatory signs

D-22. Figure D-7, page D-12, depicts hazard and military casualty evacuation route signs. Hazard signs indicate traffic hazards, such as steep hills, crossroads, sharp curves, or flooded roads. Civilian signs usually suffice, but use military signs in combat zones. Military casualty evacuation route signs indicate the evacuation route for military casualties and are rectangular in shape with a white background, red directional arrow, cross, or crescent. Military casualty evacuation route signs include the word *military*, the unit or subunit designation, and other information, such as national markings. These signs are represented as directional disks, with four segments cut out to form a cross, or a directional disk with a crescent cut out.




Figure D-7. Hazard and military casualty evacuation route signs

D-23. Figure D-8 depicts civilian casualty evacuation route signs and a blackout warning sign. Civilian casualty evacuation route signs indicate the route that is established solely for civilian casualty evacuation. They have a blue Geneva Convention information sign that portrays an ambulance in white with a red cross or crescent and the words *Civilian Casualty Evacuation Route* beneath the sign in the HN language. The placement of these signs is along the routes that are designated for civilian traffic as authorized by the HN. Blackout warning signs indicate the beginning of a blackout area. These are also based on the Geneva Convention hazard warning sign.




Figure D-8. Civilian casualty evacuation route and blackout warning signs

D-24. Figure D-9 depicts a blackout enforcement sign and a blackout relaxation sign. Blackout enforcement signs indicate that a blackout is in effect and are placed every 100 meters (109.36 yards) along the blackout route. Blackout relaxation signs indicate the end of the blackout area and are placed at the end of the blackout route.




Figure D-9. Blackout enforcement and relaxation signs

MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE SIGNS

D-25. MSR signs are identified by number, a pictorial symbol, or a name. Pictures and names—

- Are easier to identify and remember than numbers.
- Prevent confusion with link route signs which mark the routes of units that have three-figure identification numbers. (A link route connects a unit or an activity to an MSR.)
- Prevent the risk of compromising security by removing the chance use of an identification number that is already being used on a map overlay.

D-26. The two types of MSRs that are used in a theater of operations are axial and lateral. The following considerations are given for the theater of operation traffic circulation plan:

- **Axial.** Axial MSRs run to and from the forward edge of the battle area and are identified by odd numbers. Axial MSRs are shown as solid lines on the traffic circulation plan overlay. Axial routes are represented by a pictorial symbol on the route sign and are marked on the overlay as pictorial (such as MSR CLUB). On axial MSRs, up is toward the forward edge of the battle area. It is shown on overlays and signs as a plain arrow. Down is away from the forward edge of the battle area. It is shown as an arrow with a bar on the tail end.
- **Lateral.** Lateral MSRs are identified by even numbers and are shown as broken lines on the traffic circulation plan overlay. A named route sign represents lateral routes. The names are short, three- or four-letter words like fox, ant, or hen. Up and down arrows on lateral MSRs show only general directions of travel. The general direction shown by up or down arrows varies with the theater of operation. Up is usually to the north or east; down is usually to the south or west. A plain arrow on an overlay or sign indicates up; a barred arrow shows down. To avoid confusion on lateral MSRs, use the following letters on route signs to show the general direction of movement:
 - N—north.
 - S—south.
 - E—east.
 - W—west.
 - NE—northeast.
 - NW—northwest.
 - SE—southeast.
 - SW—southwest.

Appendix E

Urban Operations

An urban operation is a military operation that is conducted where man-made construction and high population density are dominant features. As urban areas and urban populations continue to grow, they exert a greater influence on military operations. The versatility of military police provides commanders with flexible forces to execute urban operations. This appendix focuses on urban combat skills and provides a framework for small-unit leaders who execute assault techniques, clearing techniques, and explosive hazard detection in the urban environment. Due to the uniqueness of each urban environment and operation, specifying a precise doctrinal solution for each situation is impossible. Leaders can adapt the information that is provided in this appendix to meet the requirements of the individual element or mission. (See ATTP 3-06-11 for detailed information on company level task organization for urban operations.)

ASSAULT TECHNIQUES

E-1. The effective and innovative task organization of military police elements shapes urban operations. To achieve the tactical dexterity that is required for the success of urban operations, many capabilities are task-organized down to the company, platoon, and squad levels. Although military police companies and platoons will continue to operate as part of a higher command task force, they will likely conduct assault missions independently.

E-2. To execute efficient assault operations in an urban environment, the company commander traditionally task-organizes the company into two elements: an assault element and a support element. The purpose of the assault element is to kill, capture, or force the withdrawal of enemy forces from an urban objective. The support element conducts a number of tasks, such as support by fire, isolate the objective, and evacuate casualties. METT-TC determines the size and composition of both elements.

E-3. Military police leaders ensure that Soldiers know the roles and responsibilities of support and assault elements. They must also ensure close and continuous coordination between supporting and assaulting forces. Employ the following fundamentals when assaulting buildings:

- Maximize the use of cover.
- Move parallel to the sides of the buildings, maintaining at least 12 inches (30.48 centimeters) of separation from the wall to avoid ricocheting and rubbing or bumping the wall. Stay in the shadow, present a low silhouette, and move rapidly to the next position.
- Use suppressive fire, cover, and obscurants when moving through streets and open spaces between buildings. When employing smoke as an obscurant, remember that thermal sighting systems can see through smoke. Also, when smoke has been thrown in an open area, the enemy may choose to engage with suppressive fire into the smoke cloud.
- Observe the area around a corner before movement is initiated. Use appropriate movement techniques around a corner.

- Avoid exposure when moving past windows. Use appropriate movement techniques over or under windows.
- Reconnoiter the opposite side of a wall before crossing. Roll over the wall quickly, and keep a low silhouette. The speed of this movement and a low silhouette deny the enemy a good target.
- Avoid using a grappling hook and rope to ascend a building.
- Provide cover for Soldiers who are scaling a wall or climbing a building.
- Use extreme caution when employing grenades. Grenades thrown at upper windows or upstairs may bounce back. Use grenades before entering the building, basement, and rooms. Vigorously throw grenades into rooms so that they careen about, denying the enemy an opportunity to throw them back.
- Use upper level entry when possible. Clearing a building from the top down is the preferred method.
- Avoid entering a building through lower-level windows and doors. Both are easily booby-trapped and are typically covered by enemy fire.

CLEARING TECHNIQUES

E-4. Building clearing and room clearing are typically conducted at platoon and squad levels. Clearing techniques differ based on METT-TC, the rules of engagement, and the probability of noncombatants inside the building. The mission commander determines which techniques to employ.

E-5. The deliberate attack (high-intensity technique), with its devastating suppressive and preparatory fires, neutralizes everyone in the room and is less dangerous to the assaulting element. If there are known or suspected enemy forces (but no noncombatants) inside the building, execute a high-intensity room clearing.

E-6. The reconnaissance in force (precision technique) conserves ammunition, reduces damage, and decreases the risk of noncombatant casualties. If there are known or suspected noncombatants within the building, conduct precision room clearing.

HIGH-INTENSITY ROOM CLEARING

E-7. The objective of standard, high-intensity room clearing is to seize control of the room and neutralize the enemy. These intense situations may require fragmentation grenade employment and an immediate high volume of small arms fire to placate a space before friendly troops enter. If a room or building is occupied by an alerted enemy force that is determined to resist and if most or all noncombatants are clear, military police employ overwhelming firepower to mitigate friendly casualties.

PRECISION ROOM CLEARING

E-8. Use precision room-clearing techniques when a tactical situation requires the room-by-room clearing of a building. Military police execute this clearing technique when enemy combatants and noncombatants are coalesced. By clearing a building methodically rather than by using overwhelming firepower to eliminate resistance, there is an increased risk to friendly forces. To minimize casualties, the clearing team may choose to create a diversion (such as a stun grenade) to momentarily distract the defender while they enter and seize the objective.

E-9. Precision room-clearing techniques are designed to be executed by a four-Soldier fire team. Mission leaders may choose to make modifications based on the current situation or personnel battle roster; however, clearing teams should never use less than two Soldiers.

Principles

E-10. Close quarter engagements, such as within a room or hallway, are planned and executed with accuracy. Military police units must train and rehearse precision room-clearing techniques until the element operates smoothly. Each team member must understand the following principles of precision room clearing:

- **Surprise.** Surprise is the principal element of a successful assault at close quarters. The military police team or squad that clears the room must achieve surprise, if only momentarily. The clearing element gains the advantage by deceiving, distracting, or startling the enemy. Stun grenades may be used to achieve surprise.
- **Speed.** Speed provides a measure of security to the clearing unit. It allows Soldiers to use the first few vital seconds provided by surprise to their advantage. In precision room clearing, speed does not mean incautious haste, but rather a vigilant hurry.
- **Controlled violence of action.** Controlled violence of action eliminates or neutralizes the threat, simultaneously suppressing the opportunity for the enemy to inflict friendly casualties. It is not limited to the application of firepower. It requires a highly motivated Soldier with the ability to dominate and control the combat situation.

E-11. Each precision room-clearing principle has a synergistic relationship to the others. Controlled violence coupled with speed increases surprise. Accordingly, successful surprise allows increased speed. (See TC 90-1 for urban operations training plans and strategies.)

Fundamentals

E-12. The fundamentals of precision room clearing outline the actions that military police take while moving along confined corridors to the room being cleared, while preparing to enter the room, during room entry and target engagement, and after contact. Military police leaders should ensure that team members—

- Carry only the minimum amount of equipment. Rucksacks and loose items carried by Soldiers tire them, slow their pace, and cause noise.
- Avoid the initial entry of buildings through middle floors. Clear up or down, and keep the procedure simple.
- Avoid set patterns of clearing; vary entry methods from room to room and floor to floor.
- Maintain communication among team members, clear the room quickly, and move on to the next objective.
- Arrive undetected at the entry to the room, in the correct order of entrance. Be prepared to enter on a single command. This approach preserves the element of surprise and allows for quick entry and domination of the room. The order of movement to the breach point is determined by the method of breach and intended actions at the breach point.
- Do not open doors by hand or attempt to kick them open. Gain access through the door by using shotgun, ballistic, explosive, or mechanical breaching methods.
- Enter quickly, and dominate the room. Move immediately to positions that allow complete control of the room, and provide unobstructed fields of fire.
- Know the sector of fire and how it overlaps and links with the sectors of other team members. Team members must maintain muzzle awareness at all times.
- Gain fire superiority, and clear the fatal funnel as fast as possible.
- Eliminate enemies in the room by fast, accurate, and discriminating fires.
- Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and of personnel in the room. Confirm whether enemy casualties are wounded or dead. Disarm, segregate, and treat the wounded. Search enemy casualties. Evacuate the wounded and friendly dead.
- Perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed search is required.
- Mark the room as cleared by using a simple, clearly identifiable marking according to the unit SOP.
- Maintain security, and be prepared to react to more enemy contact at any moment. Do not neglect rear security.
- Immediately reorganize assault teams for the defense of captured buildings.

CORDON AND SEARCH

E-13. Cordon and search operations involve isolating the target area and searching suspected buildings or terrain to capture or destroy possible enemies, material, or contraband. A cordon and search may be coupled with a movement to contact, a raid, a deliberate attack, or an area reconnaissance based on the accuracy of intelligence. However, the primary purpose of the cordon and search is to find the enemy, material, or contraband.

E-14. Platoons and squads typically participate in a cordon and search as part of a company mission. A company may perform a cordon and search independently or as part of a higher echelon operation. (See ATP 3-06.20 for detailed information regarding tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting a cordon and search.)

E-15. The conduct of a cordon and search operation requires, at a minimum, four elements to perform the major tasks: a command element, a security element, a search and assault element, and a support element. (See figure E-1 for an illustration of the objectives of cordon and search elements.)




Figure E-1. Cordon and search smart card

SEARCH ELEMENT
Main Effort

Purpose:

- Provide a safe and secure environment.
- Protect coalition forces, civil authorities, and local populace from threat and/or illegal activity.
- Free and protect the host nation government and society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

<u>Tactical Tasks:</u>	<u>Methods:</u>	<u>Considerations:</u>
• Clear • Seize • Secure • Interdict • Deny	• Knock • Knock down • Sequential • Simultaneous	• Quantity, quality, and reliability of intelligence • Forces available • Target

SECURITY ELEMENT
OUTER CORDON
Supporting Effort

Purpose:

- Prevent escape of targeted personnel.
- Protect the search team (main effort) from threat reinforcements.
- Participate in search.

<u>Tactical Tasks:</u>	<u>Methods:</u>	<u>Considerations:</u>
• Interdict • Isolate • Block • Contain • Deny • Secure	• Traffic control points • Blocking positions • Patrols • Observation posts/ listening posts • Snipers or designated marksmen	• Special instructions • Special equipment • Interpreters or linguists • Survivability

SECURITY ELEMENT
INNER CORDON
Supporting Effort

Purpose:

- Protect the search element (main effort) from threat activity such as direct fire, grenades, explosives, or civil disturbances.

<u>Tactical Tasks:</u>	<u>Methods:</u>	<u>Considerations:</u>
• Overwatch • Suppress • Secure • Neutralize • Cover • Guard	• Overwatch positions • Support-by-fire positions • Snipers or designated marksmen	• Be prepared to support by fire • Plan as a combat operation in urban terrain • Establish a direct fire plan

RESERVE ELEMENT
Supporting Effort

Purpose:

- Rapidly provide flexibility to the commander.
(Is often referred to as the quick-reaction force.)

<u>Tactical Tasks:</u>	<u>Considerations:</u>
• Identify the company/team in reserve. • Identify planning priorities to on-order missions. • Prioritize most likely threats. • Identify a clear task and purpose for each on-order mission. • Define commitment criteria for each on-order mission.	• Size of element • Uncommitted element • Location of reserve (stationary or mobile) • Ingress and egress routes • Levels of readiness • Time standards for response

Legend:
OPCON operational control

Figure E-1. Cordon and search smart card (continued)

E-16. When preparing for a cordon and search operation, leaders must integrate essential principles into the plan. The primary principles of executing a cordon and search are—

- **Speed.** Establish cordons with an immediate transition to a search of the target. Rapid tempo is critical to maintain the initiative and to reduce the enemy ability to react or escape. Speed will limit the enemy capability to react and mitigate organized opposition by the local populace.
- **Surprise.** Make efforts to deny the enemy the opportunity to react.
- **Isolation.** Physically isolate the target area and the target by establishing a cordon around each site. The cordon serves to prevent—
 - Escape from the area.
 - The repositioning of enemy elements.
 - Reinforcement.
- **Target identification.** Properly train and task personnel to identify, capture, and exploit targeted enemy personnel and material.
- **Timeliness.** Strike a balance between actionable intelligence, target activities, the desired end state, and cordon and search execution. The failure to do so allows the enemy to gain the initiative, reposition as he desires, and escape.
- **Accountability.** Several elements execute decentralized operations frequently during a cordon and search. Account for personnel and assets during the egress.
- **Minimization and mitigation of collateral damage.** Cordon and search operations focus on eliminating threats or potential threats. If the operations cause excessive or unnecessary collateral damage, this may create resentment, which emboldens the enemy cause. Actions that cause extensive collateral damage may also constitute violations under the law of war and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- **Detailed search.** Search target areas thoroughly and extensively—do not just clear them—to ensure that Soldiers capture enemy assets. Properly coordinate, mark, and adhere to unit SOPs.
- **Legitimacy.** Cordon and search operations focus on supporting the efforts of a legitimate HN government. Use and integrate properly trained HN security forces.

E-17. Searches are an important aspect of population and resource control. The need to conduct cordon and search operations may extend beyond offensive operations, becoming an ongoing requirement in certain stability situations. Implementing the following considerations will assist in a smooth transition:

- Before conducting the search, members of the search team must understand the limits of the search authority and the rules of engagement. The misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of the command mission. During a search, thoroughly record the seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other items. The proper use of authority during searches gains the respect and support of the people.
- Under normal search conditions, searchers should use minimum-essential force to eliminate active resistance. Some situations may require the full shock effect of speed and surprise and a limited violence of action. Company teams should be prepared to clear rooms under precision or high-intensity conditions.
- To avoid making an enemy out of a suspect, searchers must be tactful. Use the greatest caution during the initial handling of a person to be searched. One member of the search team provides security while another member makes the actual search. Where appropriate, place checkpoints to control individuals with minimum force while providing maximum security.
- When the enemy thinks searches might be a threat, they use females for all types of tasks when they think searches might be a threat; therefore, the search team should also use female searchers. If male Soldiers must search females, all possible measures must be taken to prevent the inference of cultural insensitivity.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARD DETECTION

E-18. The ability to recognize and react to an explosive hazard is critical to the ability of the clearing team to maneuver and survive. Buildings contain many areas and items that are potential hiding places (doors, windows, stairs, telephones, books) for explosive hazards. Military police may encounter many different types of explosive hazards during urban operations. (See appendix K for additional information regarding explosive hazards.)

E-19. When moving through a building, do not pick up anything (food, valuables, enemy weapons). These are typical items that the enemy equips with pressure devices which explode when moved. Leaders must ensure that Soldiers are well dispersed to lessen the number of casualties during a device explosion.

- Do not move closer to a suspect UXO/IED after it is identified. Approaching an explosive hazard can cause it to detonate.
- Do not strike, move, or touch a suspected explosive hazard.
- Do not move or remove anything on, near, or attached to a suspected explosive hazard.
- Do not use radios, radar equipment, cellular phones, or other electronic devices within 100 meters (109.36 yards) of a suspected explosive hazard.
- Don individual protective equipment immediately if there are peculiar smells, liquids, or dead animals in the area of the explosive hazard. This is an indication of the possible or likely presence of chemical or biological agents.

E-20. Mark the location of the explosive hazard to warn other friendly forces.

- Use easily recognizable material, such as white engineer tape, marking or survey ribbon, clothing, or an explosive marking sign.
- Use established SOPs to ensure recognition by other elements.
- Place markers so that they face friendly force avenues of approach (facing outward from the explosive hazard).
- Place the marker aboveground, between waist and head level. Ensure that the marker will stay in place once set.

E-21. Withdraw from the suspected explosive hazard, and evacuate along the same path that is used to enter. Continue to survey for additional hazards during withdrawal. Clear a 360° perimeter for a minimum of 300 meters (328 yards); for larger explosive hazards, increase the evacuation distance. Refer to SOPs for specific evacuation guidance and distances.

E-22. Report suspected explosive hazards by using a UXO report, and notify other friendly elements in the AO about the hazard. (See appendix F for an example UXO report.)

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Appendix F

Civil Disturbances

Military police perform many tasks in support of civil LE, including assisting in civil disturbance operations. Deployed military police who are involved in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations should anticipate assisting civil authorities (or, in some cases, assuming their role) in maintaining or restoring order. Domestically, there are important differences in the rules, regulations, laws, and policies that direct the employment of Army components when operating within the United States, its trusts, and its territories. State and federal laws carefully limit the support that Army forces may provide to civilian LE agencies. Federal laws, presidential directives, and DOD policies constrain the use of federal military forces from enforcing laws and providing security except on military installations. While the focus of this appendix is on preventing and responding to civil disturbances outside the continental United States, much of the information also applies to domestic operations.

PREVENTING CIVIL DISTURBANCES

F-1. When preventing civil disturbances in the United States or in other nations, military police assistance may take several forms, including—

- Background information and intelligence sharing and development.
- Relationship development.
- Police presence.
- Crowd monitoring.
- Crowd control.
- Crowd leader and participant negotiation.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE

F-2. Assessing the potential for civil disturbance begins well before an event occurs. In an AO, predictive intelligence can provide insight to social, political, and environmental conditions; external influences; or potentially catalytic events that may trigger unrest, public disorder, and riots. When tensions are already high, it may take only a seemingly minor incident, rumor, or act of injustice to ignite a crowd to violence. Knowing the potential participants in a civil disturbance; when, where, and why they might be gathering; what their objectives and capabilities are; and what their possible COAs are can assist commanders in prevention planning.

F-3. Through the effective gathering of information and a working cooperation with local government and police officials, military police can often be made aware of dates, times, locations, and the identity of groups that may assemble before an incident occurs. Within the limits of the law, seek to know as much as possible about these groups beforehand. Knowing their goals, functions, and tactics will help anticipate their moves.

RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPMENT

F-4. Working relationships between commanders and protest group leaders are increasingly seen as the best means for preventing bad outcomes in crowd situations. This is called the negotiated management model of crowd control. Open dialog helps develop working relationships. Talking allows group leaders to convey what they want to accomplish and provides an opportunity for commanders to tell group leaders what they are prepared to do and how they might respond to certain crowd behaviors. Such communications can do much to resolve issues and prevent violence.

F-5. Communication also means persuasion. For example, attempting to help demonstrators accomplish goals in a safe manner and within the law may be beneficial. Make a concerted effort to win over demonstration leaders, many of whom seek to stay on the right side of the law. Encourage demonstrators to protest in an acceptable way and, if possible, offer favors to get them to do so.

F-6. When possible, initiate communication with group leaders to work out issues before an event. Working relationships often result in protest groups policing themselves. This is one of the basic premises of negotiated management. Protesters are more likely to listen to their own leaders than listen to military police or other authorities. Protest organizers are likely to buy into a cooperative effort and agree to the ground rules that are set beforehand.

F-7. Military police may not be able to talk to all leaders before a crowd assembles. Some groups do not have recognized leaders and are ad hoc organizations. Other groups may have several leaders, but only some of them will negotiate. In such cases, meetings with willing leaders may tell who the other leaders are and provide critical information.

MILITARY POLICE PRESENCE

F-8. Military police presence, in and of itself, can have a calming effect in some situations or the opposite in others. Take precautions to avoid becoming a catalyst for a civil disturbance. In general, this means that the emphasis should be on preventing unfavorable outcomes rather than on confrontation, which will likely cause resistance. When pushed, people tend to resist opposition to the realization of their purposes.

F-9. Depending on the situation and to the extent possible, military police engagement in a peaceful assembly should be unobtrusive. Remember that participating in a legal demonstration to express views is a right of all people, not just U.S. citizens on U.S. soil. Military police should never violate basic civil or human rights. Treat people firmly but with reasonable courtesy and dignity. Do not display civil disturbance equipment or weapons, overtly prepare defenses against a crowd, or aggressively violate crowd space unless presented with information, intelligence, or negative indicators of pending violence.

F-10. Military police involved in continental United States or outside the continental United States crowd control operations should expect media and political scrutiny. Projecting a favorable image may require military police leaders to reach out to local leaders and citizens. It also requires maintaining a positive relationship with the media. Military police leaders can include media representatives during operations to demonstrate openness and mitigate otherwise potentially negative publicity. The media effect is inescapable. Appendix H provides guidance regarding interaction with the media.

F-11. Military police presence may include mounted and walking patrols—especially on a random schedule—in areas that are known to be hot spots for unrest. Alert, aggressive patrolling of a potential disturbance area deters the gathering of crowds. The use of saturation patrolling is most effective for this purpose. It allows information to be collected and creates the psychological impression of the control force being everywhere at once.

CROWD MONITORING

F-12. Under most circumstances, gatherings of individuals and small groups into crowds—even for the purpose of protest—are orderly and present little or no problems for authorities. On occasion, however, even a small, initially nonviolent protest can turn into a public disturbance or a full-scale riot. Begin monitoring group and individual behavior when people first start to assemble for a scheduled or spontaneous rally. Whether or not you have prior knowledge of an event or potential disturbance, assess the gathering crowd by attempting to answer these questions:

- Who are these people? What is the overarching identity of the crowd? For example, are they strikers or social protestors?
- What are their goals?
- What is the composition and size of the crowd, and are there any known factions (especially rival or warring factions)?
- What are they capable of doing?
- What are their traditional behaviors or cultural repertoires?

- Why are they assembling or demonstrating in this location versus another?
- Where will they go?
- What are the possible targets of violence?
- What is the worst-case scenario?
- When and where will they disperse?
- Are there plans for subsequent gatherings?

F-13. Pay particular attention to crowd dynamics since changes in demeanor and behavior can provide an advance warning of unrest and prompt military police to take a measured response. Emotional contagion is the most dramatic psychological factor of crowd dynamics. It provides the crowd with a temporary bond of psychological unity. If it lasts long enough, this unity can push a simple organized crowd into a mob. People tend to reject normal law and authority under these conditions, increasing the potential for violence and panic. Table F-1 summarizes predictive indicators of a civil disturbance.

Table F-1. Predictive indicators of a civil disturbance

<i>Predictive Indicator</i>	<i>Description</i>
Orientation	Crowd dynamics change from people milling around and talking among themselves in isolated groups to a more collective focus concentrated on a single objective (for example, you, a specific policy or concern, a government figure, or other object).
Massing	Massing occurs when a crowd begins to tighten into a large, contiguous body. If unchecked, massing can provide anonymity and a collective feeling of invulnerability. This change in group dynamics could provide ideal conditions for a civil disturbance.
Chanting	People may begin chanting slogans or yelling ethnically charged rhetoric or obscenities. Because chanting can indicate an increase in crowd intensity, translators should be positioned in strategic locations to interpret crowd rhetoric.
Signaling	Signaling occurs when members of the crowd position themselves to communicate and synchronize crowd actions tied to a plan with specific objectives. Signaling may indicate the intent to escalate the message through the use of violent or unlawful acts.
Blocking	The crowd may attempt to block public thoroughfares (for example, entrances and exits to public buildings, MSRs, community streets, or other traffic areas that may degrade freedom of movement or similar actions). This escalates the level of attention given to the crowd's message or prevents freedom of movement to opposing persons or groups.
Arming	Any signs that the crowd is arming itself with objects (for example, bottles, rocks, and sticks) are clear indications of impending violence and danger to you and others.
Outside Influence	The presence of people from outside the community may indicate more sophisticated planning and resources than would otherwise be expected from local community members. Outside people may feel insulated from responsibility for local actions and, therefore, provide a dangerous catalyst for a violent civil disturbance.

Table F-1. Predictive indicators of a civil disturbance (continued)

<i>Predictive Indicator</i>	<i>Description</i>
Agitators and Instigators	Agitators and instigators are common elements associated with civil disturbances. They often provide a catalyst to incite the crowd toward violence. Whether spewing rhetoric or committing unlawful acts, their continued presence will fuel potential strife.
Absence of Children	Recent civil disturbances have shown that even when children were initially present at a rally, they were absent before the civil disturbance erupted with violence. While the presence of children is not a guarantee of a peaceful assembly, the removal of children from a rally may provide early warning for a pending escalation of hostilities or a full-blown riot.

F-14. Crowd monitoring may include having one or more designated camera or video recorder teams to use for recording people who assemble in an area. Cameras are one of the best tools for preventing civil disturbances. Their use to document crowd formations, particularly lens-size groups (small enough to fit in a single photograph) will eliminate feelings of anonymity among the crowd and personalize contact with them. People whose identity has been documented will think twice before committing unlawful acts. Even without documenting names, photograph analysis can identify the people who are associated with the civil disturbance, especially those who unlawfully participate as crowd instigators, agitators, or magnets or those who commit unlawful acts.

F-15. As people begin to gather in and along streets, deploy camera teams as unobtrusively as possible to engage people before they congregate in mass. Camera teams should consist of two Soldiers with an interpreter (where needed) and be employed in a widely dispersed pattern. Such small, dispersed camera teams are less likely to intrude on lawful rallies or create invasive friction that might become a catalyst to a civil disturbance.

F-16. Engaging people as a crowd forms is essential to prevention. Whether based on intelligence or negative indicators, engage early before the crowd masses. Early contact will assist in personalizing interactions, ensuring that people understand that their presence is known, documented, and can be linked to their actions.

CROWD CONTROL

F-17. The tactical situation and actions of the crowd should dictate control and enforcement options. When the developing situation still permits an individual to focus on preventing a disturbance, crowd control measures may include—

- Rerouting traffic and preventing congestion near the gathering.
- Providing security at a crowd-gathering site or along a route to prevent counter demonstrators from confronting the demonstrators.
- Ensuring that one or more avenues remain open for individuals to disperse.
- Assisting with dispersal.
- Blocking the ability of a crowd to advance in a particular direction, such as protecting a facility or other potential target of the crowd.
- Delaying massing, such as temporarily blocking roads to delay the arrival of buses and vehicles full of demonstrators.
- Containing a gathering, such as establishing temporary checkpoints to control the size or movement of the crowd.
- Communicating with crowd leaders and participants.

F-18. Although checkpoints can prevent people from entering a containment area, they should never prevent people from exiting. Use checkpoints to prevent potential participants from joining the crowd. Checkpoints should also prevent activities that may commingle rival ethnic groups. The checkpoint may include processing people who are departing the area by documenting personal and vehicle information with the pictures of occupants in front of, or adjacent to, the vehicle.

F-19. Communication with crowd leaders and participants can help a commander control a situation without more severe measures. For example, the commander may be able to divert the leaders or the crowd from its stated or apparent goal. Military police can apply pressure on leaders to channel the crowd into an area that minimizes disruption to the community and aids crowd control operations. They can also limit march routes and demonstration areas to those that will help contain the crowd and reduce the potential for disrupting the community. Pressure can be positive (offering concessions) or negative (with deterrents).

F-20. If the commander can gain the cooperation of crowd leaders, he can decrease the potential for disorder. If crowd leaders seek cooperation from authorities, officials should try to be accommodating. Crowd leaders can be placed in liaison positions between the crowd and the control force and can be made responsible for managing the crowd by policing their own activities.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENABLERS

F-21. Key enablers for negotiating with a crowd are personnel from civil affairs, military information support operations, and public affairs. Civil affairs Soldiers are cultural experts who have daily interactions with the HN population and its leaders. Civil affairs Soldiers typically also have linguistic skills that may enable them to speak directly with crowd leaders. In situations where this is not an inherent capability, the civil affairs Soldier most likely has at least one translator who is immediately available for direct support. Civil affairs Soldiers are nonlethal brigade-level assets that are often assigned to battalions and may be requested through the chain of command. Given their general mission and duties, civil affairs Soldiers may already have an understanding of the group concerns and knowledge of the actions that are already underway to remedy the perceived problem.

F-22. On select occasions where there is advance notice of a demonstration, the commander may want to request support from the military information support operations unit. This is typically a deliberate process that will require military police leadership to actively request and approve across the chain of command. Military information support operations personnel typically have prerecorded messages in the HN language that allows them to conduct stationary or mobile broadcasts. This is especially effective when a military information support operations team conducts mobile operations in the vicinity of groups that are beginning to mass. The message that they will broadcast is predetermined and approved by the commander.

NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ENABLERS

F-23. It is very likely that a military police company will not have immediate support from an enabler. Translators, who may be critical during the initial verbal engagement with the crowd, may not be available immediately. Regardless, the military police leader or designee will petition the crowd for someone who is authorized to talk.

F-24. When negotiating with demonstration leaders, it is important to involve the media to promote openness and sincerity. Including a public affairs representative and local media will help prevent rumors and false allegations.

F-25. During peaceful demonstrations, a key leader or leaders will typically emerge and be willing to discuss the problem or problems that they are protesting. Unless they are authorized to make a decision that will satisfy the crowd, leaders should not negotiate beyond their ability to coordinate a follow-on private meeting with the commander or designated negotiator. Even if authorized to negotiate, it may be advantageous to delay negotiations until the crowd disperses, preferably until a future date (within 1 or 2 days). It is important to tell crowd leaders that the crowd must disperse to avoid injuries as a result of the demonstration. If the demonstration leaders and crowd refuse to disperse, request further guidance from the chain of command.

Note. Military police leaders must offer only what they are willing and able to deliver.

F-26. Several rules apply in negotiations, and credibility is a key factor. Communicate only necessary information and the actions that authorities and military police leaders intend to do. Negotiate from a position of strength, and an agreement may be reached. Even so, develop contingencies in the event that the agreement is violated.

RESPONDING TO CIVIL DISTURBANCES

F-27. Civil disturbance operations are dynamic, ever-changing environments. They often involve many military and civilian agencies and require thorough, timely, and coordinated planning, training, and execution for mission success. Whether the disturbance is an unruly demonstration or widespread looting, arson, and violence, the basic objectives are the same—to restore order by using the minimum force necessary and to not impose punishment or suppress peaceful dissent.

F-28. Since there may be little advance warning of an unfolding situation, be prepared to quickly develop COAs. When developing a plan, consider the potentially effective crowd control options (monitoring, containing, blocking, and dispersing) and the teams and elements that are necessary to implement them. Teams and elements may include—

- Camera teams with interpreters.
- Checkpoints.
- Quick response forces.
- Nonlethal weapon teams.
- Snatch and detain teams.
- Detainee evacuation sites.
- Blocking teams.
- Crowd control formations, including MWDs, as appropriate.
- Extraction teams.
- Apprehension teams.
- Lethal overwatch marksmen and/or observer teams.
- Reserve and/or security forces.
- Weapons, ammunition, and equipment requirements.

F-29. Scalable effects concepts are a measured approach in response to a crowd gathering. By establishing, teaching, and enforcing a use-of-force policy, leaders ensure that Soldiers understand that they must use the minimum force necessary. Without the appearance of a graduated response, the gathering crowd may consider actions as excessive, causing a possible escalation of hostilities or violence. As appropriate, do the following to aid in the scalable effects process:

- Try to persuade the crowd to quietly disperse by talking with leaders.
- Use translators as necessary.
- Let the first approach be by local authorities (mayor or police) if possible and they are available.
- Pass out handbills with preselected military information support operations messages requesting that the crowd return home.
- Use video and still cameras to photograph individuals and events for later use at trials.
- Give warnings before moving to the next level of force.

F-30. As the crowd begins to demonstrate negative indicators for a possible civil disturbance, camera teams must become more invasive by actively engaging groups to take their pictures. Camera teams should focus cameras on instigators, agitators, or leaders (formal and informal). If a person is purposely avoiding the camera, even if his activities are lawful, the team should take special measures to obtain his picture. Each time that a camera team takes a picture of a person or a group of people, the team should use a warning similar to, “We have your picture. You will be held accountable for your actions. If you commit an unlawful act, we will detain you. Blocking roads or access to public buildings is unlawful.”

F-31. Once a crowd has massed and displays negative indicators or begins to riot, camera teams will immediately move behind the riot formation line. It is essential, however, that camera teams continue to document the event, focusing on people who are committing illegal acts, such as arming themselves, throwing objects, and conducting assaults. Immediately following a crowd control or civil disturbance operation, consolidate, process, and submit photographs through the chain of command for analysis. A near real-time analysis will provide immediate intelligence for ongoing operations to prevent subsequent civil disturbances or to detain violators from the previous operation.

F-32. Military police leaders must ensure the use of appropriate levels of force. The end state of effective escalation-of-force training ensures that—

- Soldiers understand the escalation of force and become confident in the escalation-of-force application and their ability to make good decisions and prevent hesitation or second guessing when making a decision to apply force. This, in turn, decreases response time and increases the likelihood that Soldiers will apply the appropriate levels of force.
- Soldiers are able to determine a legitimate target.
- Leaders and Soldiers understand and recognize possible second- and third-order effects and the strategic impact of escalation-of-force incidents.
- Soldiers understand their inherent right to self-defense according to the established rules of engagement.
- Commanders and leaders effectively use information engagement as a tool to shape public opinions and counter misperceptions by the local populace.

F-33. Ideally, the response force should be positioned out of the crowd's sight. Have military police Soldiers move into their riot control position with few shouted commands. For maximum effect on the crowd, have them organize their formation decisively and professionally. Do the following to aid in the formation process:

- Display force in a graduated manner (for example, a UH-60 helicopter, hardened vehicles, and Soldiers with charged weapons).
- Exploit the psychological effects of a show of force.
- Demonstrate force (do not use on unarmed civilians).
- Escalate the military information support operations message.
- Highlight the target pointer.
- Demonstrate the sniper precision strike capability.
- Employ riot control measures.
- Use nonlethal munitions.
- Use riot control agents if approved.
- Move through the crowd using riot control formations and movement techniques.
- Use a graduated response matrix.

F-34. Numerous graduated response matrices and similar products exist throughout the military. These products graphically portray available responses in a graduated manner. The intent of these products is to give the on-scene commander a list of options with which to control or diffuse a situation before it gets out of hand. Leaders can eliminate most threats without the loss of life or collateral damage by effectively applying the available resources. Figure F-1, page F-8, depicts a sample graduated response matrix.

Target	Nonlethal Response			
	Command Presence/MISO	Show of Force	Demonstration of Force	Riot Control Means (if approved)
Unarmed Civilians	Ensure that the tactical MISO team on-site commander directs the broadcast of the dispersal proclamation and/or passes handbills. Escalate the tone of the dispersal proclamation from information to a warning of force.	Display force along with escalating the dispersal proclamation. Display force in a graduated manner, such as a helicopter hovering over a crowd or Soldiers who possess charged weapons. Exploit the psychological effect of a show of force.	Do not demonstrate force toward unarmed civilians.	Employ riot control agents at the point of penetration. Use MISO to exploit the psychological effect. Move through the crowd using riot control formations and movement techniques.
Armed Civilians (Knives, Clubs)	N/A	N/A	Display force along with escalating the dispersal proclamation. Highlight the target pointer. Demonstrate sniper precision strike capabilities.	N/A
Armed Crowds/Military (Firearms)	N/A	N/A	N/A	Do not use riot control agents; they may escalate the situation.

Figure F-1. Sample graduated response matrix

Target	Lethal Response			
	Sniper Responses	Small Arms Direct Fire	Aerial Fires	Indirect Fires
Unarmed Civilians	Ensure that the identified leaders or troublemakers are targets. Use the minimum response necessary. Exploit the psychological effect of an attack.	Determine that sniper attack is insufficient. Consider demonstrating capabilities. Exploit the psychological effect of a lethal response. Escalate gradually, starting with small-caliber, single round weapons and work up to a large caliber, automatic weapons.	Determine that small arms direct fire is ineffective. Use the minimum response necessary. Use minimal precision strike initially; use subsequent fires based on the situation. Exploit the psychological impact of each strike.	Determine that air assets are unavailable or ineffective. Use the minimum response necessary. Ensure that the response is directed by the on-site commander.
Armed Civilians (Knives, Clubs)	N/A	N/A	CAS/indirect fires must be authorized by the major command commander. Consider requesting permission for use when— • All lesser means have been ineffective. • There are physical eyes on the target. • The proximity to civilians has been considered. • The risk to friendly forces/evacuees outweighs the risk of collateral damage.	
Armed Crowds/ Military (Firearms)	N/A	N/A		
Legend: CAS close air support MISO military information support operations N/A not applicable				

Figure F-1. Sample graduated response matrix (continued)

RIOT SHIELD AND BATON TECHNIQUES

F-35. Use the riot shield and riot baton based on METT-TC and the commander's choice-of-force option. Formations that are committed to a riot with riot batons must have lethal overwatch, lethal weapons, and nonlethal weapons that are employed within the formation and reserve forces with additional nonlethal and lethal capabilities. Position these forces to rapidly reinforce the control force formation. (See ATP 3-39.33 for detailed guidance and illustrations that highlight tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing riot shields and batons.)

Riot Shield

F-36. The riot shield is primarily a defensive weapon that is designed to withstand strikes from objects that are thrown by the crowd. In addition to protecting the riot shield bearer, it also protects other members of the

formation from thrown objects. Even so, Soldiers can use the riot shield in an offensive mode, such as when the formation is in close contact with an aggressive crowd or rioters.

F-37. The riot shield may be held with one arm. It is secured to the weak side arm with a self-sticking strap system and its handle. This system is designed to make the riot shield an extension of the Soldier's arm. The riot shield is held at a slightly inward angle. This allows for debris thrown at the Soldier to fall harmlessly to the ground.

F-38. The two basic riot shield carries are—

- **At-the-ready.** The at-the-ready position is used while in a column formation or on the move toward hostilities. This position is designed for rapid movement. It should not be used when in contact with a crowd.
- **On-guard.** The on-guard position is used when the riot control formation is in contact with the crowd or when contact is imminent. It is used primarily in line, wedge, echelon, diamond, and circle riot control formations.

F-39. When the control force is in contact with the crowd, the crowd may attempt to strip the riot shield from the bearer. When a subject grabs the top of the riot shield, the riot shield holder slaps the riot shield with his strong hand (or baton) near the subject's hands and gives the following commands (while continuing to slap the riot shield until the subject releases it):

- "Get back!"
- "Get away!"
- "Stop!"

F-40. If the riot shield is grabbed from the bottom, the riot shield holder forcefully drops to one knee, pinning the subject's fingers and/or hands to the ground. This must be done quickly and with force. Depending on the situation, another Soldier in the formation may also help separate an aggressor from a shield. For example, the Soldier moves forward into a gap between the riot shields where he can quickly strike the top or side of the riot shield, slicing the long end across or straight down onto the hands and fingers of the aggressor. Alternatively, Soldiers who are armed with 12-gauge shotguns, M16 rifles, or grenade launchers can just as effectively smash the hands or fingers of a persistent aggressor with the barrels of their weapons by using the technique described above.

Riot Baton

F-41. A riot baton in the hands of a properly trained Soldier is a formidable weapon. However, it must be used in conjunction with other measures to be most effective. Train Soldiers with the riot baton to the point that various baton carries and techniques are automatic to them. Riot baton carries include the—

- Two-hand carry (most common).
- Outside-arm carry (expandable riot baton only).
- Vertical, high-profile carry.
- Vertical, low-profile carry.

F-42. The five basic types of riot baton blocking techniques that are executed from the two-hand carry position are the—

- High block.
- Low block.
- Strong-side block.
- Support-side block.
- Middle block.

F-43. Seven strikes can be executed using the riot baton. Two of these strikes come from the outside-arm or vertical carry. The other five strikes come from the two-hand carry. These seven strikes are the—

- One-hand forward strike.
- One-hand reverse strike.
- Two-hand, strong-side horizontal strike.
- Two-hand, support-side horizontal strike.
- Two-hand front jab.
- Two-hand rear jab.
- Two-hand middle strike.

Note. Never raise the riot baton above the head to strike a subject in a club fashion. Doing so portrays an unfavorable image of the control force and leaves the Soldier vulnerable to an attack on his rib cage. Failure to comply may result in personal injury or equipment damage.

F-44. Riot baton training must also include learning the vulnerable points of the human body so that Soldiers can avoid areas that may cause permanent injury or death when struck. The human body can be divided into three areas to represent the primary, secondary, and final (deadly force) target areas. (See figure F-2, page F-12.)

F-45. Primary target areas are those areas that, when struck or restrained, cause the least amount of bodily trauma. These include meaty or muscular areas, such as the—

- Foot, calf, and instep.
- Inside and outside of the thigh.
- Lower abdominal region.
- Forearms and upper arms.

F-46. Secondary target areas are those areas of the body that, when struck or restrained, cause a moderate level of trauma to the body. This type of trauma tends to be longer lasting because the time to heal is longer than with other parts of the body. If these areas are struck with a riot baton, serious injury may occur. However, some of these areas are used for control or restraining holds that tend to lessen the threat of injury. Some secondary targets are the—

- Collarbone and shoulder blades.
- Elbows and knees.
- Upper abdominal region.

F-47. Final target areas are those areas that, when struck with a riot baton, cause serious trauma that tends to be fatal or critical. However, there are some areas that (when used for restraining only) will not cause death or serious injury. Some final target areas are the—

- Front and back of the head (eyes, ears, nose, upper lip, and hollow behind the ear).
- Neck and throat.
- Upper chest.
- Xiphoid process (solar plexus).
- Spinal column.
- Groin area.




Figure F-2. Escalation of trauma chart

CIVIL DISTURBANCE FORMATIONS

F-48. Control force formations, when properly employed and executed against a crowd, are some of the most practical methods of crowd control. Historically, the riot baton has been the weapon of choice for the control force. With the development of nonlethal weapons, military police now have more options. The ability to create a standoff distance with nonlethal weapons reduces the risk of close fighting with the crowd. During a crowd control operation, leaders must protect the control force with lethal overwatch. This overwatch may be in the form of marksmen and observer teams (sniper with observer) and a response force with lethal capabilities.

F-49. Use control force formations to disperse, contain, or block a crowd. These formations are more effective in urban areas than in open areas, such as parks or fields. When control force operations are employed in urban areas, it is easier to split a crowd into smaller segments, isolate instigators, or funnel the crowd into the desired location by using buildings and other man-made structures. Well-organized crowds may attempt to move to the flanks of a formation or get behind the formation to gain a tactical advantage.

F-50. Control force formations are not the answer to all civil disturbance situations. Do not expose the formation to sniper fire or unnecessary violence simply for a show of force. Use control force formations when a crowd poses a threat and must be dispersed or moved to a specified area. Before dividing a large crowd, consider that this might not solve the problem. It may worsen it by creating smaller elements that could engage the control force in small-mob tactics, such as sniping, looting, burning, and attempting to envelop the control force. Anticipate that breakaway crowds may engage in small-mob tactics. Area control measures, such as building searches and saturation patrolling, can defeat these tactics.

F-51. The most frequently used control force formations are the line, echelon, and wedge. Less frequently used formations are the diamond and circle. (See figure F-3 for symbols used in formation graphics.)




Figure F-3. Symbols for a formation element

Line Formation

F-52. The line is the basic formation, and it is used more often because of its offensive and defensive applications. As an offensive formation, use the line to push or drive crowds straight back, across an open area, or down a city street. As a defensive formation, use the line to hold the crowd or to deny access to areas. (See figure F-4 for an illustration of a line formation that uses the three-squad platoon concept.)




Figure F-4. Line formation

Echelon Formation

F-53. The echelon is an offensive formation that is used to turn or divert groups in open or built-up areas and to move crowds away from buildings, fences, and walls. (See figure F-5 for an illustration of an echelon formation using the three-squad platoon concept.)




Figure F-5. Echelon formation

Wedge Formation

F-54. The wedge is an offensive formation that is used to penetrate and split crowds into smaller groups. (See figure F-6 for an illustration of a wedge formation that uses the three-squad platoon concept.)




Figure F-6. Wedge formation

Diamond Formation

F-55. The diamond is an offensive formation that is used to enter a crowd. It is the formation of choice for extraction teams. As a defensive formation, use the diamond when all-around security is required in open areas. Base the decision to use this formation on the conformation of the crowd. (See figure F-7 for an illustration of a diamond formation that uses the three-squad platoon concept.)




Figure F-7. Diamond formation

Circle Formation

F-56. The circle formation is also an offensive formation that is used to enter a crowd. Base the decision to use this formation on the conformation of the crowd. (See figure F-8 for an illustration of a circle formation that uses the three-squad platoon concept.)




Figure F-8. Circle formation

F-57. There are many suitable variations of control force formations that leaders may employ, but they need to be sure to develop appropriate commands and signals to execute the formations. Because of their somewhat complicated nature and the coordination required for these formations, leaders and Soldiers must train, practice, and rehearse new variations before they are used in a civil disturbance.

F-58. Vehicles may be employed with troops in control force formations, especially when a large, riotous crowd is on hand. Although vehicles add strength to formations, certain precautions must be taken. Covering the windshield with sturdy, close-mesh fencing and a standard safety glass offers some level of protection to the occupants. Shields and mobile barriers may be built by mounting a wooden or metal frame strung with barbed wire across the front of a vehicle. Members of the formation should walk as near to the front corners of each vehicle as possible to keep rioters from attacking the sides and rear of the vehicles.

F-59. Up-armored, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles; armored security vehicles; or other armored vehicles may be employed with the control force formation when determined by METT-TC. They present a strong psychological effect and offer protection for the occupants. Wheeled, armored vehicles are best because they do not deface the pavement. When vehicles are used in a crowd control formation, the commander must ensure that he is still able to see and control the formation. This may require him to occupy a position in a similar vehicle behind the formation or command subordinate leaders to move away from the front line and into line-of-sight control. This will require additional hand-and-arm signals to allow the commander and subordinate leaders to communicate. Commanders can effectively use vehicles as primary communication tools by using horns and lights as signals to organize movements or actions. However vehicles are used, it takes a good measure of training and practice to be effective. (See ATP 3-39.33 for details about specific formations and techniques.)

Appendix G

Site Exploitations

Site exploitation is systematically searching for and collecting information, material, and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution (ATTP 3-90.15). Historically, site exploitation has been associated with eliminating weapons of mass destruction. However, experience has proven that site exploitation operations contribute to defeating a wide range of threats and assist U.S. armed forces in gaining tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. This appendix provides a brief overview of site exploitation and describes military police support to site exploitation operations.

PURPOSES AND POTENTIAL RESULTS OF SITE EXPLOITATION

G-1. Figure G-1, page G-2, shows the three general purposes for site exploitation missions in relation to execution and potential results. The first purpose (answering information requirements) usually means answering the commander's critical information requirements. The second purpose encompasses the facilitation of planned and unanticipated operations. The third purpose generally involves facilitating the prosecution of war crimes by HN or international authorities.

G-2. Information at a site may take an unlimited variety of forms. In the context of search and collection, information encompasses all potential sources of information—defined as facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. Media can include common information. Additionally, materials such as weapons, ammunition, equipment, chemicals, and supplies can be collected and analyzed. Human sources can also provide information. Generally speaking, site exploitation forces search for and collect persons. Therefore, to encompass all potential sources of information, this discussion uses the terms information, material, and persons to refer to information (in any medium or form), material, or persons that can be collected and analyzed to produce intelligence.

G-3. The framework for executing site exploitation operations comprises four main actions that are generally undertaken in sequential (but sometimes overlapping) order:

- **Search**—including locating the site, protecting it, and conducting a site search. Because enemies place strategic value on exploitable sites, the most proficient enemy forces may be detailed to defend them. Based on the level of protection that is required to thoroughly search for and collect information, material, or persons, forces may execute any number of tactical tasks (such as cordon, secure, and isolate) early in site exploitation. Portions of the forces that support initial protection tasks often perform search and collection tasks, with assistance, as needed and when available, from specialized units (forensic collection units, CBRN forces, human intelligence collection teams authorized to conduct interrogation, MWD teams, demolition teams).
- **Collect**—including identifying and collecting potentially valuable information, material, or persons; preserving the site and the information, material, or persons collected; and transferring control of the site.

- **Analyze**—including analyzing the collected information, material, or persons on-site; transferring information, material, or persons for further processing; and analyzing the transferred information, material, or persons off-site. Site exploitation teams analyze information, material, or persons on-site to answer the commander's critical information requirements. Soldiers immediately report and track on-site information that contributes to planning and decisionmaking or is highly perishable. After the initial on-site analysis, units transfer information, material, or persons identified as having possible intelligence value for additional processing. Units establish an SOP for transfers, including positive control measures and a chain of custody for the information, material, or persons collected at the site.
- **Disseminate**—including establishing connectivity with intelligence organizations and sharing data, information, and intelligence through appropriate channels.




Figure G-1. Site exploitation purposes, execution, and potential results

G-4. The information, intelligence, and evidence that are gained from site exploitation are most valuable when they are used to facilitate subsequent operations. Therefore, commanders plan to rapidly exploit the information that is gained for the current operation and the next. The products and intelligence that are derived from document and media exploitation can be a significant force multiplier for the commander. Document and media exploitation must be conducted with sufficient speed and accuracy to satisfy the commander's critical information requirements and enable operations that interrupt the enemy decision cycle. Soldiers must be able to correctly identify and collect information, material, or persons for further exploitation to avoid the inadvertent loss of valuable information. Ideally, each site exploitation mission leads to another site exploitation mission. The failure to recognize the relevance and timeliness of information can impede subsequent operations and must be avoided.

G-5. Site exploitation operations that involve sensitive sites require special considerations and actions. The criteria for determining that a site is sensitive are based on formally promulgated national-level and theater level guidance. In general, the information, material, or persons that a sensitive site contains could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to U.S. security or national interests. (See ATTP 3-90.15 for more detailed information on sensitive sites and other aspects of site exploitation.)

G-6. During an operation, the commander normally provides clear and precise criteria in a fragmentary order for identifying sensitive sites. Sensitive sites seldom fit neatly into categories, but some examples include—

- CBRN facilities.
- Locations that contain evidence of war crimes, such as mass graves, illegal detainment facilities, and clandestine mission command facilities.
- Terrorist training camps.
- Prisoner-of-war locations.
- Research and production facilities that involve breakthrough technologies.
- Government buildings and infrastructures of strategic value.
- Official government residences.
- Sites that are suspected of harboring enemy leaders or other highly sought-after persons.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO SITE EXPLOITATION

G-7. Requirements for military police support are generally based on the type of site, the duration of the exploitation mission, and anticipated AO conditions. Mission planners should coordinate and allocate support from military police and USACIDC agents as required. Examples of the many potential roles of military police and USACIDC agents in site exploitation operations include—

- Isolating and securing the site by establishing a restricted perimeter, providing access control, and preventing evidence destruction.
- Conducting exploited site searches, evidence collection, and management activities, to include establishing the proper chain of custody for material collected at the site. (Establishing a proper chain of custody for evidentiary purposes will be required if the material is expected to be used in legal proceedings.)
- Conducting the initial assessment of suspected mass graves, torture chambers, and war crimes sites. (An additional follow-on task in coordination with the USACIDC may entail further investigation of these sites.)
- Segregating and processing personnel who are encountered at the site and evaluating them for possible detention and interrogation. (When criminal prosecution is expected, military police or USACIDC agents may be required to interview suspects or collect witness statements.)
- Processing captured documents and equipment.
- Conducting PIO through the collection of police information, police engagement, and biometrics. (Military police may also provide applicable police information and intelligence regarding facilities, security, emergency response personnel and organizations, and key personnel in the area.)
- Conducting crowd control and civil disturbance operations.
- Providing MWD support for explosives detection and security.

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Appendix H

Military Working Dogs

Combining a trained MWD with its trained military police handler establishes a single MWD team. The combined training and natural canine abilities make the MWD team an enabler to military police missions. Based on their training and certifications, single-purpose and dual-purpose canines can support military police functions during combat operations. MWDs are employed in support of unified land operations for searching operations, detecting and warning about explosive devices, deterring hostile activity from potential aggressors, and controlling and securing hostile targets. This appendix addresses the types of operations and capabilities of MWDs.

MILITARY WORKING DOGS IN SUPPORT OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

H-1. MWD teams support unified land operations as described in ADP 3-0 and as outlined below according to ATP 3-39.34. A significant advantage of the MWD is the nonlethal response that it offers a commander. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy targets principally through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapon employment denotes something other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning.

OFFENSE

H-2. During offensive tasks, MWD teams—

- Assist in identifying residual hazards to friendly forces.
- Search and secure seized or captured enemy resources and equipment.
- Preclude the use of enemy resources and equipment by irregular or criminal elements.

DEFENSE

H-3. During defensive tasks, MWD teams are employed with security forces and are integrated or layered with other sensors to identify threats, provide early warnings, and cover gaps in defensive cover or among defensive positions. During mobile defensive operations, MWD teams assist in clearing routes and roadway hazards.

STABILITY

H-4. Stability tasks offer numerous opportunities for the MWD team to be employed as an enabler. MWD teams may be used for—

- Traffic or access control points to detect, deter, and prevent the illicit movement of people or materials.
- Border control points to detect human trafficking, narcotics, explosives, and illicit black market items.
- Civil control missions or to support governance and an election process.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

H-5. During defense support of civil authorities support missions, an MWD team provides support to local, state, and federal LE agencies; the Department of State; and the U.S. Secret Service. MWD teams provide support to control U.S. borders during counterdrug operations and in authorized LE counterdrug operations.

TYPES

H-6. The U.S. Army classifies MWDs as single- or dual-purpose. A single-purpose MWD is trained on one specialized task and is tasked accordingly. A dual-purpose MWD is trained to perform several complex tasks.

SINGLE-PURPOSE

H-7. The primary advantage of the single-purpose MWD team is that it generally has one specific task to perform and excels at that task when properly selected and trained. Likewise, the handler of a single-purpose MWD concentrates on one training discipline rather than on several and can refine team skills through deliberate and focused training. The types and capabilities of single-purpose MWDs are detailed below.

Human Remains Dog

H-8. The human remains dog searches for human remains, from recently deceased through all stages of decomposition, including disarticulated and skeletal remains. Handlers must be familiar with crime scene protocols, evidentiary procedures, and court testimonies because the human remains dog typically works at crime scenes. During tracking, the human remains dog team requires a dismounted patrol to act as a security element. Veterinary support must be available throughout deployment.

Combat Tracker Dog

H-9. The combat tracker dog searches for an enemy by tracking the scent from a footprint or blood trail at an incident, point of origin, or OP. A combat tracker dog cannot locate explosives or narcotics, but it can track over most surfaces (depending on the weather and the age of the tracks) to link an object to a person. The combat tracker dog team can detect enemy personnel from known locations, such as IED trigger points, sniper sites, ambush sites, or OPs. The team can also assist in locating missing, lost, or captured friendly personnel. The combat tracker dog team works within the range or cover of electronic control measures. During tracking, it requires a dismounted patrol to act as a security element. Veterinary support must be available throughout the deployment.

Mine Detection Dog

H-10. The mine detection dog detects and warns the handler of land mines, UXOs, and other explosive devices. Mine detection dog teams conduct searches for theater and land mines and explosive substances. They perform searches to reduce areas that need to be manually cleared of land mines. Mine detection dog teams are not to be used to investigate suspected UXO. Units that are being supported by mine detection dog teams supply logistics, administrative, and operational support.

Specialized Search Dog

H-11. The specialized search dog searches for firearms, ammunition, and explosives in buildings, vehicles, and open areas and along roads or railways. This type of MWD can only have one handler and must be trained to find the types of explosives that it may encounter.

H-12. Specialized search dog teams can conduct venue searches before the arrival of a very important person. During searches, the specialized search dog team works within the range of electronic countermeasures. Searches are conducted at safe distances to avoid setting off booby traps.

H-13. Designated elements must search for obvious IEDs before a specialized search dog team conducts a search in a vacant or derelict building. Units that are being supported by the specialized search dog team supply logistics, administrative, and operational support.

Patrol Dog

H-14. A patrol dog detects, locates, chases, attacks, and subdues a fleeing person by using the bite-and-hold technique. The handler controls the aggression level of the MWD. The patrol dog team supports perimeter security, intrusion detection system augmentation, quick-response forces, LPs, combat patrols, tactical patrols, internment/resettlement operations, crowd control, access control points, building and area searches, and LE activities (the apprehension of subjects, walking patrols, alarm responses, parking lot security).

DUAL-PURPOSE

H-15. The types and capabilities of a dual-purpose MWD consist of the following:

- **Patrol explosive detection dog.** In addition to patrol capabilities, the patrol explosive detection dog can be employed day or night to search for explosives in buildings, vehicles, roads or open areas, and personal household possessions.
- **Patrol drug detection dog.** In addition to patrol capabilities, the patrol drug detection dog can be employed day or night to search for narcotics in buildings, vehicles, roads or open areas, and personal household possessions.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

H-16. MWD capabilities vary based on the level of experience, training, and relationship of the MWD team. Supported units should understand MWD capabilities based on the—

- Odors that the MWD is trained to detect.
- Endurance level and how long the MWD will work.
- Previous missions that the MWD team has completed.
- Ability of the MWD to work off leash.
- Past aggressiveness of the MWD toward Soldiers.
- Past aggressiveness of the MWD toward civilians.
- Ability of the MWD to travel in vehicles or helicopters.
- Ability of the MWD to work at night.
- Maximum effective distance that the MWD can work off leash.
- Action that the MWD takes upon finding a suspected target.
- Medical condition of the MWD.
- Amount of food and water that the MWD consumes.
- Reaction of the MWD to gunfire.
- Method in which the MWD is rewarded.
- Expectations if the MWD handler is wounded or killed.
- Theater-specific medical evacuation procedures for the MWD or MWD team.
- Security team support and placement of the team.
- Presence of hazmat, its locations, and its uses.

LIMITATIONS

H-17. The disadvantages of an MWD team include the necessary focus that the handler must have over the MWD; therefore, the handler is less able to act independent of the canine. MWD handlers must maintain appropriate proximity to the MWD to exercise control through hand signals, voice commands, and physical restraints. Additional security may also be needed to support an MWD team during operations.

H-18. An MWD team is not often a stand-alone system for conducting search operations; therefore, it should be used in conjunction with other equipment and methods. Other disadvantages include the possibility of the MWD—

- Accidentally activating an enemy booby trap or explosive device while conducting a search.
- Being reluctant to negotiate terrain or areas that appear physically harmful or unstable, such as rubble or broken glass.

- Becoming distracted by items, such as trash, excrement, and stray or feral animals.
- Becoming injured if it fights with feral animals.

H-19. Additional factors that may affect the performance of an MWD include the following:

- MWDs are trained to identify specific types and quantities of odors and require continuous training to maintain proficiency and reliability.
- MWDs that are not properly socialized may be more naturally inclined to bite when placed in close proximity to other Soldiers or civilians.
- MWDs are not typically trained to search people.
- MWDs do not perform cover and concealment well with people other than their handlers.
- MWDs may bark at inconvenient times.
- MWDs may become aggressive and protective if handlers are seriously wounded or killed. This is especially true of police dogs.
- MWDs work best when they are placed to take advantage of odors that are carried on the wind. During light to moderate wind conditions, the MWD still has the ability to detect odors. MWDs typically have to be closer to the scent source to locate it. During unfavorable wind conditions, the MWD can still detect personnel by sound and sight.
- Precipitation can reduce the ability of the MWD to use its senses. Visibility is reduced by movements, obscurants, sandstorms (which can be mitigated with the use of dog goggles), dense undergrowth, heavily wooded areas, and jungle growth.
- Extreme weather conditions may reduce MWD performance. Temperature and humidity also impact MWD efficiency. Low humidity quickly disperses scent patterns, and high temperatures and high humidity cause fatigue in MWDs and limit top efficiency to short periods at a time.

H-20. An MWD is typically trained to respond to the specific commands of a designated handler. The MWD cannot be quickly or easily transferred to another handler without significant degradation of technical performance if the designated handler is seriously injured or killed.

H-21. MWDs may become distracted by excessive noise and by other animals that may be in the immediate search vicinity. MWD team training requires the frequent use of narcotic, explosive, and mine training aids. These training aids are potential safety hazards and risks. Rough terrain or extreme temperatures may injure the MWD's paws if preventive care is not maintained.

H-22. There are environmental situations that can severely affect or restrict the use of MWDs. The employment of MWDs in an area near petroleum, oil, and lubricants must be limited and brief. Furthermore, MWDs must have a balance between search-work-rest ratios.

H-23. MWD handlers may face significant cultural aversion to the MWD when deployed outside the United States. (See ATP 3-39.34 for additional information.) MWD handlers should anticipate and be sensitive to the following cultural perceptions or biases toward MWDs:

- Deep-rooted fears and phobias of dogs are common in many cultures.
- Dogs may be considered to be impure in some cultures.
- Dogs may be prohibited from entering human dwellings.

H-24. MWD handlers should be aware of the significant coercive power that they wield when working an MWD among a population. They need to consider the effect of this perceived power and carefully exercise it. This is true, regardless of where an operation is being conducted, but it is especially true when the operation is conducted in close proximity to detainees or civilians.

Appendix I

Orders and Reports

Orders and reports are formal methods that are used by leaders to communicate essential information. Orders define who, what, when, where, why, and how a unit will support a specific mission. Reports are intended to succinctly explain the result or impact that is achieved from performing the mission. This appendix discusses the three types of orders (warning, operation, and fragmentary) and provides information on selected operation and intelligence reports of value to military police leaders.

ORDERS

I-1. Under mission command, commanders direct with mission orders. Mission orders emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained (not how they are to achieve them) and provide maximum freedom of action in determining how to best accomplish assigned missions. Effective mission orders communicate to subordinates the situation, the commander's mission and intent, and the important tasks of each unit. The commander's intent and concept of operations set guidelines that ensure unity of effort while allowing subordinate leaders to exercise initiative.

I-2. Orders are issued verbally and in writing with detailed graphic overlays. The standard five-paragraph format is associated with a written order. Orders are updated or changed as subordinate Soldiers and units provide timely reports about their experiences during the performance of their missions.

WARNING ORDERS

I-3. An Army warning order serves to alert or warn a unit or Soldier about an upcoming mission. It can be verbal or written and should be concise and as detailed as possible to maximize mission preparation time. Figure I-1, page I-2, shows an annotated warning order format. The initial warning order includes the type of operation, general location, and initial timeline. The initial warning order and subsequent warning orders that provide additional details serve to notify or update subordinate leaders for the upcoming mission to ensure that Soldiers, vehicles, and equipment are ready after the OPORD is finalized by the staff and approved by the commander.

OPERATION ORDER

I-4. The OPORD is the formalized directive from the commander that defines the mission for the company, platoon, squad, or Soldier. It directs how the company, platoon, or squad will support the mission. Figure I-2, page I-3, provides an example of the OPORD format.

[CLASSIFICATION] (Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)	Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number
WARNING ORDER [number] References: Refer to higher headquarters OPORD, and identify map sheets for operation (optional). Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: (Optional). Task Organization: (Optional). 1. <u>Situation.</u> The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs: a. <u>Area of Interest.</u> Describe significant changes to the area of interest. b. <u>Area of Operations.</u> Describe significant changes to the area of operations. c. <u>Enemy Forces.</u> Include significant changes to enemy composition, disposition, and courses of action. Information not available may be included in subsequent WARNOs. d. <u>Friendly Forces.</u> Address only if essential to the WARNO. e. <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations.</u> Address only if essential to the WARNO. f. <u>Civil Considerations.</u> Address only if essential to the WARNO. g. <u>Attachments and Detachments.</u> Provide initial task organization. h. <u>Assumptions.</u> List significant assumptions for order development. 2. <u>Mission.</u> State the issuing headquarters mission. 3. <u>Execution.</u> a. <u>Initial Commander's Intent.</u> Provide brief commander's intent statement. b. <u>Concept of Operations.</u> This may be "to be determined" for an initial WARNO. c. <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units.</u> Include known tasks at the time of issuance of the WARNO. d. <u>Coordinating Instructions.</u> List only instructions and tasks applicable to two or more units not covered in unit SOPs. 4. <u>Sustainment.</u> Include known logistics, personnel, or Army health system preparation tasks. 5. <u>Command and Signal.</u> Include changes to the existing order, or state "no change." ACKNOWLEDGE: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the OPLAN or OPORD by addressees. The word "acknowledge" may suffice. Refer to the message reference number if necessary. Acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]	

Figure I-1. Warning order format

[CLASSIFICATION]	
OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position]	
ANNEXES: DISTRIBUTION:	
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]	
Legend: OPORD operation order SOP standard operating procedure WARNO warning order	

Figure I-1. Warning order format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]	
Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD. Place the classification marking TS, S, or C in parentheses at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.	
Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number	
The first line of the heading is the copy number that is assigned by the issuing headquarters. Maintain a log of specific copies issued to addressees. The second line is the official designation of the issuing headquarters (for example, 1st Infantry Division). The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designation, or geographic location. The fourth line is the date or date-time group that the plan or order was signed or issued and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in the coordinating instructions. The fifth line is a headquarters internal control number assigned to all plans and orders according to unit SOPs.	
OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]	
Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any.	
References: List documents that are essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.	
(a) List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale. (b) List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.	
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]	

Figure I-2. OPORD format

[CLASSIFICATION] OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: State the time zone used in the area of operations during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use ZULU time. Task Organization: Describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and their command and support relationships. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) if long or complicated. 1. Situation. The situation paragraph describes the conditions of the operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs: a. <u>Area of Interest.</u> Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. b. <u>Area of Operations.</u> Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references; for example, "Map, reference (b)." Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) as required. (1) <u>Terrain.</u> Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (2) <u>Weather.</u> Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (Place the classification and title of the OPLAN or OPORD and the issuing headquarters at the top of the second and any subsequent pages of the base plan or order.) c. <u>Enemy Forces.</u> Identify enemy forces, and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the enemy's disposition, location, strength, and probable COA. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and adversaries within the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. d. <u>Friendly Forces.</u> Briefly identify the missions of friendly forces and the objectives, goals, and missions of civilian organizations that impact the issuing headquarters in the following subparagraphs: (1) <u>Higher Headquarters Mission and Intent.</u> Identify and state the mission and commander's intent for headquarters two levels up and one level up from the issuing headquarters. (a) <u>Higher Headquarters Two Levels Up.</u> Identify the higher headquarters two levels up the paragraph heading (for example, Joint Task Force-18). 1. Mission. 2. Commander's intent. (b) <u>Higher Headquarters.</u> Identify the higher headquarters one level up in the paragraph heading (for example, 1st U.S. Armored Division). 1. Mission. 2. Commander's intent. (2) <u>Missions of Adjacent Units.</u> Identify and state the missions of adjacent units and other units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters. e. <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations.</u> Identify and state the objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-DOD organizations that have a significant role within the AO. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required. f. <u>Civil Considerations.</u> Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact operations. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. g. <u>Attachments and Detachments.</u> List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order, on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPLAN or OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A. h. <u>Assumptions.</u> List assumptions used in the development of the OPLAN or OPORD. 2. Mission. State the unit mission—a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION] OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] 3. Execution. Describe how the commander intends to accomplish the mission in terms of the commander's intent, an overarching concept of operations, schemes of employment for each warfighting function, assessment, specified tasks to subordinate units, and key coordinating instructions in the subparagraphs below. a. <u>Commander's Intent.</u> Commanders develop their intent statement personally. The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions that the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations which represent the desired end state. It succinctly describes what constitutes the success of an operation and provides the purpose and conditions that define the desired end state. The commander's intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by two echelons. b. <u>Concept of Operations.</u> The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions that the force will use to achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement each other. Normally, the concept of operations projects the status of the force at the end of the operation. If the mission dictates a significant change in tasks during operations, the commander may phase the operation. The concept of operations may be a single paragraph, divided into two or more subparagraphs, or, if unusually lengthy, it may be summarized here with details located in Annex C (Operations). If the concept of operations is phased, describe each phase in a subparagraph. Label these subparagraphs as "Phase" followed by the appropriate Roman numeral. For example, "Phase I." If the operation is phased, all paragraphs and subparagraphs of the base order and annexes must mirror the phasing established in the concept of operations. The operation overlay and graphic depictions of lines of effort help portray the concept of operations and are located in Annex C (Operations). c. <u>Scheme of Movement and Maneuver.</u> Describe the employment of maneuver units according to the concept of operations. Provide the primary tasks of maneuver units that conduct the decisive operation and the purpose of each. Next, state the primary tasks of maneuver units that conduct shaping operations (including security operations) and the purpose of each. For offensive operations, identify the form of maneuver. For defensive operations, identify the type of defense. For stability operations, describe the role of maneuver units by primary stability tasks. If the operation is phased, identify the main effort by phase. Identify and include the priorities for the reserve. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required. (1) <u>Scheme of Mobility/Counter mobility.</u> State the scheme of mobility/counter mobility, including priorities by unit or area. Refer to Annex G (Engineer) as required. (2) <u>Scheme of Battlefield Obscuration.</u> State the scheme of battlefield obscuration, including priorities by unit or area. Refer to appendix 9 (Battlefield Obscuration) to Annex C (Operations) as required. (3) <u>Scheme of Reconnaissance and Surveillance.</u> Describe how the commander intends to use reconnaissance and surveillance to support the concept of operations. Include the primary reconnaissance objectives. Refer to Annex L (Reconnaissance and Surveillance) as required. (Note: Army forces do not conduct reconnaissance and surveillance within the United States and its territories. For domestic operations, this paragraph is titled "Information Awareness and Assessment", and the contents of this paragraph comply with Executive Order 12333.) d. <u>Scheme of Intelligence.</u> Describe how the commander envisions intelligence that supports the concept of operations. Include the priority of effort to situation development, targeting, and assessment. State the priority of intelligence support to units and areas. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. e. <u>Scheme of Fires.</u> Describe how the commander intends to use fires to support the concept of operations, with an emphasis on the scheme of maneuver. State the fire support tasks and the purpose of each task. State the priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions on fires. Refer to Annex D (Fires) as required. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION] OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] f. <u>Scheme of Protection</u>. Describe how the commander envisions protection that supports the concept of operations. Include the priorities of protection by unit and area. Include survivability. Address the scheme of operational area security, including security for routes, bases, and critical infrastructure. Identify tactical combat and other reaction forces. Use subparagraphs for protection categories (for example, air and missile defense and explosive ordnance disposal) based on the situation. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required. g. <u>Cyber Electromagnetic Activities</u>. Describe how cyber electromagnetic activities (including cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum management operations) support the concept of operations. Refer to appendix 12 (Cyber Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) as required. Refer to Annex H (Signal) for defensive cyberspace operations, network operations, and spectrum management operations as required. h. <u>Stability Tasks</u>. Describe how the commander envisions the conduct of stability tasks in coordination with other organizations through primary stability tasks. (See ADRP 3-07 for additional information.) If other organizations or the HN are unable to provide for civil security, essential services restoration, and civil control, commanders with an assigned AO must do so with available resources, request additional resources, or request relief for these requirements from higher headquarters. Commanders assign specific responsibilities for stability tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3j (Tasks to Subordinate Units) and paragraph 3k (Coordinating Instructions). Refer to Annex C (Operations) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. i. <u>Assessment</u>. Describe the priorities for assessment, and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required. j. <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>. State the task assigned to each unit that reports directly to the headquarters who issues the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3k (Coordinating Instructions). k. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. List only the instructions and tasks that are applicable to two or more units not covered in unit SOPs. (1) <u>Time or Condition When the OPORD Becomes Effective</u>. List the time or condition when the OPORD becomes effective. (2) <u>Commander's Critical Information Requirements</u>. List the commander's critical information requirements. (3) <u>Essential Elements of Friendly Information</u>. List EEFI's. (4) <u>Fire Support Coordination Measures</u>. List critical fire support coordination or control measures. (5) <u>Airspace Coordinating Measures</u>. List critical airspace coordinating or control measures. (6) <u>Rules of Engagement</u>. List the rules of engagement. Refer to appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required. (Note. For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph "Rules for the Use of Force"). (7) <u>Risk Reduction Control Measures</u>. State the measures that are specific to this operation but are not included in unit SOPs. This may include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria, and fratricide avoidance measures. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required. (8) <u>Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures</u>. Refer to appendix 2 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) as required. (9) <u>Environmental Considerations</u>. Refer to appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to Annex G (Engineer) as required. (10) <u>Themes and Messages</u>. List information themes and messages. (11) <u>Other Coordinating Instructions</u>. List in subparagraphs any additional coordinating instructions and tasks that apply to two or more units, such as the operational timeline and other critical timing or events. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION] OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] 4. <u>Sustainment.</u> Describe the concept of sustainment, including priorities of sustainment by unit or area. Include instructions for administrative movements, deployments, and transportation or references to applicable appendixes, if appropriate. Use the following subparagraphs to provide the broad concept of support for logistics, personnel, and Army health system support. Provide detailed instructions for each sustainment subfunction in the appendixes to Annex F (Sustainment) listed in Table E-2. a. <u>Logistics.</u> Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. b. <u>Personnel.</u> Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. c. <u>Army Health System Support.</u> Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. 5. <u>Command and Signal.</u> a. <u>Command.</u> (1) <u>Location of Commander and Key Leaders.</u> State where the commander intends to be during the operation. State it by phase if the operation is phased. (2) <u>Succession of Command.</u> State the succession of command if it is not covered in unit SOPs. (3) <u>Liaison Requirements.</u> State liaison requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. <u>Control.</u> (1) <u>Command Posts.</u> Describe the employment of CPs, including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific tasks or phases of the operation (for example, "Division tactical command post will control the air assault"). (2) <u>Reports.</u> List reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. c. <u>Signal.</u> Describe the concept of signal support, including the location and movement of key signal nodes and critical electromagnetic spectrum considerations throughout the operation. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the OPLAN or OPORD by addressees. The word "acknowledge" may suffice. Refer to the message reference number if necessary. The acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters files. OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position] Use only if the commander does not sign the original order. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION] OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]																															
ANNEXES: List annexes by letter and title. Army and joint OPLANs or OPORDs do not use Annexes I and O as attachments, so they label them as “Not Used.” In Army orders. Annexes T, W, X, and Y are available for use in Army OPLANs or OPORDs and are labeled as “Spare.” When an attachment required by doctrine or an SOP is unnecessary, label it “Omitted.”																															
Annex A—Task Organization Annex B—Intelligence Annex C—Operations Annex D—Fires Annex E—Protection Annex F—Sustainment Annex G—Engineer Annex H—Signal Annex I—Not Used Annex J—Public Affairs Annex K—Civil Affairs Operations Annex L—Reconnaissance and Surveillance Annex M—Assessment	Annex N—Space Operations Annex O—Not Used Annex P—HN Support Annex Q—Spare Annex R—Reports Annex S—Special Technical Operations Annex T—Spare Annex U—Inspector General Annex V—Interagency Coordination Annex W—Spare Annex X—Spare Annex Y—Spare Annex Z—Distribution																														
DISTRIBUTION: Furnish distribution copies for action or for information. List, in detail, those who are to receive the plan or order. Refer to Annex Z (Distribution) if lengthy.																															
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]																															
Legend: <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr><td style="width: 150px;">ADRP</td><td>Army doctrine reference publication</td></tr> <tr><td>AO</td><td>area of operations</td></tr> <tr><td>AR</td><td>Army regulation</td></tr> <tr><td>C</td><td>confidential</td></tr> <tr><td>COA</td><td>course of action</td></tr> <tr><td>CP</td><td>command post</td></tr> <tr><td>DOD</td><td>Department of Defense</td></tr> <tr><td>EEFI</td><td>essential elements of friendly information</td></tr> <tr><td>HN</td><td>host nation</td></tr> <tr><td>OPLAN</td><td>operation plan</td></tr> <tr><td>OPORD</td><td>operation order</td></tr> <tr><td>S</td><td>secret</td></tr> <tr><td>SOP</td><td>standard operating procedure</td></tr> <tr><td>TS</td><td>top secret</td></tr> <tr><td>ZULU</td><td>time zone indicator for Universal Time Source</td></tr> </table>		ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication	AO	area of operations	AR	Army regulation	C	confidential	COA	course of action	CP	command post	DOD	Department of Defense	EEFI	essential elements of friendly information	HN	host nation	OPLAN	operation plan	OPORD	operation order	S	secret	SOP	standard operating procedure	TS	top secret	ZULU	time zone indicator for Universal Time Source
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SOP	standard operating procedure																														
TS	top secret																														
ZULU	time zone indicator for Universal Time Source																														

Figure I-2. OPORD format (continued)

Operation Order Attachments

I-5. Attachments (annexes, appendixes, tabs, exhibits) help simplify orders by providing a structure for organizing information. Using attachments increases the base order clarity and usefulness by highlighting specific information, administrative support details, and instructions that expand on the base order. Table I-1 lists the annexes, their associated appendixes, and the staff officers who are responsible for developing each attachment.

Table I-1. List of OPORD attachments and responsible staff officers

<i>Annex A – Task Organization (G-5 Or G-3 [S-3])</i>	
<i>Annex B – Intelligence (G-2 [S-2])</i>	
Appendix 1	Intelligence Estimate
Appendix 2	Counterintelligence
Appendix 3	Signals Intelligence
Appendix 4	Human Intelligence
Appendix 5	Geospatial Intelligence
Appendix 6	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Appendix 7	Open Source Intelligence
<i>Annex C – Operations (G-5 or G-3 [S-3])</i>	
Appendix 1	Army Design Methodology Products
Appendix 2	Operation Overlay
Appendix 3	Decision Support Products
Appendix 4	Gap-Crossing Operations
Appendix 5	Air Assault Operations
Appendix 6	Airborne Operations
Appendix 7	Amphibious Operations
Appendix 8	Special Operations (G-3 [S-3])
Appendix 9	Battlefield Obscuration (CBRN Officer)
Appendix 10	Airspace Control (G-3 [S-3] or Airspace Command and Control Officer)
Appendix 11	Rules of Engagement (Staff Judge Advocate)
Appendix 12	Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (Electronic Warfare Officer)
Appendix 13	Military Information Support Operations (Military Information Support Officer)
Appendix 14	Military Deception (Military Deception Officer)
Appendix 15	Information Operations (Information Operations Officer)

Table I-1. List of OPORD attachments and responsible staff officers (continued)

<i>Annex D – Fires (Chief of Fires/Fire Support Officer)</i>	
Appendix 1	Fire Support Overlay
Appendix 2	Fire Support Execution Matrix
Appendix 3	Targeting
Appendix 4	Field Artillery Support
Appendix 5	Air Support
Appendix 6	Naval Fire Support
Appendix 7	Air and Missile Defense (Air and Missile Defense Officer)
<i>Annex E – Protection (Chief of Protection/Protection Coordinator as Designated by the Commander)</i>	
Appendix 1	Operational Area Security (Provost Marshal)
Appendix 2	Safety (Safety Officer)
Appendix 3	Operations Security (Operations Security Officer)
Appendix 4	Intelligence Support to Protection
Appendix 5	Physical Security (Provost Marshal)
Appendix 6	Antiterrorism (Antiterrorism Officer)
Appendix 7	Police Operations (Provost Marshal)
Appendix 8	Survivability Operations
Appendix 9	Force Health Protection (Surgeon)
Appendix 10	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (CBRN Officer)
Appendix 11	Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD Officer)
Appendix 12	Air and Missile Defense (Air Defense Officer)
Appendix 13	Personnel Recovery (Personnel Recovery Officer)
Appendix 14	Detainee and Resettlement (Provost Marshal)
<i>Annex F – Sustainment (Chief of Sustainment [S-4])</i>	
Appendix 1	Logistics (G-4 [S-4])
Appendix 2	Personnel Services Support (G-1 [S-1])
Appendix 3	Health Service Support (Surgeon)

Table I-1. List of OPORD attachments and responsible staff officers (continued)

<i>Annex G – Engineer</i>	
Appendix 1	Mobility/Counter mobility
Appendix 2	Survivability
Appendix 3	General Engineering
Appendix 4	Geospatial Engineering
Appendix 5	Environmental Considerations
<i>Annex H – Signal (G-6 [S-6])</i>	
Appendix 1	Defensive Cyberspace Operations
Appendix 2	Information Network Operations
Appendix 3	Voice, Video, and Data Network Diagrams
Appendix 4	Satellite Communications
Appendix 5	Foreign Data Exchanges
Appendix 6	Spectrum Management Operations
Appendix 7	Information Services
<i>Annex I – Not Used</i>	
<i>Annex J – Public Affairs</i>	
Appendix 1	Public Affairs Running Estimate
Appendix 2	Public Affairs Guidance
<i>Annex K – Civil Affairs Operations (G-9 [S-9])</i>	
Appendix 1	Execution Matrix
Appendix 2	Population and Resources Control Plan
Appendix 3	Civil Information Management Plan
<i>Annex L – Information Collection (G-2 [S-2])</i>	
Appendix 1	Information Collection Plan
Appendix 2	Information Collection Overlay
<i>Annex M – Assessment (G-5 [S-5] or G-3 [S-3])</i>	
Appendix 1	Nesting of Assessment Efforts
Appendix 2	Assessment Framework
Appendix 3	Assessment Working Group
<i>Annex N – Space Operations (Space Operations Officer)</i>	

Table I-1. List of OPORD attachments and responsible staff officers (continued)

<i>Annex O – Not Used</i>	
<i>Annex P – Host-Nation Support (G-4 [S-4])</i>	
<i>Annex Q – Knowledge Management</i>	
Appendix 1	Knowledge Management Decision Support Matrix
Appendix 2	Common Operational Picture Configuration Matrix
Appendix 3	Mission Command Information Systems Integration Matrix
Appendix 4	Content Management
Appendix 5	Battle Rhythm
<i>Annex R – Reports (G-3 [S-3])</i>	
<i>Annex S – Special Technical Operations</i>	
Appendix 1	Special Technical Operations Capabilities Integration Matrix
Appendix 2	Functional Area I Program and Objectives
Appendix 3	Functional Area II Program and Objectives
<i>Annex T – Spare</i>	
<i>Annex U – Inspector General</i>	
<i>Annex V – Interagency Coordination (G-3 [S-3])</i>	
<i>Annex W – Operational Contract Support (G-4 [S-4])</i>	
<i>Annex X/Y – Spare</i>	
<i>Annex Z – Distribution (G-3 [S-3] and Knowledge Management Officer)</i>	
Legend: CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear EOD explosive ordnance disposal G1 assistant chief of staff, personnel G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans G-6 assistant chief of staff, signal G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations S-1 personnel staff officer S-2 intelligence staff officer S-3 operations staff officer S-4 logistics staff officer S-5 plans staff officer S-6 signal staff officer S-9 civil affairs operations staff officer	

Attachments of Special Interest to Military Police

I-6. Physical security measures that support the base order are outlined in appendix 5 to annex E. (See figure I-3 for a sample format for this attachment.)

[CLASSIFICATION]
Follow classification marking guidance as described in AR 380-5.
Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.
APPENDIX 5 (PHYSICAL SECURITY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
References: List the documents that are essential to understanding the attachment. a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale. b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.
Note. Doctrinal references for this attachment include ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.11, ATP 3-39.20, ATP 3-39.32, ATP 3-39.34, ATP 3-39.35, and FM 3-39.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.
1. Situation. a. <u>Area of Interest</u>. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. b. <u>Area of Operations</u>. Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations). (1) <u>Terrain</u>. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (2) <u>Weather</u>. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. c. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). d. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. Refer to base order, Annex A (Task Organization), and Annex C (Operations). e. <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations</u>. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact physical security or the implementation of physical security procedures. f. <u>Civil Considerations</u>. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact physical security. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. View civil considerations through a physical security perspective by using operation and mission variables. g. <u>Attachments and Detachments</u>. If pertinent, list the units or assets that are attached to or are detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information that is already listed in Annex A (Task Organization). h. <u>Assumptions</u>. List the assumptions that are specific to physical security which support the appendix development.
2. Mission. Describe how physical security supports the commander's intent and protection. Discuss the physical security measures that should be employed to safeguard personnel to prevent unauthorized access to arms, ammunition, explosives, equipment, installations, materials, and documents. Also discuss measures to safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-3. Format for appendix 5 (physical security) to annex E (protection)

[CLASSIFICATION]
3. Execution. a. <u>Scheme of Physical Security</u>. The scheme of physical security is a statement of the overall physical security objective. Describe how physical security supports the commander's intent and the protection plan. Direct the manner in which each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the physical security requirements, and tie that to support of the operation with the task and purpose statement. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity. (1) <u>Protective Barriers</u>. Describe emplacement considerations of barriers and fencing (to form the perimeter of controlled areas) and vehicle barriers (to impede, channel, or stop vehicle traffic). (2) <u>Security Lighting</u>. Describe the emplacement consideration of security lighting in support of physical security. (3) <u>Electronic Security Systems</u>. Describe the emplacement considerations of interior and exterior electronic security systems. (4) <u>Access Control Points</u>. Describe the procedures for controlling access to equipment, bases and base camps, materials, and documents in support of physical security. (5) <u>Security Forces</u>. Identify the authority and jurisdiction of security forces and the type of security forces that are required. (6) <u>In-transit Forces</u>. Describe the risk management for deploying forces and the security procedures for in-port cargo and rail cargo protection. b. <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>. List the physical security tasks that are assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order. c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. List only the instructions that are applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight police operations-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations. 4. Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for physical security key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. 5. Command and Signal. a. <u>Command</u>. (1) <u>Location of the Commander</u>. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO. (2) <u>Liaison Requirements</u>. State the physical security liaison requirements that are not covered in SOPs. b. <u>Control</u>. (1) <u>Command Posts</u>. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing. (2) <u>Reports</u>. List police operations-specific reports that are not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. c. <u>Signal</u>. Address police operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if the attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarter files. DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-3. Format for appendix 5 (physical security) to annex E (protection) (continued)

Legend:

AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
ATP	Army techniques publication
FM	field manual
OPORD	operation order
SOP	standard operating procedure

Figure I-3. Format for appendix 5 (physical security) to annex E (protection) (continued)

I-7. Police operations that support the base order are outlined in appendix 7 to annex E. (See figure I-4 for a sample format for this attachment.)

[CLASSIFICATION] Follow classification marking guidance as described in AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment. APPENDIX 7 (POLICE OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPOD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] References: List the documents that are essential to understanding the attachment. a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale. b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. c. Doctrinal references for this attachment include: ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.11, ATP 3-39.12, ATP 3-39.20, ATP 3-39.32, ATP 3-39.34, ATP 3-39.35, FM 3-39, and FM 3-63. Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order. 1. Situation. a. <u>Area of Interest</u>. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. b. <u>Area of Operations</u>. Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations). (1) <u>Terrain</u>. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (2) <u>Weather</u>. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. c. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). d. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. Refer to the base order, Annex A (Task Organization), and Annex C (Operations). e. <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations</u>. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of police operations or the implementation of policing-specific equipment and tactics. f. <u>Civil Considerations</u>. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact police operations. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. View civil considerations through a policing perspective using operation and mission variables. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-4. Format for appendix 7 (police operations) (protection) to annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to, or detached from, the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List assumptions specific to police operations that support appendix development.

2. Mission. State the police operations mission in support of the operation (a short description of who, what [task], when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason why).

3. Execution.

a. Scheme of Police Operations. The scheme of police operations is a statement of the overall policing objective. Describe how policing operations support the commander's intent and the maneuver plan. Direct the manner in which each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the policing mission and tie that to the support of the operation with task and purpose statements. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity.

(1) Police Engagement. Refer to Tab A to appendix 12 to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(2) LE. Refer to Tab B to appendix 12 to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(3) PIO. Describe PIO support to police operations. Describe how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators collect, analyze, and disseminate police information and police intelligence on infrastructure, systems, populations, and individuals gathered from a policing viewpoint while conducting police operations. Direct the manner in which police information is collected through the execution of PIO, disseminated throughout the military police community, and pushed into Army intelligence through the operations process. This ensures a continuous flow of police information and intelligence into the operations process to ensure the development of a common operational picture for commanders and staffs.

(4) HN Police Support. Describe HN police support to police operations. If required, direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators may be required to initially perform police duties to establish or maintain a secure environment. If required, direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators will provide police development and transition teams to train HN police personnel in basic and advanced LE skills, investigations, police station operations, traffic management, and senior police leader skills. Identify other LE agencies in the AO and their relationship with military police and U.S. Army criminal investigations.

(5) Traffic Management and Enforcement. Describe traffic management and enforcement support to police operations. Direct how military police will support and preserve the commander's freedom of movement and enhance the movement of friendly resources in all environments. Traffic-related tasks required for effective traffic control may include developing a traffic regulation and enforcement plan, conducting enforcement of main supply route regulation, establishing traffic control post and checkpoints, providing straggler movement control, controlling the movement of displaced civilians, and conducting populace and resource control.

(6) Evidence Collection and Forensics Analysis Support. Describe evidence collection and forensics support to police operations and site exploitation. Direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators provide evidence collection and forensics analysis support to LE activities, criminal investigations, and site exploitations and how they support analyses for targeting in contingency operations.

(7) Customs Support. Describe customs support to police operations. Direct how military police will support U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Agriculture, other federal agencies, joint staffs, and commanders who enforce the laws and regulations of the United States concerning customs, agriculture, and immigration border clearances.

(8) Assessment. If required, describe the priorities for the assessment of police operations, and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required. Perform assessments of police and prison structures, organized criminal elements, legal systems, investigations and interviews, crime-conducive conditions, and enforcement gaps and mechanisms.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-4. Format for appendix 7 (police operations) to annex E (protection) (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION] b. <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>. List policing tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order. c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight police operations-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations. 4. <u>Sustainment</u>. Identify priorities of sustainment for policing operations key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. 5. <u>Command and Signal</u>. a. <u>Command</u>. (1) <u>Location of Commander</u>. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO. (2) <u>Liaison Requirements</u>. State the police operations liaison requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. <u>Control</u>. (1) <u>Command Posts</u>. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing. (2) <u>Reports</u>. List police operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. c. <u>Signal</u>. Address police operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if the attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarter files. OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position] Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block. TABS: List the lower-level attachment (for example, tabs and exhibits). A—Police Engagement B—LE DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-4. Format for appendix 7 (police operations) to annex E (protection) (continued)

Legend:

AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
ATP	Army techniques publication
FM	field manual
HN	host nation
LE	law enforcement
OPORD	operation order
PIO	public information officer
SOP	standard operating procedure
U.S.	United States

Figure I-4. Format for appendix 7 (police operations) to annex E (protection) (continued)

I-8. Police engagement applications that support the base order are outlined in tab A to appendix 7 to annex E. (See figure I-5 for a sample format for this attachment.)

[CLASSIFICATION]

TAB A (POLICE ENGAGEMENT) TO APPENDIX 7 (POLICE OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION), OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

1. Situation.

- a. Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
- b. Area of Operations. Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).
 - (1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact police engagement. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
 - (2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact police engagement. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
- c. Enemy Forces. List known and templated locations and activities of enemy units for one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other area capabilities that will impact police engagement.
- d. Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters plan as it pertains to police engagement. List the designation, location, and outline of the plan of higher, adjacent, and other police engagement assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support.
- e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of police engagement.
- f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact police engagement. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. View civil considerations through a policing lens using the operation and mission variables.
- g. Attachments and Detachments. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization.
- h. Assumptions. List police engagement-specific assumptions.

2. Mission. State the police engagement mission in support of the policing mission with a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. Execution.

- a. Scheme of Police Engagement. The scheme of police engagement is a statement of the overall police engagement objective. Describe how police engagement supports police operations. Direct the manner in which military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators engage local, HN, and coalition police partners; police agencies; civil leaders; and local populations to pass and obtain critical information that can influence military operations or affect the AO. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity.

Figure I-5. Format for tab A (police engagement) to appendix 7 to annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

(1) Formal Police Engagement. Describe how formal police engagement supports the mission. Direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators conduct formal police engagement as part of deliberate information operations strategies to gain support or information or to convey a message to local, HN, coalition police partners, police agencies, civil leaders, and local populations.

(2) Informal Police Engagement. Describe how informal police engagement supports the mission. Direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators conduct informal police engagement.

(3) Establish Networks. Describe how the establishment of police networks supports police engagement. Direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators establish networks to enhance the exchange and collaboration of police information.

(4) Information Operations. State the overall concept for synchronizing police engagement with information operations.

(5) Assessment. If required, describe the priorities for assessment of police engagement, and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight police engagement-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

4. Sustainment. Describe sustainment support to police engagement as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment). At a minimum, address logistics, personnel services, religious support, and medical treatment to detained persons.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command.

(1) Location of Commander. State the location of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State mission-specific liaison requirements not covered in unit SOPs.

b. Control.

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing.

(2) Reports. List reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address mission-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]

[Commander's rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters files.

OFFICIAL:

[Authenticator's name]

[Authenticator's position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-5. Format for tab A (police engagement) to appendix 7 to annex E (continued)

Legend:

AO	area of operations
HN	host nation
OPORD	operation order
SOP	standard operating procedure
U.S.	United States

Figure I-5. Format for tab A (police engagement) to appendix 7 (continued)

I-9. LE activities that support the base order are outlined in tab B to appendix 7 to annex E. (See figure I-6 for a sample format for this attachment.)

[CLASSIFICATION] TAB B (LE) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX E, OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] 1. Situation. a. <u>Area of Interest</u>. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. b. <u>Area of Operations</u>. Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations). (1) <u>Terrain</u>. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact LE activities. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (2) <u>Weather</u>. Describe the aspects of weather that impact LE activities. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. c. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. List known and templated locations and activities of enemy units for one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other area capabilities that impact LE. d. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. Outline the higher headquarters plan as it pertains to LE. List the designation, location, and outline of the plan of higher, adjacent, and other LE assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support. e. <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations</u>. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of LE activities. f. <u>Civil Considerations</u>. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact LE activities. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. View civil considerations through a policing lens using the operational and mission variables. g. <u>Attachments and Detachments</u>. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. h. <u>Assumptions</u>. List LE-specific assumptions. 2. Mission. State the LE mission in support of the policing mission with a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. 3. Execution. a. <u>Scheme of LE</u>. The scheme of LE activities is a statement of the overall LE objective. Describe how LE supports police operations. Direct the manner in which military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators conduct LE activities in an effort to enforce laws and regulations within an AO. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity. (1) <u>Police Station Operations</u>. Describe how police station operations support LE activities. Direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators establish and conduct police station operations that provide the base for LE communications, planning, desk operations, patrol operations, investigations, employment of specialty capabilities, temporary detention of subjects, and logistics and administration support specific to LE operations. (2) <u>Detention Cell Operations</u>. Describe how detention cell operations support LE activities. Direct how military police conduct detention cell operations for the temporary holding of military or civilian subjects, subsequent to apprehension for an offense. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-6. Format for tab B (LE) to appendix 7

[CLASSIFICATION] (3) <u>Management of Police Information</u>. Describe how the management of police information supports LE activities. Direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators manage and report police information in support of LE operations. All Army LE personnel, including police intelligence analysts and associated staff, must understand the legal and regulatory requirements for handling and sharing LE information. (4) <u>LE Patrol Operations</u>. Describe how LE patrols support LE activities. Direct how military police conduct LE patrols to enforce laws, regulations, and other applicable directives; maintain order; apprehend offenders; protect personnel and resources; and obtain relevant information. If required, describe how military police conduct LE patrols in support of U.S. commanders and their assigned AOs or in support of efforts to establish and maintain law and order within an HN population. Military police LE patrols can also be crucial to restoring order and assisting in the transition from instability to normalcy. (5) <u>Traffic Management and Enforcement</u>. Describe how traffic management and enforcement support LE activities. Direct how military police conduct traffic enforcement, traffic studies, and traffic accident investigations to enforce laws and methods encompassed in executing traffic programs. (6) <u>Criminal Investigations</u>. Describe how criminal investigations support LE activities. Direct how military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators conduct criminal investigations in coordination with federal, state, local, and foreign LE agencies and how the investigation of crimes and offenses is conducted to support the commander's effort to protect personnel, resources, and critical assets. (7) <u>Forensics Support</u>. Refer to appendix 12 (Policing Operations) to Annex C (Operations) as required. (8) <u>Assessment</u>. If required, describe the priorities for assessment of LE activities and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required. b. <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>. List LE tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order. c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight LE-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations. 4. <u>Sustainment</u>. Describe sustainment support to LE as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment). At a minimum, address logistics, personnel services, religious support, and medical treatment to detainees. 5. <u>Command and Signal</u>. a. <u>Command</u>. (1) <u>Location of Commander</u>. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO. (2) <u>Liaison Requirements</u>. State the LE liaison requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. <u>Control</u>. (1) <u>Command Posts</u>. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing. (2) <u>Reports</u>. List LE area-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports). c. <u>Signal</u>. Address mission-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters files. OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position] [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-6. Format for tab B (LE) to appendix 7 (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]													
Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.													
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[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]													
Legend: <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 150px;">AO</td> <td>area of operations</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HN</td> <td>host nation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>LE</td> <td>law enforcement</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OPORD</td> <td>operation order</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SOP</td> <td>standard operating procedure</td> </tr> <tr> <td>U.S.</td> <td>United States</td> </tr> </table>		AO	area of operations	HN	host nation	LE	law enforcement	OPORD	operation order	SOP	standard operating procedure	U.S.	United States
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SOP	standard operating procedure												
U.S.	United States												

Figure I-6. Format for tab B (LE) to appendix 7 (continued)

I-10. Detention operations that support the base order are outlined in appendix 14 to annex E. (See figure I-7 for a sample format for this attachment.)

[CLASSIFICATION]	
Follow classification marking guidance as described AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.	
APPENDIX 14 (DETENTION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX E (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]	
References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment. a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale. b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. c. Doctrinal references for this attachment include FM 3-39 and FM 3-63. Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.	
1. Situation. a. <u>Area of Interest</u>. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. b. <u>Area of Operations</u>. Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations). (1) <u>Terrain</u>. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact detention operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (2) <u>Weather</u>. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact detention operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. c. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. List known and templated locations and activities of enemy units for one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other area capabilities that impact detention operations. State expected enemy COAs and employment of enemy assets. d. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. Outline the higher headquarters plan as it pertains to detention operations. List the designation, location, and outline of the plan of higher, adjacent, and other detention operations assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support.	
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]	

Figure I-7. Format for appendix 14 (detention operations) to annex E

[CLASSIFICATION] e. <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations</u>. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of detention operations. f. <u>Civil Considerations</u>. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact detention operations. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. View civil considerations through a policing lens using the operational and mission variable. g. <u>Attachments and Detachments</u>. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. h. <u>Assumptions</u>. List detention-specific assumptions that support the appendix development. 2. Mission. State the detention mission in support of the operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. 3. Execution. a. <u>Scheme of Detention Operations</u>. The scheme of detention operations is a statement of the overall detention objective of detainees and U.S. military prisoners. Describe how detention operations support the commander's intent and the maneuver plan. Direct the manner in which each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the detention mission and tie that to support of the operation with the task and purpose statement. The following subparagraphs further detail the scheme of detention operations: (1) <u>Detainee Operations</u>. Describe detainee operations support to detention operations. Direct how all individuals captured, interned, evacuated, or detained by U.S. armed forces are treated humanely and safeguarded. Also describe the range of actions taken by U.S. forces. Begin at the point of capture; continue through the movement to a DCP, detainee holding area, or fixed detention facility; and end with transfer, release, or repatriation. Direct the manner in which military police are responsible for receiving, securing, processing, and detaining detainees and for operating a DCP, detainee holding area, or fixed detention facility. At a minimum, address detainment authorizations, infrastructure requirements, security requirements, use-of-force requirements, safety and evacuation plans, medical and dental care procedures, sanitation requirements, intelligence and interrogation operations, strategic reporting requirements, legal support procedures, liaisons with external agencies, transportation requirements, public affairs, transfers, and transitions. (2) <u>Confinement of U.S. Military Prisoners</u>. Describe the support of the confinement of U.S. military prisoner in support to detention operations. If required, direct how military police may be required to operate a field detention facility or a field confinement facility to hold or confine U.S. military prisoners for short terms. At a minimum, address detainment authorizations, confinement orders, infrastructure requirements, security requirements, use-of-force requirements, safety and evacuation plans, medical and dental care procedures, sanitation requirements, and legal support procedures. (3) <u>HN Corrections Reform</u>. Describe HN corrections reform support to detention operations. If required, direct how military police provide corrections reform to train HN police/corrections personnel in basic and advanced detention and corrections duties, from guard force to senior administrative personnel. b. <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>. List detention operations tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order. c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight detention operations-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations. 4. Sustainment. Describe sustainment support to detention operations as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment). At a minimum, address logistics, personnel services, religious support requirements, and medical treatment procedures to detained persons. 5. Command and Signal. a. <u>Command</u>. (1) <u>Location of Commander</u>. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO. (2) <u>Liaison Requirements</u>. State detention operations liaison requirements not covered in unit SOPs. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-7. Format for appendix 14 (detention operations) to annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]																		
b. <u>Control</u>. (1) <u>Command Posts</u>. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing. (2) <u>Reports</u>. List detention operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. c. <u>Signal</u>. Address mission-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position] Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block. ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits). DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]																		
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Figure I-7. Format for appendix 14 (detention operations) to annex E (continued)

I-11. Operational area security missions that support the base order are outlined in appendix 1 to annex E. (See figure I-8 for a sample format for this attachment.)

[CLASSIFICATION]

Follow classification marking guidance as described in AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX 1 (OPERATIONAL AREA SECURITY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

c. Doctrinal references for this attachment include ADRP 3-37, ADRP 3-90, and FM 3-39.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. Situation.

a. Area of Interest. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

b. Area of Operations. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

(1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

c. Enemy Forces. No change to Annex B (Intelligence).

d. Friendly Forces. No change to the base order Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of operational area security.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact area security operations. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to, or detached from, the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List assumptions specific to operational area security that support appendix development.

2. Mission. State the area security mission in support of the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. Execution.

a. Scheme of Area Security. The scheme of area security is a statement of the overall area security objective. Describe how area security supports the commander's intent, the maneuver plan, and protection priorities. Direct the manner in which each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish area security, and tie that to support of the operation with a task and purpose statement. Discuss how area security orients the force, installation, route, area, or assets to be protected and how area security is often an economy-of-force role assigned to many organizations and often designated to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations. Describe how forces engaged in area security saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy attack with an active response. Discuss the role of response forces in the area security concept. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-8. Format for appendix 1 (operational area security) to annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

(1) Base and Base Cluster Defense. Describe how base and base cluster defense measures (normal and emergency) are required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities are available to U.S. forces. A division or corps may be required to protect multiple forward-operating bases. Describe how bases leverage mutually supporting capabilities or joint assets for their collective defense. Units may be assigned base defensive operations on a permanent or rotating basis, depending on mission variables.

(2) Critical Asset Security. Describe how critical asset security supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss the protection and security of personnel, physical assets, and information analyzed and deemed essential to the operation and success of the mission and the required resources for protection. This designation generally comes as a result of a deliberate assessment or as a directed mission. Refer to the commander's critical assets list and defended asset list as required.

(3) Mission Command Node Protection. Describe how mission command node protection supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how command posts and operations centers are protected through area security techniques that involve the employment of an array of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and redundant manner. Describe when, where, or under what conditions command posts will be massed or dispersed for survivability.

(4) High-risk Personnel Security. Describe how high-risk personnel security supports the commander's intent and area security. Identify high-risk personnel by grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation. High-risk personnel are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets and could include HN dignitaries. Discuss what special precautions are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals. Identify the requirements for security details from internal resources. However, under certain circumstances, designated personnel may require protective services by specially trained units.

(5) Response Force. Describe how response force operations support the commander's protection priorities and area security. Direct minimum response force capabilities and procedures for increasing those capabilities. Discuss how response force operations expediently reinforce a unit's organic protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. Discussion should include the planning for defeat of Level I and Level II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until designated combined arms, tactical combat force arrives for decisive operations.

(6) Lines of Communication Security. Describe how lines-of-communication security support the commander's movement priorities and area security. Outline locations for concentrated protection along lines of communications and supply routes that are critical to military operations. Discuss focused protection for lines of communications and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, waterway) throughout the AO. Describe how route security operations are defensive in nature and how route security forces prevent an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along a route or portions of a route. Direct movement corridor operations as necessary to facilitate movement in high-risk areas (the movement of a single element) as an enduring operation. Also discuss how units synchronize their efforts (reconnaissance, security, mobility, information engagement) within the movement corridor.

(7) Checkpoint and Combat Outposts. Describe how checkpoint and combat outposts support the commander's movement and protection priorities. Discuss how organizations control the freedom of movement in an AO for a specific period of time (curfews) or as an enduring operation (safety and antiterrorism). This can be accomplished by placing permanent or temporary checkpoints and combat outposts along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time movement. Combat outposts are used for sanctuary, support, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance or area denial.

(8) Convoy Security. Describe how convoy security supports the commander's concept of support and area security. Discuss how convoy security is a specialized area security operation conducted to protect convoys and how units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes in an area of operations and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. Also discuss how units conduct convoy security operations in conjunction with route security operations. Planning includes designating units for convoy security; providing guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for units to provide for their own security during convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Local or theater policy typically dictates when or which convoys receive security and protection.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-8. Format for appendix 1 (operational area security) to annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION] (9) <u>Port Area and Pier Security</u>. Describe how port area and pier security support the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how units who are assigned a port area as part of their AO must develop and organize plans to ensure that forces are trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive time and place to protect or secure port areas and cargo, as necessary. The patrol of harbors and anchorages is generally the mission of a dedicated port security unit and may include waterfront security operations. (10) <u>Surveillance</u>. Describe how surveillance supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how the protection working group uses staff analysis and coordination with higher headquarters to determine which critical assets or locations are likely to be attractive targets and require surveillance. Direct the collection of information against specified intelligence requirements or at specified locations by units engaged in area security operations. (11) <u>Area Damage Control</u>. Describe how area damage control supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how commanders conduct area damage control when the damage and scope of the attack is limited and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. This recovery involves resuming operations, maintaining or restoring order, evacuating casualties, isolating danger or hazard areas, and mitigating personnel and material losses. Some attacks may rise to the level of incidents of national significance and require additional resources for mitigation, recovery, and investigation. In the latter case, commanders transition from area damage control to consequence management activities. b. <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>. List area security tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order. c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight operational area security-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations. 4. Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for area security operations key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. 5. Command and Signal. a. <u>Command</u>. (1) <u>Location of Commander</u>. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO. (2) <u>Liaison Requirements</u>. State the area security operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. <u>Control</u>. (1) <u>Command Posts</u>. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing. (2) <u>Reports</u>. List area security operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. c. <u>Signal</u>. Address area security operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position] [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-8. Format for appendix 1 (operational area security) to annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]	
Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.	
ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).	
DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.	
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]	
Legend:	
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
AS	area security
FM	field manual
HN	host nation
OPORD	operation order
SOP	standard operating procedure
U.S.	United States

Figure I-8. Format for appendix 1 (operational area security) to annex E (continued)

I-12. Antiterrorism measures that support the base order are outlined in appendix 6 to annex E. (See figure I-9 for a sample format for this attachment.)

[CLASSIFICATION]	
Follow classification marking guidance as described AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.	
APPENDIX 6 (ANTITERRORISM) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]-[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]	
References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.	
a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale. b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. c. The doctrinal reference for this attachment includes ADRP 3-37.	
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.	
1. Situation.	
a. <u>Area of Interest</u>. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations). b. <u>Area of Operations</u>. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations). (1) <u>Terrain</u>. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (2) <u>Weather</u>. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. c. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. If not indicated in the base order or Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, describe specific details on the terrorist threat within the AO. Include the factors of identification, operational capability, intentions activity, composition, disposition, location, estimated strength, and known threat vulnerability. Endure threat information includes potential terrorist capabilities and intentions for use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Threat information should be divided, and each paragraph classification level should be labeled to ensure that as much of the information as possible remains unclassified.	
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]	

Figure I-9. Format for appendix 6 (antiterrorism) to annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

d. Friendly Forces. If indicated in the base order or Annex A (Task Organization) Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, identify the forces available (military and civilian) to respond to terrorist threats or attacks. Include the next higher headquarters and adjacent bases and units and organizations that are not under base command but may be required to respond to such an incident. These units and organizations may include HN, multiservice, and U.S. Army military police forces; fire and emergency services; medical, federal, state, and local agencies; special operations forces; engineers; detection (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) decontamination services; and explosive ordinance disposal services. Include a memorandum of agreement or understanding and other special arrangements that improve forces which are available to support the plan before, during, and after a terrorist attack.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of antiterrorism measures or the implementation of antiterrorism-specific equipment and tactics.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact antiterrorism. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to, or detached from, the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List assumptions specific to antiterrorism that support appendix development. Assumptions are those factors that are unlikely to change during the implementation of the antiterrorism appendix and that must be addressed to continue to plan. They can range from discussing base troop strength to addressing the local political and social environment.

2. Mission. State the antiterrorism mission in support of the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. Execution.

a. Scheme of Area Security. The scheme of antiterrorism is a statement of the overall antiterrorism objective. Describe how the commander envisions antiterrorism measures in support of the scheme of protection that supports the concept of operations in the base order. It should stress detection, deterrence, and mitigation of the terrorist threat in the environment (intransit, on base, during operations, in protection of the HN and local civilians.)

(1) Terrorist Threats and Other Threat Activities. Describe the unit process for developing its tailored threat assessment or local terrorist threat picture. The unit tailored threat assessment should be continuously evaluated, updated, and disseminated by implementing the antiterrorism principles as appropriate and as directed by the commander. Include the priority of effort to situation developments; force protection conditions; and random antiterrorism measures, determinations, and assessments.

(2) Reduce Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Acts and Attacks. Describe the unit procedural process for reducing identified vulnerabilities to terrorist actions. This section should be tailored to support the environment that the appendix supports, such as troops and equipment during movement, airfield security, port security, embarkation/arrival areas, bases, and HN/local civilian terrorist mitigation measures. Discuss legal limitations or agency coordination procedures required to ensure that antiterrorism risks are mitigated.

(3) Physical Security. This includes building and vehicle modification (sandbags, additional armor plating, blast film), barrier plans, specialized equipment employment, and entry control.

- (a) Entry control point procedures.
- (b) On-site security elements.
- (c) Operations and information security.
- (d) High-risk personnel procedures.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-9. Format for appendix 6 (antiterrorism) to annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

(4) Terrorist Incident Response Measures. Discuss the critical areas within the unit or base terrorist threat or incident response plan that address the unit response reconstitution responsibilities upon notification of an imminent terrorist threat or incident response and the procedures for obtaining technical assistance and augmentation if the incident exceeds the unit or base organic capabilities. Include the—

(a) Base Defense Operations Center. Discuss command relationships, staffing (partial/full), tenant unit responsibilities, messages and message flow, and security and access procedures.

(b) Reporting Procedures. (Who/What/When/Where/How)

(c) Incident Response Management Procedures. (Who/What/When/Where/How)

(d) Critical Systems Continuity of Operations. Describe those systems that are essential to mission execution and the critical infrastructure that supports essential operations of the base (utilities systems, computer networks). This is of particular importance if vulnerability has identified one or more single points of failure for capabilities to the operations of the base or unit primary mission. For bases and fixed-site facilities, it is also important to note that critical infrastructure may be located off the base, with services being supplied by local municipalities. This document outlines how the base or unit should continue to operate if one or more critical systems are disrupted or fails and how the systems should be restored.

(5) Information Operations. State the overall concept for synchronizing antiterrorism with information operations.

(a) Force Protection Condition. Describe the implementation of security measures across all force protection condition levels. Each set of force protection condition measures is the minimum that must be implemented when a particular baseline force protection condition level is designated. Although not completely applicable in a combat zone, these measures can be used as a template in the development of assessment, delay, denial, and notification. Force protection condition measures include provisions for reinforcing physical security; increasing security personnel and inspections of vehicles, hand-carried items, and packages; reinforcing random antiterrorism measures; and implementing other emergency measures.

(b) Random Antiterrorism Measures Procedures. Refer to the Random Antiterrorism Measure attachment that outlines random antiterrorism measures implementation based on a weekly schedule in the form of an execution matrix by date/time, unit, and necessary equipment.

(c) Rules of Engagement. See appendix 11 to Annex C as required.

(d) Critical Asset List. Identify assets that are of such extraordinary importance that their incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on operations. The list will vary depending on the mission variables and should represent those assets that are most attractive to terrorist action. Critical assets can range from facilities (such as a Soldier's barracks on a forward operating base) to local infrastructure (such as HN power plants and wells) to voting centers and HN government officials. Criticality decision support tools (such as MSHARPP and CARVER) support critical asset list development.

(e) Defended Asset List. Identify assets from the critical asset list that are prioritized by the commander to be defended with available resources. This allows the commander to apply finite protection capabilities to the most vital assets. The defended asset list consists of assets that could directly impact mission failure or strategic setbacks.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List antiterrorism tasks assigned to specific subordinate units that are not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units that are not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight antiterrorism-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

4. Sustainment. Identify the priorities of sustainment for area security operations key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure I-9. Format for appendix 6 (antiterrorism) to annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]																			
5. Command and Signal. a. <u>Command.</u> (1) <u>Location of Commander.</u> State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO. (2) <u>Liaison Requirements.</u> State the area security operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. <u>Control.</u> (1) <u>Command Posts.</u> Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing. (2) <u>Reports.</u> List area security operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. c. <u>Signal.</u> Address area security operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank] OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position] Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block. ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits). DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.																			
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]																			
Legend: <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%;">ADRP</td> <td>Army doctrine reference publication</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AO</td> <td>area of operations</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AR</td> <td>Army regulation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CARVER</td> <td>criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizable</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HN</td> <td>host nation</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MSHARPP</td> <td>mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizable, population, and proximity</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OPORD</td> <td>operation order</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SOP</td> <td>standard operating procedure</td> </tr> <tr> <td>U.S.</td> <td>United States</td> </tr> </table>		ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication	AO	area of operations	AR	Army regulation	CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizable	HN	host nation	MSHARPP	mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizable, population, and proximity	OPORD	operation order	SOP	standard operating procedure	U.S.	United States
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OPORD	operation order																		
SOP	standard operating procedure																		
U.S.	United States																		

Figure I-9. Format for appendix 6 (antiterrorism) to annex E (continued)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER

I-13. The fragmentary order is used to update the OPORD with new information, tasks, or requirements. Fragmentary orders are issued when changes occur. (See figure I-10, page I-32, for an illustration of the fragmentary order format.)

[CLASSIFICATION] (Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)		Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number
FRAGMENTARY ORDER [number] References: Refer to higher order being modified. Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: Write the time zone established in the base order.		
1. <u>Situation.</u> Include changes to existing order, or state "No change." For example, "No change to OPORD 03-XX." 2. <u>Mission.</u> State "No change." 3. <u>Execution.</u> Include changes, or state "No change." a. Commander's intent. Include changes, or state "No change." b. Concept of operations. Include changes, or state "No change." c. Scheme of movement and maneuver. Include changes, or state "No change." d. Scheme of intelligence. Include changes, or state "No change." e. Scheme of fires. Include changes, or state "No change." f. Scheme of protection. Include changes, or state "No change." g. Stability operations. Include changes, or state "No change." h. Assessment. Include changes, or state "No change." i. Tasks to subordinate units. Include changes, or state "No change." j. Coordinating instructions. Include changes, or state "No change." 4. <u>Sustainment.</u> Include changes, or state "No change." 5. <u>Command and signal.</u> Include changes, or state "No change."		
ACKNOWLEDGE: [Commander's last name] [Commander's rank]		
OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position]		
ANNEXES: DISTRIBUTION: [page number] [CLASSIFICATION]		
Legend: OPORD operation order		

Figure I-10. Army fragmentary order format

REPORTS

I-14. Military police leaders make extensive use of verbal and written reports to provide information to higher, lower, and adjacent commands. Whereas orders are directive by nature, reports are descriptive and are intended to communicate the status of something that is performed or observed. Accurate, timely reporting is often critical to the successful accomplishment of missions, so the importance of reporting should be emphasized in training and operational environments.

I-15. Reports that are commonly prepared by military police can be generally classified as follows:

- **Administrative reports**—standardized reports that are applicable to routine Army operations, such as most personnel and logistics reports, casualty reports, and journals or logs. Examples include DA Form 1594 (*Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log*), DA Form 3997 (*Military Police Desk Blotter*), and DD Form 200. Other administrative reports may be specific to a unit and prepared according to the unit SOP.
- **Operational reports**—standardized reports that are operationally focused and typically used Army-wide. Examples include situation, status, detainee, medical evacuation, and UXO reports.
- **Intelligence reports**—submitted observations, generally in standardized formats, that include spot; size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment; and selected CBRN reports. Military police use spot reports to provide timely intelligence or status information regarding events that could have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations, such as enemy activity and area information of immediate value. Spot reports (and other reports such as those used to report human intelligence or counterintelligence information) include size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment information.

SIZE, ACTIVITY, LOCATION, UNIT, TIME, AND EQUIPMENT REPORT

I-16. The size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment report is a standardized report that identifies observed enemy activity at a particular location. If information is unknown, observers should report it as unknown, but they should include as much detail as possible. The report should be submitted up the chain of command as soon as possible. Table I-2 shows the content for a size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment report.

Table I-2. Size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment report contents

<i>Element</i>	<i>Description</i>
Size	Report the number of personnel, vehicles, and aircraft and the size of the object. Make an estimate if necessary.
Activity	Report a detailed account of activity (direction of movement; troops digging in; artillery fire; type of attack; chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear activity).
Location	Report where you saw the activity. Include grid coordinates or a reference from a known point, including the distance and direction from the known point.
Unit	Report the enemy unit. If the unit is unknown, report distinctive features (uniforms, patches or colored tabs, headgear, vehicle identification markings).
Time	Report the time and date that the activity was observed, not the time that the activity is reported. Always report local or ZULU time.
Equipment	Report equipment associated with the activity, such as weapons, vehicles, and tools. If unable to identify the equipment, provide as much detail as possible so that identification can be made by higher headquarters.
Remarks	Include additional information not included above.
Legend:	
ZULU	time zone indicator for Universal Time Source

NINE-LINE MEDICAL EVACUATION REPORT

I-17. Military police must be able to request the evacuation of casualties by using the nine-line medical evacuation report. The report format is shown in figure I-11.

<i>Line</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Explanation</i>	<i>Where/How Obtained</i>	<i>Who Provides</i>
1	Location of evacuation site	Include grid zone letters to preclude misunderstanding.	From map	Leader
2	Radio, frequency, call sign, and suffix	Encrypt the frequency of the radio at the pickup site, not a relay frequency. The call sign (and suffix if used) of the person to be contacted at the pickup site may be transmitted in the clear.	From signal operating instructions	Radio transmitter operator
3	Number of patients by precedence	Report only applicable information, and encrypt the brevity codes. A–Urgent D–Routine B–Urgent-Surg E–Convenience C–Priority	From evaluation of patient	Medic or senior person present
4	Special equipment needed	Encrypt the applicable brevity codes. A–None C–Extraction equipment B–Hoist D–Ventilator	From evaluation of patient/situation	Medic or senior person present
5	Number of patients, by type	Report only applicable information, and encrypt the brevity codes. If requesting medical evacuation for both types, insert the word <i>break</i> between the litter entry and ambulatory entry. L + # of patients–Litter A + # of patients–Ambulatory (sitting)	From evaluation of patient	Medic or senior person present
6	Security of pickup site (wartime)	N–No enemy troops in area P–Possibly enemy troops in area (approach with caution) E–Enemy troops in area (approach with caution) X–Enemy troops in area (armed escort required)	From evaluation of situation	Unit leader
7	Method of marking pickup site	Encrypt the brevity codes. A–Panels D–None B–Pyrotechnic signal E–Other C–Smoke signal	Based on situation and availability of materials	Medic or senior person present
8	Patient nationality and status	The number of patients in each category need not be transmitted. Encrypt only the applicable brevity codes. A–U.S. military D–Non-U.S. citizen B–U.S. citizen E–Enemy prisoners of war C–Non-U.S. military	From evaluation of patient	Medic or senior person present

Figure I-11. Format for a nine-line medical evacuation report

<i>Line</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Explanation</i>	<i>Where/How Obtained</i>	<i>Who Provides</i>
9	CBRN contamination (wartime)	Include this line only when applicable. Encrypt the applicable brevity codes. C—Chemical R—Radiological B—Biological N—Nuclear	From situation	Medic or senior person present
Legend: CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear U.S. United States				

Figure I-11. Format for a nine-line medical evacuation report (continued)

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE REPORT

I-18. A UXO report follows the format that is shown in figure I-12, page I-36. It identifies the critical information that must be reported to avoid casualties and minimize further disruption to operations. It also serves to inform the commander of additional COAs.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR REPORT

I-19. The CBRN Warning and Reporting System is the primary method that is used to warn units of an actual or predicted CBRN hazard. The CBRN Warning and Reporting System consists of six standard reports:

- **CBRN 1 report.** The CBRN 1 report is an observer's report and provides initial and follow-on information that a CBRN attack has occurred. This is the most common report and one of the two reports that provide the baseline data for the CBRN Warning and Reporting System.
- **CBRN 2 report.** The CBRN 2 report is used to pass evaluated data from collected CBRN 1 reports.
- **CBRN 3 report.** The CBRN 3 report is used to provide immediate warning of the predicted hazard and contamination areas.
- **CBRN 4 report.** The CBRN 4 report provides monitoring, survey, and reconnaissance data about the hazard location. (This report provides baseline data.)
- **CBRN 5 report.** The CBRN 5 report is used to pass information of an actual contamination. This report can also include areas of possible contamination, but only when the actual contamination coordinates are also included in the report.
- **CBRN 6 report.** The CBRN 6 report is used to pass detailed information of CBRN events.

I-20. The CBRN reports use a standard format and line items to shorten the message. The reports start with a common message heading that consists of the CBRN report number (1–6) and type of event (nuclear attack, biological attack, chemical attack, or release other than attack). Figure I-13, page I-37, shows the format for an observer's report of a chemical or biological attack.

I-21. Figure I-14, page I-38, shows the format for an observer's report of a nuclear attack. Note that the first five line items are the same in both formats and then diverge. An observer's report of a release-other-than-attack is in the same format as the report of a chemical or biological attack except that the releases other than attack report also includes line MIKE (description and status of a release-other-than-attack event).

I-22. The meanings of the letter codes are standard across all six CBRN reports. They are shown in table I-3, page I-39. (See FM 3-11.3 for additional information concerning CBRN reports.)

<i>Line</i>	<i>Item</i>
1	Date-time group the item was discovered
2	Reporting activity (unit identification code) and location (8-digit grid of UXO)
3	Contact method: radio frequency, call sign, point of contact, and telephone number
4	Type of ordnance: dropped, projected, placed, possible IED, or thrown. If known, give the size of the hazard area and number of items. Without touching, disturbing, or approaching (trip wire) the item, include details about size, shape, color, and condition (intact or leaking).
5	CBRN contamination. If present, be as specific as possible.
6	Resources threatened. Report any threatened equipment, facilities, or other assets.
7	Impact on mission. Provide a short description of the current tactical situation and how the presence of the UXO affects the unit status.
8	Protective measures. Describe any measures taken to protect personnel and equipment.
9	Recommended priority. Recommend a priority for response by explosive ordnance detachment technicians.
<i>Priority</i>	<i>Basis</i>
Immediate	Stops the unit maneuver and mission capability or threatens critical assets vital to the mission
Indirect	Slows the unit maneuver and mission capability or threatens critical assets important to the mission
Minor	Reduces the unit maneuver and mission capability or threatens noncritical assets
No Threat	Has little or no effect on unit capabilities or assets
Legend: CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear IED improvised explosive device UXO unexploded ordnance	

Figure I-12. Explosive hazards spot report format

Message Heading: CBRN1 CHEM/BIO Report																	
From: 1 st Military Police Company		To: Headquarters, 1 st Infantry Division															
Precedence: FLASH		Security Classification: Unclassified															
DTG Sent: 10 1130 August 2014		Category of Report: <u>Initial</u> Follow-up															
Line Item	Description	Req	Sample Entry														
ALFA	Strike serial number	O	—														
BRAVO	Location of observer and direction of attack or event	M	/32UXXX064258/090DGG//														
DELTA	DTG of attack or detonation and attack end	M	/201450ZSEP2006//														
FOXTROT	Location of attack or event	O	—														
GOLF	Delivery and quantity information	M	/OBS/AIR/1/BML////														
INDIA	Release information on biological/chemical agent attacks or ROTA events	M	/AIR/NERV/P/MPDS														
TANGO	Terrain/topography and vegetation description	M	Flat/urban														
YANKEE	Downwind direction and downwind speed	O	—														
ZULU	Actual weather conditions	O	—														
GENTEXT	General text	O	—														
Note. The "Requirement" column indicates whether each set or field is mandatory (M), operationally determined (O), or conditional (C).																	
Legend: <table border="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td>/AIR/NERV/P/MPDS</td> <td>air/nerve agent/ persistent /manned point detection system</td> </tr> <tr> <td>/OBS/AIR/1/BML////</td> <td>observed/aircraft/1 delivery system/bomblet</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CBRN</td> <td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CHEM/BIO</td> <td>chemical/biological</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DTG</td> <td>date-time group</td> </tr> <tr> <td>req</td> <td>requirement</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ROTA</td> <td>release other than attack</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				/AIR/NERV/P/MPDS	air/nerve agent/ persistent /manned point detection system	/OBS/AIR/1/BML////	observed/aircraft/1 delivery system/bomblet	CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear	CHEM/BIO	chemical/biological	DTG	date-time group	req	requirement	ROTA	release other than attack
/AIR/NERV/P/MPDS	air/nerve agent/ persistent /manned point detection system																
/OBS/AIR/1/BML////	observed/aircraft/1 delivery system/bomblet																
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear																
CHEM/BIO	chemical/biological																
DTG	date-time group																
req	requirement																
ROTA	release other than attack																

Figure I-13. Sample observer's report for a chemical or biological attack

Message Heading: CBRN1 NUC Report			
From: 194 th Military Police Company		To: 716 th Military Police Battalion	
Precedence: FLASH		Security Classification: Unclassified	
DTG Sent: 10 1130 August 2014		Category of Report: Initial Follow-up	
Line Item	Description	Req	Sample Entry
ALFA	Strike serial number	O	—
BRAVO	Location of observer and direction of attack or event	M	/32UXXX064258/090DGG//
DELTA	DTG of attack or detonation and attack end	M	/201450ZSEP2006//
FOXTROT	Location of attack or event	O	—
GOLF	Delivery and quantity information	M	/SUS/AIR/1/BOM/SML/
HOTEL	Type of nuclear burst	M	/SURF//
JULIET	Flash-to-bang time in seconds	O	—
LIMA	Nuclear burst angular cloud width at H+5 minutes	O	—
MIKE	Stabilized cloud measurement at H+10 minutes	O	—
PAPAC	Radar determined external contour of radioactive cloud	O	—
PAPAD	Radar determined downwind direction of radioactive cloud	O	—
YANKEE	Downwind direction and downwind speed	O	—
ZULU	Actual weather conditions	O	—
GENTEXT	General text	O	—
Note. The "Requirement" column indicates whether each set or field is mandatory (M), operationally determined (O), or conditional (C).			

Figure I-14. Sample observer's report for a nuclear attack

Legend:	
/SURF//	/SURF//
/SUS/AIR/1/BOM/SML/	suspected/aircraft/1 delivery system/bomb/small—less than 200 kilograms
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
DTG	date time group
H+5	5 minutes after attack or event
H+10	10 minutes after attack or event
nuc	nuclear
req	requirement

Figure I-14. Sample observer's report for a nuclear attack (continued)

Table I-3. Standard line items for CBRN reports

<i>Line</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ALFA	Strike serial number
BRAVO	Location of the observer and the direction of the attack or event
CHARLIE	Date-time group of the report or observation and end of the event
DELTA	Date-time group of the attack or detonation and attack end
FOXTROT	Location of the attack or event
GOLF	Delivery and quantity information
HOTEL	Type of nuclear burst
INDIA	Release information on the chemical-biological agent attacks or release-other-than-attack events
JULIET	Flash-to-bang time (in seconds)
KILO	Crater description
LIMA	Nuclear burst angular cloud width at H+5 minutes after attack or event
MIKE	Stabilized cloud measurement at H+10 minutes after attack or event
MIKE	Description and status of release-other-than-attack-event
NOVEMBER	Estimated nuclear yield (in kilotons)
OSCAR	Reference date-time group for the estimated contour lines
PAPAA	Predicted attack or release and hazard area
PAPAB	Detailed fallout hazard prediction parameters
PAPAC	Radar-determined external contour of the radioactive cloud
PAPAD	Radar-determined downwind direction of the radioactive cloud
PAPAX	Hazard area location for the weather period

Table I-3. Standard line items for CBRN reports (continued)

<i>Line</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
QUEBEC	Location and type of the reading, sample, or detection
ROMEO	Level of contamination, dose rate trend, and decay rate trend
SIERRA	Date-time group of the reading or initial detection of the contamination
TANGO	Terrain or topography and vegetation description
WHISKEY	Sensor information
XRAYA	Actual contour information
XRAYB	Predicted contour information
YANKEE	Downwind direction and downwind speed
ZULU	Actual weather conditions
GENTEXT	General text
Legend:	
H+5	5 minutes after attack or event
H+10	10 minutes after attack or event

Appendix J

Tactics

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSM 5120.01A). Tactics vary based on METT-TC and frequently change as the enemy reacts and friendly forces explore new approaches. Effective tactics translate combat power into decisive results. Military police leaders must continuously evaluate and modify tactics based on the unique circumstances of a specific situation to ensure that the tactics have the desired effects. This appendix focuses on the basic concepts, supporting techniques, and control measures that are associated with tactics.

OFFENSIVE TASKS

J-1. An *offensive task* is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). Offensive tasks impose the commander's will on the enemy. In a combined arms maneuver, the offense is a task of decisive action. Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical and psychological advantages and achieve definitive results. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against an enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation does not destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces disintegrate or retreat to where they no longer pose a threat. Executing offensive tasks compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing additional weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit. (See ADRP 3-90 for a detailed discussion on offensive tasks.)

J-2. During the offense, military police operations in close support of maneuver forces are the primary focus. However, all disciplines are applied simultaneously to some degree. Military police priorities (when supporting offensive tasks) are detention operations and security and mobility support. PIO activities are integrated throughout the execution of other military police disciplines, and limited police operations may be conducted to facilitate the future transition to stability.

J-3. Military police support to offensive tasks varies. Military police disciplines support each combatant commander based on mission variables. Military police leaders who support offensive tasks must—

- Exercise a disciplined initiative within the commander's intent.
- Anticipate selective elements of the offensive force to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute while other forces attack.
- Anticipate changes in the tempo of the operation and prepare the military police effort toward that action.
- Provide military police support within the area of responsibility. Military police must understand how the mission affects security functions in a joint supportability assessment or line of communication, which translates to the protection of mission command and information systems sustainment.
- Understand the IPB and the commander's critical information requirements to facilitate the integration of PIO activities within military police operations.
- Conduct police operations within the local population.
- Perform detention operations to reduce the impact on combat forces.
- Conduct security and mobility support to assist the commander in speeding the shift of forces to support the main effort and enhancing overall maneuverability. (Military police coordinate the treatment of dislocated civilians with HN or foreign forces.)
- Anticipate pursuit and exploitation by positioning military police forces to support follow-on forces. Military police organizations support as far forward as possible while protecting sustainment assets.

- Support movement of maneuver forces, enabling their ability to mass. Military police protect mission command nodes, such as the main command post and tactical command post. The security and mobility support disciplines assist in orchestrating the efforts to mass, sustaining the offensive move. Military police quickly attack enemy reconnaissance forces in the area of responsibility. Likewise, military police maintain surveillance, provide early warning, and attack the enemy with supporting and organic fires, ensuring freedom of action of the force.
- Know the location and composition of probable response forces/tactical combat forces to coordinate with and to assist in securing the joint supportability assessment against area threats.

J-4. Military police company, platoon, and squad leaders must understand the principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures that are associated with the offense. Additionally, they have to know their role when performing within larger organization operations and when operating independently. Leaders must recognize the complementary and reinforcing effects of other maneuver and supporting elements and how those elements augment their own capabilities.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

J-5. A *movement to contact* is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (ADRP 3-90). Conduct a movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague, when the enemy has broken contact, or when there is no time to reconnoiter extensively to locate the enemy.

J-6. Purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control, and the hasty deployment of combat power characterize the movement to contact. The following are the fundamentals of a movement to contact:

- Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.
- Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid the decisive engagement of the main body on ground that is chosen by the enemy. This provides the commander with maximum flexibility to develop the situation.
- Task-organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and attack rapidly in any direction.
- Keep forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.
- Maintain contact, regardless of the COA, once contact is gained.

J-7. A movement to contact is conducted by using one of two techniques: approach march or search and attack. (See table J-1 for additional information.) Use the approach march technique when the enemy is expected to deploy using relatively fixed offensive or defensive formations and the situation remains vague. Use the search and attack technique when the enemy is dispersed, when it is expected to avoid contact or quickly disengage and withdraw, or when the higher unit needs to deny it movement in an AO.

Table J-1. Types of movement to contact

<i>Approach march is best used when the—</i>	<i>Search and attack is best used when the—</i>
• Enemy force is more conventional in nature. • Enemy force follows a more structured order of battle and is more predictable. • Enemy force is more centrally located. • Enemy conducts more centralized operations.	• Enemy conducts operations over a very large area in a dispersed manner, forcing friendly units to disperse to locate it. • Enemy forces and operations are unconventional or guerilla in nature. • Enemy typically operates in small teams and only makes contact when it feels it has the advantage.

J-8. The result of a movement to contact is a *meeting engagement*, which is a combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place (FM 3-90-1). At the onset of the engagement, seizing the initiative is the overriding imperative. The prompt execution of battle drills at the platoon level and below and standard actions on contact for larger elements give that initiative to the friendly force.

J-9. Military police platoons and squads participate in a movement to contact as part of a company mission or higher echelon operation. A company generally conducts a movement to contact when it must gain or maintain contact with the enemy or when it lacks sufficient time to gain intelligence or make extensive plans to defeat the enemy. Primarily, military police perform a support role in a movement to contact. However, in certain circumstances, military police can take the position of the main effort in collaboration with HN police forces.

HASTY ATTACK

J-10. An *attack* is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (ADRP 3-90). When the mission leader decides to attack or the opportunity to attack occurs during combat operations, the execution of the attack must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The objective of the mission leader is to gain *fire superiority*—that degree of dominance in the fires of one force over another that permits that force to conduct maneuver at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy (FM 3-90-1).

J-11. Execute a hasty attack when the situation calls for immediate action. A hasty attack necessitates minimal preparation and employs only available forces. Use a hasty attack to—

- Exploit a tactical opportunity.
- Maintain the momentum.
- Regain the initiative.
- Prevent the enemy from regaining organization or balance.
- Gain a favorable position that might be lost with time.

J-12. The term *hasty* refers to limits on planning and preparation time, not to an acceleration in the conduct of actions on contact. Execution begins with the establishment of a base of fire, which then suppresses the enemy force. The maneuver force uses a combination of techniques to maintain its security as it advances in contact to a position of advantage. These techniques include the—

- Use of internal base of fire and bounding elements.
- Use of covered and concealed routes.
- Use of indirect fires to suppress or obscure the enemy or to screen friendly movement.
- Execution of bold maneuver that initially takes the maneuver force out of enemy direct fire range.
- Execution of a tactical task to destroy the remaining enemy once the maneuver force has gained the positional advantage.

J-13. Maintaining unrelenting pressure through hasty attacks keeps the enemy off balance and makes it difficult for him to react effectively. Attacking before the enemy can act often results in success even when the combat power ratio is not as favorable as desired. The hasty attack is often the preferred option during continuous operations. It allows the commander to maintain the momentum of friendly operations while denying the enemy the time to prepare defenses and recover from the losses that were suffered during previous actions.

J-14. Military police normally participate in a hasty attack as part of a higher echelon operation, most often in a supporting role. However, military police execute this COA in particular circumstances, such as when conducting a patrol. If the military police patrol and the enemy element become aware of each other at the same time and at such a close range that maneuver is not feasible, the patrol may make an immediate assault. If the patrol attacks an enemy, it should only attack small, dismounted formations or lightly armored or unarmored reconnaissance vehicles. Except in self-defense, patrols avoid attacking heavily armored vehicles or large formations.

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

J-15. Movement techniques are designed to minimize exposure of the platoon or squad to enemy fire and to place the element in a good position to react to enemy contact. They provide varying degrees of control, security, and flexibility. The movement by military police elements in combat depends on many factors, including the—

- Mission.
- Size and composition of the moving unit.
- Distance that the unit must cover.
- Visibility.
- Terrain.
- Likelihood of enemy contact.
- Type of contact expected.
- Urgency of execution.

J-16. Movement techniques are not fixed formations. They identify the position of squads and teams in relation to each other during movement. Military police platoons and squads use three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. Table J-2 outlines the characteristics of movement techniques. From these movement techniques, leaders are able to conduct actions on contact, making natural transitions to fire and maneuver. Military police apply the following fundamentals when executing movement:

- Move on covered and concealed routes.
- Avoid likely ambush sites and other danger areas.
- Enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
- Maintain 360° security, to include air guards.
- Use formations and movement techniques based on METT-TC.
- Make contact with the smallest element if enemy contact is unavoidable.

Table J-2. Movement techniques and characteristics

<i>Movement Technique</i>	<i>Normal Use</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>			
		<i>Control</i>	<i>Dispersion</i>	<i>Speed</i>	<i>Security</i>
Traveling	Contact not likely	More	Less	Fastest	Least
Traveling overwatch	Contact possible	Less	More	Slower	More
Bounding overwatch	Contact expected	Most	Most	Slowest	Most

J-17. Although the movement techniques described in this appendix represent mounted military police formations, leaders may choose to conduct dismounted tactics based on METT-TC. FM 3-21.8 provides doctrinal guidelines for dismounted infantry tactics that concentrate on platoon- and squad-size elements. FM 3-21.10 outlines company level tactics, techniques, and procedures for dismounted infantry tactics. While military police and infantry elements have inherently different organizational configurations, military police leaders can use FM 3-21.8 and FM 3-21.10 as adaptable frameworks for specific units or missions. Military police dismounted operations in an urban environment are addressed in appendix L.

TRAVELING

J-18. A military police leader selects the traveling technique when enemy contact is unlikely and speed is required. This method allows for the simultaneous movement of all elements in the unit. It is the fastest, but least secure, movement technique. Movement is continuous, and leaders should maintain interval and dispersion between the elements as terrain and weather permit. The military police element does not intend

to engage in combat, but it is dispersed to prevent destruction in case of unexpected air or ground attack. The distance between vehicles is based on METT-TC factors. Trailing elements can move in parallel columns to shorten the column and reaction time. Figure J-1 depicts the traveling movement technique with mounted military police.




Figure J-1. Traveling movement technique

TRAVELING OVERWATCH

J-19. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling that provides additional security. Military police leaders use the traveling overwatch method of movement when enemy contact is possible but speed is important. The lead element moves continuously along the best covered and concealed routes for protection from possible enemy observation and direct fire. The trail element moves at various speeds and halts periodically to overwatch the movement of the lead element. The trailing element keys its movement to the terrain. Dispersion between the two elements is based on the trail element ability to overwatch from a position where it can support the lead element if it engages the enemy. The intent is to maintain depth, provide flexibility, and preserve the ability to maneuver, even if contact occurs. (See figure J-2, page J-6, for an illustration on the traveling overwatch movement technique.)




Figure J-2. Traveling overwatch movement technique

BOUNDING OVERWATCH

J-20. When military police leaders expect to make contact with the enemy, they select the bounding overwatch method of movement (figure J-3). It is the slowest, but safest, movement technique. There are two variations of bounding overwatch: alternate bounds and successive bounds:

- Alternate bounds.** When executing alternate bounds, the lead element moves forward, halts, and occupies a support-by-fire position that is covered by the trail overwatch element. The trail overwatch element advances past the lead element and takes up overwatch positions. Swing elements are uncommitted and are ready for employment as directed by the mission leader; they move in conjunction with their assigned element—lead or trail. This sequence continues as necessary, with only one element moving at a time. This method is usually more rapid than successive bounds.




Figure J-3. Bounding overwatch movement technique

- Successive bounds.** In successive bounds, the lead element (covered by the trail element) advances and takes up overwatch positions. The trail element advances to an overwatch position roughly abreast of the lead element and then halts. The lead element moves to the next position, and the move continues. Only one element moves at a time, and the trail element avoids advancing beyond the lead element. As in alternate bounds, swing elements move in conjunction with the assigned element. This method is easier to control and is more secure than the alternate bounds method, but it is slower.

J-21. Bounding overwatch provides military police elements with immediate, direct suppressive fire on an enemy force that engages the bounding element with direct fire. Movement focuses on the next support-by-fire position, which should offer cover and concealment and good observation and fields of fire. While one element moves, another is stopped in position to overwatch the bounding element. The length of the bound is based on the terrain and the range of overwatch weapons. The bounding element avoids masking the fires of the overwatch element; it never bounds beyond the range at which the overwatch element can effectively suppress likely or suspected enemy positions.

DEFENSIVE TASKS

J-22. A *defensive task* is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). Defensive actions alone are

generally not decisive; they are often combined with or followed by offensive actions. A well-coordinated defense sets prime conditions for follow-on forces and operations.

J-23. The immediate purpose of defensive tasks is to counter enemy offensive operations. The defense defeats enemy attacks by focusing on the destructive effects of combat power, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. Defense also preserves control over land, resources, and populations. Defensive tasks retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. There are three types of tactical tasks that are associated with defense: mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde defense. (See FM 3-90-1 for details regarding the different types of defensive tasks.)

J-24. In all three types of defensive tasks, the primary focus for the military police force is to ensure movement of repositioning or counterattacking forces, provide security and mobility support, and support the evacuation of captured or detained individuals. Defensive missions demand focused effort to provide freedom of movement for repositioning forces and the reserve when it is committed. Examples of expected missions include—

- Conducting detainee operations.
- Providing support to movement corridors.
- Conducting convoy escorts.
- Conducting response force operations.

J-25. Military police support a defending force by assisting in movement and sustainment to maintain the initiative. Military police support reflects the maneuver commander's focus of destroying an attacking force, retaining or denying key terrain, moving away from an enemy force, or a combination of these tasks. In supporting defensive operations, military police leaders must—

- Exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent.
- Anticipate operational changes and transitions and prepare the military police effort toward that action.
- Provide military police support within the area of responsibility. (Military police must understand how operations affect security functions in a joint supportability assessment or line of communication, which translates to the protection of mission command and information system sustainment.)
- Understand the IPB, commander's critical information requirements, and priority intelligence requirements to facilitate the integration of PIO activities within military police operations to support those requirements.
- Conduct police operations within the local population.
- Integrate PIO within operations to enhance situational understanding and provide a holistic common operational picture.
- Consider the type and size of the area of responsibility, the lines of communication security, and the plan for detainee operations and dislocated civilians to determine how their presence may affect the movement of forces.
- Perform detainee operations to control and protect detainees who are a result of previous offensive or ongoing stability operations to reduce the impact on combat forces.
- Coordinate the treatment of dislocated civilians with HN or foreign forces.
- Conduct security and mobility support to aid a force to maneuver and mass. (Military police also conduct security and mobility support to deny information to enemy reconnaissance elements that are seeking the location of the defending force. The military police unit is positioned where it can control key terrain or improve the defensive capability of bases and base clusters. Military police conduct aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance to deny enemy access to critical logistics and sustainment facilities.)
- Know the locations and compositions of probable response and tactical combat forces to coordinate and assist them in securing the joint supportability assessment against area threats.
- Protect sustainment resources while supporting the lateral, forward, and rearward movement of combat forces.

J-26. The characteristics of defense are the planning fundamentals; leaders must understand these characteristics to effectively apply troop leading procedures during the planning, preparation, and execution of the operation. Successful defensive operations share the following characteristics:

- **Preparation.** The friendly defender arrives in the battle area before the enemy attacker and, therefore, has the advantage of preparing the terrain before the engagement. By thoroughly analyzing the factors of METT-TC, Soldiers gain an understanding of the tactical situation and identify potential friendly and enemy weaknesses.
- **Security.** The goal of security is to deceive the enemy as to the location of friendly positions, strengths, and vulnerabilities. Security efforts include providing early warning, destroying enemy reconnaissance units, and impeding and harassing elements of the enemy main body.
- **Disruption.** The goal of defensive concepts is to disrupt attacker synchronization. Counterattacks, indirect fires, obstacles, and the retention of key or decisive terrain prevent the enemy from concentrating strength against portions of the defense and disrupt enemy synchronization and flexibility.
- **Massed effects.** The successful defender concentrates combat power at the decisive time and place to obtain the advantage. To concentrate combat power, the defender may economize in some areas, retain a reserve, and maneuver to gain superiority.
- **Flexibility.** Flexibility originates from a detailed mission analysis, an understanding of the purpose of the unit, and aggressive reconnaissance and security. The defender must be agile enough to counter or avoid the attack and then strike back effectively. Flexibility requires that the mission commander see the battlefield—physically and through timely and accurate reports.
- **Maneuver.** The goal of maneuver is to allow the defender to take full advantage of the AO and to mass and concentrate when desirable. Maneuver, through movement in combination with fire, allows the defender to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy to accomplish the mission.
- **Operations in depth.** Operations in depth provide the simultaneous application of combat power throughout the AO to improve the chance of success while minimizing friendly casualties. These actions hurt, confuse, and paralyze an enemy force just as the enemy force is most exposed and vulnerable. Operations in depth prevent the enemy from gaining momentum in the attack.

DELAY

J-27. A *delaying operation* is an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 3-04). The delay is one of the most demanding defensive operations. It is usually conducted when the commander needs time to concentrate or withdraw forces, establish defenses in greater depth, economize in an area, or complete offensive actions elsewhere.

J-28. In a delay, the enemy slows its forward momentum when friendly forces press to repeatedly deploy for attack. After causing the enemy to deploy, the delaying force withdraws to new positions, trading space for time. A delay is typically done to buy time for friendly forces to regain the offensive. It is also done to buy time so that friendly forces can establish an effective defense or determine enemy intentions. When conducting a delay, the destruction of the enemy force is secondary to slowing its advance.

J-29. During a delay, units operate on extended frontages at great risk from advancing enemy forces. The tactical situation constantly changes with maneuver opportunities that exist for only extremely short periods of time. Subordinate leaders must have the flexibility to take immediate action to retain the integrity of the forces. This helps retain the freedom of maneuver and inflict maximum destruction on the enemy.

J-30. Normally, a delay operation is unlikely to be conducted in a sustainment area. However, bypassed enemy forces could create a situation in which a military police response force may be required to delay a threat to buy time for a base to establish defenses in greater depth or to delay an enemy until the arrival of the tactical combat force. Military police deliberately conduct a delay only when ordered to do so by higher headquarters, which will determine the size of the military police force that is required to conduct the mission.

TYPES OF DELAY

J-31. The two basic types of delay differ largely in the intent of the assigning commander and the degree of decisive engagement that may be required:

- **Delay in sector.** A delay in sector requires a unit to slow and defeat as much of the enemy as possible without sacrificing tactical integrity—the delaying force delays the enemy as long as possible while avoiding decisive engagement. This form of delay is assigned when force preservation is the highest priority and there is considerable depth to the AO.
- **Delay forward of a specified line, specified time, or event.** The unit must control the enemy attack and retain specified terrain to achieve a purpose that is relative to another element, such as setting the conditions for a counterattack, for the completion of defensive preparations, or for the movement of other forces or civilians. The focus of this delay mission is clearly on time, terrain, and enemy destruction. It carries a much higher risk, with the likelihood of all or part of the unit becoming decisively engaged. The timing of the operation is controlled graphically by a series of phase lines with associated dates and times to define the desired delay period. The unit must repeatedly fight the enemy, disengage a part of the force, conduct internal battle handover, and move rapidly to reposition and resume the fight.

DELAY TECHNIQUES

J-32. When executing a delay in sector or a time-related delay, the commander can choose from the techniques shown in table J-3.

Table J-3. Delay techniques

<i>Method of Delay</i>	<i>Use</i>	<i>Advantages</i>	<i>Disadvantages</i>
Delay from subsequent positions	• The AO is wide. • Forces do not allow themselves to be split.	• Masses fires of all available combat elements	• Has limited depth to delay positions • Has less available time to prepare each position • Is less flexible
Delay from alternate positions	• The AO is narrow. • Forces are adequate to be split between different positions.	• Allows positioning in depth • Allows more time for equipment and Soldier maintenance • Increases flexibility	• Requires continuous coordination • Requires the passage of lines • Engages only part of the force at one time
Legend: AO area of operations			

Delay From Subsequent Positions

J-33. The commander uses a delay from subsequent positions when the assigned AO is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more than a single tier of positions. In a delay from subsequent positions, delaying units are committed to each series of battle positions. The mission dictates the delay from one battle position to the next. The commander staggers the movement of delaying elements so that all elements are not moving at the same time.

J-34. When the unit receives the order to conduct the delay from its initial positions, one element (such as a company or a platoon) displaces and occupies its subsequent battle position. The rest of the unit maintains contact with the enemy until the first displacing element is in position to engage the enemy from the subsequent position. The first element then provides overwatch or a base of fire as other elements displace to subsequent positions. (See figure J-4.)




Figure J-4. Delay from subsequent positions

Delay From Alternate Positions

J-35. A delay from alternate positions is used when the delaying element has sufficient forces to occupy more than a single line of positions, normally in a narrow sector. In this method of delay, two or more units in a single AO occupy delaying positions in depth. As the first unit engages the enemy, the second occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for the operation. The first force disengages and passes around or through the second force. It then moves to the next position and prepares to reengage the enemy while the second force takes up the fight. This sequence continues until the delay operation is completed. (See figure J-5, page J-12.)

J-36. Alternate positions are normally used when the delaying force operates on a narrow front. A delay from alternate positions is particularly useful on the most dangerous avenues of approach because it offers greater security than a delay from successive positions. However, it requires more forces and continuous maneuver coordination. Additionally, delaying forces risk losing contact with the enemy between delay positions.




Figure J-5. Delay from alternate positions

DELAY TERMINATION

J-37. A delay operation terminates when the—

- Delaying force conducts a rearward passage of lines through a defending force.
- Delaying force reaches defensible terrain and transitions to the defense.
- Advancing enemy force reaches a culminating point.
- Delaying force goes on the offense after being reinforced.

J-38. If the advancing enemy force reaches a culmination point, the delaying force may maintain contact in current positions, withdraw to perform another mission, or transition to the offense. In all cases, the senior commander must plan for the expected outcome of the delay that is executed by a subordinate.

URBAN CONSIDERATIONS

J-39. A delay destroys enemy reconnaissance elements forward of the outskirts of the urban area, prevents the penetration of the urban area, and gains and maintains contact with the enemy to determine the strength and location of the main attack. Delays are planned by assigning platoon battle positions, platoon sectors, or both. Figure J-6 shows a company delay in urban terrain, with the company commander assigning platoon battle positions.




Figure J-6. Company delay in urban areas

J-40. Routes are planned to each battle position or within the sector to take advantage of the inherent cover and concealment that is afforded by urban terrain, such as hugging buildings and using shadows and subsurface areas.

HALTS

J-41. Whether a military police unit moves independently or as part of a larger element, an important component of the movement plan is predetermining security measures to take at halts. There are two types of halt formations: coil and herringbone:

- Coil formation.** The coil formation is an arrangement of vehicles that form a circle which provides 360° security. Military police elements use the coil formation to establish a perimeter defense during extended halts. The lead vehicle will halt in the direction of travel (12 o'clock) while the other vehicles position themselves to form a circular formation that covers suspected enemy avenues of approach. (See figure J-7, page J-14.)
- Herringbone formation.** The herringbone formation is an arrangement of vehicles at left and right angles to the direction of travel. Military police use the herringbone formation when the unit must assume a hasty defense with 360° security while remaining postured to resume movement. It is normally employed during temporary halts. If the terrain permits, vehicles should move off the route and stop at 45° angles, allowing the passage of vehicles through the center of the formation. (See figure J-8, page J-14.)




Figure J-7. Coil formation

J-42. Actions that are conducted during halts are based on many of the same factors as movement techniques. The most critical fundamental that military police leaders must enforce during a halt is the effective placement of vehicles to maintain 360° security. Additionally, leaders must assess possible locations of halts, ensuring that halt areas are—

- In a relatively secure area.
- Off the roadway where there is some natural cover and concealment.
- In an area where there is a view for 200 meters (218.72 yards) at each end of the element with no obstructions, such as curves or hills.
- In an area that is large enough to maintain the proper interval.
- In an area where local civilians can be kept away.
- In an area that is not heavily populated.
- In an area where HN police are present, if applicable.




Figure J-8. Herringbone formation

Note. In these examples, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the concept of the formation. In the field, the location and sequence of vehicles in the formation are based on mission requirements or are prescribed in the unit SOP and OPORD.

Legend:

OPORD	operation order
SOP	standard operating procedure

Figure J-8. Herringbone formation (continued)

DANGER AREAS

J-43. When analyzing the terrain during the METT-TC analysis of troop leading procedures, military police leaders may identify danger areas. A danger area refers to an area on the route where the terrain could expose the element to enemy observation, fire, or both. Examples of danger areas include—

- Open areas.
- Road junctions.
- Streams.
- Bridges.
- Defiles.
- Curves.

J-44. If possible, leaders plan to avoid danger areas, but sometimes they cannot. Military police make specific plans for crossing each known danger area and general plans for crossing unexpected danger areas. Leaders must quickly modify these plans to fit the tactical situation. The military police mission leader determines the appropriate movement technique that the unit will use to cross a danger area based on the—

- Amount of time available.
- Size of the patrol.
- Size of the danger area.
- Fields of fire into the area.
- Amount of security available.

J-45. To cross a danger area, the mission leader must designate near side and far side rally points, secure the near side and far side, and cross the danger area. When the military police element crosses a danger area, it does so as quickly and as carefully as possible. A small element may cross all at once, in pairs, or one team at a time. A large patrol normally crosses its elements one at a time. When a military police unit crosses a danger area independently or as the lead element of a larger force, it must perform the following actions:

- The mission leader positions the near side security teams far enough out on both flanks and to the rear of the crossing point to give warning of the approaching enemy and to overwatch the crossing element.
- The mission leader directs the far side security team to cross the danger area when the near side security is in place.
- The far side security team crosses quickly, reconnoiters, and secures the far side of the danger area. The area on the far side must be large enough for the entire element.
- The mission leader signals the rest of the element to cross when he knows that the far side is safe.
- Each element moves to an overwatch position or to the far side rally point until told to continue movement.
- The near side security teams cross and rejoin the element when the unit has crossed the danger area.

Note. The above actions are also used when crossing a smaller unit (such as a squad) across a danger area.

MANEUVER

J-46. Maneuver is the technique used for moving while in contact with the enemy. Maneuver uses movement, in combination with fire, to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. One element moves to a position where it can engage the enemy while another element supports that movement with a base of fire. When effectively executed, maneuver leaves enemy elements vulnerable by forcing them to fight in at least two directions, robbing them of initiative and ultimately limiting their tactical options. Military police leaders must prepare to quickly transition from movement to maneuver to minimize the effects of the enemy.

J-47. Military police maneuver by using mounted techniques, dismounted techniques, or a combination of both. Leaders choose a movement technique based on the situation. Mounted military police conduct movement techniques, such as traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. (See paragraphs I-15 through I-23.) Dismounted military police typically execute individual movement techniques (such as the low crawl, high crawl, and 3- to 5-second rush) in squad-size elements:

- **Crawl.** Crawls are executed when the military police squad faces intense enemy fire and has little cover. Soldiers use the low or high crawl, depending on the particular situation and the requirement for speed. This method is slow, but it reduces exposure to enemy observation and fire. Soldiers must place suppressive fire on the enemy when they are not moving forward. If necessary, the members of the squad may advance into and through enemy positions by using the crawl.
- **Rush.** Three- to 5-second rushes are used when cover is available. The squad makes a series of short 3- to 5-second rushes to avoid accurate enemy fire. Movement is in a staggered line with enough lateral clearance between Soldiers to allow for effective fire to the front. Movement is rapid and accompanied by a heavy volume of fire.

BASE-OF-FIRE FORCE

J-48. The combination of fire and movement requires a base of fire in which elements of the military police unit remain stationary and provide protection for bounding forces by preventing the enemy from reacting to the bounding force. The base-of-fire force occupies positions that afford effective cover and concealment, unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire. The selection of the base-of-fire position is based on a careful study of the terrain and known or likely enemy locations.

J-49. When the enemy situation is vague or unknown, the base-of-fire position is selected in a manner that allows the base-of-fire force to place effective fire on terrain that dominates the area in which the bounding force will traverse. Once in position, the base-of-fire force is responsible for suppressing known enemy forces and scanning assigned sectors of observation. It also identifies previously unknown enemy elements and suppresses them. The protection that is provided by the base-of-fire force allows the bounding unit to continue its movement and retain the initiative, even when under enemy observations or within range of enemy weapons.

J-50. Maneuver is decentralized in nature; decisions on where and when to establish a base of fire are made at the appropriate level. These decisions normally fall to the leader who knows which enemy forces can engage the bounding force and which friendly forces are available to serve as the base of fire.

BOUNDING FORCE

J-51. Movement in a maneuver situation is inherently dangerous. It is complicated by the obvious potential for harm that is posed by enemy weapons and by the uncertainty that is presented by new terrain and other factors. Actions that are taken by the bounding force include—

- Taking full advantage of the cover and concealment that the terrain provides.
- Exploiting the use of restrictive terrain, intervening terrain features, and intervisibility lines and avoiding skylining.
- Continuously scanning assigned sectors of observation.
- Minimizing exposure to enemy fire by remaining within the range at which the base-of-fire force can effectively suppress known, likely, or suspected enemy positions.
- Determining the length of bounds according to the terrain. In restricted and severely restricted terrain, bounds are generally much shorter than in areas that are more open.

- Remaining focused on the goal of gaining a positional advantage, which is used to destroy the enemy by direct and indirect fire.
- Remaining flexible to adjust to plan modifications. When the bounding force comes under direct fire from the enemy, it transitions to the base-of-fire force, which allows the original base-of-fire force to become the maneuver force.

ACTIONS ON CONTACT

J-52. When military police encounter enemy forces, they must quickly execute actions on contact. The mission leader first takes measures to protect the element, determines enemy capabilities, and then decides on a COA. To properly execute actions on contact, military police execute actions that are consistent with the following fundamentals of reconnaissance:

- Remain focused on the reconnaissance objective.
- Report quickly and accurately.
- Maintain contact with the enemy.
- Retain the freedom to maneuver.
- Develop the situation rapidly.

J-53. *Actions on contact* is a series of combat actions, often conducted nearly simultaneously, taken upon contact with the enemy to develop the situation (ADRP 3-90). The mission leader specifies the actions on contact for the unit. These specific instructions include engagement criteria and the desired COA, based on the size and activity of the enemy force encountered. Military police develop the situation and arrive at and execute the desired COA more rapidly by knowing these details before the mission. The unit strives to make contact with the smallest possible element. The goal is to observe the enemy while remaining undetected. This gives the unit the greatest possible flexibility to maneuver and develop the situation.

J-54. Leaders employ actions on contact by using a logical, well-organized process:

- Deploy and report.
- Evaluate and develop the situation.
- Choose a COA.
- Execute the selected COA.

This process provides an orderly framework that enables the unit and its elements to respond to initial contact and apply sound decisionmaking and timely actions to complete the operation.

DEPLOY AND REPORT

J-55. When a military police element makes contact with an enemy, lead elements deploy into positions from which they can fire, observe, or move to defeat the enemy. If elements in contact receive direct fire, they immediately suppress enemy weapons. If the enemy is visually located but the unit has not received fire, the unit holds fire until friendly elements are in the best position to engage the enemy. If the initial contact reveals that the enemy is clearly superior, the unit does not risk moving toward him. Instead, it holds in place, returns fire, and serves as a base of fire for the company.

J-56. The mission leader immediately reports enemy contact to the company commander by using a spot report, supplying as much detail as possible and providing frequent subsequent reports to update the situation as necessary. The mission leader must ensure that reports are precise and on time to be useful. Timely, accurate, and complete reports are essential throughout actions on contact.

EVALUATE AND DEVELOP THE SITUATION

J-57. The mission leader evaluates and develops the situation by determining enemy location, disposition, and strength. The mission leader quickly gathers the information that he needs to make a decision on the COA through personal reconnaissance or squad leader reports. At a minimum, the mission leader needs to confirm the friendly situation and determine the enemy situation by using the size, activity, location, unit,

time, and equipment report. (See appendix F.) The mission leader analyzes gathered information to determine critical operational considerations, including—

- The size of the enemy element.
- The location, composition, activity, orientation, and capability of the enemy force.
- The effects of obstacles and terrain.
- Probable enemy intentions.
- A method to gain positional advantage over the enemy.
- Friendly situation (location, strength, and capabilities).
- Possible friendly COAs to achieve the specified end state.

CHOOSE A COURSE OF ACTION

J-58. After developing the situation and determining that there is enough information to make a decision, the mission leader selects a COA that meets the requirements of the commander's intent and is within the unit capabilities. The mission leader has the following options for selecting a COA:

- If development of the situation reveals no need for change, the mission leader directs the element to execute the original plan.
- If analysis shows that the original plan is still valid but refinement is necessary, the mission leader informs the commander (before execution, if possible) and issues a fragmentary order to refine the plan.
- If analysis shows that the original plan needs revision but the selected COA still complies with the commander's intent, the mission leader informs the commander (before execution, if possible) and issues a fragmentary order to retask subordinate elements.
- If analysis shows that the original plan deviates from the commander's intent and needs revision, the mission leader must report the situation and, based on known information in response to an unforeseen enemy or battlefield situation, recommend an alternative COA to the commander.
- If the battlefield picture is still vague, the mission leader must direct the element to continue to develop the situation. This allows the mission leader to gather the information that is needed to clarify a vague battlefield picture. The mission leader then uses one of the first four options to report the situation, choose a COA, and direct further action.

J-59. The military police leader considers various possible COAs, such as—

- **Fixing the enemy.** To close with the enemy, the assaulting force must suppress enemy fire by blocking enemy vision with an obscurant or by shooting at the enemy with enough accuracy and volume of fire to drive it from the firing position. Once the enemy is suppressed, the assaulting force maneuvers toward the enemy position, concentrating efforts against the enemy flank, rear, or other weak points. Suppressive fire fixes the enemy so that it cannot reinforce weak points.
- **Assaulting the enemy.** The purpose of the assault is to destroy the enemy position. As the unit deploys and moves through the assault position, supporting fire should increase to its greatest rate. Machine guns are deployed near the assault position to provide continuous supporting fire. As elements of the unit close with the enemy, they may alternate as overwatch and assault elements. Assault teams move as close to supporting fire as possible. As fire is shifted, teams in the assaulting element deliver intense small-arms fire, throw hand grenades, and close with and kill the enemy. The assault continues until enemy resistance is destroyed. The assault is conducted over a short distance that is covered quickly. It is concentrated where enemy defenses are quickly overrun.
- **Breaking contact.** The mission leader identifies the enemy as a superior force and makes the decision to break contact. The unit breaks contact by using fire and movement. The unit continues to move until the enemy cannot observe or place effective fire on the unit.
- **Bypassing the enemy.** The mission leader may choose or receive orders to bypass the enemy. A *bypass* is a tactical mission task in which the commander directs the unit to maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force (FM 3-90-1).

EXECUTE THE SELECTED COURSE OF ACTION

J-60. When executing the selected COA, the mission leader must direct the engagement and maintain control of movement and fires. As the unit executes the COA, additional enemy information becomes available. Based on the new details of the enemy situation, the mission leader may have to alter the COA during execution.

J-61. The military police element continues to execute the selected or refined COA until it accomplishes the original mission, receives a fragmentary order from the commander that changes the mission or COA, or receives orders to execute consolidation and reorganization of the objective.

J-62. The mission leader keeps the commander abreast of the situation with spot and situation reports. Key information that the commander needs includes the number, type, and location of enemy elements that the unit observed, engaged, destroyed, or bypassed.

CONTACT BREAKS

J-63. A military police element breaks contact when the enemy is clearly an overwhelming force or if directed by higher headquarters. A dismounted element takes the following actions to break contact:

- The mission leader designates an element to suppress the enemy with direct fire as the base-of-fire element.
- The mission leader orders distance, direction, a terrain feature, or a last rally point for the movement of the first element.
- The mission leader calls for and adjusts indirect fire to suppress enemy positions.
- The base-of-fire element continues to suppress the enemy.
- The bounding squad or team uses the terrain and/or obscurants to conceal its movement and bounds to an overwatch position.
- The bounding element occupies its overwatch position and suppresses the enemy with accurate fire.
- The base-of-fire element moves to its next covered and concealed position.
- The unit continues to suppress the enemy and bound until it is no longer in contact with the enemy.
- First-line leaders account for Soldiers, report to respective supervisors, reorganize as necessary, and continue the mission.
- The mission leader reports the situation to higher headquarters.

J-64. A mounted element takes the following actions to break contact:

- The mission leader directs the vehicles in contact to place accurate suppressive fire on enemy positions. (See appendix M for additional information.)
- The mission leader orders distance, direction, a terrain feature, or a last objective rally point over the radio for movement of the first section.
- The mission leader calls for and adjusts indirect fire to suppress enemy positions.
- Gunners in base-of-fire vehicles continue to engage the enemy. They attempt to gain fire superiority to support the bound of the moving squad.
- The bounding squad moves to assume the overwatch position by using the terrain and/or obscurant to mask movement.
- The unit continues to suppress the enemy and bounds until it is no longer receiving enemy fire.
- Squad leaders account for Soldiers, report to the mission leader, reorganize as necessary, and continue the mission.
- The mission leader reports the situation to higher headquarters. (See *Warrior Battle Drills*, 07-3-D9505, Break Contact.)

PLATOON CONSOLIDATION

J-65. *Consolidation* is organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy (FM 3-90-1). The platoon takes actions to secure the objective and defend against an enemy counterattack. Actions taken to consolidate include the following:

- Platoons eliminate remaining enemy resistance and secure detainees.
- Squads reestablish 360° security and LP/OPs.
- Soldiers execute procedures for a hasty defense to prepare for possible counterattacks.
- Snipers (if available) are used for targets of opportunity. They should be employed with the LP/OP or at a vantage point on or behind defensive positions.
- Platoons reestablish communications to higher headquarters and throughout the platoon.
- Soldiers replace and/or emplace obstacles, mines, and early warning devices as necessary.
- The platoon leader reassigns sectors of fire for each vehicle and squad, ensuring that firing positions remain mutually supporting.
- The platoon leader positions crew-served weapons to cover the most likely and most dangerous avenue of approach.

PLATOON REORGANIZATION

J-66. *Reorganization* is all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specified level of combat capability (FM 3-90-1). Reorganization includes the measures that are taken by the platoon leader to maintain the combat effectiveness of the platoon or to return it to a specified level of combat capability. Responsibilities during reorganization include—

- Reestablishing the chain of command.
- Treating and evacuating casualties according to the casualty evacuation plan.
- Ensuring that crew-served weapons are manned and positioned on likely avenues of approach.
- Conducting an inventory and coordinating for resupply.
- Relaying platoon information to higher headquarters. The platoon sergeant consolidates liquid, ammunition, casualty, equipment, and fuel reports from squad leaders and relays the following information:
 - **Liquid.** The amount of water that each Soldier has left.
 - **Ammunition.** The amount of ammunition that the platoon has per Soldier after redistribution.
 - **Casualties.** The number of casualties that the platoon encountered.
 - **Equipment.** The special equipment that remains with the platoon.
 - **Fuel.** Mounted units that provide the fuel status.
- Redistributing and resupplying ammunition, weapons, and fuel. Squad leaders pass out additional ammunition (if available) or divide the remainder equally throughout the squad.
- Redistributing critical equipment (radios, CBRN equipment, night vision devices).
- Ensuring that detainees and enemy materials are collected, reported, and evacuated if possible.

HASTY LANDING ZONE

J-67. Military police may require rotary-wing assets for events, such as medical evacuation, troop evacuation, or detainee transport. In such an event, the preparation of a hasty landing zone is critical to successful withdrawal. The establishment of a landing site is an important function of military police ground personnel. There are several considerations when selecting and preparing an area for a helicopter to successfully land, such as size, surface, obstacles, and marking. (See FM 3-21.38 for additional details regarding the establishment of a helicopter landing zone.)

LANDING ZONE SIZE

J-68. Prescribing definite measurements for landing sites is difficult since they vary with temperature, altitude, terrain, loading conditions, and individual helicopter characteristics. As a general guideline, the minimum requirement for light helicopters is a cleared area of 30 meters (32.81 yards) in diameter with an approach and departure zone that is clear of obstructions. However, the CH-47 Chinook cannot land in an area that is smaller than 80 meters (87.49 yards) in diameter.

LANDING ZONE SURFACE

J-69. The surface should be as flat and level as possible and have less than a 7° slope. Choose a landing point with a hard surface to support the weight of the aircraft to prevent helicopters from becoming mired, creating excessive dust, or blowing snow. The surface of the landing point must allow a fully loaded helicopter to land, restart, and leave again without sinking into the ground.

OBSTACLE REDUCTION

J-70. Military police who request evacuation must take measures to improve landing zone surfaces so that aircraft can land. Remove obstacles from the landing area. (In general, an obstacle is a stump, rock, hole, or other object that is 18 inches (45.72 centimeters) or larger and might damage the aircraft or impede aircraft landing.) Additionally, remove objects that are likely to be blown about the landing area by the wind from a rotor. Clearly mark obstacles (cables, wires, antennas at or near the landing zone) that cannot be readily seen by a pilot. Red lights are normally used at night to mark obstacles that cannot be easily eliminated within a landing site. In combat situations, it is impractical (for security reasons) to mark obstacles. Advise pilots of existing conditions by radio if obstacles or other hazards cannot be marked.

LANDING ZONE MARKS

J-71. Landing zone markings must be visible from the air. During the day, the marking of the landing zone can be accomplished by using a VS-17 panel, smoke, or signal mirror. At night, landing zones should have a recognition signal, such as a swinging chemical light or strobe light, to make the landing zone easier to find. Nonessential lights should be turned off to preserve the pilot's night vision, and vehicle lights that illuminate the landing zone should be on low beam.

VEHICLE RECOVERY

J-72. Military police are organized and equipped to conduct mounted operations; consequently, the allocation of vehicles makes recovery an inherent responsibility of military police. Disabled vehicles diminish the effectiveness of training and decrease the unit ability to accomplish the mission. For recovery efforts to be successful, operators and leaders at all levels must be trained on recovery operations. (See table J-4 for the eight-step recovery method.)

Table J-4. Eight-step recovery method

Step	Action Required
1	Reconnoiter the area. - Check the terrain for the best approach to the load, and then determine the method of rigging and the availability of natural anchors. A recovery crew must know the problem before making decisions. - Conduct a complete ground survey of the area, and then select the best route of approach to the disabled vehicle to prevent possible disablement of the recovery vehicle. When selecting the evacuation route, ensure that the military route classification number will support the combination vehicle classification (recovery plus towed vehicles). Refer to FM 3-34.170 for further information.

Table J-4. Eight-step recovery method (continued)

Step	Action Required
3	Calculate the ratio. Compute an estimated mechanical advantage for the rigging by dividing the resistance of the load (step 2) by the available effort (the capacity of the winch).
4	Obtain resistance. • Compute the tackle and total load resistance. Multiply the percent of the load resistance (as determined in step 2) by the number of sheaves in the rigging. The determined resistance of the tackle added to the load resistance equals the total resistance. • Multiply the winch capacity by the mechanical advantage (as computed in step 3) to determine the total available effort. If the available effort is more than the total resistance, proceed to step 5. If it is less, return to step 3 and add the mechanical advantage.
5	Verify the solution. • Compute the line forces to compare with the winch and dead line capacities. Divide the total load resistance (step 4) by the mechanical advantage (step 3). The result is the fall line force. The fall line force must be less than the capacity of the available effort. Therefore, this step of the recovery procedure is the key to solving the problem. Note. When verifying the solution, if the computed fall line force is greater than the effort, the mechanical advantage must be increased. No physical work has occurred up to this point. As a result, no time is lost moving or reerecting rigging equipment. • Compute the dead line force, determine the required strength of the equipment capacity, and choose the correct equipment to use as dead lines.
6	Erect the rigging. • Orient the crew, instruct them on how to assemble the tackle, and then move to a safe location. • Advise the crew members of the plan, direct them to erect the tackle, and assign specific tasks for the desired mechanical advantage. (Crew members that have finished their tasks should assist those who are having difficulty. The crew members can save time by having a thorough knowledge of the tackle to be erected and by helping each other.) • Observe safety precautions.
7	Recheck the rigging. • Ensure that the tackle is rigged for proper and safe operation. • Direct the operator to remove most of the slack from the lines and to inspect for correct assembly. If corrections must be made, direct the crew members to make them. • Explain the details of the operations to the operators of the recovery vehicle and the other vehicles involved. Direct operators to watch for signals and to be prepared to act on them. Then move to a safe location where signals can be observed by vehicle operators.
8	Signal ready. • Signal the operators to apply winch power and recover the load. Be alert; ensure that nothing obstructs the operation of the equipment and that personnel on the ground remain in a safe location.
Legend: FM field manual	

SELF-RECOVERY

J-73. Self-recovery starts at the location where the equipment becomes mired or disabled. The team uses basic-issue items or on-vehicle equipment items to perform self-recovery.

J-74. Vehicle recovery is easiest when the tires still have traction and when team members can help the vehicle move through the original tire tracks. When the vehicle is stuck in snow, sand, or mud, the tire pressure can be lowered to increase traction.

J-75. When the equipment has a mechanical failure, the team uses the equipment technical manual to perform troubleshooting procedures with the tools that are available in the basic-issue items or on-vehicle equipment. When self-recovery fails, the team requests assistance from another available like-vehicle in the squad.

LIKE-RECOVERY

J-76. Like-recovery is used when self-recovery fails. The principle is to use another piece of equipment, of the same weight class or heavier, to extract or tow the mired equipment by using tow straps, tow bars, chains, or tow cables—at least one tow bar per military police squad is standard. Using like-vehicles is usually the quickest method of recovery because they are readily available. When self-recovery and like-recovery are not practical or are unavailable, use dedicated company recovery assets.

DEDICATED RECOVERY

J-77. Dedicated recovery is used when self-recovery or like-recovery is not possible because of the severity of the situation, safety considerations, or inability to use like-vehicle assets that are employed in the primary mission. Squad leaders must ensure that recovery vehicles are used only when absolutely necessary. Dedicated recovery vehicles must be returned as quickly as possible to a central location to support the company.

TOW BARS

J-78. Before attempting to tow a disabled vehicle, refer to the vehicle technical manual. Be familiar with the location, features, and operation of the tow bar components. (Some tow bars have operator instruction decals mounted on them.) Ensure that the proper tow bar is used for the equipment that is being towed.

J-79. Tow bars can be used to tow any vehicle up to the gross weight of the towing capacity of the tow bar. Before attaching a tow bar to a disabled vehicle, chock the wheels and set the emergency brake. After attaching the tow bar to a disabled vehicle, remove the chocks and release the emergency brake before moving.

J-80. The following are general rules for towing:

- Use a tow bar in preference to chains, ropes, or cables. Tow bars keep the towed vehicle from running into the towing vehicle.
- Connect cables, chains, or ropes to the pintle of the towing vehicle and to the lifting shackles of the towed vehicle.
- Proceed slowly at 5 to 10 miles per hour (8.05 to 16.09 kilometers per hour) because the towed vehicle will skid on turns at higher speeds. Avoid quick stops.

- Connect a chain between the two vehicles for safety in case the bar breaks or becomes disconnected.
- Ensure that a vehicle operator is in every towed motor vehicle to control it unless a wrecker is towing the vehicle.

DANGER

Never walk or stand between vehicles being towed. The sudden forward movement or lurching of a vehicle could result in immediate death or permanent injury.

Appendix K

Explosive Hazards

IEDs, suicide bombers, and UXOs pose deadly and pervasive threats to Soldiers and civilians in operational areas all over the world. Soldiers must know how to identify and react to these and other explosive hazards. This appendix provides a fundamental overview.

AWARENESS, IDENTIFICATION, AND DETECTION

K-1. The modern battlefield is lethal and complex and is littered with explosive hazards that contain an explosive component. These hazards, which are often concealed, unmarked, or unknown until Soldiers are within the hazard area, pose an ever-present threat to personnel and equipment and can have a major impact on force mobility.

K-2. Military police must be trained on the recognition, marking, and reporting of explosive hazards. They must be constantly vigilant for indicators (anything out of the ordinary for the area, and regardless of how subtle) that will help locate and neutralize explosive hazard threats. (Appendix L discusses explosive hazard detection in the urban environment.) Some examples of indicators include—

- An exposed wire, cord, or fuze protruding from an object that usually has no such attachment.
- An unusual smell, sound, or substance emanating from an object.
- An item that is oddly light or heavy for its size.
- An object that seems out of place in its surroundings.
- An object or area that locals are obviously avoiding.
- An object covered with written threats or whose possessor uses verbal threats.
- A would-be suicide bomber's behavior or clothing.
- An object that is thrown at personnel, or facilities.
- Turned-up soil in a pattern.
- Valuable materials that are not claimed by locals.
- Unattended vehicles, trailers, or boxes along major travel routes.

DANGER

Treat suspected explosive hazards as potentially lethal hazards. Failure to comply may result in immediate death or permanent injury.

K-3. Explosive hazards can be detected through a variety of visual, physical, mechanical, and biological means, including aerial imagery and reconnaissance, ground search techniques, mechanical clearance operations, and specialized MWD teams. Understanding where explosive hazards may be placed may also be key in helping to visually locate the hazard. Examples of potential explosive hazard locations include—

- Frequently used roads and key intersections.
- Bridge bypasses and fording sites.
- Obvious turnarounds and bypasses.

- Roadblocks and checkpoints.
- Key logistics points.
- Trails, paths, and cleared spots in wooded areas.
- Open fields or grassland suitable for helicopter landing sites.
- Overgrown areas near culverts or occupied areas.
- Roads that have been recently repaired.
- Political or historical landmarks.
- Religious or public gathering places.
- Police or military headquarters or recruiting stations.

K-4. Prevention activities focus on actively stopping the creation, emplacement, and detonation of an explosive hazard from occurring by—

- Conducting forensic operations to track bomb makers and handlers.
- Conducting persistent surveillance.
- Training to improve the human detection of potential hazard locations.
- Targeting known enemy personnel (bomb makers, leaders, financiers).
- Identifying and targeting the infrastructure and logistics capabilities (suppliers and bomb factories).
- Removing piles of trash, debris, and abandoned vehicles from main traffic routes.
- Denying the enemy the opportunity to emplace explosive hazards (through methods such as presence patrols, OPs, checkpoints, and aggressive surveillance operations).
- Rewarding local nationals for their cooperation in reporting the locations of caches, bomb manufacturing, or IED emplacing activities.
- Denying critical explosive hazard-related supplies to the enemy.
- Increasing awareness of enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures and their effectiveness to U.S., coalition, and HN forces.
- Conducting surveillance of at-risk persons or groups for suicide bomber recruitment.
- Supporting the creation of jobs and the hiring of unemployed local nationals.

TYPES

K-5. Explosive hazards that are currently encountered in the operational environment can be broken down into five basic, and sometimes overlapping, categories:

- UXO and ammunition
- Booby traps.
- IEDs (including suicide bombers).
- Captured enemy ammunition.
- Bulk explosives.

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AND AMMUNITION

K-6. A UXO is an enemy or friendly force ordnance that has failed to detonate. It can be the result of a recent operation from past conflicts; and it can be found on the battlefield, in urban areas, or anywhere in an AO. A UXO may pose no immediate threat; but it can cause injuries, loss of life, or damage to equipment if appropriate actions are not taken. In general, Soldiers should not touch or move toward UXO because some types of ordnance have magnetic or motion-sensitive fusing. ATTP 4-32.2 and FM 3-34.210 provide illustrations and identifying characteristics of the four types of UXO: dropped, projected, thrown, and placed.

Dropped

K-7. Dropped ordnance is dispensed or dropped from an aircraft. This category includes—

- Bombs, small to very large, with metal casings, tail fins, lugs, and fuzes. They may contain high explosives, chemicals, or other hazmat.
- Dispensers that look similar to bombs but may have holes or ports in them. Do not approach them; submunitions might be scattered around them.
- Very sensitive submunitions, such as small bombs, grenades, and mines. Mines dropped from aircraft (scatterable mines) land on the surface and are often more easily detected than placed mines.

Projected

K-8. Projected ordnance is fired from a launcher or gun tube and includes—

- Projectiles (high explosives, chemicals, proximity fuzing, illumination, and submunitions).
- Mortar rounds (high explosives, chemicals, white phosphorous, and illumination).

Thrown (Hand Grenades)

K-9. Hand grenades are small items that may be held in one hand and thrown. They can be classified by their use as fragmentation, offensive, antitank, obscurant, or illumination. Grenades have three main parts: a body, a fuze (with a pull ring and a safety clip assembly), and a filler. Never touch or move a hand grenade found in the AO even if it appears to be unarmed. Consider grenades to be booby-trapped. Only explosive ordnance clearance agents or explosive ordnance disposal personnel should be used to dispose of grenades.

Placed (Mines)

K-10. Placed ordnance is often referred to as land mines or mines. Mines that are emplaced by hand may be hidden or buried under the ground. Mines may be placed in large, concentrated areas (minefields) or at random (nuisance mines) within the AO. Both can contain antipersonnel and antitank mines. Visual detection of land mines may be difficult for Soldiers.

BOOBY TRAPS

K-11. Booby traps are typically hidden or disguised explosive devices that are rigged on common items to detonate unexpectedly. They may also be employed as antihandling devices on UXO, emplaced mines, or IEDs.

K-12. Booby traps are victim-actuated dumb munitions, which do not have the ability to discern between military and civilian targets or the priority of the target. U.S. forces may encounter booby traps during operations and must be prepared to counter their effects.

K-13. In conventional operations, the majority of booby traps that are found in the combat zone are constructed using military stores and ammunition. In urban areas and in counterinsurgency operations, booby traps are constructed by using whatever material is available.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

K-14. IEDs are nonstandard explosive devices that are designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. As an obstacle, the IED is emplaced to fix, turn, block, or disrupt the movement or maneuver of U.S. military personnel, coalition forces, or HN civilians. When used in conjunction with other obstacles or as a close contact weapon, IEDs are employed to ambush military forces; assassinate key military, government, or civilian figures; or target a particular group or organization.

K-15. The sophistication of the IED depends on the maker. IEDs range from being very simple to very complex and are equipped with booby traps, antihandling devices, and electronic-initiation devices to prevent

disarming. IEDs can be singular explosive hazards or they may be multiple when the devices are daisy-chained together. Anything that can explode may be used to make IEDs. Examples include—

- Artillery rounds that contain high explosive or white phosphorous.
- Mines (antitank or antipersonnel).
- Plastic explosives.
- Powerful powdered explosives.
- Ammonium nitrate (fertilizer) combined with diesel fuel in containers.

K-16. Common types of IEDs that military police may encounter during unified land operations include—

- **Command-wired.** A command-wired IED is initiated by a wire that is attached to a power source. The use of a command-wired IED mandates that the operator is physically attached to the explosive device. This type of IED is also frequently used in conjunction with aiming stakes to ensure accuracy.
- **Remote-controlled.** The remote-controlled IED, also known as a radio-controlled IED, is initiated electronically with a wireless method that consists of a transmitter and receiver. Remote-controlled IEDs require an OP from which to time the remote detonation. A remote-controlled IED is typically used to stop a convoy, conduct an ambush, or detonate a secondary remote-controlled IED on a halted convoy.
- **Explosively formed penetrator.** An explosively formed penetrator is an IED that is constructed from a pipe, fitted with a concave liner, and usually made of copper (brass and steel have been used, but not as frequently) because copper is denser and has a lower melting point. The acceleration and deformation of the metal causes it to melt and flow into a shaft that is also pushed to super high speed by the explosion. The small shaft of heavy molten metal moving at high speed forces tremendous energy into one small spot on the target. Upon detonation, the liner forms into a lethal projectile. A detonation charge causes the liner to form into a hyper-velocity or focused energy projectile that is capable of penetrating armored vehicles.
- **Vehicle-borne.** A vehicle-borne IED is a vehicle that is filled with explosives. The vehicle may be driven or towed to a target and can be moving or stationary. The vehicle-borne IED may be initiated in a variety of ways. The nature of the initiation device will depend on whether the initiator remains inside the vehicle. The initiation method of a vehicle-borne IED should be spelled out in reports (remote-controlled vehicle-borne IED, command-wired vehicle-borne IED, timed vehicle-borne IED, suicide vehicle-borne IED).
- **Victim-operated.** The victim-operated IED is also known as the victim-actuated IED. It is initiated by the actions of an unsuspecting person or by one who is willing to commit suicide. Examples of this type of initiation may be the use of tripwire, pressure plate, bait, or passive infrared sensor initiation. An example of the bait technique may include newly trained HN security forces on patrol who naively pick up a used AK-47 magazine that is attached to an explosive device. The victim-operated IED is placed so that it is not visible to the initiator but is deadly just the same.
- **Suicide-activated.** The suicide-activated IED is also known as a suicide bomber. The explosives are attached to a person. The person who carries the IED moves into kill range of the target and then initiates the explosives. This type of IED is often initiated with a plunger trigger or a reverse plunger device, also known as a dead man's switch. The reverse plunger device requires the carrier to maintain pressure on the trigger until the carrier is ready to detonate the explosives. This system is used so that even if the carrier is stopped by gunfire, the device will still detonate. These initiation systems have also been used with a small delay built into the trigger. The carrier can be shot and the trigger released, but the explosion will not occur for several seconds, giving the unsuspecting shooters time to walk up on the body of the carrier.

K-17. The suicide bomber is possibly the most difficult challenge for Soldiers to identify and defeat. This is done by maintaining situational awareness, avoiding complacency, and recognizing a would-be suicide bomber's behavior, motivation, style of clothing, and mental or emotional state before a detonation occurs. Full body X-rays and similar technological tools, where available, help to see what is often hidden under clothing, but the best detection is from a distance and not when in close proximity.

CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITION

K-18. Captured enemy ammunition includes the ammunition products and components that are produced for or used by a foreign force that is or was hostile to the United States and is under the control of a DOD component. The term includes confined gaseous, liquid, and solid propellants; explosives; pyrotechnics; chemical and riot-control agents; obscurants and incendiaries (including bulk explosives); chemical warfare agents; chemical munitions; rockets; guided and ballistic missiles; bombs; warheads; mortar rounds; artillery ammunition; small demolition charges; and devices and components of the above-mentioned items. Captured enemy ammunition can also include North Atlantic Treaty Organization or U.S. manufactured munitions that may not have been under U.S. custody or control.

K-19. Captured enemy ammunition normally does not pose an immediate threat to the force. However, personnel must take care to ensure that the captured enemy ammunition is not booby-trapped or sabotaged. Chemical munitions without markings or with unconventional markings may be intermixed with the captured enemy ammunition. Captured enemy ammunition may range from only a few rounds of ammunition and rifles to the entire enemy ammunition supply point. Units that are capturing or locating captured enemy ammunition should mark and report it to higher headquarters to ensure that the proper personnel are dispatched to destroy or handle the munitions and arms.

BULK EXPLOSIVES

K-20. The term *bulk explosives* refers to explosives that do not normally have military applications but may be found within the AO. Bulk explosives are often used in civilian quarrying or mining operations; however, the enemy can use these explosives as ammunition. Intelligence gathering can identify and determine the location of possible supplies of bulk explosives and their disposition before beginning operations. Units that locate possible stores of bulk explosives should report and handle bulk explosives the same as captured enemy ammunition.

SIGNS AND MARKERS

K-21. Use signs or markers to identify hazardous areas and provide a warning to military personnel and the local population about the presence of explosive hazards. A hazard marker is used to indicate explosive hazards when signs are not available or when local conditions prevent their effective use, such as when the local population repeatedly removes signs. The words should represent the predominant hazard (mine, UXO, booby trap), and the symbol should indicate danger in a manner that will be recognized nationally and locally.

K-22. Hazard signs and markers must be readily identifiable in daylight at a distance of 30 meters (98.43 feet) and be distinguishable from other types of markers and signs. Hazard signs and markers should not be constructed of munition casings, materials that may have contained explosives, or discarded weapon systems. Markings must be of a distinct and durable nature and must be visible to a person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area. Make signs according to SOP and higher headquarters guidance. If vegetation prohibits the use of markers or signs, a blockade or physical barrier must be considered.

RESPONSE

K-23. A progressive response level approach to suspected explosive hazards allows for the effective utilization of explosive hazard disposal assets. (See FM 3-34.210 for additional information.) This is especially critical in high-intensity operations where resources are crucial. The four levels of progressive approach are—

- Warfighter.
- Engineer.
- Explosive ordnance clearance agent.
- Explosive ordnance disposal.

WARFIGHTER

K-24. All Soldiers are responsible for confirm, clear, call, cordon, and control when a suspected explosive hazard is discovered. These actions must be performed based on METT-TC.

Confirm

K-25. Confirm the presence of the suspected explosive hazard. This should be done from a safe distance when possible. Use hard cover and spotting equipment (binoculars and scopes) to the maximum extent possible. From a safe position, conduct 5- and 25-meter (16.40- and 82.02-feet) checks to ensure that no secondary devices are present.

K-26. When in convoys, the first vehicle to identify an IED (or other explosive hazard) should activate the appropriate turn signal to indicate contact and use a unit-designated IED marking system. The occupants of the nearest vehicle (more than 100 meters [328 feet] from the IED) with a radio must transmit the location of the IED to the remainder of the convoy by using vehicle interval call signs and indicate the distance, direction, and description of the threat.

Clear

K-27. Clear personnel away from the suspected explosive hazard. Mark the location, and note the direction and distance to the hazard. Move to a minimum distance of 300 meters (984 feet) from the suspected explosive hazard. The convoy commander or patrol leader at the scene decides the size of area to clear. Detonation may be imminent if the device was armed before being located. Personnel should make maximum use of hard cover, ensuring that they are out of the direct line of site from the suspected area to cleared positions. If cover cannot be obtained, maximize the distance from the device.

Call

K-28. While the area around the explosive hazard is being cleared, a 9-line explosive hazard spot report should be called in. This report includes the necessary information for the unit tactical operations center to assess the situation and prepare an appropriate response.

Cordon

K-29. Cordon off the established danger area. Establish an incident control point for follow-on agencies (weapons intelligence team). The purpose of the cordon is to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the site (for their own safety and the safety of first responders), to preserve the scene for further exploitation, and to provide outward protection and security against command-initiated explosive hazards.

K-30. Cordon off at least 300 meters (984 feet) from a small device; 1,000 meters (3,280 feet) for a van-size device; and 2,000 meters (6,562 feet) for a truck-size device. As part of the cordon, leaders should—

- Direct personnel out of the danger area.
- Establish escalation-of-force measures.
- Position jammers/counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare devices to best protect the element.
- Identify, clear, and establish an area for an incident control point.

K-31. Ensure that Soldiers remain vigilant in providing protection and security against command-detonated, person-borne, and vehicle-borne IEDs while scanning for other enemy activity, such as a triggerman, cameraman, or sniper from their cordoned positions. Soldiers must follow existing rules-of-engagement procedures to question, search, and detain suspects.

Control

K-32. Control access to the area inside the cordon. Allow only first responders to breach the cordon through the incident control point. Civilian traffic should be diverted away from the cordon. Maintain (from a safe distance) visual/line-of-sight (binoculars and scopes) observation of the suspected IED to ensure that no tampering occurs.

K-33. Immediately report personnel who are seen approaching the IED. The cordon must be secure, preventing anyone from entering the danger area until the explosive ordnance clearance agent or explosive ordnance disposal team has given the all-clear signal.

ENGINEER

K-34. Engineers conduct countermine operations, mine detection operations, enemy minefield reconnaissance, combined arms breaching, and enemy mine operations prevention. The primary focus is on conducting route decontamination for lines of communication and area clearance to prepare field sites for coalition forces. However, engineers can be called on to reduce or clear nonmine UXO hazards on a limited basis and under the direct technical guidance of explosive ordnance disposal forces.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CLEARANCE AGENT

K-35. Explosive ordnance clearing agent personnel are combat engineers who are trained to perform limited battlefield disposal of UXO during route reconnaissance, route clearance operations, or other engineer missions. If the UXO is outside the scope of operations for the explosive ordnance clearance agent, explosive ordnance disposal personnel must be called. Explosive ordnance clearance agent personnel can assist explosive ordnance disposal personnel in disposing of other explosive hazards as requested. Properly trained and certified explosive ordnance clearance agent personnel capabilities include—

- UXO reconnaissance.
- UXO identification.
- UXO area marking.
- Protective works.
- UXO disposal.
- IED disposal.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

K-36. The mission of explosive ordnance disposal is to eliminate or reduce CBRN hazards and protect the commander's combat power. Explosive ordnance disposal personnel work in conjunction with engineer, military intelligence, and other staffs to support the operation plan of the maneuver leader. Explosive ordnance disposal teams can respond in a timely manner with dedicated security provided by the supported unit.

K-37. Units can expedite the response of explosive ordnance disposal teams by reporting accurate information on the nine-line explosive hazard spot report. (See appendix F for the explosive hazard spot report format.) The unit also populates the Force XXI Battle Command–Brigade and Below, Blue Force Tracker, or an equivalent system that is used with the location of the explosive hazard and the blocked locations along the route. This allows military units and convoys to avoid the hazard.

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE DEVICE CAPABILITIES

K-38. Current electronic countermeasure devices include a variety of electronic warfare components. There are various countermeasure devices being used in the current operational environment. Refer to specific theaters and AOs to determine which countermeasures are available.

K-39. Counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare is a radio frequency jammer that is located on unit vehicles (tracked or wheeled) or man-pack radios. It preempts the detonation of a remote-controlled IED by disrupting the radio signal of the initiating device. For a counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare system to be effective, it must be programmed to jam the correct remote-controlled IED initiator signal frequency and be within range of the remote-controlled IED and receiver. This will prevent the initiating radio frequency signal from reaching the receiver of the explosive device. Counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare is a protection family of systems that is referred to as the Warlock family of systems.

K-40. The Warlock family of systems is designed to eliminate or reduce the effects of IEDs. These systems are employed in the forward combat areas during offensive and defensive military operations in urban terrain, sustainment area logistics support, containment area security, and peacekeeping operations. Besides the Warlock family of systems, there are several other counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare systems that are used by other DOD services to reduce the effects of remote-controlled IEDs. Examples of these systems include, but are not limited to, the Chameleon, Hunter, and Symphony systems.

K-41. Soldiers should access the [Army Reprogramming Analysis Team Web site](#) for threat data reports and information on the Warlock family of systems.

Appendix L

Detention Operations Forms

The accountability for detainees, detainee property, and items with evidentiary or intelligence value begins at the point of capture—the most vulnerable point at which Soldiers process detainees. This appendix focuses on the most commonly used forms that are completed at the point of capture or shortly thereafter: DA Form 2823, DA Form 4137, DD Form 2708, and DD Form 2745. Military police who accept or transfer control of detainees or detainee property during detention operations must ensure that accountability is maintained throughout custodial activities. This appendix also includes a list of numerous other forms that are associated with detention operations.

DD FORM 2745

L-1. The capturing unit should complete a DD Form 2745 for each detained person at the earliest opportunity after capture—preferably, immediately after searching a detainee. The DD Form 2745 number is used to link the detainee to confiscated property and other records (property accountability forms, medical treatment records, interrogation data, custody transfer records). It is the only number that is used to account for a detainee and his property until an internment serial number is assigned at a theater detention facility. (When assigning the internment serial number, enter the DD form 2745 capture tag number into the detainee reporting system to establish a cross reference.)

L-2. Figure L-1, page L-2, shows a sample DD Form 2745, which is composed of three parts (A, B, and C). The form is constructed of a durable, waterproof, tear-resistant material with reinforced eyelets at the top of Parts A and C. Attach Part A to the detainee's clothing with wire, string, or another type of durable material. Attach Part C to any confiscated property. The capturing unit maintains Part B in its records.

L-3. DD Form 2745 should include, at a minimum, the date and time of capture, the capturing unit, the grid coordinates that identify the point of capture, and the circumstances of the capture. Military police at a DCP must ensure that each DD Form 2745 contains the minimum required information and that it is attached to the correct detainee. Capturing units may need to be directed to complete DD Form 2745 before a detainee is accepted into the DCP. As a last resort, military police may also need to complete and attach a DD Form 2745 to any detainee who arrives without one.

L-4. Any weapons, special equipment, and military documents that are removed from the detainee should also be annotated on DD Form 2745 at the point of capture. Additional identifying information, such as the name and date of birth of the detainee, should be added as it is known and as time permits. Locally approved and produced forms may be used to supplement, but not to replace, DD Form 2745.

L-5. Proper and accurate documentation of the capture circumstances (DD Form 2745 and, if desired, a locally produced and approved supplemental form) provides information to support continued assessments on whether to detain or release the detainee, to make determinations on the detainee's status (civilian internee, retained person, or enemy combatant), to prepare for criminal proceedings, and to transfer custody of the detainee. Proper documentation also provides an official historic record of the events that surround the capture of a detainee, which may prove invaluable to counter future false claims (such as the loss of personal property).

ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW) CAPTURE TAG (PART A) <i>For use of this form, see AR 190-8. The proponent agency is DCSOPS.</i> Attach this part of tag to EPW. (Do not remove from EPW.) 1. Search - For weapons, military documents, or special equipment. 2. Silence - Prohibit talking among EPWs for ease of control. 3. Segregate - By rank, sex, and nationality. 4. Safeguard - To prevent harm or escape. 5. Speed - Evacuate from the combat zone. 6. Tag - Prisoners and document or special equipment. DD FORM 2745, (BACK), MAY 96	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 23APR2015</td> <td style="width: 50%;">2. SERIAL NO. 0090829 A</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">2. NAME Acad Khan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. RANK Captain</td> <td>6. TELEPHONE NO. 123-46-8789</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. UNIT OF EPW 17th Regiment</td> <td>8. CAPTURING UNIT 705th MP CO Camp Arfan, Kuwait</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">9. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE (Grid coordinates) 231420APR14 (Q67888 81911)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE Cordon and Search</td> <td>11. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF EPW No Injuries</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">12. WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS One AK-47</td> </tr> </table> DD FORM 2745, MAY 96 REPLACES DA FORM 5976, JAN 91, USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED	1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 23APR2015	2. SERIAL NO. 0090829 A	2. NAME Acad Khan		5. RANK Captain	6. TELEPHONE NO. 123-46-8789	7. UNIT OF EPW 17th Regiment	8. CAPTURING UNIT 705th MP CO Camp Arfan, Kuwait	9. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE (Grid coordinates) 231420APR14 (Q67888 81911)		10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE Cordon and Search	11. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF EPW No Injuries	12. WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS One AK-47	
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UNIT RECORD CARD (PART B) Forward to Unit. <i>(Capturing unit retains for records.)</i> Use string, wire, or other durable material to attach the appropriate section of this form to the EPW's equipment or property. DD FORM 2745, (BACK), MAY 96	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 23APR2015</td> <td style="width: 50%;">2. SERIAL NO. 0090829 B</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">2. NAME Acad Khan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. RANK Captain</td> <td>6. TELEPHONE NO. 123-46-8789</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. UNIT OF EPW 17th Regiment</td> <td>8. CAPTURING UNIT 705th MP CO Camp Arfan, Kuwait</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">9. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE (Grid coordinates) 231420APR14 (Q67888 81911)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE Cordon and Search</td> <td>11. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF EPW No Injuries</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">12. WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS One AK-47</td> </tr> </table> DD FORM 2745, MAY 96 REPLACES DA FORM 5976, JAN 91, USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED	1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 23APR2015	2. SERIAL NO. 0090829 B	2. NAME Acad Khan		5. RANK Captain	6. TELEPHONE NO. 123-46-8789	7. UNIT OF EPW 17th Regiment	8. CAPTURING UNIT 705th MP CO Camp Arfan, Kuwait	9. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE (Grid coordinates) 231420APR14 (Q67888 81911)		10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE Cordon and Search	11. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF EPW No Injuries	12. WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS One AK-47	
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DOCUMENT/SPECIAL EQUIPMENT WEAPON CARD (PART B) Attach this part of tag of property taken. (Do not remove from property.) As a minimum, the tag must include the following information: Item 1. Date and time of capture (YYYYMMDD) Item 8. Capturing unit. Item 9. Place of capture (grid coordinates). Item 10. Circumstances of capture (how the EPW was captured). DD FORM 2745, (BACK), MAY 96	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 23APR2015</td> <td style="width: 50%;">2. SERIAL NO. 0090829 C</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">2. NAME Acad Khan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. RANK Captain</td> <td>6. TELEPHONE NO. 123-46-8789</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. UNIT OF EPW 17th Regiment</td> <td>8. CAPTURING UNIT 705th MP CO Camp Arfan, Kuwait</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">9. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE (Grid coordinates) 231420APR14 (Q67888 81911)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE Cordon and Search</td> <td>11. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF EPW No Injuries</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">12. WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS One AK-47</td> </tr> </table> DD FORM 2745, MAY 96 REPLACES DA FORM 5976, JAN 91, USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED	1. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE 23APR2015	2. SERIAL NO. 0090829 C	2. NAME Acad Khan		5. RANK Captain	6. TELEPHONE NO. 123-46-8789	7. UNIT OF EPW 17th Regiment	8. CAPTURING UNIT 705th MP CO Camp Arfan, Kuwait	9. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE (Grid coordinates) 231420APR14 (Q67888 81911)		10. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE Cordon and Search	11. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF EPW No Injuries	12. WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS One AK-47	
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Legend:

AR	Army regulation
co	company
DCSOPS	deputy chief of staff, operations
DA	Department of the Army
DD	Department of Defense form
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
MP	military police
No.	number

Figure L-1. Sample DD Form 2745

DA FORM 4137

L-6. DA Form 4137 is used to inventory, transfer, and maintain the property chain of custody. Everything that is confiscated from a detainee (weapons, personal items, items of intelligence or evidentiary value) must be documented on DA Form 4137 and linked to the detainee by annotating the form with the DD Form 2745 number. DA Form 4137 must be completed at the earliest opportunity, preferably at the point of capture. If time or circumstances at the point of capture do not allow for the use of DA Form 4137 to document confiscated items, this form should be completed at the DCP or detainee holding area if the detainee is evacuated directly there. Required information on this form includes—

- National identifying letters of the capturing unit.
- The designation of the capturing unit, to include the branch of service.
- The date-time group of capture.
- The location of capture, to include the eight-digit grid coordinates.
- The unit from which the detainee was captured (enemy or warring faction), to include national identifying letters as appropriate.
- A summary of capture circumstances.
- Associated captured persons, if applicable.

L-7. DA Form 4137 will accompany the detainee and his property from the point of capture onward. The form is composed of three sections. The first section contains the administrative or header information that begins with the military police report/USACIDC sequence number (the same number that is recorded on the detainee capture tag). The second section is a description of the articles that were confiscated. The third section documents the chain of custody and is used to record the transfer of items from the owner or individual from whom items are obtained to the person receiving custody of the items.

Note. Any material or method may be used to bundle property as long as it is secure, will protect the property, and can be marked so that it can be tracked with the detainee DD Form 2745 number.

DA FORM 2823

L-8. DA Form 2823 is recommended for recording capture circumstances at the point of capture. Other means (such as notepaper) may be used if time or circumstances do not permit completion of DA Form 2823 at the point of capture. Military police must make a statement on DA Form 2823 if a detainee arrives at a DCP without an attached DD Form 2745.

DD FORM 2708

L-9. Use DD Form 2708 when transferring custody of the detainee to the DCP, detainee holding area, or other individual or organization. Units that are designated to receive detainees at the DCP will prepare a DD Form 2708 (with an attached list that contains each detainee name) if one does not accompany the detainee and will provide a copy of the form to the escort.

L-10. Unless the detainee has already received an internment serial number, use the assigned capture tag serial number from DD Form 2745 to document the custody transfer. Put the serial number in Block 5. Return a copy of this receipt to the unit for its records.

L-11. The forms in table L-1, page L-4, also support detention operations.

Table L-1. Detention operations forms

Number	Title	Use
DA Form 1129-R	<i>Record of Prisoners' Personal Deposit Fund</i>	To record the balance of a prisoner's personal deposit fund
DA Form 1134-R	<i>Request for Withdrawal of Personal Property</i>	To request the withdrawal of personal property
DA Form 1135-R	<i>Personal Property Permit</i>	To show that prisoners are authorized to have documented personal property in their cells
DA Form 2662-R	<i>EPW Identity Card</i>	To be issued to each detainee and carried at all times by that detainee
DA Form 2663-R	<i>Fingerprint Card</i>	To collect fingerprints
DA Form 2664-R	<i>Weight Register</i>	To monitor the weight of each detainee
DA Form 2665-R	<i>Capture Card for Prisoner of War</i>	To be completed by each detainee upon capture and each time that a detainee's address changes, such as when a detainee is moved to the hospital
DA Form 2666-R	<i>Prisoner of War Notification of Address/Prisoner of War Mail</i>	For detainees to notify their families of their present address (See AR 190-8)
DA Form 2667-R	<i>Prisoner of War Mail (Letter)</i>	For detainees to send letters to their families
DA Form 2668	<i>Prisoner of War Mail (Post Card)</i>	For detainees to send post cards to their families
DA Form 2669	<i>Certificate of Death</i>	To verify the date, place, and cause of a detainee's death and provide brief details of death/burial and the status of the detainee's personal effects
DA Form 2670-R	<i>Mixed Medical Commission Certificate for EPW</i>	To be used by the Mixed Medical Commission to certify whether a detainee is eligible or ineligible for repatriation or hospitalization
DA Form 2671-R	<i>Certificate for Direct Repatriation for EPW</i>	To authorize direct repatriation and to note who authorized the action
DA Form 2672-R	<i>Classification Questionnaire for Officer Retained Personnel</i>	To document personal and/or professional information on officer detainees for classification purposes
DA Form 2673-R	<i>Classification Questionnaire for Enlisted Retained Personnel</i>	To document personal and/or professional information on enlisted detainees for classification purposes

Table L-1. Detention operations forms (continued)

<i>Number</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Use</i>
DA Form 2677-R	<i>Civilian Internee Identify Card</i>	To be issued to each CI and carried at all times by that CI
DA Form 2679-R	<i>Civilian Internee Letter</i>	To be used by CIs to send letters to their families
DA Form 2823	<i>Sworn Statement</i>	To record capture information in support of I/R operations
DA Form 3078	<i>Personal Clothing Request</i>	To request the issue of personal clothing (See AR 700-84)
DA Form 4137	<i>Evidence/Property Custody Document</i>	For use in an I/R facility to retain, account for, and track the custody of the personal property of I/R populations (See AR 190-45 and AR 195-5)
DA Form 4237-R	<i>Detainee Personnel Record</i>	To record personal information pertaining to a detainee (maintained by the unit that has custody of the detainee)
DA Form 5162-R	<i>Routine Food Establishment Inspection Report</i>	To rate and record the results of routine inspections on food service establishments
DA Form 5456	<i>Water Point Inspection</i>	To record the results of inspections on water points and related equipment
DA Form 5457	<i>Potable Water Container Inspection</i>	To record the results of inspections on water trailers and water tank trucks
DA Form 5458	<i>Shower/Decontamination Point Inspection</i>	To record the results of inspections on shower/decontamination points, including water and associated equipment conditions
DA Form 5513	<i>Key Control Register and Inventory</i>	To record the accountability of key control
DD Form 499	<i>Prisoner's Mail and Correspondence Record</i>	To record incoming and outgoing mail activity
DD Form 503	<i>Health Assessment Certificate for Segregation</i>	To be used by a medical examiner to show the mental and physical status of U.S. military prisoners and their communicable disease status

Table L-1. Detention operations forms (continued)

<i>Number</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Use</i>
DD Form 1131	<i>Cash Collection Voucher</i>	To impound U.S. currency and collect it; and to exchange foreign currency to U.S. currency
DD Form 2708	<i>Receipt for Pre-Trial/Post Trial Prisoner or Detained</i>	As a receipt for a detainee by a given individual and/or organization, such as the SJA
DD Form 2713	<i>Prisoner Observation Report</i>	To report an observation of a prisoner
DD Form 2745	<i>Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag</i>	To record information on captured detainees
Legend: AR Army regulation CI civilian internee DA Department of the Army DD Department of Defense form EPW Enemy Prisoner of War I/R internment/resettlement SJA Staff Judge Advocate U.S. United States		

Appendix M

Fires

The complex and unpredictable nature of nonlinear battlefield operations makes indirect and joint fire support critical assets to troops on the ground. Indirect fire and joint fire allow leaders of maneuver elements to apply rapid, precision fire to enemy forces. Fire can surprise the enemy and protect the flanks of maneuver elements. In some cases, it is the most effective method for small elements to seize the tactical advantage during engagements with enemy forces. This appendix provides a summary that outlines the procedures for requesting CAS without the support of a joint terminal attack controller, CFF, or close combat attack.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

M-1. *Close air support* is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 3-0). Operations are conducted at any location and at any time that friendly elements are in close proximity to enemy forces.

M-2. There are two types of CAS requests: preplanned and immediate:

- **Preplanned.** Preplanned requests are CAS requirements that are scheduled during mission planning and are included in the air tasking order.
- **Immediate.** Immediate requests are the result of unforeseen situations that require CAS support, such as friendly ground forces that receive effective enemy fire.

M-3. Ideally, CAS is the result of detailed planning, coordination, and training. However, in situations that require immediate fire support, an accurate, detailed, and timely nine-line CAS briefing increases the probability of effective and safe CAS execution. (See JP 3-09.3 for details regarding CAS employment.)

Note. Because immediate CAS requests are not scheduled and included in the air tasking order, tailored ordnance, sensors, or platforms may not be available for the specified target.

M-4. The nine-line CAS briefing format follows the numbered sequence 1 through 9. Each element must be passed in numerical order. Each line is understood, and line numbers do not need to be stated. They are included below only for ease of reference:

- **Line 1: Initial point/battle point.** The initial point is the starting point for the run-in to the target. For rotary-wing aircraft, the battle point is where attacks on the target are commenced. Initial points/battle points are selected based on enemy capabilities, target orientation, friendly location, weather, aircraft capabilities, and fire support coordination requirements. Initial points are normally located 5 to 15 miles (8.05 to 24.14 kilometers) from the target for fixed-wing aircraft, and battle points are located 1 to 5 kilometers (0.62 to 3.11 miles) for rotary-wing aircraft. High-altitude aircraft may require initial points in excess of 20 nautical miles (32.19 kilometers) from the target.
- **Line 2: Heading and offset.** The heading is given in degrees that are magnetic from the initial point to the target or from the center of the battle point to the target. The offset direction tells the aircrew on which side of the initial point-to-target line they can maneuver for the attack. An offset direction is used to ease fire support coordination, align the aircraft for the attack or egress, or keep aircrews away from known threats.

- **Line 3: Distance.** The distance is given from the initial point/battle point to the target. For fixed-wing aircraft, the distance is given in nautical miles and must be accurate to a tenth of a nautical mile. For attack helicopters, the distance is given in meters from the center of the battle point and is accurate to the nearest 100 meters (109.36 yards).
- **Line 4: Target elevation.** The target elevation is given in feet above mean sea level. The fire direction center (FDC) needs target elevation for cuing sensors and for weapon and target solutions for CAS platforms that require it. Target elevation is a mandatory read-back line.
- **Line 5: Target description.** The aircrew needs a target description that is accurate, concise, and specific enough to quickly identify the target. The target description is a mandatory read-back line.
- **Line 6: Target location.** The target location is given in one of several ways, such as grid coordinates, latitude and longitude, relative to a navigational aid, or as a visual description from an obvious reference point. If using grid coordinates, include the 100,000-meter grid identification. For an area target, give the location of the target center or the location of the greatest concentration. For a linear target, give the location of the intended end impact point, the orientation, and the distance to each end in the remarks section of the brief. For a visual description from a reference point, the controller establishes the visual point and the aircrew verifies the location before the nine-line briefing or during the situation update. The target location is a mandatory read-back line.
- **Line 7: Mark type.** The mark type identifies the mark technique used, such as obscurant, laser, or infrared. (If using a laser, also transmit the code to be used.)
- **Line 8: Friendlies.** The distance of the closest friendlies from the target is given in meters and is a cardinal/subcardinal heading from the target (N, S, E, W, NE, NW, SE, SW).
- **Line 9: Egress.** These are the instructions that the aircrews use to exit the target area. Egress instructions are given as a cardinal direction or by using control points.

M-5. Use the remarks/restrictions section for supplemental data. Include the following information if applicable:

- Laser-to-target lines (in degrees magnetic).
- The desired type and number of ordnance or weapon effects.
- The threat, location, and type of suppression.
- Active gun-target lines.
- Aviation hazards.

M-6. The following information is always a restriction and is included in the remarks/restrictions section if applicable. Additional restrictions are at the discretion of the joint terminal attack controller or mission leader on the ground. The following passed restrictions are read back:

- Final attack heading.
- Airspace coordination area.
- Danger close. (When using danger close, the ground commander must approve the use of the ordnance by announcing his initials in the restrictions line.)
- Time on target/time to target.

M-7. Units that have a reasonable expectation to request CAS to accomplish the assigned mission need to have a qualified joint terminal attack controller. A joint terminal attack controller is trained and certified to request CAS from a forward position, directing the action of engaged combat aircraft. In certain circumstances, the leader on the ground may require CAS when a joint terminal attack controller is not available but detailed integration with friendly force fire and movement is still needed. In these situations, CAS aircrews assist the unit to the greatest extent possible to execute effective fire support.

M-8. Ground personnel without a joint terminal attack controller who require CAS must immediately identify themselves to strike aircraft as nonjoint terminal attack controller-qualified by stating, “I am not a joint terminal attack controller.” during the initiation of the CAS request. At a minimum, ground personnel must transmit—

- Line 4 (target elevation).
- Line 5 (target description).
- Line 6 (target location).
- Line 8 (location of friendlies).
- Restrictions (if applicable).

Note. Due to the complexity of CAS, leaders must consider the increased risk of fratricide when using personnel who are not joint terminal attack controller-qualified.

CALL FOR FIRE

M-9. Military police leaders must know how to conduct a CFF to obtain indirect fire support from mortars, artillery, and CAS. Military police typically use indirect fire in support of military police during offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

M-10. A CFF is a concise fire support request message that is prepared by the observer and transmitted to the FDC. It contains the information that is needed by the FDC to determine the method of target attack. The message must be sent quickly but must also be clear enough to be understood, recorded, and read back, without error, by the FDC recorder. The standard CFF consists of six elements, composed of required and optional information, sent in three transmissions. There is a break after each transmission, during which the FDC reads back the data for confirmation. Table M-1 outlines the six elements in transmission sequence.

Table M-1. Required and optional elements of CFF transmissions

<i>Transmission #</i>	<i>Required Element</i>	<i>Optional Element</i>
1	Observer identification Warning order	None
2	Target location	None
3	Target description	Method of engagement Method of fire and control

OBSERVER IDENTIFICATION (TRANSMISSION 1)

M-11. The first element of the CFF is observer identification, which tells the FDC who is calling and clears the net for the duration of the fire mission.

WARNING ORDER (TRANSMISSION 1)

M-12. The warning order tells the FDC the type of mission. Table M-2 identifies the types of CFF missions.

Table M-2. Types of CFF missions

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Description</i>
Adjust fire	- Use this command when the target location is uncertain. Calling an adjust fire mission means that the observer knows adjustments will be made before requesting a subsequent FFE. - Observer announces, "Adjust fire."
FFE	- Use this command when the observer is certain that the target location is accurate. The accuracy of FFE depends on the accuracy of the target location. The intent of an FFE request is to ensure that the first round has the desired effect on the target so that little or no adjustment is required. - Observer announces, "Fire for effect."
Suppression	- Use this command to quickly obtain fire on the preplanned targets that are known by the FDC. Suppression enables friendly forces to close with and destroy the enemy with direct fire. - Observer announces, "Suppress."
Immediate suppression	- Use this command to signify to the FDC that the element is already being engaged by the enemy. To mitigate fratricide, precise target identification is required. - Observer announces, "Immediate suppression."
Legend: CFF call for fire FDC fire direction center FFE fire for effect	

TARGET LOCATION (TRANSMISSION 2)

M-13. This element enables the FDC to plot the location of the target to determine firing data. When locating a target for engagement, the observer must determine which target location method to use (grid, polar, or shift from a known point). Table M-3 outlines the target location methods.

Table M-3. CFF target location methods

<i>Method</i>	<i>Description</i>
Grid	- The observer locates the target to an accuracy of at least 100 meters (109.36 yards) (six-digit grid). During the CFF request, the observer provides the FDC with an enemy target location as a two-character, six-digit grid coordinate. Figure M-2 provides an example of a CFF transmission that requests a grid fire mission. - The observer announces, "Grid," followed by a two-character, six-digit coordinate.
Legend: CFF call for fire FDC fire direction center	

Table M-3. CFF target location methods (continued)

<i>Method</i>	<i>Description</i>
Polar	- The observer must make his location known to the FDC before initiating the CFF. The observer sends direction, distance, and an up or down measurement (if significant) from his location to the enemy target. The up or down correction is an estimated vertical shift from the observer's location to the target; it is considered significant if it is greater than or equal to 35 meters (38.28 yards). If the target is higher, it is an up correction. If the target is lower, it is a down correction. Figure M-3 provides an example of a CFF transmission that requests a polar fire mission. - The observer must notify the FDC immediately if he is using a laser range finder, such as a mini eye-safe laser infrared observation set, to determine range azimuth. - The observer announces, "Polar."
Shift from a known point	- This request is only performed when the observer and the FDC have a common known point and the enemy target is located in relation to that known point or recorded target. The observer sends a target/known point number; a direction; and lateral shift, range shift, and vertical shift corrections. The direction is a grid azimuth in mils from the observer to the target. The lateral shift is how far left or right that the target is from the known point, given in meters. The range shift is how much farther (add) or closer (drop) (to the nearest 100 meters) (109.36 yards) the target is in relation to the known point. The vertical shift is how much the altitude of the target is above (up) or below (down) (to the nearest 5 meters) (5.47 yards) the altitude of the known point, expressed. Figure M-4 provides an example of a CFF transmission that requests a shift from a known point fire mission. - The observer announces, "Shift," followed by the number of the known point.
Legend: CFF call for fire FDC fire direction center	

TARGET DESCRIPTION (TRANSMISSION 3)

M-14. The target description helps the FDC determine the type and amount of ammunition to best defeat the enemy. The description must include the target identification (troops, equipment, supply dump), target action (digging in, occupying an assembly area, moving), number of elements in the target (squad, platoon, six trucks), and degree of target protection (in the open, in foxholes). Linear targets may be described by length, width, and altitude.

METHOD OF ENGAGEMENT (TRANSMISSION 3)

M-15. The observer uses the method of engagement portion of the CFF to specify to the FDC how to attack the enemy target. The method of engagement consists of the type of adjustment, trajectory, danger close, ammunition, and distribution. Table M-4, page M-6, outlines the methods of engagement.

Table M-4. Methods of engagement

<i>Method</i>	<i>Description</i>
Type of adjustment	Two types of adjustment may be employed (unless precision fire is specified, area fire will be used): • Precision. Precision fire is conducted with one weapon on a point target. It is used to obtain registration corrections or to destroy a target. • Area. Area fire is used to attack an area target. Because many area targets are mobile, the adjustment should be as quick as possible (consistent with accuracy) to keep the target from escaping. Select a well-defined point at or near the center of the area to be attacked as an aiming point.
Trajectory	A low-angle trajectory is standard without a request. A high-angle trajectory is at the request of the observer or when it is required due to masking terrain. An example of this terrain would be an enemy position in defilade on the backside of a mountain range. This allows the indirect fire munitions to successfully clear the top of the masking terrain and have a more vertical descent, resulting in the munitions that impact directly on the enemy position.
Danger close	Danger close is included in the method of engagement when the target is within 600 meters (656.17 yards) of friendly troops for mortar and field artillery; 750 meters (820.21 yards) for naval guns 5 inches (12.7 centimeters) and smaller; and 1,000 meters (1093.61 yards) for naval guns larger than 5 inches. The creeping method of adjustment will be used exclusively during danger-close missions. The forward observer makes range changes by creeping the rounds to the target and uses corrections of less than 100 meters (109.36 yards). The observer transmits, "Danger close."
Ammunition	Ammunition is the type of projectile, the type of fuse action, and the volume of fire desired in the FFE phase that is stated in rounds per howitzer. The observer can request the type of ammunition, but the FDC makes the final determination based on the Class V unit basic load and target description.
Distribution	The observer can request a specific burst pattern (called a sheaf) in the target area. The observer may also request a sheaf of any length and width. Unless otherwise requested, the battery computer system assumes a circular target with a 100-meter (109.36-yard) radius. The battery computer system determines individual weapon aiming points to distribute the bursts for maximum coverage of the target. A converged sheaf places all rounds on a specific point and is used for small, hard targets. An open sheaf separates the bursts by the maximum effective burst width of the shell fired. The observer announces, "Converged sheaf" or "Open sheaf" respectively.
Legend: FDC fire direction center FFE fire for effect	

METHOD OF FIRE AND CONTROL (TRANSMISSION 3)

M-16. The method of fire and control indicates the desired manner of attacking the target, if the observer wants to control the time or delivery of fire or he can observe the target. Table M-5 outlines the different methods of fire and control.

Table M-5. CFF methods of fire and control

<i>Method</i>	<i>Description</i>
Fire when ready	Fire when ready is standard without request and is not announced. The mission will be fired as soon as the data is processed, guns are laid on the target, and munitions are loaded.
At my command	At my command is used when the FDC informs the observer when munitions are set to be fired. The observer announces, "Fire." when he is ready for target engagement. The observer must also consider the time of flight for the munitions to leave the indirect fire system and impact the target. The time of flight data can be requested by the observer. The command remains in effect throughout the mission until the observer cancels the request. The observer announces, "At my command."
Cannot observe	This method indicates that the observer cannot see the target because of vegetation, terrain, weather, or obscurant. The observer has reason to believe that a target exists at the given location and that it is significant enough to justify firing on it without adjustment. The observer announces, "Cannot observe."
Time on target	The observer may tell the FDC when he wants the rounds to impact by requesting a specific time. The observer must ensure that his time and the FDC time are synchronized before the mission. The observer announces, "Time on target (specified time)."
Time to target	Time to target is the elapsed time, in minutes and seconds, when rounds are expected to hit the target. The observer may tell the FDC when he wants the rounds to impact by requesting a time to target. The observer announces, "Time to target (specified numbers) minutes and seconds from now."
Check firing	Check firing is used to cause an immediate halt in firing. Use this command only when necessary (such as for safety reasons) as it may result in cannons being inoperative until rammed/loaded rounds can be fired or cleared from the tubes. The observer announces, "Check firing."
Repeat	Repeat means firing a subsequent round with the last data and adjusting for any change in ammunition if necessary. It can be given during adjustment or FFE missions. Repeat is not sent in the initial CFF. The observer announces, "Repeat."
Request splash	Request splash is used when an observer in a tactical situation has difficulty identifying or observing rounds due to a concealed position or because of other fire missions being conducted in the area. The FDC informs the observer 5 seconds before round impact. The observer announces, "Splash."
Legend: CFF call for fire FDC fire direction center FFE fire for effect	

REFINEMENT AND END OF MISSION

M-17. Table M-6, page M-8, outlines observer actions based on the CFF results. The observer should monitor the results of the CFF and take one of the following actions to complete the mission: refine the data for subsequent CFF, repeat the last CFF, or report the end of mission and continue surveillance.

Table M-6. Refinement and end of mission

<i>CFF Results</i>	<i>Observer Actions</i>
Accurate and sufficient	End mission and surveillance.
Inaccurate and sufficient	Refine and repeat CFF or end mission and surveillance.
Inaccurate and insufficient	Refine and request new CFF or end of mission and surveillance.
Accurate and insufficient	Repeat last CFF.
Legend: CFF call for fire	

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

M-18. The battle damage assessment is a report that describes the outcome of the CFF. The report is forwarded to the FDC and parent unit at the end of the CFF mission. Higher headquarters staff officers use battle damage assessments to update staff estimates and feed the common operational picture. Examples of battle damage assessments are “four tanks destroyed” or “enemy sniper team suppressed.”

SAMPLE MISSIONS

M-19. Figures M-1 through M-3 are sample CFFs and FDC responses for various mission types. (See ATP 3-09.30 for additional information regarding CFF procedures.)

<i>Observer</i>	<i>FDC</i>
Z56, this is Z71, adjust fire, over.	This is Z56, adjust fire, out.
Grid NK180513, over.	Grid NK180513, out.
Stationary infantry platoon in the open, over.	Stationary infantry platoon in the open, out.
Legend: FDC fire direction center	

Figure M-1. Sample adjust fire, grid CFF

<i>Observer</i>	<i>FDC</i>
Z56, this is Z71, fire for effect, polar, over.	This is Z56, fire for effect, polar, out.
Direction 4520, distance 2300, down 35, over.	Direction 4520, distance 2300, down 35, out.
Mobile infantry company in the open, time on target 0950, over.	Mobile infantry company in the open, time on target 0950, out.
Legend: FDC fire direction center	

Figure M-2. Sample fire for effect, polar CFF

<i>Observer</i>	<i>FDC</i>
Z56, this is Z71, adjust fire, shift AA7733, over.	This is Z56, adjust fire, shift AA7733, out.
Direction 5210, left 380, add 400, down 35, over.	Direction 5210, left 380, add 400, down 35, out.
Stationary platoon in the open, danger close, over.	Stationary platoon in the open, danger close, out.
Legend: FDC fire direction center	

Figure M-3. Sample fire, shift from a known point CFF

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK

M-20. A close combat attack is a coordinated attack which is conducted by Army aircraft against targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces. During close combat attack, the attack team engages enemy units with direct fire. Targets may range from tens of meters to a few thousand meters from friendly forces. A close combat attack is not synonymous with CAS. (See ATP 3-09.32 for specific details concerning close combat attack and the tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint fire applications.)

M-21. Military police teams, platoons, or company level elements coordinate and direct close combat attack by using the standard five-line close combat attack brief. The air mission commander or flight lead must have direct communication with the leader of the ground element to provide direct fire support.

M-22. After receiving the close combat attack briefing from ground forces, the attack team conducts combat identification to positively identify the location of friendly and enemy forces before the engagement. The methods for location marking include, but are not limited to—

- Laser handover.
- Tracer fire.
- Marking rounds (flares or mortars).
- Smoke grenades.
- Signal mirrors.
- VS-17 panels.
- Infrared strobe lights.
- Laser target markers.
- Chemical light sticks.

M-23. After the attack team has identified friendly and enemy locations, flight leads formulate an attack plan and brief the supported leader on the ground.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms with Army or joint definitions.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

5 Ss and T	search, silence, segregate, speed, safeguard, and tag
AAR	administrative adjustment report
ADP	Army doctrine publication
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
AT	antiterrorism
ATP	Army techniques publication
attn	attention
ATTP	Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
CAS	close air support
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CFE	call for fire
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
COA	course of action
DA	Department of the Army
DC	District of Columbia
DCP	detainee collection point
DD	Department of Defense form
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
E	east
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
FDC	fire direction center
FM	field manual
HN	host nation
IED	improvised explosive device
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield

JP	joint publication
LE	law enforcement
LP	listening post
MDMP	military decisionmaking process
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MO	Missouri
MOS	military occupational specialty
MSCoE	Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MSHARPP	mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity
MSR	main supply route
MWD	military working dog
N	north
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NE	northeast
NLW	nonlethal weapon
No.	number
NW	northwest
OP	observation post
OPORD	operation order
pam	pamphlet
PIO	police intelligence operations
S	south
SALUTE	standard size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SE	southeast
SL	skill level
SM	Soldier's manual
SMCT	Soldier's manual of common tasks
SOP	standard operating procedure
ST	special text
STP	Soldier training publication
SW	southwest
TAMMS	The Army Maintenance Management System
TC	training circular
TG	trainer's guide
TM	technical manual
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
U.S.	United States
USACIDC	United States Army Criminal Investigation Command

USC	United States Code
UXO	unexploded ordnance
W	west

SECTION II – TERMS

None.

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References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. Most Army publications are available online at <www.apd.army.mil>. Most joint publications are available online at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.

ADRP 1-02. *Terms and Military Symbols*. 2 February 2015.

JP 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

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11 August 2015

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gerald B. O'Keefe". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Gerald" being the most prominent.

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1520102

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